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WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME I MAY, 1962 NUMBER 1

COMMUNISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Russia Since 1945
By C. Jay Smith 3
University of Georgia

What is Communism?
By George S. Parthemos 18
University of Georgia

Latin America, Communism and the Changing World.
By Alfred B. Thomas 31
University of Alabama

Communism and the Emerging States of Southeast Asia and Africa.
By Thomas J. Bellows 42
West Georgia College

FORWARD

This publication is an outgrowth of a series of lectures held on the West Georgia College campus during February, 1962, under the joint sponsorship of the Division of Social Sciences and the Department of Adult Education. Designed to acquaint students and interested adults with various aspects of World Communism, the lectures were delivered to the West Georgia College student body at daytime meetings and to adult groups in the evening as part of the College in the Country program of the Department of Adult Education.

The two sponsoring organizations are especially indebted to Professors Eugene R. Huck, W. Glenn Moore, and Charles A. Scudder of the Division of Social Sciences, who made arrangements with the speakers; to President James E. Boyd and the Board of Regents, who gave their support and made money available for the lectures and for this project; and to Mrs. Bernice T. Ozburn and Mrs. Eloise Merrell for their untiring secretarial assistance.

The lectures are published with the intention of making available to a wider public the stimulating ideas of the four outstanding scholars who participated in the series.

John M. Martin, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences

J. Carson Pritchard, Director
Department of Adult Education

RUSSIA SINCE 1945

By C. JAY SMITH*

The topic which has been selected for my talk today is obviously a broad one; hence it is perhaps appropriate that I begin by mentioning some of the things I will *not* attempt to discuss. Later this week you will hear a speech by my distinguished colleague at the University of Georgia, Professor George Parthemos of the Political Science Department, on the subject of Communism as an ideology. I do not propose, therefore, to deal today in any way with abstract ideas and theories, though I can assure you that I do not by any means discount their importance. However, my own field is History, and I must confess at the outset that I am an unrepentant follower of the school of German 19th century historiography which believed, in the words of von Treitschke, that history ought to be written "*wie es eigentlich gewesen* (as it actually happened)." This does not mean, I take it, that the historian should concern himself solely with what are hopefully called "facts" or exclude from his writing interpretations and moral judgments. It does mean, I think, that he is more concerned with what has been, and what is, than with what ought to have been, and what ought to be.

The Soviet Russia that we have known since 1945 is a fact, not a theory. The Soviet Russian satellite empire in eastern Europe is a fact, as is the existence of Communist China, Communist North Korea, Communist North Viet Nam, and Communist Cuba. Other not too pleasant facts with which we have had to deal since 1945 have been: (1) the great strength of Communism in France, Italy, and Greece down to around 1950; (2) the overwhelming Soviet military might in conventional armed forces down to around the same year; (3) the difficulties encountered by our traditional West European allies as their colonial empires in Asia and Africa have disintegrated; (4) the apparent attraction of some of the new nations of Asia and Africa towards the Communist bloc; (5) the appearance of this same phenomenon in Latin America as far back as the early 1950's; and (6) the apparently spectacular advances of Soviet Russia in science, technology, and economic development after 1953, and especially after 1957.

All these are facts. So also are certain other items which we are often all too prone to overlook. Our own country has not exactly stood still since 1945. To those to whom the Great Depression of the early

*Dr. Smith is Professor of History at the University of Georgia.

1930's and the isolationism of the same decade is still a vivid memory, World War II seems to have brought many changes for the better. Despite some serious internal difficulties, we have nevertheless managed to stand together to meet the challenge of the Cold War. Moreover, we should not forget that our friends and allies in Western Europe have also met it, and in a fashion few would have thought possible in 1939. The economy of that part of the world rivals our own, and the old nationalistic hatreds are dead or dying. Not all the news from the ex-colonial world has been bad, and Cuba, of all places, represents the only significant addition to the Communist bloc since 1954.

Thus, though I propose to deal with facts today, I am by no means suggesting that all of them are gloomy. Ever the historian, I propose to look at both sides of the coin.

In the time alloted to me it will be possible to examine three areas of contemporary Soviet Russian affairs—the economic system, the social system, and the educational-scientific-technological system. Though I will speak largely of the contemporary scene, I will feel free to roam widely on occasion rather far back into the past—back into pre-1917 Tsarist Russia, and back into the more recent Soviet Russia of 1917-45. I make no apologies for doing so. I happen to believe that the contemporary scene can only be understood in terms of the past, and that if we are to have any success at all in reading the future, however dimly, we must widen our perspective as much as time allows. I would suggest that one of the reasons why so many Americans are so constantly surprised by Soviet Russia is not that they don't know enough about Communism, but that they don't know enough about Russia, or for that matter, about any country except their own and, possibly Great Britain.

I.

Quite clearly, most Americans have always viewed the Soviet Russian economic system with suspicion, and not a little hatred, and more recently, with fear and dread. Back in the 1930's, the enemies of Roosevelt's New Deal in this country coined a new expression which no one before had ever thought of applying to our own economic system, *i.e.,* "free enterprise." It is still for many people a convenient tag to describe our system, but I see more signs that the expression "democratic capitalism" may take its place. Actually, before 1930, the term "capitalism" was not much used in this country, the term "business" being commonly employed instead. From about the 1880's on-

ward, the terms "socialism" and "communism" were occasionally used in this country, usually as synonyms for "anarchism." During and after World War I such terms as "Reds" and "Pinks" were also commonly employed, invariably, of course, to refer to people or programs which were strongly disliked.

Let me suggest, however, that we will not get very far towards understanding the Soviet Russian economy if we confine ourselves to an effort to define those vague and nebulous terms.

I believe we shall have a much more fruitful discussion of the Soviet Russian economic system if we focus our attention on such terms as "production," "distribution," "marketing," "investment," "interest," "finance," etc., rather than on such emotion-laden terms as "capitalism," "free enterprise," "socialism," "communism," etc. In so focusing, I think it important to say that my own understanding of man's history is that if it is not wholly to be undertood by reference to his economic life—if man has never really lived by bread alone—it is nevertheless true that man's political, social, cultural, and spiritual life has been helplessly intertwined with his economic life. This being the case, it is really foolish to try to explain the economy of any group of people at any given moment in history without recognizing that the economy does not operate in a vacuum. What is usually called "free enterprise" in this country has worked remarkably well in America, and is likely to do so in the future, but I would suggest that this is as much the result of our political, social, cultural, and spiritual life as it is the result of the inherent virtues of "free enterprise."

In the history of Russia, however—a history which stretches back over 1,000 years in time—the political, social, cultural, and spiritual milieu in which the economy has operated has been vastly different from ours. Just over a hundred years ago, around 90% of the people were peasant serfs, belonging either to the members of a privileged land-owning nobility, or to the state. The state was ruled by an absolute monarch who, with the aid of his bureaucracy, his army, and his police, dominated all elements of society, including the relatively small middle class. The economy was largely agricultural, though an effort had been made to keep pace with Western Europe in trade, industry, and communications. However, perhaps the most significant fact about most economic activities of the time which went beyond the bare subsistence level was the very large amount of government intervention. In Russia, as in other countries with this type of government and society, the state, and not the people, made all the really important economic decisions.

The main aim of the Russian state was to preserve and strengthen its absolute power over its subjects at home, and to pursue a policy of power and prestige in its relations with other states. If it did anything to promote the welfare and happiness of its subjects, it did so only as a means of pursuing more effectively its major objectives. The principal aim of most of the landed nobility was to preserve its privileged social position, though some members of the nobility joined some members of the middle class in the various revolutionary movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Though Russia was a country with vast natural resources, these were tapped only insofar as this was necessary for the government and the nobility to pursue their aims, with just enough left over to gain essential foreign exchange for the purchase of imports and to permit the masses to enjoy a bare subsistence existence. Not until the last generation of the old regime did the importation of significant amounts of foreign capital permit attention to be focused on production of goods and services as an end in itself. Not until two or three decades before the great Revolution of 1917 was much attention focused upon the accumulation and investment of domestic capital, and upon the mechanisms of modern high finance. To the very last, the government found it necessary almost to force its subjects into creating a true capitalist economy, and finally the effort to do this, and at the same time pursue its other objectives, became too much for it. In forcing the creation of a modern industrial society, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, since an industrial working class is an essential component of a modern economy. The old regime could not cope with this new problem and simultaneously maintain its international position. In 1917 it gave way to the revolutionaries.

Most Russian revolutionaries of the 19th century had been agrarian socialists. In economic matters, they came nowhere near understanding the dominant currents of the 19th century. This is the basic reason why they were finally beaten by the Marxist Bolsheviks in the Civil War of 1917-21. However, the Bolsheviks, including their leader, Lenin, also knew very little about economics; what they did know—the economics of Karl Marx—had been outdated by at least a generation in 1917. The real trouble with Marx, Lenin, and other socialists was over-concentration on the problem of distribution. For a brief period during the first stage of the Communist regime, it was assumed that the main objective was to equalize consumption by regulating the distribution of goods and services—or at least to equalize consumption for supporters of the regime and to deny consumption

completely to its enemies. Such matters as production, capital accumulation, and capital investment were assumed to be matters which took care of themselves automatically. After three years, industrial production had fallen off 90%, and agricultural production 50%.

In my view, the Communist rulers of Russia have never gotten over the state of shock with which they contemplated the wreckage of their country's economy in 1920-21. Since that time, they have made production their god, with capital accumulation and capital investment only slightly lesser dieties, at least after 1928. In the mid-1930's, they also discovered the idea of inequality of distribution as a motive force behind production.

As a consequence, many of the arguments which go on in this country about the relative merits of our economic system and that of the Soviets are simply pointless, for the reason that they are based on false assumptions as to the direction in which the Soviet economy has been moving. By this I mean that the many people who accuse all or nearly all American governments since 1933 of taking us in the direction of the Soviet economic system evidently do not understand that the Soviet rulers have been striving desperately to move their own system in the direction of the American economy of the 1920's.

What have been the results of the introduction of what may be called state capitalism in Soviet Russia since 1921? The period from 1921 to 1928 was one in which economy moved back to about 1913 levels, with the small surplus of goods and services devoted largely to repairing the devastation of seven years of war and revolution. From 1928 to 1933, living standards were drastically lowered, through the manipulation of wages and prices, in order to invest the surplus capital thus made available in heavy industrial enterprises. Between 1933 and 1939, living standards were allowed to climb back up to approximately 1928 levels, but they were lowered again—and drastically—during World War II. Up until 1951, they had not risen past 1938 levels, in spite of the plunder of the satellite states. However, by that date, the damage inflicted by World War II had been repaired, and the war-making potential created by the forced industrialization of the 1930's was as great as it had ever been.

The chief Soviet economic problems in the 1950's were the following. Despite all that has been written about collective farms and machine tractor stations, agriculture remains the No. 1 economic problem. The problem, moreover, has two aspects: (1) too many people are still on the farm; and (2) they do not produce enough food. Time will not permit that I discuss all the different expedients

which have been tried to solve both these problems. The fact is, however, that Soviet agriculture is somewhere in between that in advanced industrial nations and that in backward ex-colonial nations.

Still another major Soviet economic problem is that of finding the funds to support an ambitious foreign policy, including control of the satellites, a threatening attitude towards Western Europe, economic support of the Asian Communist states, and foreign aid programs in the so-called uncommitted nations. So long as the grim figure of Stalin was on the scene, promises of the improvement of living standards at home could merely remain promises. However, down to at least 1957, there were grave disputes among the topmost figures in the Soviet governing elite, and it is by no means certain that Khrushchev is now, after five years, as firmly entrenched in 1962 as Stalin was in 1952.

What is certain is that there is among the Soviet people today a clamor for more and better consumer goods, and that the Soviet rulers, assuming that they have any serious intention of trying to satisfy this demand, are unable to do so except at what apparently seems a snail's pace to their subjects.

Even the official spokesmen of the Soviet regime do not dispute the existence of low living standards for the great masses of their people. They claim, to be sure, that Soviet Russia will reach American living standards by 1970 (a claim, incidentally, which assumes that our standards will not be raised for the next eight years), and that by 1980, "true communism," whatever that may mean, will be attained. As evidence to support these claims, they cite the fact that their "economic growth rate" exceeds our own. One statistic frequently mentioned is that in 1960, Soviet steel production nearly equalled ours. A great deal is also said about the advantages of having an economic plan.

Now, I am sure that most economists would agree that the term "economic growth rate" is a highly relative one. So far as I can see, the yardsticks by which our growth rate and that of the Soviets are usually measured relate largely to the production of such items as steel, coal, oil, and hydroelectric power. Yet we are told constantly that we stand on the threshold of a new technological age when the yardsticks by which economic growth are measured will be quite different from those in use today. Granted the necessity for bold and imaginative efforts to push this country forward towards the economic horizons of the 21st century, can we assume that in 1970 statistics on steel production will be as significant as they are today?

As for planning, it seems to me that the whole argument against

us presupposes that there has never been any economic planning under the "free enterprise" system; it also presupposes that Soviet economic progress has in fact proceeded according to a fixed plan. I suggest to you today that both these presuppositions are preposterous. Is anyone in this country really prepared to believe that any large industrial or commercial enterprise in this country was ever successfully undertaken without the most careful advance planning, including especially calculations of profit, after the initial investment, interest charges, and overhead expenses had been paid off? And what, in the final analysis, assuming the existence of competition, is the final determinant of profit? Is it not in fact the desires of the consumer? I realize, to be sure, that some enterprises must by their very nature be monopolistic. It should never be forgotten, however, and certainly few American businessmen forget it, that the consumer is also a voter. In a word, assuming the existence of a democratic political order, ultimately economic planning is done by the people, acting through the mechanisms of their democratic political order.

The great difference between our planning and that of the Soviets is, then, that theirs is done by the leaders of the dominant Communist Party alone. Does this, however, give the Soviets a distinct advantage, in the political and military struggle known as the Cold War? Assuming that they have sacrificed living standards in order to achieve an apparent technological lead in missiles and space exploration since 1957, does this mean that they are fated to defeat the allegedly fat and lazy Americans?

Aside from the fact that this lead seems far less impressive in 1962 than it did in, say, 1957, there are some other aspects of the situation which, I believe, we should consider. Careful study of the so-called Soviet economic plans, including the classic Five-Year Plan of 1928-33, has suggested that these "plans" have actually been nothing but psychological devices, similar to those of Madison Avenue, designed to get the maximum possible effort out of the long-suffering Soviet people. It has been admitted by official sources that figures are often padded, and the recent "decentralization" of Soviet industry was actually a device to prevent useless and wasteful stockpiling of scarce labor and materials by factory managers determined not to be caught not fulfilling their part of the plan. As recently as 1958, a Five-Year Plan scheduled to run until 1961 gave way to a Seven-Year Plan scheduled to run until 1965.

Finally, assuming that there has been some improvement in Soviet living standards since 1952—and I believe this to have been the case—

is the Soviet Government not running the risk—as did the Tsarist regime of 1900—of sowing the seeds of its own destruction? I would suggest to you today that there is coming on the scene in Soviet Russia a new generation of younger people whose memories do not reach further back than the 1930's, and who will not forever be satisfied that their allegedly well-planned economy produces only such purely psychological triumphs as being able to put a man into space a few months before the United States does the same thing. I suggest to you that it was to appease this restless younger generation that Khrushchev had to resort in 1961 to a new belaboring of the memory of Stalin as a means of emphasizing his claim that he has rejected Stalin's policy of putting guns before butter.

In 1960, the year of the U-2 incident, of the abortive Paris Big Four Conference, of Castro's seizure of American properties in Cuba, of the anti-Eisenhower riots in Tokyo, and the beginning of the Congo troubles, Khrushchev chose to come to New York and dissipate what little good will had been created by his 1959 visit. But despite the Berlin crisis, 1961 ended with grave dissatisfaction in Communist China and Albania over the relatively mild line taken by the Soviet leader in his dealings with the West.

Is Khrushchev's fear of nuclear war the only explanation of this mild line? Or can it be that his own people have less confidence in their "planned," "socialist" economy, and the oligarchy which controls it, than we have been led to believe? Are they willing to wait until 1970 for American living standards?

II

Part of the answer to this question may come from an examination of the Soviet Russian social system. All too many people in this country simply refuse to believe that an economy not founded on "free enterprise," but allegedly on "socialism," can have a society which can be described pictorially in the shape of a pyramid. At the beginning of the 20th century, the American sociologist William Graham Sumner, who was anything but a radical, thought that a diamond-shaped figure —narrow at the top and the bottom, and extended in the middle— best represented our own society. In the 18th century, an observant Briton described the society of his own country as being like a keg of English beer—froth at the top, dregs at the bottom, and good, sound brew in between.

Despite the early claims of the Soviet regime that it had abolished social distinctions, the late Joseph Stalin candidly admitted in the mid-

1930's that they had returned, when he defended inequalities of income and status which were too obvious to be ignored. He insisted, to be sure, that these inequalities were rational, in that they were based on the relative contribution of individuals to the "building of socialism." However, by the early 1950's, many observers of the Soviet scene felt that they detected signs that inequalities were becoming hereditery.

Quite a lot of thought was given by the Soviet leaders in the early years of the regime to the problem of the family as a social institution, and to the fact that throughout history the untalented off-spring of talented parents have seemingly had a head start on the talented off-spring of untalented parents. It seemed wise at first to deemphasize, if not exactly to abolish, the family. Until the dawning of the Khrushchev era, it was good form, in most cases, for Soviet leaders to keep their wives and children out of the public spotlight, unless, as was true in some cases, the wives were performing some important public service.

Nevertheless, since 1945, the suspicion has grown apace that not only do the top Party officials, the top government officials, the industrial managers, the military officers, and the intellectual and artistic elite lead what are, by Russians standards, lives of luxury, but that their children enjoy advantages denied to the children of workers and peasants. There has been a very definite effort since 1953 to do something about this problem.

Judging by the drastic nature of some of the things that have been done, the problem was reaching scandalous proportions in the mid-1950's. Not only did the sons and daughters of the Party, government, military, industrial, and intellectual elite disdain labor of any sort; not only did they regard the higher educational institutions as their exclusive preserve, they also chose to point up their superior social status by engaging in riotous living in public, and by showing a marked preference for the decadent bourgeois culture of the West.

Khrushchev seems to have thought that the heart of the matter was that few of these *stilyagi* had experienced the hard labor of farm and factory which he had known as a youngster. Over the agonized protests of Nesmeyanov, head of the prestigious Academy of Sciences, he decreed a program of hard manual labor for all school children, stricter admission standards to institutions of higher learning, and the granting of more scholarships to poor but deserving youngsters.

These reforms took place too recently to permit any assessment of their results at this time. However, the study of Russian history brings to light many an instance of absolute rulers who have failed to compel the members of the privileged classes on whose support they rely to

earn their privileges on the basis of merit alone.

Another important point that should be made here is that being a member of the privileged classes in Soviet Russia does not bring as many concrete privileges as does being an average man in the United States. Nothing is more discouraging than to read the impressions of some innocent Americans who have been to Soviet Russia, and who come back feeling that our society rewards all the wrong people, while theirs rewards all the right people.

I suppose I have my own ideas as to who makes a valuable contribution to our society, and who does not—and so does each one of you. I wonder, though, if we are not sometimes in danger of forgetting that there are people who seem to deserve more from society than do others, precisely because they disdain, or at least ignore, the material rewards of their endeavors. In fact, is not selfless dedication to some goal other than mere material reward the dominant characteristic of the individual to whom society owes the most.

If this be true, then one may be permitted to wonder whether the reappearance of privileged castes in Soviet Russia, with a progeny which, according to Soviet sources, in interested only in the almighty ruble and what it will buy—whether this phenomenon does not portend serious difficulties for the regime. One may concede that the Soviet hierarchy of the 1920's consisted of dedicated men, believing, however mistakenly, that they were leading mankind towards a new and better world. One may concede also that the Stalinists of the 1930's and 1940's were hard-working, self-made men, unimaginative but capable. It is not possible, however, that the softness which some observers have detected in America since the lush decade of the 1950's has its counterpart in Soviet Russia?

III

This leads me to my third and final topic—education, science, and technology in Soviet Russia. In discussing these matters, I am, I fear, in grave danger of being misunderstood, and I shall try, therefore, to be as precise as possible.

I should like to begin with some generalizations about our own educational problems. There are, I believe, many ways of judging whether an educational system is good or bad, but I also think we can all discern two broad viewpoints in this country today. One holds that formal education of young people between the ages of 6 and 22 should be built on the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number." This viewpoint is apt to include the belief that except for differences

of sex, and differences produced by purely physical handicaps, all children are really pretty much the same. It is conceded that teachers cannot turn all children into carbon copies of each other, but it is held that the undeniable differences are the result of differences in home or community environment. School curricula must, therefore, be rigged so that despite environmental conditions outside the school, everyone moves forward at the same pace—except in athletics, since for some reason the notion that everyone is not equally good in athletics is not regarded as undemocratic.

It has been held in this country, both before and after the launching of the first sputnik in 1957, that the educational theories I have just described were a prime cause of this Soviet triumph over the United States. We have been bidden by some notable public figures to rid ourselves of the watered-down curricula in use in our schools and colleges, even if by so doing we are compelled to recognize that some students are brilliant, some are stupid, and most are somewhere in between. The result of all this has been the introduction of the 2-, 3-, or 4-track system in many of our schools and colleges, with results which cannot yet be forseen.

I will not attempt to comment on all this, but I would like to point out that the Soviets went through something very similar in the 1920's and 1930's. The educational system which had been inherited from the Tsarist regime may be characterized as one which provided a very excellent education for the few, and very little, if anything, for the many. In this respect, of course, Tsarist Russia differed little from any of the major European countries, except that it was about a generation later than Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary in seeing the necessity for providing the broad masses with a rudimentary primary education. Indeed, it is hard to discern any general conviction in this country until the 1880's or 1890's that all children had any right to expect a secondary education from the society in which they lived.

Nevertheless, we must remember once more that merely because an educational system does not serve the broad masses of the people, it is not thereby necessarily bad in terms of quality. What the old Russia had before 1917 may have been reserved for the very few, but on any objective basis it must be conceded that it was quite good. It is inconceivable that the great Russian literature and music of the 19th century could have been produced by a society totally lacking in high-grade formal education. Moreover, we should not laugh off as absurd all that the Soviet propagandists of the late 1940's and early 1950's said about the achievements of 19th century Russian science.

Americans, I fear, have been the victims of a delusion which affected our thinking during and after both World Wars of this century, *i.e.,* that only the Germans have made important breakthroughs in natural science. However, aside from the fact that so many of the best German scientists were expelled from the country in the 1930's because they were Jews, a strong case could be made for saying that scientific accomplishments in Great Britain exceeded those in Germany during both World Wars, at least insofar as the actual waging of war was concerned.

In any case, if it be true that Russian technology was not anywhere near Western standards until the 1930's, it is also true that Russian science, both before and after 1917, was not negligible. To be sure, in the 1920's, the Soviet government was far less interested in promoting the study of science, foreign languages, etc., than it was in substituting the study of Marxism-Leninism for a more normal curriculum in the humanities and social studies in Russian schools and universities. It was also interested, to use the phrase of progressive educationists in this country, in "educating the whole child." Consequently, though it succeeded in wiping out illiteracy in Russia in the 1920's, it also lowered the overall standards of education to a marked degree.

By the mid-1930's, however, there took place in the Soviet school system a tightening-up which was apparently similar to what is going on in our schools today. The results were the Soviet school system which has been described in this country in such glowing terms over the last six or seven years.

Now, at this point, I want to be sure that I am not misunderstood. Personally, I sympathize strongly with the current movement to tighten up our own school sysem. I believe that the kind of athletics which is designed to provide a spectacle for the grownups, rather than develop the bodies of children, should be eliminated. I believe that there is no excuse for high schools turning out graduates who cannot use the English language correctly, who are all but totally ignorant of elementary mathematics and elementary natural science, and who know nothing of their own country's history, its political, social, and economic institutions and literature, not to speak of the great heritage of Western civilization on which American civilization is built. If it takes fear of the Soviet Union to produce a change in such a situation, then so much the better.

Nevertheless, I would be less than honest if I did not say to you that I believe this fear to be based on false premises. The Soviet educational system is not nearly as good as some have told us, and if we had

been willing to do so, we could have learned about as many lessons from our friends in Western Europe as we seem now anxious to learn from our enemies in Eastern Europe.

It is quite true, to be sure, that the Soviets take the whole matter of education more seriously than we do, though not more seriously than do West Europeans. It is probably true, too, that in some respects their scholarly work is better organized than in this country, and that scholarship is better respected. Certain types of education and training, such as foreign language study, receive more attention, though not any more than is the case with British, French, and German schools.

Against all this must be put certain grave deficiencies. Half the population of Soviet Russia still lives on the farm, and from personal observation I can testify that rural children there simply do not have the opportunities of rural children in this country. What often passes for training in science in Soviet schools is actually the transmission of simple mechanical or technical information which many American children pick up in homes which are so bountifully stocked with all the electronic marvels with which we are all familiar. In the study of the humanities and social sciences, Soviet children are still very much hampered by the constricting bands of Marxism-Leninism.

I do not hold to the theory that Soviet progress in guided missiles, atomic energy, and space exploration in the 1950's was to any important degree the result of the capture of German scientists at the end of World War II, or the betrayal of American secrets by spies in this country. Such progress as there has been is the result of efforts by Russian scientists, many of them trained in the schools and universities of the old regime, and of the decision of the Soviet government to place almost unlimited resources at their disposal. But I would question the continued ability of that government to so expend its funds, and at the same time meet its other commitments.

IV

I fear that I may have tried your patience at this point by the length of this address, but in closing, let me summarize briefly what I have been trying to say.

Since 1945, the U.S.S.R., or Soviet Russia, a country of 200 million people sprawling over one-sixth of the land surface of the world, has undoubtedly been a major problem to our country. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the threat it poses in purely concrete terms.

The Soviets have come to seem so successful more because of the faults and mistakes of their opponents than because of their own vir-

tues and achievements. There would never have been a Soviet Russia, had the advanced countries of Western Europe not become involved in the First World War, and Soviet Russia would not have become one of the Big Two, had Hitler not plunged Europe into the Second World War. Personally, I believe that when Western Europe finally resolves the last vestiges of traditional nationalistic hatreds and of the colonial problem, we may well find it possible to turn over to Western Europe the question of how best to deal with the Soviet menace, such as it is, in Europe and the Middle East.

This would seem the more appropriate in that if our economic growth rate failed to keep up with that of the Soviets in the 1950's—and I am not sure it did—this can scarcely be said of the growth rate in Western Europe. In fact, the whole Soviet economic achievement has been vastly overrated. After nearly 45 years of power, the Soviet regime has still not created a standard of living for its people which compares with that of Western Europe, much less with that of America. If it is argued that the Soviet regime has had to repair the damage of two World Wars before attempting anything new, then this has also been true of the West European countries which, like our own, also endured the Depression of the early 1930's.

Most of the surplus capital produced in Soviet Russia has been plowed into the instruments of international power and prestige. Such instruments as these, however, grow rusty if they are not used. We are, therefore, passing through a period when the Soviet regime must decide whether to use these instruments or to redirect its efforts towards lowering the pressure of a popular discontent which cannot forever be put off with prestige symbols. Currently, it would seem, the overall trend is in the direction of quietly redirecting national energies towards the production of consumer goods. There has been, to be sure, much backing and filling, but on the whole, I think, more backing than filling.

Russia is not becoming a democratic country, but there has been enough genuine economic progress to create a class of people which feels it has more to lose than to gain by going to war. It has a genuine, if somewhat unjustified, pride in what it has accomplished, both inside the country and in terms of extending Russian influence, to a greater or less degree, into Eastern Europe, the Far East, the ex-colonial world, and even Latin America. Khrushchev is its spokesman and probably faithfully reflects the vulgar ostentation of a Soviet elite which, for all its braggadocio, knows all to well the limitations of what it has created.

If the self-made men who run Soviet Russia today are flattered to hear the compliments bestowed upon their educational system, their

science, and their techonology by uninformed and unobservant Americans, they themselves remember all too well the poverty-stricken Russia of their youth to take all this too seriously. Their peasant forebears from whom they sprang learned long ago how to cheat the vapid noble landowners who oppressed them, and much the same crude slyness lies just below the surface in the dealings of the modern Russian elite with Westerners.

Such men were not cast in the same mold as the Russian revolutionaries of the first three decades of this century. They like what they have, and they want to keep things the way they are. They will fight to defend what they have, but only reluctantly, since they realize full well their own shortcomings. But they are not ready, as are the Chinese Communist leaders, to win or lose all in a final cataclysmic attack on the West. Fortunately, it is they, and not the Chinese Communists, who have the missiles, the atomic warheads, and the space capsules.

WHAT IS COMMUNISM?

By George S. Parthemos*

Today, America and the free world which it leads faces a number of challenges to their free institutions, values, and security—challenges unparalleled in their scope and complexity. These stem in part from the great revolution in technology and the resulting transformation in modern warfare; in part they stem from the political, social, and economic revolutions sweeping across a great portion of the world. All of these challenges, however, whatever their immediate source, relate in one way or another to the challenge which stems from the dramatic rise to power in our time of militant, imperialistic, and aggressive Communist regimes in Russia, China, and their satellite states. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the nature of the Communist challenge.

To cope successfully with the challenge of Communism in all of its aspects, it is necessary that we know about Communism in all of its aspects—its features, its characteristics, its theory, its objectives, its historical background, its mode of operations, the nature of its appeals, the implications of its policies, methods, techniques and tactics. Widespread ignorance of these and other aspects of Communism can be dangerous. A proper understanding of them has become an essential of effective citizenship. And it might be parenthetically noted that a realistic study of Communism will not only help promote an undertsanding of the true nature of its challenge; it will also deepen one's understanding of the ideals and institutions of freedom. For freedom and democracy are better understood through a study of contrasting political, economic, and social systems.

This, however, assumes an understanding and appreciation of our own free institutions, our own ideology and our own political and economic systems. In our concern for a better understanding of Communism, we must not lose sight of the need of widespread understanding of the basic ideals, concepts, institutions, and underlying assumptions of our own free society. We should be able to articulate with conviction and to be able to explain very clearly and with understanding the basic values of our own free society to others. But our purpose here is to analyze the nature of Communism so that we may better understand the challenge it lays before us.

In analyzing the nature of Communism, it is first necessary to note that Communism is not a passing phenomenon. It is a dismaying

*Dr. Parthemos is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia.

fact, which we must face squarely, that Communism has attained a high degree of permanence and stability and will consequently challenge us for the foreseeable future. The stability of Communism is based in part on the success of Soviet Communism in adapting autocracy to twentieth century industrial and technological society; in part it is based on the apparent success of the Soviet Union in meeting one of the most perplexing problems which has confronted modern dictatorial and autocratic systems of government—that is, the problem of succession to leadership. Modern autocratic regimes, based on the cult of personality, have found it difficult to survive the death or removal of the leader. As a result, such regimes have not been able to attain any high degree of stability. But the Communist principle of leadership—whether individual or collective—seems to have shown its viability, its capacity to survive a leader's death or removal, at least in the Soviet Union. Thus, in the Soviet Union, we have seen leadership pass from Lenin to Stalin to Malenkov to Bulganin and finally to Khrushchev. Doubtless, the Soviet regime will survive the death or removal of Khrushchev without serious dislocation. To the student of modern autocratic systems of government, this is a significant, though dismaying fact. It indicates that Communism has attained a high degree of stability and viability, and that it will pose a serious threat to our institutions and our security for the indefinite future.

In analyzing the nature of the Communist challenge, it is furthermore necessary to note that the conflict between freedom and Communism is an all-embracing struggle that cannot be conceived of entirely or exclusively in simple military terms. The struggle absorbs all the resources of a nation. It involves mass populations dedicated to total philosophical, economic, political, and religious systems. To understand this fundamental fact, so that we may better grasp the nature of the Communist challenge, it is necessary to know just what Communism is.

The term "Communism" is not easy to define. It is an old word which has meant different things to different people. It has also had different meanings at different periods in history. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the founders and patron saints of modern Communism, revived the use of the term about the middle of the nineteenth century and applied it to distinguish their form of socialism from other socialist movements current at the time. Today there should be no dispute over what the term "Communism" has reference to. It refers to the system of government and kind of society established in the Soviet Union ever since the revolution of 1917, and the system of government and kind of

society established subsequently in China and some other countries. Thus, Communism means the following things:

1. A dictatorial and autocratic system of government characterized by the rule of a fanatical and messianic group, allegedly on behalf of the majority, but tolerating no dissent, and engineering a degree of popular approval through various devices at their command.

Communist doctrine holds that the average man is stupid and that the full-truth is known only to a small group of all-wise leaders (the "vanguard," as Communists call them.) From this position in Communist philosophy there is a direct line to the idea of the one-party state—the idea of the party as the ruling elite, to be kept select and pure by periodic purges, peaceable or violent.

Here, it might be noted that Communist parties are not political parties in the American or Western sense of the term. Communist parties in Communist countries do not campaign against other political parties. They do not hold primaries within the party. The Communist party in Russia, for example, is a professional elite of officials, administrators, technicians, and other privileged persons. In Communist countries only one party is permitted and that party monopolizes the field of organized political activity. That one party is not a mass political organization which seeks to maximize its membership. It is usually a relatively small body composed of a small minority of the total population of a country. Membership is highly selective and narrowly restricted. Within the party, leadership is kept secure in the hands of a very small group.

2. Communism also means a totalitarian system of government characterized by total and complete control of all aspects of life by the state. The functions of government in Communist societies are total in that government is deemed morally and legally competent to encompass within its range of functions and powers all areas of human activity. The *total* life of the individual is subject to the control of the state. This position is based on the assumption that man is made for the state and that the state is the source of all rights. This position affords no recognition of any rights of the individual in his relation to the collectivity; it accords no inherent, natural, or inalienable right to human personality. It recognizes no limit to the power of the state.

3. In addition Communism means a completely collectivistic or socialistic economic system in which the government owns, operates, and manages all productive property, including land, mines, factories, shipyards, railroads, utilities, banks, mills—even department stores, hotels, and other business enterprises. All decisions as to what and how

much is to be produced are made and enforced by the government. Thus, the political leaders under Communism are at the same time the economic leaders who manage industry, agriculture, trade, and so forth. The government also decides not only what is to be produced, but how it is to be distributed, what the consumer may purchase, and what profession or occupation one may engage in.

Communism is thus a political and economic philosophy and system. *But,* there is more to Communism. And in order to properly understand Communism today we must move on to consider it in its aspects other than as a concrete system or organization of political and economic life. For in addition, Communism is:

4. A seductive promise of a new order. It is a plan for changing society and government from the bottom up and as such has a way of capturing some people's imagination.

5. Communism is also a religion and much of its doctrinal strength lies in the fact that Communism has become a religion. Although it denies a transcendent God and rejects the concept of man as first of all a spiritual creature, Communism is fundamentally a secular atheistic religion. There are a number of interesting parallels between Communism and organized religions which are worth noting because they provide additional insight into the nature of Communism and its appeals.

First, it is interesting to note how Communists use the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as constituting holy scripture. If a Communist wishes to prove a point, he invariably seeks to clinch his arguments by quoting Marx, Engels, or Lenin as holy gospel.

Second, Communism pretends to be a gospel of deliverance, proclaiming a new order—a new kingdom. But it is a kingdom of this world that can be brought about only by sacrifice on the part of the faithful.

Third, Communism, in common with other religions, sees the present as merely a preparation for the future. A happy and fulsome life in the future is held out in return for sacrifice and suffering in the present.

Fourth, Communism holds itself to be in possession of a cosmic truth, a final purpose toward which all creation moves, which must be vindicated at whatever costs to individuals here and now. Consequently, Communism thinks nothing of sacrificing the individual to its messianic task and cosmic purpose.

Fifth, there is to be found in Communism, as in most religions, the idea of inevitability, the belief in ultimate victory, which is guaranteed

by the eternal and immutable laws of history and the universe. Yet, in Communism as in other religions, there is the awareness that man has an active and positive role to play in furthering the grand design. Thus, as Henry Mayo points out in his *Introduction to Marxist Theory,* Communism avoids a complete fatalism, and becomes a fighting creed which challenges its adherents to change the world, and not merely to accept it passively and piously.

Sixth, the Communist party in Communist countries bears an astonishing resemblance to a church heirarchy or priestly caste. As we have noted, the Communist party in the Soviet Union is not a political party in the Western sense of the term. The Communist party in Communist countries does not campaign against opposing parties. It is not even a mass group and it does not seek to maximize its membership and then through electoral processes win control of government. Rather, the Communist party is a relatively small, tightly organized, dedicated elite that can be entered only after demonstrated fitness and a rigorous period of training and indoctrination. Obedience, loyalty, discipline, and sacrifice are the watchwords of members.

The party also has its beatified saints, its apostles, its martyrs, and they are accorded the usual religious adoration, reverence, veneration, and profound respect combined with awe. The cult of Marx and the cult of Lenin are among the characteristics of Soviet life that appear strange to the average American.

To carry the analogy with organized religions further, the Communist party like a religious heirarchy, is entrusted with the message and the maintenance of the doctrinal purity of Communism. It proclaims and interprets doctrine. It guards against deviation and heresy. Holders of heretical views are denounced as both false prophets and as evil men.

6. Although Communism has many things in common with organized religion, it goes still beyond most religions. For it is a total philosophy of life and a complete system of thought. Communism postulates concepts concerning the nature of man and the nature of the universe. In its philosophic basis, Communism functions as a metaphysic, a theory of knowledge, and a new logic. It claims to have an infallible explanation of history, of the universe, of truth, of morality, of science, politics, economics, and the arts. There is nothing outside of it.

In its more purely philosophical theory, Communism begins with Marx's philosophy of dialectical materialism. This doctrine asserts that everything is of an essentially material nature. It holds that

the universe is in essence a purely material and self-sufficient nature, moving inexorably by its own inherent dialectical laws from which mind, spirit, and God are totally excluded.

These dialectical laws, Communism holds, operate not only in the physical universe but in the realm of human affairs. Mankind in the mass, that is, is subject to the same impersonal and immanent dialectical laws as the physical universe. History itself evolves and can be understood only in terms of these dialectical laws. According to these laws, historical development and evolution takes place through the antithetical struggle and ultimate synthesis of inherent tensions, conflicts, and contradictions in the material and economic organization of society.

The dialectical movement of history finds expression in the conflict primarily between economic groups; that is, it operates in history essentially through the medium of the struggle of economic classes. In the modern period, the class struggle occurs between capitalists and wage-earners (or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as Marx called them). This class struggle can only end in revolutionary victory for the proletariat. After this victory, the proletariat must establish its dictatorship—the dictatorship of the proletariat—it must then institute a program of socialism. Ultimately there will follow at some time in the future a classless Communist society which will represent the final and ultimate synthesis of the antagonistic material forces inherent in society.

Although this philosophy of dialectical materialism is developed with a great deal of intellectual sophistication by Communist philosophers, it reduces in simple terms merely to an emphasis on conflict, change, and process in society. It is thus a doctrine that drives its adherents to change the structures of social, political, and economic life. In doing so, it pretends to see the tides of history running inevitably in their favor; it insinuates that their inanimate dialectical forces of history will compel the world to accept the Communist way of life. Therefore, they contend that it is foolish and futile to resist this "irresistible" march toward socialism. Thus, Communists follow Marx in purporting to see the inexorable and immutable drive toward a Communist future as the dialectical process gradually unfolds itself in the world of reality.

This philosophy of dialectical materialism is combined with a militant atheism. In itself Communism is no more atheistic than any naturalistic philosophy that posits the experienced world of nature and history as self-sufficient. But Communism levels a bitter attack on

all *theistic* religion, Communism itself being an *atheistic* religion. Thus the philosophical system known as dialectical materialism can have no place for faith in God as the Creator on whom the whole experienced world of nature and history depend. Rather, Communism explains away God as a projection of human desires, needs, and frustrations. God and theistic religion is simply an opiate of the people. God is just an illusion. Faith and trust must be placed, not in God, but in the dialectical processes of history. This dialectical movement alone will bring redemption and salvation. And there is no God above this movement.

In seeking to ascertain the nature of Communism in all of its many aspects, we have considered Communism as a political philosophy translated into a dictatorial, autocratic, and totalitarian system of government; as an economic doctrine actualized in a completely socialistic economic system combined with a command economy; as a seductive promise of a new order — a plan for reconstructing society and government from the bottom up; as a metaphysic translated into action; as an atheistic secular religion, with a program aimed at action and not abstract doctrinal exegesis; and, as a philosophy that seeks to offer an integral interpretation of the whole of reality.

7. Finally, we must move to another aspect of Communism and consider it as a revolutionary method for seizing political power; for Communism is, first and foremost, a plan for the seizure of political power. It is perhaps most dangerous in the way it approaches the age-old political problem of how to seize, retain, and expand power. Through the expert use of tactics and techniques which it has devised, the world Communist movement has in the span of a relatively short period of time engulfed approximately one-fourth of the land area of the world and has extended its domination over the lives of approximately one billion people and threatened countless millions of others.

Fundamental to Communist strategy for the seizure of power is the organization of close knit, well disciplined, dedicated Communist parties in countries throughout the world. Today, there are approximately 90 Communist parties containing some 36,000,000 persons operating legally or illegally throughout the world. These Communist parties are joined in membership in an international Communist organization which is dominated by the Russian Communist party. This explains why the Moscow party line is always followed abroad. Thus, Communism is a well organized world wide movement that is centrally organized and directed. In effect, Communist parties throughout the

world are not domestic political parties as we understand the term in the United States. Rather, they are local branches of a world wide political organization controlled by the Communist party of the Soviet Union, and they have as their sole purpose that of advancing the interests of the Soviet Union.

Side by side with these Communist parties, working both within and outside their framework, are organizations of small groups of professional fulltime revolutionaries. These professional revolutionaries are highly select persons, professionally trained for revolutionary and subversive techniques in schools established over the world for that purpose. These professional revolutionaries are entirely secret, unknown in most cases even to rank and file Communists. They devote themselves wholly, under centralized control and para-military discipline, to the overthrow of non-Communist governments.

This approach to organized Communist activity, of professional revolutionaries, was perhaps the most important single contribution of Lenin to the Communist movement. This was the type of organization he created to make the Russian Revolution, and it is the type of organization which was the vanguard of Communist movements in China, Czechoslovakia, and the countries over the world.

Activity by these Communist groups assumes many different forms. They engage in propaganda and fight to win converts to Communism, seeking to undermine countries from within through the power of ideas. They have made a fine art of the use of mass demonstrations, riots, and mob agitation, as we have witnessed most recently in France, Japan, and in certain other parts of the world. They have sought to exploit unrest and tensions wherever they may find them. Where tensions and hatreds do not exist, they have sought to create them. They have devised subtle techniques for enlisting the unwitting support of innocent but gullible persons to advance their own objectives. In particular, as Lenin advised, they have developed infiltration techniques and have sought to have their professional revolutionaries infiltrate and form cells in social, political, economic, and other institutions in society. They are also responsible for espionage, and for the recruitment and training of spies, saboteurs, and agents for all other activities relating to intelligence. They have sought in general to promote chaos, confusion, and moral decay, and they attempt to undermine people's faith and confidence in their institutions and practices.

Again following the lines of strategy laid down by Lenin, Communist activities have sought to work through front organizations. The purpose of front organizations is to attract sincere but unwary non-

Communists. It is the old trick of selling a bill of goods under false label. Communists know that most people will not support a program or organization if it is known to be Communist. To get around this, they skillfully organize special organizations—under a new, attractive, and frequently patriotic label. Key positions in the organization are held, of course, by Communists or Communist sympathizers. Outsiders are often deceived into endorsing the activities of such organizations, or even contributing to their financial support. The number of such "front" organizations has always been large, and their object is to increase support of the Communist movement far beyond the number of actual Communists. Such front organizations have been formed to appeal to many different groups in the population—workers, women, young people, professional people, among others. Perhaps the most complete list of front organizations in the United States is to be found in the U.S. Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations.

In the field of international relations and foreign policy, the core of Communist strategy consists of the following points:

1. Communists seek to exploit tensions between the western powers and their colonial and former colonial territories. Here, the strategy of the Communists is always to support the colonial or former colonial state against the western state. However, the idea is not to help the colonial state. The main objective is always to weaken the western "imperialist" state. Perhaps by ousting it so as to create a vacuum in a backward area, they hope to fill after the western imperialistic state has been ousted. In doing this, Communists seek to identify imperialism with the western powers, and particularly with the United States. Then, they exploit the slogan of "anti-imperialism" particularly in Latin-America, Africa, and Asia. In Latin-America they conduct propaganda and diplomatic offensives against "yankee imperialism" and seek thereby to exploit animosities between Latin-American countries and the United States.

Nowhere, of course, do Communists indicate that it is precisely such western imperialist and capitalist countries like England and France that have massively liberated their colonies, prepared them for independence and self-government, and set them on the road to nationhood. Nowhere do they indicate that the only truly imperialistic powers of significance in the world today are the Soviet Union and Red China who hold millions in their East European and Asian satellites subject to their oppression. Despite Russian brutality in suppressing the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and Chinese brutality later in Tibet, Communists have been amazingly successful in disguising the

imperialistic aspects of the Communist drive for power.

It would be unwise, however, to underestimate the weapon the Communists have and the effectiveness with which they have been able to use that weapon when they exploit the slogan of anti-imperialism throughout vast areas of the world. For in most parts of the world, imperialism has been traditionally identified with the western powers.

2. A second and related feature of Communist strategy in the international field is the effort of Communists to subvert, infiltrate, manipulate, capture, or control the struggles for national independence as well as other revolutionary movements going on in various parts of the world, and then use those struggles as a weapon against the west. Perhaps the best illustration of the success of this strategy by the Communists was the case of Indo-China. More recently the same strategy could be seen in the capture by the Communists of the Castro movement in Cuba.

3. Thirdly, Communists have never hesitated to use military force as an instrument to achieve their objectives when they think it would succeed. When conditions have permitted, Communists have prepared, promoted, and conducted armed uprisings, guerilla war, revolutions, and prolonged rebellions. As a matter of fact, it was through armed uprising that the Communists originally seized power in Russia. This is how power was seized by the Chinese Communists in 1949. In the chaos and unrest of the post war period, Communists resorted to armed uprising in Greece, waging a frightful civil war there from 1946 to 1949, and in other parts of the world. Most recently, we have seen this resort to military force and armed uprising in Korea, Cuba, Laos, and South Viet-Nam.

A variety of other forms of political warfare short of actual war are utilized by the Communists to weaken or exert pressure upon other states. These methods include propaganda, sabotage, diplomacy, military pressure, threats of military force, espionage, etc.

4. Another feature of Communist strategy on the international front is to use various devices designed to promote disunity, discord, and division among the western powers. This is the old stratagem of divide and conquer. A basic objective of Communist foreign policy has been to break up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to divide the United States from its western allies. Diplomatic offensives are constantly conducted to sharpen differences between the United States and its allies over such issues as Berlin, Formosa, among others.

In this connection, Communist strategists cannot help but be gravely concerned and view with great apprehension and trepidation

the development of the European Common Market. The commitment of those nations comprising the Common Market to the course set forth in their treaties can be reasonably regarded as one of the most important events of this century. For if the European Common Market fulfills its promise, it will involve the creation of a powerful and giant bloc to rival, economically and politically, the Soviet Union. As an economic and political unit , potentially as strong as the United States, the European Common Market will serve as a powerful check to Communist expansion. The United States allied with a powerful European union could dwarf the Soviet Union in industrial and economic power.

For these and other reasons, one of the basic goals of the Soviet Union in waging its latest war of nerves against the west can be seen as an effort on the part of the Communists to persuade the West Europeans to abandon their moves toward economic and political unity. For the Communists, if they are to achieve their goals, must prevent further unity on the part of the West European states. The recent and continuing Berlin crisis can be interpreted as the Communist reaction to a significantly new political situation developing in world politics today as a result of the success of the European Common Market. A United Europe would restore an effective counter-balance and checkmate to Soviet power on the vast Eurasian-African land mass. Thus the Communists must view as imperative the objective of promoting disunity and division in Europe, and between the United States and its European allies.

5. Still another feature of Communist strategy on the international front is to exploit the widespread, understandable fear of nuclear holocaust. First, Communists seek to terrorize the world by exploding monstrous bombs and threatening nuclear destruction. They then systematically seek to exploit and manipulate this understandable fear of nuclear destruction; however, not in the interest of peace, but as a major instrument with which to render the non-Communist world wholly ineffectual.

6. Another important aspect of Communist strategy on the international front is the use of Soviet economic diplomacy to bring about the objectives of the Communist movement. In recent years, the Soviets have resorted increasingly to economic diplomacy as an instrument of policy. This has assumed different forms. For example, offers of credits, technical assistance, and proposals for expanded trade are subtly combined with political propaganda, and diplomatic strategems in an effort to replace Western influence and as a prelude

to undermining the foundations of non-Communist governments, particularly in under-developed countries.

Trade offers are playing an increasingly important role in Communist attempts to gain more political influence throughout the world. Trade is, in fact, regarded by the Soviets as a crucial aspect of their entire effort. Numerous trade missions have been sent out in various parts of the world with appeals for the conclusion of trade agreements. Exhibitions have appeared in most of the major and many of the minor trading centers of the world. Also, even when the Soviets have no use for the products of an under-developed country, it will frequently buy those products, if only to gain a foothold in a country.

Considerable effort has been exerted especially to establish an effective framework for conducting and expanding trade with less developed countries. Through such trade the Soviets hope to achieve a steady infiltration and subversion of those countries, and, in consequence, they not only seek to tie them economically with the Soviet Union, they also hope to cut off the free world's reserves of vital raw materials from around the world.

Another aspect of Soviet trade policy has been the practice of dumping on the world market its own competitive supplies of materials at ruinous prices in an effort to weaken the economy of Western countries.

There are many other aspects of Soviet strategy on the international front such as their effort to gain recognition as being the intellectual and scientific leaders of the world for the purpose of gaining greater prestige for themselves and lowering that of the Western powers.

Communism is an order dedicated to achieving its goal of extinction of all but the Communist way of life in part through education and scientific progress. Scientific development and economic production have thus become categorical imperatives in the Communist camp as instruments through which Communists may advance their objectives and goals.

In conclusion, then, it must be emphasized that Communism has many aspects which we must understand if we are to adequately and accurately assess the true nature of the challenge which it lays before us. It is a political philosophy, and economic doctrine, a plan for the reconstruction of society, a complete philosophy, a metaphysic, a theology, and a religion. But first and foremost, it is a plan to seize, consolidate, and then expand power. If we are going to rise to the challenge which it throws down before us, we must understand the

nature of the Communist challenge as growing out of a diametrically opposed interpretation of the very meaning of human life itself.

LATIN AMERICA, COMMUNISM AND THE CHANGING WORLD

By Alfred B. Thomas*

Probably the most important phrase in the title of this subject is "the changing world." Latin America today is going through changes characteristic of every area where people are struggling for freedom. The driving force remolding Latin America is the growth of a middle class pushing its way into power in a region long dominated by a land-holding oligarchy. Late in the nineteenth century Latin America middle classes suddenly took on new life. When one examines the reason for that shift, one finds a vast flood of foreign capital moving into Latin America from Europe and the United States. This, invested in producing raw materials, minerals, tropical fruits, and agricultural products required in addition greatly improved means of communication. In almost every country we see railroads and highways built, docks and harbors improved to accommodate the huge numbers of ships coming to take away the raw materials. Likewise banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses and a myriad of other businesses the foreigners needed for this vast movement of goods, rose in the key cities.

Important as were the exports for foreign industries, even more so were the effects of this investment upon Latin America itself. The middle class suddenly discovered opportunities galore to expand their own activities. Large numbers of professional men, lawyers and engineers, found employment by foreign corporations; business men had new openings to expand their own enterprises and develop new ones; a large white collar class came rather quickly into existence; store clerks, bank clerks, and others in various service occupations. Above all, the most important part of the middle class, labor, because of its vast numbers, found new employment on plantations, in mines, on railroads, and highway construction, on the docks and in the new businesses and industries being established by native business men.

These far reaching economic changes gave rise in turn to political change. The governments of Latin America long dominated by a land-owning agricultural oligarchy were challenged. Business men wanted laws to protect them from the competition of foreign goods; laws aimed at developing national resources in addition to the raw materials being exported by foreigners. Labor wanted laws to improve their standard of living, better wages, better houses, better working condi-

*Dr. Thomas is Professor of History at the University of Alabama.

tions; business men wanted better education both for their children and to develop more highly trained personnel, and labor wanted schools for their children. All of these things, and others, were impossible because they were excluded from the oligarchical governments.

Inevitably a demand arose for the extension of the suffrage, universal education, for the right to discuss these ideas by a free press, to exercise the right of freedom of speech, and, of course, freedom of religion. Labor, actually wanted the right to strike, and a whole range of benefits. In short, the basic ideas of democracy became firmly implanted among millions of Latin Americans. Out of this struggle emerged two great movements: political parties and labor unions to challenge the old oligarchy. Since the late nineteenth century these movements have continued to grow in strength and in many countries have forced their way into power.

Giving great impetus to the growth of political parties and labor unions has been a sudden expansion of Latin America's population. This phenomenon has now reached such proportions that Latin America has the fastest growing population in the world. It is multiplying twice as fast as the teeming populations of China and India. In fact, at the present rate, it is entirely possible that by the year 2000 A.D. we shall have on our doorstep in Latin America more than half a billion people. The principal reasons for their astonishing growth were the use of modern medical discoveries, particularly the wonder drugs, to reduce disease and decrease the death rate, but more especially the investment of foreign capital which gave such an impetus to Latin American economies. This capital created jobs that had never existed before in Latin America and at better wages. Almost at once a movement from the wretched serf-like conditions in the rural areas set in. Over the years the population has continued to grow by leaps and bounds. Thus Buenos Aires with barely 100,000 people in the late nineteenth century has today almost six million; Mexico City is beyond five million; Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil are in the neighborhood of four million; the same story is repeated everywhere: in Havana, Caracas, Bogota, Lima, and other cities besides the capitals.

Given the basic situation in which these changes have been taking place, in a society dominated by an agricultural oligarchy, they have been resisted at every point. The oligarchies have fought against extension of the suffrage, against improving living conditions in the cities, against the extension of education, against land reform. In short, they are against any proposal they think threatens their powers. Inevitably the extreme poverty that existed among the masses of the people,

because of a long history of agricultural feudalism, became greatly intensified by the blindness of the wealthy in Latin America refusing to make changes necessary to improve the standard of living.

Most unfortuately, this wealthy element in Latin America, in order to divert attention from their role in blocking reform, have pointed their finger at foreigners and blamed them for all the woes Latin America suffered. Because the United States has played a major role in extracting raw materials from Latin America, anti-American feeling resulted from this practice of the wealthy.

In brief, these are the major reasons for changes in Latin America. We now can examine what factors favor the growth of Communism in that area. First is the discontent in the cities. The laborers and union members in the cities are not like the servile peasants in the rural areas; they are free men and deeply discontented with the low wages, poor housing, inadequate schools for their children and other similar important reasons. It is upon this urban disaffection the Communists are putting their emphasis, not in the rural areas, for their theory is that the proletariat of the cities is the principal base of a Soviet state. While this situation is a source of Communist strength, I shall point out later that they do not have a completely free field, as democratic labor unions and parties are fully alert to the necessity of meeting the demands of urban labor.

Secondly, the Communists exploit the rise of nationalism in Latin America where the feeling for developing their own nations and escaping from the dependence on foreign markets for their raw materials is strong. Thus have developed anti-foreign attitudes among the people at large. But it is at this point that the Communists happily join the wealthy in attacking foreigners, since, for the Communists, foreigners only are Americans. That is, the Communists really have no interest in the Latin American nations themselves; they are stirring up nationalism to aid the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its world wide struggle with the United States.

A third factor aiding the Communists is militarism, particularly dictatorship based on military power. These dictatorships are in modern days established by the wealthy to prevent democratic reforms, particularly land reform. The Communists know that military dictatorship perpetuates the low standard of living, stirs discontent and brings about violent revolution. By aiding the creation of greater misery and hopelessness among the people of these nations, Communists hope to advance their cause in the confusion that follows revolts and violence. Thus the Communists supported Peron in Argentina; Perez Jimenez in

Venezuela; the Somoza family in Nicaragua, and once they supported Batista in Cuba.

Cuba illustrates a very important tactic of the Communists in a dictatorship. In such cases, the Communists always have two branches to their party. One branch, usually called in Latin America the Black Communists, supports the dictator; while the other branch, called the White Communists, supports the opposition to the dictator. The two branches find ways of keeping closely in touch so that they can direct the revolt in such a way as to take the maximum advantage. Thus Castro, with the Communists supporting him, came into power on a program of land reform very popular among the Cuban people, but the Communists also came into power. There is evidence at the moment that the Communists are getting ready to take their next step, the elimination of Castro.

Thus military dictatorships in Latin America encourage Communism and are per se a great danger to ourselves. Our government is now fully conscious of this danger and its awareness explains why we did not support the Trujillo regime, but made sure that a democratic reform government got into power when the Trujillo dictatorship was recently overthrown.

A fourth weapon the Communists use to advance their cause is the struggle for democracy itself in Latin America. The situation in Guatemala in 1954 illustrates how they try to take advantage of such a movement. In 1944 after the overthrow of the Ubico dictatorship, a normal democratic movement secured power and began to make reforms. The Communists associated themselves with this movement and succeeded in infiltrating the labor unions and even part of the army. From these positions they were able to advance some of their members into the government. When this point was reached they received military supplies from Communist Poland to launch their uprising by arming the peasants, because the Guatemalan army would not support a revolt. Fortunately, a Guatemalan group of exiles under Castillo Armas succeeded in invading Guatamala in overthrowing the regime under Arbenz and putting an end to that manoeuvre.

Finally, a very important factor in Communist efforts to overthrow governments in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world, is the extremely rigid discipline of their members. The Communist leaders do not hesitate in cases in which they support democratic reform movements to accept a great number of people into the party. Thus Brazil in 1945 registered almost 800,000 Communist votes in the election in December of that year; today, the party is estimated to have

less than 150,000. But only a small part of these numbers are actually Communists, a hard core upon which discipline has been so deeply imposed that the members can always be depended upon. The great numbers sometimes claimed by the Communists are easily shuffled off by the party when the time comes for it to do so.

Communist labor organizers and union leaders are on duty twenty-four hours a day. Labor leaders in democratic unions in Latin America have to work for their bread and butter and can only devote time after hours to their union work. Thus in any given situation, the Communists can produce a considerable body of supporters for a demonstration, a protest march, or a riot. Always there is that hard core of followers who have to study, go to Communist schools, and their leaders to make frequent trips back to the Soviet Union for indoctrination in the latest "line" of the party.

Communist operations in Cuba in connection with the Castro seizure of power again exemplified this tactic. A prominent Communist mentioned frequently in the Cuban government is Che Guevara. Before Cuba, Guevara was an Argentine communist; next he appeared in Guatemala when the movement for a Communist take-over seemed ready there. After that he fled to Mexico where he joined Castro. When Castro came to power in Cuba, Guevara occupied a leading position in the government. Recently he has been replaced by another Communist. It is entirely possible that he will quietly disappear from Cuba and reappear in another Communist uprising elsewhere in Latin America. Thus this discipline and constant indoctrination is an extremely effective weapon Communists use to advance their cause.

With this picture in mind of the major factors that favor Communist growth in Latin America, it is time now to see what is on the other side of the coin. I believe that in spite of these advantages, the Communists are under handicaps that will reduce their activities to not much more than a nuisance value in Latin America. I believe also that these same factors in favor of both ourselves and the democratic groups in Latin America will not only prevent another Cuba, but will result in the overthrow of Communist control in Cuba.

Since we are considering Latin America within a framework of the world, we must note first that Communism has enjoyed no successes remotely approaching those achieved in areas comparable to Latin America. In Russia, the Communist movement reached power in a little more than ten years from the time Lenin founded the Bolshevik or Communist Party in 1905. The case of China is more likely since the Communist party was founded in both areas at about the same time,

1921. Yet in China, the Communists won power in 1949. In Latin America, after more than forty years, with the exception of Cuba, by no means yet lost to Communism, the Communists have had no such triumphs. In fact, the Communists reached the highest point in numbers in 1945 when they polled some 800,000 votes in the Brazilian election of that year. Since that date their numbers have steadily declined. Indeed, in Mexico in the presidential election of 1958, the Communists were unrepresented since the few votes for them in the 1952 election were not sufficient to meet the legal requirement of 25,000 votes necessary to enter a candidate in the next election.

What are the reasons for a major failure to make effective progress in Latin America? The most important fact in this respect is that both capitalism and democracy have deep roots in Latin America. Capitalism goes back for more than four centuries; democratic development started in a significant way more than a century and a half ago with independence from Spain. In contrast, the Czars of Russia and the Chinese emperors never permitted the development of political parties, to say nothing of democratic ideas in those countries. Since the masses of people knew nothing of democracy, the Communists had only to overcome the monarchial and fedual societies to succeed.

In Latin America capitalism came in with the Spanish empire. The investment of foreign capital late in the nineteenth century greatly strengthened capitalistic development. The middle class and labor groups, beneficiaries of this investment, formed political parties to advance their determination to share in their own governments.

The great democratic party of Uruguay, the Colorado, one of the oldest in Latin America, dates its origin to 1826. Throughout the nineteenth century, most of the countries developed a liberal party which became the ancestor of the various democratic parties of today. Succeeding it in Argentina was the present Radical Party, founded in 1891. It owes its name "Radical" simply to the fact that it favors as one of its principles the radical separation of state and church. But it stands for all the great democratic principles such as universal suffrage, universal education, representative form of government, the basic freedoms of speech, press and religion. Its counterpart in Chile, the Radical Party, dates back to the 1860's. Columbia's Liberal Party has had an unbroken history since the early part of the nineteenth century. Brazil began the development of its parties within a constitutional framework in the 1830's. Its modern political organization, however, dates from 1891 when the new republic that followed the empire began its history. Mexico's great Liberal Party originated after the adoption of the 1824 con-

stitution. It received great impetus from the work of Juarez. When the Mexican Revolution came in 1911, this party emerged from the struggle as a revolutionary party and today carries the name of the Party of Revolutionary Institutions. Venezuela's Liberal Party, like that of Columbia's, dates back to the early nineteenth century. After the overthrow of Gomez dictatorship in 1936, this party emerged under the new name of the Democratic Action Party. In Peru, the successor to the Liberal Party was a new organization, the Apra Party, founded in the early 1920's, and is regarded as one of the very significant democratic forces in South America. Bolivia's present democratic party, the National Revolutionary Movement, did not take form until the early 1940's.

I have listed these parties because I think it is important for us to realize that the Latin American countries do have a significant political tradition associated with ideas of democracy. Even more important is the fact that these parties in their long history have struggled to improve the conditions of the poor, have fought to make democratic practices effective, to extend the suffrage, to broaden education and firmly to implant respect for freedom, speech, press and religion. In this struggle they have won great advances for their people; they have had a galaxy of great leaders, fought great political battles and have established strong traditions. It is essential to understand these achievements because these parties look upon the Communist Party as an intruder, as it did not appear in Latin America until after 1920. To the democratic parties, the Communist Party seemed to be trying to reap the harvest of their hard work in behalf of the people. The inevitable result was open hostility of the democratic parties to the Communists as simply another foreign influence penetrating their midst.

This picture would not be complete without my pointing out also that in Latin America the great labor organizations play a similar role as do the unions in this country. That is, the Democratic Party here enjoys the support of labor. In Latin America many of the political parties came out of the labor unions themselves. Others were formed by business men. Thus in Mexico virtually all unions, both urban and rural, support overwhelmingly the Mexican Party of Revolutionary Institutions, because this party has carried on a program of reform and is of native origin. This long history of improving the standard of living in Mexico is one of the reasons why the Communist party has steadily declined in influence in that country. Is is true that some labor unions have succumbed to Communist influence, but, like some in our country that suffered similar infiltration, they are few in number.

Thus we reach the most important conclusion of this paper: the

principal reason why the Communist party in forty years had not had the success in Latin America as it had in China, for example, is that the massive block of democratic political parties and labor unions stand in the way of Communist triumph. To this large block of political power must also be added the not unimportant business men's political parties who have put out no welcome mat for the Communists. Only some backward looking conservative parties, trying to preserve their special privileges, have not hesitated to accept Communist support.

There are other important handicaps under which the Communists labor. One of these is the lack of confidence the Communists have inspired among thinking leaders in Latin America by their sudden changes in course during the last forty years. For example, in their fight against the Nazis in the 1930's, the Communists enthusiastically offered their support to the democratic parties in their reform battles. But when Stalin made his pact with Hitler in 1939, the Communists suddenly attacked the democratic parties, the Allies in Europe fighting Hitler, and the United States. When, however, Hitler invaded Russia, the Communists abruptly changed their policy and became all out supporters of the democratic parties, the Allies in Europe, and the United States. As soon as the war ended and the cold war began, the Communists switched their position again. The United States, the great ally of Latin America in the war, now suddenly became the great imperalist power that the Latin Americans must fight against. A few years later when Khruschev made his attack on Stalin's policies, the Latin American Communists, who had been ardent Stalinists, suddenly began portraying Stalin as a criminal in their newspapers, magazines, speeches and books.

This instability of the Communists, because they are fundamentally associated with the Soviet Union and not with the country in which they live, has inspired deep distrust among Latin Americans in responsible positions in political parties, labor unions, government and other organizations. They never know what change the Communists will be advocating next. Too, this instability is an important factor which has antagonized many intellectuals, formerly supporters, and others who believe in democratic principles, and who may have thought that the Communists were sincere when they advocated at a particular moment support of democratic reforms. At the present time, there seems to be an antagonism developing between the Soviet Union and China. Who knows what the Communists will be advocating next as their official "line"?

Finally, and destined to play a decisive role in strengthening demo-

cratic movements in Latin America is our new policy in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress. To grasp the full meaning of this massive undertaking to aid Latin America, we must again see the world picture. The Alliance for Progress has the same meaning for the present that the Marshall Plan had for Europe immediately after World War II. The objective of that plan was to reconstruct Europe as a means of preventing Communism from gaining a foothold on the continent in the west. Everyone knows the great success that attended this effort. But not everyone is aware that following the Marshall Plan, and made possible by that Plan, was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Orginzation, known as NATO. This was a second broad measure aimed at strengthening another value of the west, its military potential to supplement the economic recovery going forward under the Marshall Plan.

One of the very important dividends from NATO, apart from its military aspect, it that it brought European leaders together to cooperate in a mutually beneficial organization. Out of this cooperation emerged the creation of a European Common Market, for in NATO the Europeans had learned the value of submerging their antagonisms. It was but a step to submerge their nationalistic predjudices so that they could cooperate economically and add to their strength by abolishing tariff barriers and permit, as we do in the United States, the free flow of goods across boundaries.

The effect of this new economic cooperation is creating a prosperity in Europe that is unheard of in her history. Another effect of her new strength is, of course, a blow to the Soviet Union's hopes of taking advantage of conflicts between European nations. Finally, the example of a prosperous Europe is creating difficulties for the Soviet Union because of the continued low standard of living in the neighboring satellite states. It is entirely possible, also, that this weakening of Soviet influence in Europe is a cause of the conflict between Soviet Union and China. The Chinese have been insisting that Khruschev made a mistake when he changed Stalin's harsh anti-western policies.

The bearing of this European situation upon Latin America is very clear. The present Alliance for Progress which proposes over a period of years to pour twenty billion dollars into Latin America is identical to the fundamental objectives of the Marshall Plan in aiding Europe to raise its standard of living after World War II. The urgency for such a Marshall Plan for Latin America is just as great, principally because the extraordinary rate of population growth is intensifying poverty since the increase is naturally among the great masses of the people who are already on a low standard of living.

The Alliance aims to support the building of industries in all countries, to construct new railroads and highways, to meet the extremely pressing problem of house construction. Under the Alliance, for example, Panama has already received a grant of 20 million dollars to improve the housing of the poor. Other funds will go to support needed health programs to stamp out endemic diseases. Still other funds are earmarked to develop the immense resources that exist on every hand in this territory which embraces more than ten million square miles.

The effects of this massive program will provide a myriad of opportunities for the growth of the middle class and a whole range of employment opportunities for the huge urban populations. The Soviet Union, far removed geographically from Latin America, can offer nothing comparable to this emmense effort on the part of the United States. As such, the Alliance for Progress is a blow to Communist influence in Latin America in the same way that the Marshall Plan was a blow to Communist plans to take over Western Europe after World War II.

Important also as further evidence of new economic changes going forward in Latin America that will contribute to combatting Communist activities is the recent creation by fourteen Latin American countries of two common markets. They have been greatly influenced by the success of the European common markets in raising the standard of living. Here, too, the Alliance for Progress is giving important support for the effort to establish a common market in Latin America for great material obstacles must be overcome, such as the construction of communications between the various countries. Though not directly bearing on the subject we are discussing, it might be noted parenthetically here that the Alliance for Progress will, in undertaking to provide the immense amount of industrial goods necessary to develop an area of ten million square miles, have an effect on our own economy similar to that of the opening of our great West in the nineteenth century.

Corresponding to the military program represented by NATO for Western Europe is the Inter-American Defense Board. This came into existence during World War II and became part of the 1947 Rio Treaty to which all Latin American nations and ourselves are signatories. In any event, all aspects of the program we launched with the Marshall Plan to block Communism in Europe are now functioning in Latin America, with, as in Europe, the cooperation of the Latin American states.

This brings us to the immediate concern of Communism in Latin America: Cuba. Our recent meeting at Punta del Este, where our policy

was to expel Cuba from the Inter-American Organization, represents a very important victory in the struggle against Communism in Latin America. It is true that not all of the Latin American nations went along with us, but a majority did do so, and Argentina has since changed her vote to add weight behind this inter-American policy. There are two important considerations that attach to the action of the American countries at Punta del Este. The first is that we did have the unanimous support of all the nations in branding the present regime in Cuba as inconsistent with the ideals of the New World. We got that support precisely because the history of all the Latin American nations has been one that rests upon a background of capitalistic and democratic development. On the other hand, none of the nations, not even Cuba, has had any organic connection with Communist development.

The second consideration is one to which I attach great significance, namely, that Cuba in this struggle against the policy of the United States received absolutely no support from the Soviet Union. There were many things the Soviet Union could have done to aid Cuba-given the assistance of the considerable number of disciplined groups of Communists in all the Latin American nations. She could have poured large sums of money to finance demonstrations, riots, strikes, and other disturbances in any number of the Latin American cities as a means of bringing pressure upon governments to reject our policy. Again, the Soviet Union, through her disciplined groups, could have exploited and, of course, misrepresented for propaganda purposes, the legal reasons Mexico, for example, advanced for not going along with the majority. In other words, Cuba has received a taste of the Soviet Union's policy of using her or deserting her when it suits the foreign policy of the Soviets to do so. We can expect to hear repercussions in Cuba of this failure of the Soviet Union to give Cuba strong support. Castro has as a result of the action at Punta del Este suffered a very serious blow to his prestige.

Finally, it is my opinion that Cuba, having been forced into the Soviet Union's orbit by the deception practiced upon her by Castro, has placed herself but temporarily outside the normal development going forward in all the other Latin American countries—namely, an evolution of democratic practices and capitalistic economic growth. I believe it is only a question of time before the pressure exerted by the American nations at Punta del Este, together with the pressure flowing from the beneficial effects of the Alliance for Progress, will result in creating a situation within Cuba that will result in the overthrow of the Communist regime there. Then Cuba will resume her normal role in the family of American nations.

COMMUNISM AND THE EMERGING STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFRICA

By Thomas J. Bellows*

The general topic assigned to me calls for a discussion of both Southeast Asia and Africa. I should like to make clear at the beginning, however, that the major portion of my training has been with regard to Southeast Asia. Therefore, because I am more familiar with developments in Southeast Asia, most of my generalizations in this talk will be based on this area, though by and large they also hold true for sub-Saharan Africa.

It is a valid premise to assume, I believe, that we are all familiar with what is meant when I say I shall consider those portions of Africa south of the Sahara. However, the rather generic term Southeast Asia is of more recent origin and many of you may not be familiar with what this term embraces. Southeast Asia is a term which came into common use during World War II to describe the territories of Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo and the Phillipines. Like all generic terms, it is open to a number of objections but since we use the term Southeast Asia mainly for the sake of convenience, consideration of these objections is unnecessary here.

I. COMMUNIST DOCTRINE

Before going further I think it would be beneficial if we spent some time considering Communist doctrine. When classical Communism was applied to the emerging, underdeveloped areas of the world it was transformed, and this transformation is the threat we in the United States today face as we look toward Africa and Southeast Asia.

Communism continues to prophesy a "class crisis" in the highly industrialized countries which are in the advanced stages of capitalism. This crisis, it is argued, will precipitate the coming of the Age of Communism. The countries toward which the preceding prophecy of doom is especially directed are the United States, Canada and Western Europe.

It is the essence of Marxism that the bourgeoisie in capitalist society create the class that will destroy it—the proletariat. The victory of the proletariat is inevitable according to Communism's scientific determinism. As the factory system of the bourgeoisie develops and

*Mr. Bellows is Assistant Professor of Political Science at West Georgia College.

the highest stages of capitalism are reached, the concentration of monopolistic capital and the exploitation of the proletariat is facilitated. Accordingly, the crisis of capitalism and the subsequent Communist revolution take place only when the maturation process is completed and capitalism has become overripe and decadent. The revolutionary seizure of power by the working class finally occurs as extreme industrialization produces a great concentration of plant facilties and workers in the urban areas. Concomitantly there is over-production followed by a depression of the worst type, culminating in the pauperization of the masses and the bourgeoisie.

It is apparent that if the Communists were to adhere strictly to the above doctrine, their resources and expectations would be directed almost exclusively toward the United States, Western Europe and Canada. It is equally apparent that contemporary Communists are not this naive. Rather, they are realistically directing their major efforts toward the agrarian, poorly developed and technologically backward areas of the world—especially Africa and Southeast Asia. It is in these underdeveloped lands where the hopes of Communism lie and where the great dangers for the non-Communist world exist. If the underdeveloped nations of the world fall prey to the Communist blandishments, the very existence of western democracy is theatened with annihilation. At stake in this struggle is a majority of the world's people, the vast natural resources which these people will eventually harness and control, and ultimately, the fate of the United States itself. [1]

A. CLASSICAL DOCTRINE OF MARX.

Classical Marxism, as found in the writings of Marx himself, assigned no significant role in the Communist revolutionary struggle to the economically backward areas of the world such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

Whether or not Marx was familiar with developments in these areas, the very nature of Marx's theory required that the revolution of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat take place in a technologically advanced, capitalist country, not in the agrarian, technologically backward and industrially underdeveloped societies of Asia and Africa. Therefore, the major concern of Karl Marx was the problem of the industrially mature countries, Western Europe in

[1] For an enlightening and readable discussion of the world's natural resources and implications for the future see Harrison Brown *et al., The Next One Hundred Years* (New York: Viking Press, 1957).

particular. Marx predicted his theory on the basis of the suffering and degradation of the masses which surrounded him in the industrializing England of the nineteenth century.

The colonial areas of Southeast Asia and Africa did not exhibit the requisite property and class maturation necessary for the final class struggle leading to the Communist state of nature.[2] Thus, these colonial areas and peoples were "backward" in their development. These were Asiatic or Oriental peoples, rarely referred to by Marx except in disparaging terms. The millennium for the peoples of Asia and Africa would come, and this is implicit in Marx, as a result of one of two conditions: 1) the revolution of the proletariat in Europe which would in time lead to the liberation of Southeast Asia and Africa; or 2) After Southeast Asia and Africa had gone through the advanced stages of capitalism, fulfilling the required steps in the process of dialectical materialism preliminary to an indigeneous proletarian revolution.

In essence, the Communism of Karl Marx ignored, for all practical purposes, the underdeveloped areas of the world such as Asia and Africa. Communism would come to these lands either very, very late, or as a result of the rise to power of the proletarian dictatorship in Western Europe. Southeast Asia and Africa did not have even a negligible role in Marx's dialectic. These areas of the world were peripheral in the truest sense of the word to Marx's Communism.

B. TWENTIETH CENTURY COMMUNISM.

Since this is not to be a theoretical discussion of the evolution of Communist ideology, I feel it is fair to span the century between Marx and the present and to consider the new Communist ideology. For now, if the Communist Revolution is to move forward it will only do so in the emerging states of the world such as those in Africa and Southeast Asia. This emphasis on Southeast Asia and Africa is now an integral part of what I would call the "new" Communism — the Communism of the twentieth century. What was peripheral for

[2] The Communist utopia, so hazily envisaged by Marx, would, I believe, be a state of nature. In this earthly paradise, which Communism is supposedly striving toward, the fundamental problems of production and distribution would have been solved. Thus, the rigid discipline and oppression that feudalism and capitalism had imposed on the masses could be relaxed. Production and distribution would come to be the work of freely associated, informal groups, assisted but not controlled by technical advisors. Government and the ideological class super-structure which have oppressed society for so long would wither away since the forms of production in the Communist utopia could no longer prostitute man's rational powers. It would then be possible for social co-operation to be based on man's reason which is no longer corrupted by a distorted class ideology.

Marx is integral for Twentieth Century Communism.

In the lands of Southeast Asia and Africa, which are characterized as feudal societies, Communism proposes to bypass the capitalist stage. It is not now necessary for the rather pristine lands of Southeast Asia and Africa to develop an advanced form of capitalism before the proletariat can seize power through a workers' reolution. Neither is it necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat first to seize power in the advanced capitalist nations and then liberate the colonial and former colonial areas of Southeast Asia and Africa. All this has changed. No longer will dialectical materialism culminate in the overthrow of capitalism in the technologically advanced countries of the Western world. No longer must every country evolve a factory system and a concomittant proletarian-bourgeois conflict in order to break down the old feudal institutions and adopt the higher forms of social relationship which the Communist envisage. The last exploitative stage in dialectical materialism, capitalism, may be skipped.

Current Communist dogma holds that, largely because of the aid which the Soviet Union gives to the Southeast Asian and African Communist parties, these respective areas can bypass the capitalist stage and proceed immediately from the feudal stage to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dialectical materialism of Marx is no longer applicable to those areas in which the Communists are now experiencing their greatest success. The irreconcible dichotomy of affluence and poverty continues in Communist ideology, but this has been transferred from a national to an international setting.

C. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING.

Althought Communists have not entirely ignored class conflict within nations, the new strategy is to stress the inevitable class conflict between nations which are at different stages of economic development. The reference group for the poverty-stricken, underdeveloped states of Southeast Asia and Africa is the relatively few, wealthly, industrialized nations of the world. This reference group is negative in the sense that its progress and accomplishments are looked upon with a jaundiced and frequently jealous eye. The industrialized West is a positive reference group in the sense that Africa and Southeast Asia hope to emulate the West's achievements. Lenin skillfully described the countries of Asia and Africa as the "exploited" and the industrial countries of the world as the "exploiters." Thus, all manner of discontent can be blamed on the "exploiters" (the wealthy nations of the world).

The new dialectic is not a struggle between classes within a nation-state, but it is a struggle between the working class nations and the

bourgeois nations. The epitome of the "new" working class are the nations of Asia particularly, and this is where the threat has manifested its most dangerous characteristics. And, paradoxically, this is why Communism, which originally posited victory only as the result of an advanced form of class struggle within a nation, is having its greatest success in the relatively backward lands of Southeast Asia, and probably soon, Africa.

This brings me to the second point I should like to discuss with you.

II. THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS

A. THE SPREAD EFFECT.

Unfortunately, the world is dividing into rich nations and poor nations, into proletarian nations and bourgeois nations, and the material extremes between these two groups has increased alarmingly since approximately 1920. The differential living standards between underdeveloped and highly industralized countries during the past four decades have been widening rather than narrowing. According to the statistical services of the United Nations, the industrialized countries of the West are not only far ahead but are pulling further ahead. Their rates of economic progress on the whole continue to be more rapid than those of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. [3]

While the desires and expectations of the peoples of Africa and Asia are stimulated by various groups, not the least of whom are the Communists, these areas are falling behind as the goals to which they aspire are incessantly being raised by the rapid technological advances of Western Civilization. The aspirations of the Asians and Africian

[3] "There is some reason to suspect that the difference between the richest and poorest populations of the world have been increasing in the years since 1920. The diagram of pre-war real incomes between 1925 and 1934 shows a difference between the per capita incomes of China and of the United States of the order of one to ten. About twenty years later, after the war-caused devastation of China and the war-borne expansion of American industry, the corresponding United Nations figures for 1949 show a contrast between the two countries of the order of more than one to fifty. This fivefold increase in the spread between American and Chinese real incomes is matched, to some extent, by the threefold increase of the spread between the real per capita incomes of India and the United States from one to eight in 1925-34 to more than one to twenty-five in 1949.

This richest 11 per cent of the world's population lives in 8 countries, has 56 per cent of the income. The poorest 54 per cent of population lives in 57 countries, has 15 per cent of the income." Quoted from Karl W. Deutsch *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., and the Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953), pp. 41-43.

are continually stimulated as they increasingly appear to be falling behind.

The greater the economic development of the West, the greater is the spread effect between the West and the nascent economies of Asia and Africa. To state this very simply, the rich are getting richer, and the poor, poorer. We might note briefly that social tensions, which are the food of Communism, are not an expression of position but rather of unfulfilled expectations. It is expectation which determines dissatisfactions and satisfactions. It is understandable then that the Communists have exploited the unfulfilled Asian and African expectations to the limit.

We stand at a very unusual moment in history. Never have so many expected so much. Never have so many been made to feel that legitimate aspirations are unattainable in the present national and international order. Thus, the growth of social tensions is nurtured and the work of the Communists becomes easier.

B. COMMUNIST REALISM.

Another factor directing Communist efforts toward Southeast Asia and Africa is their frequently ignored paragmatism combined with, in this instance at least, a realistic reading of history.

Stalin's success in expanding the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc was almost exclusively in the less advanced portions of the globe. Nations such as Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Albania which were taken over by the Communists following World War II were at a low level of economic development. No less notable are Outer Mongolia, China and North Vietnam. Czechoslovakia, a highly industrialized state, was a deviant case.

The preceding does not fail to take into consideration the fact that Communist armies were present on the soil of these relatively "backward" nations. What has changed in the past fifteen years is that the victorious and conquering armies of the Soviet Union and China have been replaced by armies of subversives supplied and directed by the Chinese and the Soviets. Even today Communist success in underdeveloped nations is correlated with the level of subversion.

Revolutionary Communism is a disease of modern industrial society, but it is a disease of early childhood and youth rather than maturity. Countries in the early stages of modernization (more properly referred to as social mobilization—in particular, areas such as Southeast Asia and Africa) are the most vulnerable. Only in the poor and technologically backward nations have Communist revolutionaries seized and held power. Even if the Communists were to consider only the

developments of the past four decades it would not be surprising if they devoted much of their efforts to areas such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

III. THE INTELLECTUALS

Now that we have reviewed briefly the general Communist approach to Southeast Asia and Africa I should like to consider some of the indigenous factors, especially some of those present in Southeast Asia.

One of the most important groups in Southeast Asia today is the intellectual.

A. THE NEW ROLE IN HISTORY.

In the creation and erection of emergent states in the expanse of human history intellectuals have never played such a prepotent role as they have in the rise of the nations of Southeast Asia and Africa.[4] In the past new states have been established by military subjugation, by the succession of racial, linguistic or kin groups lead by the traditional tribal and warrior chiefs, or by the gradual extension of the royal house through intermarriage, agreement or conquest.

In Western civilization in modern times politics has never been an exclusive preserve of the intellectuals. Aristocrats and landed gentry with ample leisure have provided much of the personnel of politics. Clergymen and the merchant middle class have also added to the ascendant groups in Western political development.[5]

In Asia and Africa the intellectuals are playing the eminent role in creating the emergent nations. They are the instigators, formateurs and rulers of the new nation-states. And, this is something new, never before experienced to this degree and on such a prevalent scale in history.

One reason for the political ascendance of the intellectuals in the new states is that there was practically no one else.

The royalty and nobility of the old dynasties were withering and

[4] For an extensive discussion of this development see Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," *World Politics* XII (April, 1960), pp. 329-68.

[5] A melliflous account of the participation of all these groups in nineteenth century England may be found in O. F. Christie, *The Transition from Aristocracy: 1832-67* (London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1928).

became appurtenances of the colonial powers.[6] Business and enterprise were dominated by the foreigners. The prudence and narrowness of their concerns excluded what indigenous middle class businessmen there were from politics.

B. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT.

There have been a number of implications resulting from these newly created, we might almost call them "intellectual," nation-states.

One of these implications is historical in nature. Pre-World War II Communism had a tremendous impact on what were then the colonial areas of Southeast Asia, mainly through its effect on the intellectual. Messianic Communism gave to Southeast Asia, as no other secular ideology nor religion has done, the idea of both personal, and more important, national salvation—ideas which previously had been almost alien to this portion of the world. Philosophic Buddhism and Confucianism, the two major religions of Southeast Asia, provide moral precepts, not salvation.[7] Now for the first time salvation was offered to Asia, particularly to the intellectuals, one which was clearly delineated and could be realized in the material world through the efforts of the intellectuals themselves.[8]

Deliverance was to be found in the establishment of a rational,

[6] This situation has had its parallel in Western history. Louis XIV exiled the leading nobles of France to Versailles where he consoled them with pensions and flattered them with empty but impressive court duties. The nobles found their strength and influence drained away as they no longer trod their estates. The result was that the social and intellectual center of France was Paris where the salons were located. Out of these salons emerged the *philosophes* and the Enlightenment. The consummation of these developments was the French Revolution and a new concept of nationhood based on reason and the participation of all citizens.

[7] This is "intellectual" or "philosophic" Buddhism and Confucianism. These two religions as practiced by the illiterate peasant masses, became intimately concerned with personal salvation. However, these religions became so amalgamated with animism and superstition that salvation might vary from locale to locale or even from village to village. The Muslim religion of Indonesia is another problem. As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, it is in many if not most respects so intermingled with animism and Hinduism as to have lost much of its Muslim character. The Hinduistic aspects which the intellectuals emphasize did not stress a "personalistic" salvation. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

[8] Professor Eduard Heimann has particularly stressed this aspect of Marxism through tending to ignore the salvation aspect of the traditional religions as practiced by the masses. See "Marxism and Underveloped Countries," *Social Research,* XIX (September, 1952), pp. 322-45. What Communism gave to Southeast Asia was a consentient means of salvation for the entire nation if the "vanguard" would but follow and preach doctrine.

classless, Communist society following liberation from colonialism and the rise to power of the proletariat. This was to be achieved under the direction of the intellectual elite who could understand the objective historical conditions necessary for winning the revolution and establishing the Age of Communism. Thus, would many of the ablest intellectuals turn to Communism, individuals such as Ho Chi Minh and Chou En-lai.

Intellectually directed salvation is not new to contemporary history. Robespierre's "Republic of Virtue" was to be achieved by an enlightened elite. The roots of this of course can be traced back to the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment.

The salvation aspect of Communism has a particular appeal to the intellectuals of Southeast Asia, because the "philosophic" religions which they might otherwise follow did not preach salvation.. Redemption will come with the Age of Communism when the intellectuals, as the "vanguard," facilitate and seize direction of the process which is already in motion. This in turn is intimately related to the notion of inevitability. The absolutist character of the dialectical process is what is particularly exciting to the "vanguard." They take inspiration in declarations such as that of Nikita Khrushchev which boasts, "All the world will come to Communism. History does not ask whether you want it or not."

Communism, which is a Western ideology based on an analysis of a particular stage in Western development, had to be imbued with inevitability in order to compete with the influence of Christianity. If the Communists were to generate the energy necessary to lead a world revolution they had to be inspired with the belief that their cause was not only desirable and possible but also inevitable.

Any system of thought which has its origin in the West, wherever it may be transplanted, must preach inevitability or it can never hope to maintain its vitality. Otherwise it will break on "The Letter of Paul to Titus" which declares: "For the grace of God has dawned upon the world with healing for all mankind; and by it we are disciplined to renounce godless ways and worldless desires, and to live a life of temperance, honesty, and godliness in the present age, looking forward to the happy fulfillment of our hopes when the splendor of our great God and Savious Christ Jesus will appear." The Messianic character of Marx's Communism, which is explained by its Western origin, is eagerly seized upon by the intellectuals of Southeast Asia and other underdeveloped nations of the world.

Admittedly, all intellectuals in Southeast Asia did not turn toward

Communism. However, the elitist, intellectual struggle for independence from the former colonial powers has continued to have serious ramifications following the awarding of independence.

For one thing, the intellectuals, by virtue of their Western education, their thinking in terms of Western political problems, and their feelings of superiority, frequently find themselves detached and alienated from their own people because of their peculiar status in society. Too often only the Communists have been able to overcome these problems through party discipline and the assurance that they are part of an inevitable historical process which directs their strategy and tactics. Communist intellectuals are particularly conscious of their roots in the masses. [9]

Another result of intellectual leadership is that almost all the political parties are monolithic organizations organized and controlled from the top. Most political parties may be characterized as a network of personal ties and obligations among a few hundred elite. It should be emphasized that this intellectual elite comes largely from the recently urbanized segments of the population who have received the most extensive Western education and have adopted some version, even if in prostituted form, of Western political philosophy. This intellectual elite, claiming that they were capable of embodying all legitimate interests of their societies, aroused the illiterate peasant masses to rise up against the colonial powers who in turn ceded to them political direction of the new nation-states. Except for the Communists, the intellectuals rarely set up mass party organizations which could function effectively once independence was achieved. The tendency today is increasingly to restrict admission to the ranks of the national elite. This tendency has emphasized developments which would encourage a new aristocracy, this time an intellectual elite which would control the national political life. The result has been that following independence continuing dissatisfactions are exacerbated by the only mass organization in the emergent states, the Communist Party.

IV. A FEW EXAMPLES

We have thus far discussed Twentieth Century Communism as applied to Southeast Asia and Africa, the Revolution of Rising Expectations, and the peculiar role of the intellectuals in the new states of

[9] An illustration of this fact is the island of Java where the Communists have become the single most powerful political movement. A major cause of their strength is that they have emphasized local organization. Thus, ambitious youth whatever their original political predisposition, are inclined to join the Communist Party as a means of personal advancement.

Southeast Asia and Africa.

I should now like to discuss some specific cases which indicate how the Communist threat is free of doctrine and how this compounds the problem facing the United States. Dissatisfaction are exacerbated without reference to ideology or even in contradiction to ideology.

A Communist propaganda pamphlet in Sumatra attempted to show that "religion, *adat* law and prosperity" were one with Communism and this atheistic Communist leaflet quoted directly from the Koran—the Muslim scriptures.

Incongruous as it may seem, a leading Burmese Communist was publicly reprimanded by the Reds when atheism and anti-clericalism crept into his writings. For a long time the indigenous Burmese Communists attempted to reconcile Marxist theory and Buddhist philosophy-theology.

The directive from the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 declared: "The Party must utilize every conflict, however significant." This they have done.

When the Soviet Union first established an embassy in Thailand in 1948 nearly two hundred members were assigned by the Russians to their new embassy, a number entirely disproportionate to the size of Thailand. The major occupation of these Russian officials was to find out the grievances and aspirations of the local Thai in hopes of reaping a return on them at a future date.

At times even local non-Communists have trouble distinguishing the Communist absorption of perennial problems. King Savang Vatthana of Laos refers to the current Communist seizure of Laos simply as "the Annamese problem." This is because Laos has so many times been invaded by their western neighbors, the Vietnamese. In this instance the perennial problem has become a Communist problem and one that could well endanger the stability and peace of the entire world.

Another example is South Vietnam. Since 1945 the Vietnamese have been subjugated to a war of attrition by the Communists. The people are war weary and will turn to any side that can offer temporary peace and stability. There is no security in Vietnam, and the situation appears to be growing worse.

In reality the peasant masses seem to follow neither the Communist Viet Cong nor the American supported Ngo Dinh Diem. Tired of war and insecurity, in each zone they rally to whatever authority is in power. It would be fair to say that the rural masses will lean to the side where they find a promise of peace, security and an acceptable daily life. They will turn to the Communists only as the Communists appear to

control the countryside. The Viet Cong infiltrators from the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam create such a state of anarchy that the peasants will turn to them, not for any ideological reason, but simply for some type of imperturbation.

I shall say only a few words about sub-Saharan Africa because this is not my area of specialization.

Not until recently have the Communists directed their energies toward Africa and therefore Communist strategy is at variance with that now being developed in Southeast Asia. At present it is not the policy of the Soviet Union to establish Communist parties in Africa, but rather for the Communists to align themselves with African neutralists and nationalists movements which do not conflict with Soviet strategy. [10]

The Communists are using the familiar pattern of creating "front" organizations to promote their propaganda and penetrate the economic and social life of the African peoples. These organizations are designed to carry out Communist policy and mask their real purpose behind a facade of ideals which are acceptable to progressive public opinion.

One example of "front" organization toward which the Commonists are directing their efforts is the World Federation of Trade Unions which is particularly active in training African trade union "militants." The W. F. T. U. hopes to keep Africans out of the main stream of the international labor movement and establish a footing through Communist-indoctrinated union leaders. Thus, it appears that the Communist penetration of Africa is only in its initial stage and that the future will challenge even more intensively our resources.

I am concerned about an indigenous African cultural factor which may possibly favor the growth of Communism on this great continent. This is the African predilection toward one-man or one-party rule.

The Defense Minister of Ghana, Mr. Kofi Baako, recently advocated a one-party system of government for all Africian countries. Baako emphasized that traditional patterns of African society have never had room for opposition. This position is supposedly based on the cultural condition of personal rule by the chief. The chief was never voted out of office, his tribesmen merely waited for him to die.

Modern manifestations of this cultural pattern are found in recent elections returns. Dr. Hastings Branda's party in Nyasaland received 99 per cent of the vote. In 1960 Kwame Nkrumah's party in Ghana

[10] A succinct description of Communist tactics may be found in "The Cold War in the Tropics: Communist Pressure on the African Mind," *Round Table* LI (December 1960), pp. 15-21.

received the support of 90 per cent of the voters. The Democratic Party in recent Ivory Coast elections achieved a 99 per cent majority. All the seats in the Upper Volta Assembly are controlled by a single party, the African Rally, and the story continues.

The Communists offer a solution to all grievances and they do this through one-party rule. How much easier will their task be in Africa if one-party rule is an accepted cultural pattern.

CONCLUSION

What now is the solution to all the problems that have been raised? I have no solution. I can only suggest some of the problems to consider for those of you seeking solutions.

The "united front" such as that proposed at Geneva for the Kingdom of Laos is not, I believe, the answer. The greatest danger to the United States comes in those situations where the Communists find it expedient to talk *modus vivendi,* united fronts and peaceful coexistence. There are indications today that a new, more conciliatory phase may be in the making. It would be shortsighted to regard this as a sign of weakening Communist pressure on Southeast Asia and Africa. We might very well be guided today by what Rudyard Kipling wrote, almost four score years ago, concerning the Siberian Bear:

> But this is the time to fear,
> When he stands up like a tired man, tottering
> near and near;
> When he stands up as pleading, in wavering man
> brute guise;
> When he veils the hate and cunning of his little
> swinish eyes;
> When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like
> hands in prayer;
> That is the time of the peril—the time of the
> Truce of the Bear.

Then some will say that the answer is to modernize and industrialize the emergent nations as quickly as possible. Only then will their expectations join with reality and the social tensions in the Southeast Asian and African milieux cease. It is a common observation that the Afro-Asian leaders, that is the intellectuals, have come to define the greatness and the success of their societies in terms of economic achievements.

Are all of these lands capable of developing mature, industrial societies which only then can meet the legitimate aspirations of the

people? Not since the industrial revolution began have nations industrialized other than at the expense of the masses.

Aneurin Bevan, the late, fiery, left-wing British Laborite, candidly stated: "The great deal of capital aggregation (current wealth and affluence) we are at present enjoying, are wages our fathers went without."[11]

Then others will suggest Japan as a blueprint for Asia and Africa to follow. But this is not the case. Japan entered the industrial age when, fortuitously, there was a silkworm disease in Southern Europe and the Taiping rebellion cut off China's silk exports to Western Europe. Thus, by monopolizing the silk market for a period Japan was able to accumulate the necessary capital to finance her industrialization program. Furthermore, Japan built her industry on the backs of the peasants and workers. Heavy taxes were placed on the peasants, and unions were suppressed to facilitate low wage rates.

Therefore, if we rapidly industrialize Southeast Asia and Africa, can we tolerate the exploitation of the masses for at least decades? Empirical studies have shown that wherever industrialization occurred rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and the industrial situations, a higher proportion of extremist working class movements emerged. I only suggest for your consideration the possibility that rapid industrialization might encourage those very conditions we are striving to prevent. It is difficult with the appeals of the trade unions, the welfare state, the socialists, and even the Communists themselves, to restrain the demands of the peasants and the workers in order to provide the captains of industry with investment capital.

It has been argued that the immediate answer is to democratize these areas—give the greatest number possible the right to choose their leaders through constitutional procedures. However, never has democracy had to face the problems it now faces in Southeast Asia and Africa.

[11] Although the eve of the industrial revolution in Great Britain was 1760, I believe the greater part of the nineteenth century could be accurately described as part of this continuing process. Charles Booth's 17 volume *Life and Labor of* the People of London showed that 30 percent of London was at or beneath the level of base subsistence in 1900. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman declared in 1903 that 12 million Englishmen were "underfed and on the verge of starvation." Joseph Chamberlain quoted Professor Thorold Rogers to the effect that the English working class was worse off in the nineteenth century than they were at the close of the fifteenth century. See O. F. Christie, *The Transition to Democracy*: 1867-1914 (London: George Rutledge and Sons, Ltd., 1934). p. 287.

Democracy may endanger economic development by allowing public pressure for consumption to divert resources from investment. The result may be a conflict between the intense commitment to industrialization and the demand of the masses, for immediate social services. This conflict may very well undermine the democratic state. Even if democracy is achieved in an underdeveloped nation, it is under constant pressure from inherent conflicts in the developmental structure. There is the ever present conflict between the demands of capital accumulation and welfare benefits.

Shall we then draw on our supposedly more sophisticated experience here in the West and the advice based on this experience, which will either be accepted by the countries of Southeast Asia and Africa or result in the loss of United States economic aid? I would suggest that we would alienate more friends than we could possibly make.

The only country to which we are currently and obviously offering foreign aid with strings attached is South Vietnam. In this instance, however, the situation borders on disaster.

During the past eight years we have provided the Republic of Vietnam with over $300,000,000 yearly, over 50 per cent of their national budget. Nevertheless, not until this past year, when his regime appeared on the verge of collapse, did President Ngo Dinh Diem begin instituting those vital reforms we have been urging him these past years. And, think of the cost. We now have 4,000 United States troops in South Vietnam and we face the distinct possibility of a war with Communist China. It is better that we not impose our reforms if we must reach such a crisis as the above to precipitate the acceptance of our advice.

The essence of the problem involves Gunnar Myrdal's principle of circular and cumulative causation. There is no tendency toward automatic self-stabilization in the social system. Change does not call forth countervailing change but rather supporting changes in the same direction and increases the tempo of these changes. Variables are interlocked in circular causation so that change in any one induces others in a similar direction.[12] Therefore, if we are to propound any solution we must be fully aware of supporting changes which will follow.

In conclusion, I must emphasize my belief that there is no pat solution, that we must consider very carefully our proposals and all their ramifications. I have simply suggested that you look carefully at the problem and just as carefully at the proposed solutions.

[12] See Chapter II in Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

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STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME II JUNE, 1963 NUMBER 1

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Population Change in Georgia
By John L. Fulmer 3

Changes in Georgia Agriculture
By J. W. Fanning 18

Industrial Change in Georgia: Problems, Implications and Prospects
By Kenneth C. Wagner 29

Political Change in Georgia
By Thomas Askew 46

Representative Government: Can and Should This Have a New Meaning for Georgians?
By Betty A. Vinson 66

FOREWORD

This publication is an outgrowth of a series of lectures held at West Georgia College during the Winter Quarter of 1963 under the joint sponsorship of the Division of Social Sciences, the Department of Adult Education and the League of Women Voters. Designed to acquaint students and interested adults with various aspects of change in Georgia and their implications, the lectures were delivered to the West Georgia College student body at daytime meetings and to adult groups in the evening as part of the College in the Country program of the Department of Adult Education.

The three sponsoring organizations are indebted to numerous people in the respective groups who gave assistance and encouragement, to members of the History Club for their assistance, to President James E. Boyd and the Board of Regents who gave their support and made money available for the lectures and this publication, to Mr. Tracy Stallings of the West Georgia College Public Relations Department for many invaluable services and, especially, to Mrs. Carol Gladney for her untiring secretarial assistance.

The lectures are published with the hope that they will be as stimulating to the reading public as they were to those who heard them when they were delivered.

J. Carson Pritchard, Director
Department of Adult Education

Mrs. Elizabeth Cobb Boyd, President
Carrollton League of Women Voters

John M. Martin, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences

POPULATION CHANGE IN GEORGIA

By JOHN L. FULMER*

Most of our modern problems begin with population pressure. Rapid growth of population since World War II has alarmed many and we hear the term, "population explosion." In fact, I have heard the remark: "If it were not for people we would have no problems." Philosophically, I could not imagine a career without problems, and I believe we can say that one major objective of college education is to teach problem solving. Life certainly would be dull without problems, without obstacles to overcome or mountains to climb. Just think how dull earth would be if we were to turn it back to wild animals, and how quiet also. No, I think we want earth peopled by humans with their problems—at least most of them.

Experts estimate that the world's population will increase from 2,900 million in 1961, to 4,000 million in 1975, to 6,000 million in the year 2000.[1] Our national population is expected to grow from about 187 million, currently, to 380 million by the year 2000, or more than double the present population. Georgia's population is placed at 8,203,000 for the year 2000. Atlanta's population may be around 3,000,000 by that date.

Startling as these projections may sound, we get a real shocker when we realize that the figures just given, quoted from experts[2] in the field of population projections, mean that the gains in world population which it took 200,000 years to attain, will be more than matched in the next 40 years, a time span within the lifetime of most in this room. These projections do assume, however, that no great world-wide destructive force will be unleashed in the next 40 years. Should a world-wide atomic war break out, or if a biological type of warfare is started insidiously, then we may move backward some thousands of years in the earth's total population.

With this background for our discussion, I should like to outline

*Professor, School of Industrial Management, Georgia Institute of Technology.

[1] *United Nation's Review,* V, No. 8 (February, 1959), p. 19.

[2] Select Committee on National Water Resources United States Senate, "Water Resources Activities in the United States: Population Projections and Assumptions," 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print No. 5, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, p. 29.

for you briefly the main contents of this paper. It will be presented in four parts with a summary and conclusion at the end. The four major parts are: (1) population profile of Georgia, (2) population trends and projections, (3) population problems, and (4) impacts of population change. In my discussion of the profile of Georgia's population, I will paint a broad picture of the population characteristics of the state. The second part on trends and projections will examine the important population trends over time, the tendency for population to concentrate at certain points. We shall also look at Georgia's population prospects in the next decade. Our discussion of population problems will be concerned with births and deaths, aging, and urbanization. The fourth section will examine the impacts of population growth and concentration on the state's economy, and in a concluding section, we shall try to draw the argument together in a tight package indicating what all this may mean for the future of Georgia and all of us.

I. Population Profile of Georgia[3]

A broad look at Georgia's population indicates that three in ten are nonwhites; the median age is 27 years. Over half live in urban centers. Almost one-fifth were born outside Georgia, and also about one-fifth work outside the county of residence. Seven-tenths drive to work in a personally owned automobile or car pool. Females outnumber males by 8 per cent. In Atlanta, females aged 20-29 outnumber males by 20 per cent. Thirty-five per cent of all Georgians work; in Atlanta the ratio is 40 per cent, but only 26 per cent in Quitman County work. Almost one-tenth are engaged in agriculture, one-fifteenth in mining and construction, slightly over one-fourth in manufacturing, and almost six-tenths are employed in trade, government, finance, transportation and related activities. Over one-fourth of the state's population live in Metropolitan Atlanta and nearly 28 per cent work there.

One-fourth of Georgia's adult population, 25 years old or over, have completed high school or college. The ratio for the Negro population is only one-third as large. Over 44 per cent in Atlanta have completed high school or college. The median years of schooling completed is the ninth grade, compared to 10.6 grades for the U.S. In Georgia, white females have the highest educational level, 18 per cent above the median years of schooling, while colored males have the lowest, 41 per cent below the median.

[3]Basic data have been extracted from the following U.S. Censuses of Population for 1960: (1) United States Summary, Final Report PC (1)-1C; (2) General Social and Economic Characteristics, Georgia Final Report PC (1)-12C; and (3) Detailed Characteristics, Georgia Final Report PC (1)-12D.

The median income of persons fourteen years old or over in Georgia in 1960 was $1,928 compared to $2,798 for the United States. White males in Georgia earn 75 per cent above the median income, with colored females being at the lower extreme, or 66 per cent below the state's median income.

These figures are not intended to impress or confuse you. Instead they have been given to show you, first, how very complex a subject like population is, even though at this point we have just broadly brushed over the profile of Georgia's population. In the second place, this resume has been presented in order to bring alive the concept of population and to stimulate your interest in pursuing individual research projects along some of these lines.

II. Population Trends and Projections

There are four major population trends in Georgia which are especially noteworthy for this talk. They are: (1) an accelerating rate of overall growth, (2) rising concentration of population in a comparatively small number of counties and a few urban centers, (3) decline in migration loss, and (4) continuation of the decline in the ratio of the state's Negro population, although with a surprising absolute increase in the total Negro population for the first time since 1920.

A. Accelerating population growth

Georgia's population growth by decades is as follows:[4]

Decade	Population Increase in Decade	Per Cent Increase in Decade
1930-40	209,000	7.0
1940-50	329,000	10.5
1950-60	499,000	14.5

The extent to which Georgia's population is accelerating is shown by comparisons between decades. The increase in the decade 1950-60 was 2.5 times the 1930-40 increase and almost 50 per cent larger than during 1940-50.

B. Increased concentration of population

The rising concentration in a few counties and centers is demonstrated in several ways. First, population growth of the six major cities greatly outstripped the state's growth. Compared to a state growth of 14.5 per cent in 1950-60, Atlanta had an expansion over 2.5 times

[4]The 1960 Census of Population, Advance Reports: Final Population Counts for Georgia, December 2, 1960, p. 1.

this rate; the other major cities (Albany, Columbus, Augusta, Macon and Savannah) had a composite growth over twice the state's percentage increase.[5]

The effect of growth in Atlanta and five other urban centers on Georgia's population growth is shown by the following tabulation:[6]

Decade	Per Cent Increase due to Atlanta	Per Cent Increase due to 6 Metropolitan[7] Centers
1930-40	46	71
1940-50	51	96
1950-60	58	91

The data show that even during the decade 1930-40 Atlanta accounted for almost half of the state's growth, and in 1950-60 almost six-tenths. The six major metropolitan centers were responsible for 70 per cent of Georgia's population growth during 1930-40 and over 90 per cent in 1950-60. Georgia's growth therefore is dominated by the population increase of six metropolitan areas and is significantly influenced by what happens to Atlanta's population growth.

More rapid growth in these six centers has increased the concentration of these areas. This is shown by the fact that in 1950 the six centers accounted for 37 per cent of the state's population. By 1960 this ratio had advanced eight points to 45 per cent of the state's total.

A second indication of the increased concentration of the state's population is found in an analysis of the rapidly growing counties, that is, counties which have a rate of growth sufficient to attract in-migrants. Analysis of population increase in Georgia for 1950 to 1960 discloses that 23 counties had a population increase in excess of the natural increase, indicating in-migration. These counties are: Baldwin, Bibb, Camden, Catoosa, Chatham, Clarke, Clayton, Cobb, Columbia, DeKalb, Dougherty, Douglas, Glynn, Gwinnett, Hall, Houston, Liberty, Lowndes, Muscogee, Richmond, Rockdale, Whitfield, and Wayne. There are additionally three counties which probably qualify as gaining from in-migration. They are: Fulton, Peach, and Walker.[8] It will be observed

[5]*Loc. cit.*

[6]Basic data are from the Census Reports of Population for 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960.

[7]Albany, Atlanta, Augusta, Columbus, Macon, and Savannah.

[8]The 1960 Census of Population, Advance Reports: Final Population Counts for Georgia, December 2, 1960.

that the 26 counties listed include all of the major cities of Georgia, with many counties constituting the fringe areas of these cities.

Analysis of the 1960 population data indicates that these 26 counties in the composite had a total population growth which was 15 per cent greater than the state's total population increase in 1940-50 and 14 per cent above the 1950-60 increase. The dominance of the state's population growth by these 26 counties is further shown by the fact that in 1940 they accounted for 40 per cent of Georgia's total population, 47 per cent in 1950, and 55 per cent in 1960. It is significant and startling that over half of the state's population is concentrated in 26 counties.[9]

C. Negro population trend is reversed during 1950-60.

Trends in the Negro population in Georgia are of interest because for the first time in forty years the downward trend in numbers was reversed significantly during 1950-60. The increase was 62,000, or 5.8 per cent, representing about one-third of the overall percentage increase for the state; however, 58,800 or 95 per cent of the total increase was in the Metropolitan Atlanta area.[10] The other interesting point is that while the ratio of the state's total population Negro continued to decline, the rate was decelerating as compared to some recent decades. In the case of Metropolitan Atlanta, the ratio of population Negro declined from 23.8 to 22.8, a very small drop in the ratio as compared to the 1940-50 decade. The Negro population in the Atlanta area, as is well known, is concentrated in Fulton County but particularly in the City of Atlanta. Because of extension of the city limits from incorporations, Fulton County outside Atlanta had a net decline in the population Negro. The City of Atlanta proper had a gain both absolutely and relatively. The actual increase of the city's population Negro was about 65,000, or 5 per cent greater than the state's total. The ratio of population Negro in the City of Atlanta rose nearly two points, or from 36.6 per cent to 38.3 per cent. The conclusion is that Atlanta is becoming increasingly attractive to migrant Negroes both from Georgia and from other points probably.

[9]*Loc. cit.*

[10]Censuses of Population for 1930, 1940, and 1950; and "Population and Housing," Atlanta Regional Metropolitan Commission, 1960, pp. 27-30. The 1960 data have been provided through the courtesy of Mrs. Peggy Breland of the Atlanta Metropolitan Planning Commission. See also the *Atlanta Journal* of March 14, 1961, which has a story on Negro population in Atlanta compared to some other cities in the United States.

The trend in the ratio of Georgia's population Negro is as follows:

Year	Number (000)	Percentage of total Population
1920	1,206	42
1930	1,071	37
1940	1,084	35
1950	1,063	31
1960	1,123	28

Source: Bureau of the Census, Population Reports.

D. Migration loss is declining.

In the period 1956-60 Georgia lost about 20-25 per cent of its natural increase through migration to other states, representing from 15,000 to 18,000 persons yearly, of whom about 45 per cent were in age classes 18-34 years of age.[11] Migrants represented slightly more males than females. A preponderance of the out-migrants in the period were Negroes, who in the decade 1940-50 accounted for about 75 per cent of the state's loss from migration. During 1960-61, for the first time since World War II, Georgia gained 15,000 to 20,000 people from in-migration. This surprising reversal of a strong trend has come four years ahead of expectations.

The decade migration loss ratio is as follows:[12]

Decade	Per Cent of Natural Increase Lost
1930-40	50
1940-50	48
1950-56	41
1957-60	22
1950-60	30

The decline in the loss ratio during 1950-60 was due to improved

[11]Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Characteristics of the Population, Series P-20, "Mobility of the Population of the United States April 1958 to 1959," No. 104, September 30, 1960, pp. 12-13. The ratios are national averages. Georgia's population gain during July 1, 1960, to July 1, 1961, was 89,000 persons. See Series P-25, No. 258, November 21, 1962, p.3.

[12]Data for 1930-40 and 1940-50 from: John L. Fulmer, "Population Estimates of Georgia Counties for 1956-57, with Analysis of Reasons for Changes from 1950," Special Report No. 33, Engineering Experiment Station, Georgia Institute of Technology, December 1957, pp. 5-8. Data for 1950-60, from author's calculations.

economic opportunities in the state relative to some other areas, and to a changed attitude relative to the state's potentials. If Georgia continues to accelerate its economic growth, especially at rates comparable to job expansions in the period 1960-62, migration loss should be definitely at an end by 1965.

E. Population projections.

This section is based on a recent study, prepared for the Georgia Department of Labor,[13] in which employment trends by major industrial category were analyzed and projected to 1970. This study concluded that the state could reasonably expect to add 265,000 jobs from 1960 to 1970 with a rapid upsurge, beginning about 1965 when the post-war babies begin to mature into the labor force. The corresponding population increase would be 703,000 persons, up more than 200,000 persons, over the decade gain for 1950-60, with a total population of 4,658,000. The corresponding estimate for Atlanta is 1,425,000 and for the six metropolitan centers, 2,536,000, or 54 per cent of the state's total. The other counties showing rapid growth and recent high concentration of population are expected to continue to develop rapidly. Thus recent population trends are expected to accelerate.

III. Population Problems

The problems are too numerous to permit much more than a mere cataloguing. But for the sake of the discussion planned, we shall touch on three problems briefly. They are: (1) birth and death rates, (2) aging population, (3) and urbanization.

A. Birth and death rates are high but declining.

The South is generally regarded as having significantly higher birth rates and natural increase than the rest of the country. But detailed analysis of crude birth and death rates for Georgia during the period 1950-57 shows that the state's higher natural rate of increase is due to two factors: (1) lower death rates among whites, and (2) higher birth rates among Negroes in Georgia. While birth rates among whites in Georgia are less than five per cent higher than the national composite, death rates are 15 and 25 per cent lower among urban and rural whites, respectively. Birth rates among Negroes in Georgia are 30 and 55 per cent higher than the national average for urban Negroes and farm Negroes, respectively. The fact that death rates are proportionately higher (30 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively) reduces

[13]John L. Fulmer, "Georgia Employment Trends 1947-1960, 1965, 1970," Georgia Department of Labor, October 1961, pp. 58-60.

the natural increase among Negroes in Georgia, but due to the overwhelmingly higher birth rates, the natural rate among Negroes in Georgia remains significantly higher (30 per cent) than the national increase.[14] If the differentials due to race between Georgia and the nation were removed, crude birth rates would be only 0.3 per thousand higher than the national average, but the crude death rate among southern whites is 20 per cent lower than the national average. The result is still a natural rate of increase that is 15 per cent higher than the national rate. Growing urbanization will in time remove most of these differences.

B. The age distribution is distorted.

The age distribution of Georgia's population reflects the low birth rates of 1930-1945 and high rates since World War II. There is a relative scarcity of age classes 20 to 35 as a result of low births during the 1930's. On the other hand, high post-war births have built up relatively large numbers in the age classes below 20 years. This build up in youngsters will be felt most heavily about 1965 when a sudden upsurge in numbers of young people maturing into the labor force will be experienced. This will put a heavy demand on jobs.

Declining death rates is causing another build up in population among the older age classes. While the ratio of older persons in Georgia's population is 20 per cent below the national ratio, the relative number of persons 65 and over increased 83 per cent from 1930 to 1960, or from a ratio of 4.0 per cent to 7.3 per cent.

The highest ratio of older persons is found among rural farm people (8.3 per cent in 1960) and lowest in the urban areas (or 7.1 per cent in 1960), which is 14 per cent below the ratio for rural farm population.[15] This seems to indicate a higher death rate among the urban population. As the population cohort develops a more normal distribution by 1970 and beyond, and also as a result of an expected further decline in death rates, it is expected that the ratio of persons 65 years old and over will rise continuously for many decades in the future. This means that we can expect to have more of the older people in the population both absolutely and relatively. The problems, needs, and demands of our older citizens are bound to grow more pres-

[14]Vital Statistics of the United States, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics); U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1961.

[15]Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Georgia. Final Report PC (1)-12C, p. 186.

sing in the years ahead.

C. Urbanization is closing up on the national ratio.

In 1960, U.S. population was 70 per cent urban; the Middle Atlantic States, 81 per cent; and the South Atlantic, 57 per cent. Georgia's urban population ratio was 55 per cent in 1960, up 10 percentage points from 45 per cent in 1950. This ratio should be contrasted to 85 per cent for New York,[16] one of the most urbanized states in the nation. The trend is definitely toward higher urbanization for all the states of the nation. Georgia and the South will probably lead the parade to higher urbanization ratios because growth is inherent to cities. If Georgia rises to an urban ratio of 60 per cent by 1970, 2,800,000 people will be living in urban centers compared to 2,180,000 in 1960.

Further urbanization is inevitable but it will enlarge a number of serious economic and social problems now quite troublesome. They are crime and juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, unemployment and poverty, and mental ailments of all sorts. The scope of this paper will not permit me to dwell on any one of these topics in detail. Looking at one or two briefly, we find that 50,000 persons were arrested in Atlanta last year for drunkenness, many repeaters. If we include traffic violations, several thousand youths are apprehended yearly for a variety of crimes. The unemployed, particularly those of long term duration, are a serious problem. Most are unable to train for higher type jobs which are in demand. The alcoholics represent maladjustments and mental breakdowns of various sorts. The juvenile offenders come from poverty stricken homes in slum areas, from broken homes often. Many of their parents are recent migrants to the city who have not been able to make proper adjustments to a complex world. A high percentage are high school drop-outs who damn their futures by lack of preparation for a skilled or technical job.

A parallel problem is traffic congestion which frays the nerves and at times brings everything to a standstill. In a typical year, Atlanta may hand out around 150,000 traffic summons. This problem too will grow tragically worse. In 1950 the five-county area of Metropolitan Atlanta had 248,821 motor vehicles of all types registered. At the end of the decade the number had increased 73 per cent, or to 432,268.[17] Of the 1960 total of over 430,000, about 15 per cent were trucks and

[16]U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1961, pp. 21, 23.

[17]State of Georgia, Revenue Department, License Tag Information, Motor Vehicles, State Capital, Atlanta, Georgia.

trailers, a total of 68,403. In the last five years of the decade, automobile registration increased 14,200 yearly and trucks and trailers at the annual rate of 4,200. By 1970 the area will be operating at least 675,000 motor vehicles, of which around 110,000 will be trucks and trailers. Although no one knows the limit of human endurance, it is suspected that by that date it will be much closer to some definable limit than is obviously true now, unless a public transit system succeeds in moving a much higher ratio of the working population to downtown than presently.

We are drowning in an affluent society. All are unhappy about traffic congestion; remedies are known. But no one has the nerve to take the lead in achieving a solution. Fairly obvious answers are available to many of the others problems which beset our city culture. Some brave and persistent souls are working at them and are making a dent in the problem but again disinterest, lethargy and callousness command the scene.

IV. Impact of Population Change

I shall discuss this topic briefly in terms of the following points: (1) general population growth and market demand, (2) rise of cities and economic development, and (3) migration and the transfer of resources.

A. People with money make a market.

More people with the same purchasing power give some growth in market demand but market growth occurs primarily in the necessities of life. An increase in people with more money to spend per capita also gives a rising market but of different character from the former. Population growth accompanied by higher per capita incomes is what the marketers want because this gives them not only a buoyant market but a fascinating market because it can be manipulated. This is the sort of market we have had in the United States for several decades. A market expanding at the rate of 3.5-4.0 per cent per year compounded is constituted of two elements—1.5-1.7 per cent population increase and a rise in productivity (or standard of living) of about 2.0 per cent. A market of this sort enables consumers to broaden demand to luxuries, recreation and travel, buying more expensive clothes and automobiles. The businessman greets such a market with zeal. It pays him to develop new products and advertise. From the standpoint of the economy, it means greater demand for investment in research and to expand plant capacity. Furthermore, money can be obtained by taxation to provide

social capital—highways and education.

During the next 10 years we expect a population increase in Georgia of 18 per cent and a rise of at least two per cent per year in per capita income, a total growth in the market of 40 to 50 per cent—not counting the gradual rise in prices. If this is included it is expected that Georgia's economy will advance from 6.4 billion dollars personal income payments in 1960 to 11.0 billion dollars[18] in 1970, a market growth of 72 per cent. You (and I) anticipate with pleasure this prospective growth because of its impact on jobs. Yet businessmen are even more interested because of what it means in terms of growth in volume of sales and investment demands.

B. The rise of cities as a factor in economic growth.

The city is the basic building block in economic growth. The larger the city up to a certain point (traffic congestion, etc.), the more growth forces are inherent to the city proper. This arises because of specialization and division of labor and leadership factors which are at a premium in the larger centers. Large cities attract adult job seekers and particularly the enterpriser types. This influx develops a demand for housing, house-furnishings, recreation and similar types of consumption. This in turn leads to a construction boom and related impacts on other businesses in the area. This is called the multiplier effect. The mere fact that a given market is within telephone range or a short distance by travel gives the person of unusual ability scope to develop his talents. There is also a pyramiding of financial power.

Hallenbech[19] in his volume, *American Urban Communities,* finds a direct correlation between the ratio of a state's population urban and the proportion of its citizens listed in *Who's Who.* Florence[20] emphasizes greatly the importance of the intercommunication of designs, inventions and ideas to rapid economic progress. For three metropolitan areas in the western world he shows that the proportion of such specialized personnel is in multiples of the areas' labor force. The three areas he has reference to are London, Paris and New York, and I cite his data directly:

[18]John L. Fulmer, "Georgia Employment Trends 1947-1960, 1965, 1970," Georgia Department of Labor, October, 1961, pp. 59-62.

[19]Wilbur E. Hallenbech, *American Urban Communities,* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 137.

[20]P. Sargant Florence, "Economic Efficiency in the Metropolis," in Robert Moore Fisher (ed.), *The Metropolis in Modern Life* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 90.

"In 1931 Greater London contained 19.5 per cent of the employed population of Great Britain. But it held 52.7 per cent of all workers engaged in making scientific instruments and apparatus other than photographic and electrical . . . .

In 1946, the Department of the Seine (the metropolitan area with its center at Paris) contained 12.2 per cent of the employed population of France but held: 36 per cent of the engineers, 37 per cent of the industrial designers, 34 per cent of the technological workers, 37 per cent of the lab workers, and 32 per cent of the chemists.

The New York metropolitan area contained 11.2 per cent of the total employees in American manufacturing industries in 1947, but also held: 56.5 per cent of all workers employed in surgical manufactures and medical instruments, 40.5 per cent of all workers employed in making scientific instruments, 32 per cent of all workers employed in making electrical measuring instruments, and 17.5 per cent of all workers employed in making mechanical measuring instruments."

The manner in which a city of a million population dominates an area as large as a state is shown by some figures on the relative importance of Atlanta[21] in the economy of Georgia. No later than 1957 we find that with 24.7 per cent of Georgia's population, Atlanta, however, had a proportionately higher percentage of the state's economic activity in the following items: retail sales, 34.4 per cent; wholesale trade, 65.7 per cent; construction employment, 38.8 per cent; employment in finance and related activities, 62.2 per cent; and so on with numerous other measures of the state's economic activity, including the professions, that are concentrated in Atlanta.

Young persons hunting a job will find proportionately a greater variety and number of jobs the larger the city. For instance, a city the size of Atlanta has a turnover of about 6,000 jobs monthly plus a growth of about 1,000 jobs, giving a total of about 7,000 job opportunities in the course of 30 days.

C. Migration and the transfer of resources.

Population growth is constituted of two components—natural increase and net migration. We have previously explained natural increase as the difference between births and deaths. Net migration is the balance left from the interchange of persons moving out and those moving in. Rapid population growth cannot occur without migration gain. Georgia had a net migration loss of 214,000 from 1950-1960[22] where-

[21]John L. Fulmer, "The Challenge of Economic Development in Georgia: Part III, Atlanta's Leadership," *The Atlanta Economic Review,* IX (October, 1959), p. 8.

[22]Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Population Estimates, Series p-25, No. 247, April 2, 1962, p. 4.

as Metropolitan Atlanta had a net migration gain of 120,000 during the same period. In the decade 1950-60[23] Georgia's growth was 14 per cent, whereas that of Atlanta's was 40 per cent. Georgia lost 30 per cent of its natural increase while Atlanta added 43 per cent to its natural increase.

It is more advantageous as a general rule to an area to gain population through migration than natural increase. For one thing the more aggressive *and better* educated persons are usually attracted to the cities in underdeveloped states, seeking opportunities and even making opportunities. On the other hand, the growth from natural increase is less selective and is burdensome in terms of the cost of rearing and educating such workers to manhood. Realistic estimates during 1950-60 of the cost of educating and rearing a child to manhood vary from $5,100 in rural areas to $14,600 in urban areas.[24] During the period 1930-60, it has been estimated that this capital drain from Georgia was between two and three billion dollars.

Based on studies by Hoover and Ratchford[25] of the educational and occupational characteristics of migrants for the period 1935-1940, it is concluded that in-migrants to the South have a substantially higher educational level than out-migrants. There is a substantially higher percentage also of professional, managerial, and skilled workers among in-migrants.

The South (and Georgia) have thus gained qualitatively from the migration interchange with other regions. Migrants from other areas have helped to fill the state's deficit of professional, managerial, and skilled workers.

V. Summary and Conclusion

Georgia's population picture is a varied and interesting one, similar to a kaleidoscope or a terrain map. It is significant that nearly one-fifth of the inhabitants were born outside the state and a similar number work in a county other than the county of residence. Fifty-five per cent reside in urban centers. Over one-third are gainfully employed; and trade, transportation, government, finance and services occupy about 60 per cent of them. Females outnumber males by eight per cent

[23]Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission, "Population and Housing, 1961," April 1, 1961, pp. 2-7.

[24]John L. Fulmer, "Migration Studies for the Southeast River Basins Area," U.S. Study Commission, December, 1961, pp. 3, 48.

[25]C. B. Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, *Economic Resources and Policies of the South* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 38-40.

and Negroes constitute less than 30 per cent of the population.

The most important population trends are: (1) overall growth is accelerating; (2) city population is the fastest growing segment of the population, six metropolitan centers accounting for over 90 per cent of the state's growth; (3) population growth is tending more toward concentration in a few cities and adjacent counties; (4) during 1950-60 Negro population declined relatively but increased absolutely for the first time since 1920, with 105 per cent of the state's increase occuring in the city of Atlanta; (5) migration loss is declining and may shift to a net in-movement around 1965, reflecting better job opportunities; (6) Georgia's population estimate for 1970 is 4,658,000 and Atlanta's, 1,425,000; (7) urban population is expected to rise to 2,800,000, up 620,000 from 1960.

Several important population problems condition the state's future. The high birth rates of the Negro population accompanied by high death rates in urban centers is troublesome and should be corrected. The natural increase of Georgia's population is 15 per cent above the national rate due entirely to the higher birth rates of Negroes. The age distribution of Georgia's population is relatively heavy in the younger ages and the older ages. This creates problems of finding jobs for an upsurge of youngsters in the labor force about 1965, and oppositely, a complex and serious problem of caring for the aged. The trend toward higher ratios of population urban, concentrated in larger cities, promises to intensify problems of crime, poverty, unemployment, and traffic congestion.

The impacts of the most important population trends underway in Georgia (and accelerating) are reflected in larger markets, more rapid economic growth, and relative gains in professional, skilled and managerial talent from the migration interchange with other regions.

The conclusion from all of this is that we are living in an exciting era in Georgia. The prospects for the development of the state are the best that they have ever been. This means enlarged job opportunities for all those with professional competence or training in skills. Yet these opportunities pose certain challenges—in education, economic development, and social welfare. Our educational and training programs must be enlarged and strengthened to help an expected larger number of young people fill jobs that will be available. The age old problems of crime and poverty in the most prosperous era of mankind are still with us. In fact, they are likely to get worse because of increased population congestion. It troubles our spirit to know that there are

those misguided to crime, and even more so, that there are children and young persons denied opportunity for personal development because of unemployment and poverty. It is not enough to be sorrowful over their unhappy lot; we must help to find a solution. This is the challenge to me, to us, to everyone here—to help make our Georgia a better state—a state of equal opportunity and justice for all. It is late, and we must hurry to bestir ourselves. I have already begun. Will you join me?

CHANGES IN GEORGIA AGRICULTURE

By J. W. FANNING*

The history of Georgia is a fascinating account of a people settling a new land, building a spectacular culture, fighting tenaciously to hold onto a way of life destined from the beginning to be "Gone With The Wind," and courageously and with much faith gradually rising from abject poverty to build a new economy and culture. Even though much has been accomplished toward the solution of its economic, social and political problems, much remains to be done.

Georgia has been a farming land. Prior to 1860, its people cried out against urbanization. "Shall we build cities while the forest is untouched by man?" questioned a Georgian in 1860. "Shall we erect factories, those parents of hollow cheeks and sunken eyes and short lives while the cheerful land invites us to healthful and remunerative labor?"

In those days, Georgia had more than $500,000,000 invested in land, buildings, implements, fences, livestock and slaves. Its investment was less than $10,000,000 in 1890 manufacturing establishments. Fewer than 12,000 persons were employed in factories against 350,000 in planting and harvesting. Seventy-five cents of every dollar of real and personal property in Georgia at that time was invested in agriculture. Forty-seven cents of every dollar of wealth was in slaves.

Between 1860 and 1865, the farming systems of Georgia fell apart as well as the culture they supported. Agriculture was almost completely destroyed. In 1865, a people lay flat on their back. That they rose under almost unbearable circumstances to build anew without a Marshall Plan or Alliance For Progress funds is a tribute to their endurance, courage and faith — and the abundant resources of this state — its climate, water, soil and location.

Today, 100 years later, you and I can observe a new way of life that has come to this pleasant land. No longer is it characterized by cotton and forty acres and a mule. It is a land of tractors, electric lines, fewer and bigger farms, growing cities, urban sprawls, expanding industries and changing rural and urban communities. Through the blue skies fly airplanes transporting its people to every part on the

*Director, Institute of Community and Area Development, University of Georgia.

globe. Giant dams hold in store the waters of its rivers for use in producing electric power — and a means by which boats can transport its products to many lands. Truly, the dreams of Henry Grady and others who saw a new Georgia and South are approaching fruition.

You and I live in this new and developing state. We observe its changes, discuss the ensuing problems, and try to understand the impacts and implications of these upon a way of life and dream of its future. I am convinced that to those of us of this generation has come the challenge and responsibility of further reshaping an economy and remodeling our communities. We face, therefore, momentous decisions on economic, social and political questions.

For the next few minutes, I should like to direct your thinking to the position of agriculture in this new Georgia. I shall try to examine some of the changes taking place within this industry, the resulting problems, implications and possible adjustments. I hope to challenge you to make your own analysis of this basic industry in Georgia's future growth.

GEORGIA'S AGRICULTURE IS HIGHLY DIVERSIFIED

Georgia's farmers secured $770,563,000 for the products which they produced and sold in 1961. The income from livestock, milk, eggs and poultry was $412,880,000. That from crops in the same year was $357,683,000. Not only are the total sales of farm products in Georgia rising from year to year, but this increase is being reflected in a great variety and diversity of products. Highly significant is the fact that the sales of livestock and poultry now equal and often exceed those of crops.

The three most important sources of crop sales within the state are cotton, tobacco and peanuts. But of no minor significance are a great variety of other crops including fruits, nuts, feeds, food grains, vegetables and flowers and ornamentals.

The chicken has moved into first place as a source of farm income in Georgia. Among livestock and poultry enterprises, eggs are in second place, followed by hogs, cattle and calves, and milk in that order.

There is a tendency for modern farm businesses to specialize in the production of one or two commodities. However, the total agriculture of Georgia remains highly diversified which is quite advantageous. The origin of industrial development in this state lay in the processing of farm products. Beginning with cotton and the textile industry,

expansion took place gradually as new enterprises came to Georgia farms. For example, the peanut butter industry came with peanut production, the canning industry with vegetables, the dairy industry with milk, the livestock processing plants with more hogs and cattle, and the giant broiler processing industry with the expansion of broiler production. Thus farming contributed to an expanding employment and investment base in Georgia's economy.

Georgia has another crop which occupies two of every three acres of land. This is trees, principally pine. The product of these 23,000,000 acres is the base for the diversified wood processing industries of the state including pulp and paper plants, lumber, furniture and many others.

Within the past 15 years, a new word has been coined to describe and emphasize the interrelationships of agriculture-industry-business. This word is agribusiness. It embraces three segments of our economy. The first is the production of the farms which in Georgia in 1961 was $770,000,000. The second is the value added to these products by industry in their assembly, processing and distribution. This amounted to approximately $2,000,000,000 for the products of Georgia farms in 1961. This simply means that you and I as consumers paid $2,770,-000,000 for the products which brought the farmers of this state $770,000,000. It's interesting that more people are now employed in assembling, processing and handling farm products than in producing them. You and I are demanding more built in services in our foods than heretofore — even to the extent of having them precooked.

The third aspect of agribusiness is the spending by farmers themselves of about $500,000,000 each year for goods and services. Here is purchasing power which supports such industries and businesses as feed, trucks and tractors, fertilizer, seeds, insecticides, building materials and others. These are important industries in this state as are the businesses which handle the products.

Together these three segments of agribusiness in Georgia contribute over $3 billion to the economy of this state. On the national level, agribusiness comes to 20 percent of the gross business of the United States. I regret that I do not have comparable figures for Georgia, but the aggregate is great.

The point I wish to make is that agriculture is a dynamic and highly important industry in the economy of Georgia. From its basic production much new wealth is created and many new jobs are made.

GEORGIA'S FARM POPULATION HAS DECLINED

Within the past twenty years, the number of people on Georgia farms has declined by over 1,000,000 persons. Today, only 10.8 per cent of the population of this state reside on her farms, as compared to about half twenty years ago. This is a part of a long term trend in the decline in farm population. The past twenty years and more particularly the past 10 years has seen this trend greatly accelerated.

There are two reasons for this decline. The first is the expanding off-farm employment opportunities that came to farm people during and after World War II. They moved quickly to take advantage of these higher income advantages.

The second reason was the coming to farms of electric and mechanical power and the fuller use of scientific methods. At the beginning of 1940, Georgia farmers had about 9,000 tractors. Today the number is close to 125,000. Twenty years ago, only a portion of Georgia farms had electricity. Today it is difficult to locate a farm without this power. One pair of hands can now do the work formerly done by 6 to 10 pairs, and with greater ease and less time.

To put this revolution in simple words it means that Georgia farmers have exchanged machine power for human power, capital resources for human resources. Under such an arrangement, human labor decreases per unit of product and capital resources increase per unit of product.

Let me illustrate further. The farmers of Georgia are devoting to each unit of output, as compared to 1935-39, two-thirds less labor, 40 per cent less land, twice as much fertilizer, one and one-third times more tractor power, 87 per cent less horse and mule power, and double the amount of purchased feed. This substitution of capital resources for human resources simply means that fewer people and fewer farms are needed to produce the food and fiber requirements of our markets. So, Georgia now has about 100,000 farms instead of 300,000; 400,000 people on farms instead of 1,500,000. Larger farms have come into being and Georgia farms now average about 180 acres compared to 80 acres forty years ago. And another significant fact is that about 30 per cent of all Georgia farms produce more than 80 per cent of the products going to market. This nation is depending upon fewer and fewer farms for its food and fiber.

One mistake is often made in a consideration of Georgia's agri-

culture. A declining population is quite frequently equated with a declining agriculture. This is erroneous. No longer does a drop in farm population mean a decline in farm production. The reverse has been true. We must recognize the fact, however, that farming is no longer a producer of job opportunities. It is no longer a cushion for town unemployment. This basic change has brought social and political problems to our society which we are struggling even now to recognize, understand and solve.

Farming is no longer a way of life to the extent it once was. It is a business, requiring large capital investments, and demanding expert managerial ability. It is a business offering the challenge of pioneer to the young man who likes to be challenged by natural as well as economic forces. It is a business crying out for an understanding by the society in which it exists in its new and radically different form.

GEORGIA'S AGRICULTURE IS A HIGHLY COMMERCIALIZED BUSINESS

Georgia farmers no longer produce for their own needs as was true in the days of subsistence or live-at-home farming. They now produce for a market. Their products are exchanged in the market place for dollars. The dollars received are then exchanged for goods which the farmer needs to operate his business. Another way of expressing this is to say that farming today is a highly commercialized business which is greatly affected by changes in economic conditions. The modern farmer is extremely sensitive to variations in the prices he receives for his products as well as the prices he pays for goods and services he uses in production and living.

Farmers now purchase from off their farms most of what they use in production and living. The modern farm has many of the characteristics of a processing plant. For example, the producer of broilers purchases feed and chicks and with his labor and housing produces a broiler. This is a far cry from the farmer who purchased nothing from off his farm to produce a commodity to sell. This twentieth century farmer incurs risks not known by his ancestor—risks that are economic as well as natural.

One of these risks is a widely fluctuating price that comes with a production either exceeding market demand or failing to meet market needs. A few years ago, the farmers of the United States sold 105,000,000 hogs for less money than they received for 95,000,000 the year

before. Those 10,000,000 additional hogs brought lower income rather than higher. This same economic phenomenon occurred in broiler production last year. The modern farmer with high cash and fixed costs has great difficulty with this situation and the ensuing fluctuating income. So, into the life of farmers has come programs of production control with Federal Government regulations. Here is one of the most controversial issues in America today. It is important to understand that it grew from a basic change in farming whereby price and dollar income have become so important in modern commercialized agriculture. Farmers wish to control supply to control price the same as industry does.

This new agriculture is greatly concerned with its markets at home and abroad. It looks with favor upon large urban populations, expanding job opportunities and rising per capita income. These make good markets for farm products of high quality. Also, United States farmers are students of foreign markets because here go more than $5 billion in farm products each year—cotton and tobacco are exported in large quantities. So are broilers. And lately as the European Common Market raised tariff barriers against broilers, our producers have been greatly affected.

There is still another characteristic of the modern Georgia farm that is both troublesome and unique. This is its insatiable demand for capital. High incomes in farming are associated with large investments of capital. For example, a $5,000 net income from dairy farming requires about $60,000 in capital. For this net from beef cattle farming, one must provide $100,000 in capital. Here are examples of how the modern farmer has substituted capital for labor. His problems now center around managing dollars to make them return their best. Thus management becomes one of the essentials in today's agriculture, and the modern commercial farmer is a business man in every sense of the word.

These changes have brought about the elimination of the "share cropper" from Georgia farms, certainly as he was known in the past. As the share cropper declines in numbers there has come a system of tenure in which the tenant is an owner of capital and more of a partner in the business. Thus tenancy becomes a step toward the ownership of a farm business—and not a stigma of poverty and lack of opportunity.

AGRICULTURE IS IN A NEW SETTING

The majority of the people of Georgia now live in cities and towns. Farm people have become a minority group with only 10 per cent of the total population. The chances are that farm population will decline further in this state from its present 400,000 level. But this will not affect gross production. Production per hour of labor continues to rise and even though 22,000 jobs may be lost in farming in this 10 year period, the size of the farm plant will not decline.

Dr. Norman J. Wood of the University of Georgia projects a decline of 22,000 jobs in farming in this decade even though the total work force in this state is expected to rise by 320,000 or 23.3 per cent. Agriculture finds itself, therefore, in an economy with expanding non-farm jobs but contracting farm job opportunities. For the commercial farmer this poses no problems of consequence except those of a social and political nature. Obviously, his markets will expand and the demand for his products will increase.

One of the more unfortunate developments in many respects is the decline in the number of people from large numbers of Georgia counties and many hundreds of its rural communities. Ninety-one of Georgia's 159 counties suffered a loss in population between 1950 and 1960. A projection by Dr. Belcher of the University of Georgia indicates that as many as 95 counties could lose population in the 1960-70 decade.

It is significant that 34 counties in Georgia exceeded a 20 per cent loss in the number of persons under 44 years of age between 1950 and 1960. Nineteen counties gained more than 20 per cent in the number of persons under 44 years of age. Obviously the 19 counties are gaining in a productive population base while the 34 counties are losing.

For many of the counties with a basically farm economy, no decline in farm income will likely take place even with a loss in population. Actually, the income in many instances has increased and will continue to do so. But a change in the retail and wholesale trade patterns in these counties is creating serious adjustments in their total economy. Even in these counties, however, per capita incomes or the ability to buy will increase.

AGRICULTURAL CHANGE IS BRINGING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

One of the most significant adjustments growing from an agriculture which demands fewer people on the farm but more in towns and cities is with its institutions such as schools, churches, business, and government.

As people go to towns and cities the problems of growth become acute. There is need for more schools, more churches, more business establishments and more government services. Thus the growing community has its headaches, too.

But, as people leave the county to go to towns and cities, the rural communities face a declining need for school facilities, church buildings and business establishments. The pressure is lifted somewhat from government for services but the nature of services changes, and demands upon government continue heavy. Thus, the adjustments upon a community with a declining population are extremely difficult to make.

We like to grow and we have a way of equating growth with a rising population. By this standard, not every community will grow, and those which do not have the problems of adjusting to a declining population, a new economic base, and a changing governmental and social structure. Here lies one of Georgia's toughest current problems, and one for which there is no easy solution.

Agricultural change is too often criticized for its part in causing changes in rural communities. It is true that many community adjustments grow from developments in farming which lead to greater efficiency but fewer job opportunities. But this should serve as a challenge in economic development growing from a rising efficiency in a basic industry.

AGRICULTURAL CHANGE RESULTS IN A CHANGING POLITICAL POWER BALANCE

One of the most fantastic developments in the world today is the ability of less than 10 per cent of the population of this country to more than adequately feed and clothe all of the people of this nation and provide a substantial surplus for export. My understanding is that 55 per cent of Russia's population remain on farms, yet their food and fiber

production is inadequate. In China the figure is around 90 per cent, yet food is in short supply.

A nation wrestling with the problems of adequate food orients its governmental policies in that direction, especially if most of its people are employed in farming. This has been the history of Georgia and the United States.

But, this situation no longer exists. Food is no problem. Employment in farming is less than 10 per cent of the labor force. Farm population is in the minority. These changes are resulting in a loss of political power by farm people. This decline has been evident for some time but its coming into clear focus now.

Evidence of this in recent years is the loss of the county unit system, the reapportionment of the legislature and the strong voice of urban leadership. You and I are seeing history in the making in the changing political status of rural and urban. Many look upon this as most unfortunate. Others see it as progress. And I believe all serious thinkers are greatly concerned that the new balance in political power be such as to contribute to sound rural and urban growth and development in our state.

AGRICULTURAL CHANGE BRINGS A CHANGE IN PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS

I have a way of thinking that much of what we believe about thrift, conservatism, work, freedom, independence and religion came from a close association with the land by a large segment of our population.

There is virtue in the soil and those who live close to it are by the nature of their existence conservative.

With a change from a live-at-home type of existence to one of extreme commercialization the philosophy of the farm and non-farm person tends to become very much alike. Both are confronted with a world made by others and subjected to forces over which they have very little control. And many persons wonder whether we shall continue to have a base of rural conservatism in our nation and state to call upon as a balancer.

I feel that some way must be maintained by which farm people can speak out on major issues of the day. It seems inevitable that an even larger proportion of Georgia's people will live in cities. The future of this state depends not so much upon what one group has to

contribute but on what many groups have to offer. Emphasis must continue to be placed upon those great moral and spiritual values upon which this society of ours was built. They are eternal and serve as mud-sills. I feel that farm people have a special contribution to make and their voices must speak loud and clear on many of the great issues of our present-day civilization.

THERE MUST BE EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH

Modern-day farms offer only about one job to every 10 of its youth. This will continue as capital is substituted for human resources, and productivity per man-hour in farming continues to increase.

But as farm jobs do not expand rapidly, the opportunities for employment in agricultural industries and businesses do expand. Within the factories processing farm products are an increasing number of job openings. And within the field of goods and services are a great variety of demands for well trained young people.

Into focus comes very plainly the need for the young people on Georgia farms to equip themselves well through education and training for expanding employment opportunities. Many will choose to farm and there is not today a more challenging business to test the fiber and intelligence of young people. But a greater number will seek employment in non-farm occupations found in cities, towns and metropolitan areas. Those who wish the best must prepare for the best—and the best begins with the education and training of the individual so far as employment is concerned.

AS WE EMBRACE MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, WE MUST LEARN HOW TO LIVE WITH IT.

The machine has come to Georgia farms to stay. In the air, on the water, upon the land, in the home have come the gremlins of science and technology to disturb an old way of life and build a new one. As farm people have embraced these, change has come in their way of life, which has extended to other segments of our society. We are often baffled by problems that come with change, and become confused in our thinking. But never will we go backwards. Never will farming return to the "good old days" of "forty acres and a mule," hard phy-

sical work, few conveniences and a "way of life." Gone are those days never to return.

We find we must continue to swing the doors open to science. We realize that attitudes must change, education must persist and skills must be developed. And surely capital must flow as machines and science continue to replace hard labor.

Our problem becomes one of controlling machines, planning for the full use of science and directing technology toward the kind of developments we need for quality in our living.

This is the new agriculture. This is the new challenge to young people in this great industry.

WE MUST SEEK AND FIND UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGE

I am convinced that among all our challenges one stands foremost. It is to strive to understand the forces at work bringing change in our way of life. Without understanding there can be no forward planning.

We must come to understand what we must do to build the new Georgia without losing eternal values.

We must come to understand that we as a state and each segment of our economy have a new place in the order of things.

I feel very strongly that we must deal with total community life both rural and urban as we build. City and country folks must sit around the same table to understand their respective problems and chart the community and area development voyage they wish to travel.

To you who must assume the leadership responsibilities of Georgia in a very short while, I extend congratulations. May I exhort you to examine thoughtfully and carefully all opportunities for growth and development, and to build your programs carefully. Look to your foundation and build strongly. And never forget the dreams of those who came ahead of you for a great Georgia, a dream which you must now carry forward. For as Ernest Rogers states

> The dreamer dies, but never dies the dream.
> Though death shall call the whirlwind to his aid,
> Enlist man's passions, trick their hearts with hate,
> Still shall the vision live. Say never more
> That dreams are fragile things. What else
> Endures of all the broken world save only dreams.
> The dreamer dies, but never dies the dream.

INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN GEORGIA: PROBLEMS, IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS

By KENNETH C. WAGNER*

Since Georgia is in the midst of an industrial, economic, social and political revolution the likes of which this great state has never before witnessed, the subject President Boyd asked me to address myself to is an extremely challenging and exciting one: industrial change in Georgia, the attendant problems, their implications, and Georgia's prospects for the future.

The implications and prospects of the changes which are occurring and the problems accompanying those changes are of especial importance for college students. For you are in the process of deciding what your life's work will be —yet you can scarcely hope to imagine what the world you will be living in will be like even a few years from now. Georgia in 1963 is already a radically different place than it was in 1959—or even in 1961. And the Georgia of 1970 will be more different still. You are going to find it difficult just to keep up with the changes that are ahead of us.

I am not thinking now of the number of people who will be living within the state a few years hence, or the interstate highways which should be completed by then, and similar matters. I am thinking of the types of industries we can expect to develop, of the types of employment they will offer, the skills that will be required, and the critical decisions you and those who follow you through high school and college will have to make regarding your careers and your future.

I am thinking of Georgia Tech's recently dedicated nuclear reactor—which exists, by the way, largely due to the vision, persistence and drive of your President, Dr. Boyd. This one facility alone can be expected to have tremendous ramifications for the future development of Georgia's industrial economy.

But I am thinking even more of the demands which this new era we are moving into will make on all of us. We are going to have to be more adaptable, yet in some ways more unyielding; we are going to have to be more imaginative, more creative, be better able to make

*Chief, Industrial Development Division, Georgia Institute of Technology.

decisions and to effect change. Those of you who are "getting by" now—those of you who are not exerting every effort to get as much as you possibly can out of your college years—will live to regret it. Those who struggle to develop your capabilities to their fullest have rich lives ahead of you.

A POINT OF VIEW

Before commenting on the industrial changes which have been taking place, I would like to note briefly certain aspects of our broad industrial development program at Georgia Tech, since I believe you should know what my viewpoint is before I make some of the remarks I plan to say to you.

In a very real sense my "business" is the engineering of industrial —and therefore economic and social—change. Some of my fine old professors would shudder if they heard me say that, because so often academic people feel that their role should be one of study and analysis only.

But I feel that each of us has an obligation to do what guiding and directing we can—and especially those of us who are engaged in research, for we have (or should have) far greater insight into the problems and potentials which require decision-making than most other persons are privileged to have. Too often, I am afraid, we abdicate what should in fact be one of our most important responsibilities. It is much too easy to define our role as a passive rather than active one.

The philosophy which dominates our whole industrial development research program at Tech is that the analyses we make—the reports we produce—are of no value to anyone unless they are put to use. If our findings and recommendations are not acted upon, we have fallen short of our goal. This is the philosophy which directs our demonstration project in Carroll County. Our aim is to have our staff members work with local leaders to help solve the problems which are now preventing fuller development of the county's potentials.

Our efforts therefore involve a combination of research and action—a combination which I personally feel is all too rarely found. One very practical reason for adhering to this point of view is the quite obvious one that inaction itself frequently has the effect of being negative action. Another key factor is that so often education is required—interpretation of research findings is necessary—before assimilation and use of research results can possibly be expected. Where such interpretation is necessary it seems apparent that the research job is

not complete until understanding has occurred. Where inaction can negate all the work that has gone into a research project, the choice actually is not between "pure" research or a combination of research and action, but between positive action or negative action.

So, we have written a manual to help guide and educate those who want to know how to develop their communities and their industrial potentials. We have made studies of the state's economy which focus not only on change that has occurred, but also on problems which exist and goals which we have recommended for future efforts. We analyze local industrial potentials and recommend specific actions which we feel are essential to the fuller development of available resources. We have made and continue to make many studies of markets which offer opportunities for new branch manufacturing plants or for possible new "home-grown" industries. We study the state's mineral and water resources, transportation facilities, port facilities and potentials.

We are particularly concerned also with special studies of our human resources. We also have a special interest in and are increasing the effort we are devoting to technical assistance to established manufacturers, in order to expedite their growth and diversification. And we have even had the temerity to prepare what we have called a "Preliminary Blueprint for Industrial Development in Georgia," which outlines a five year program covering everything from the need for topographic maps to the role the Governor should play.

Now, let's look at what has been happening to Georgia—particularly the industrial changes.

MANUFACTURING vs. AGRICULTURE

One bit of background information is necessary before we look specifically at changes in the state's manufacturing complex. That has to do with the dominance of manufacturing over agriculture. I mentioned earlier the rate at which change has been taking place. This is nowhere more evident than in the decline of agriculture as a major source of employment. Few people realize the extent to which manufacturing now dominates the state's economy.

If we look quickly at a map which shows where manufacturing employment exceeds agricultural employment and vice versa, we see that manufacturing dominates in 104 counties. (Carroll County is among these, with manufacturing jobs exceeding farm jobs by more than 4,000.) Agriculture still employs more persons in the remaining 55 counties.

But this is not the whole story by any means. In the 55 counties where farming still provides more jobs, the margin is usually very small. Where manufacturing dominates, the margin is often extremely large. To give you only the extreme example, Bulloch County has the largest surplus of agricultural workers over manufacturing—1,430. Fulton County, on the other hand, has a "plus" of more than 41,000 manufacturing workers! This is almost 15,000 more than the total "surplus" of farm workers over manufacturing employees in all 55 "agricultural" counties! And in many of the 55 manufacturing will soon dominate, since the trend in recent years has left a difference of only a handful of workers in many previously strongly agricultural counties which are now in the process of urbanizing and industrializing.

We could easily spend an hour talking just about the vast implications of this one small part of the story of industrial change in Georgia. Let's move on, however, to see what has been happening to industry in Georgia.

INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN GEORGIA

I do not intend to bombard you with statistics and charts, because I know few things that are more deadly in a verbal presentation. However, I believe a few of each can be enlightening. For example, a bar chart showing the changes that have taken place from 1940 to 1960 tells a great deal in a hurry. Textile employment went up from 1940 to 1950, but has dropped since then. Apparel, now the state's second largest employer, went up substantially in the first 10 years, then up still more sharply from 1950 to 1960. Furniture, lumber and wood products went up sharply from 1940 to 1950, then dropped back substantially. (This was due principally to the decline in small saw mills and planing mills.) Food processing, now the fourth largest manufacturing category, has gone up steadily since 1940, with a big percentage increase from 1950 to 1960.

It is important to note that all four of the state's major sources of manufacturing employment are in the low wage category. Together, they employ more than 60% of the state's manufacturing workers. It is obvious that we have not yet been successful in attracting the higher wage industries we badly need to balance the economy.

The fifth largest is the first relatively high wage industry — transportation equipment (except motor vehicles). This is, of course, principally Lockheed. The total in this category went from virtually nothing in 1940 and 1950 to its present rank of fifth by 1960. However, the total remains scarcely a third of the previous category.

The other categories show fairly steady but not by any means dramatic or sufficient gains—primary and fabricated metals, printing and publishing, chemicals, motor vehicles and equipment, machinery (except electrical), and electrical machinery. It is worth noting that in the electronics field, which is included in the electrical machinery category, we have done poorly indeed. While North Carolina and Florida, in particular, have surged ahead, our only significant plant is in the 100 to 250 employee bracket. Every other state in the area has at least one plant in the 1,000 employee and over category, and three plants in the 250 to 1,000 bracket as well.

We have also done poorly in chemicals, where in recent years our neighboring states have attracted from 24 to more than 400 times as much capital investment in chemicals as Georgia has secured. A quick look at the synthetic fiber plant picture shows Georgia again lagging badly. We are the only state in the area which has not attracted at least two of the newer type synthetic plants. (Our one plant is an older one which produced rayon and acetate, not nylon or orlon or one of the newer fibers.)

One important aspect of the change which has occurred is that most of the new industrial jobs have been generated in only a few counties. Actually, more than one-third have been concentrated in only three counties in the Atlanta area. A total of only seven counties—Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, Chatham, Hall, Glynn and Clarke—have gotten almost half the total accumulated by the entire state.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING GEORGIA

We have already started to talk about the problems confronting Georgia as industrialization takes place. These are not the types of problems confronting so many other states, where automation is displacing thousands of workers. We have some of that type of problem, too, but for the most part our problems are much more rudimentary, for the simple reason that we have not yet really plunged fully into the new industrial revolution which is sweeping the country.

To give you one quick example which is fresh in my mind because I returned just a few days ago from that area—where is was 30 below zero when my plane landed, by the way—the mining town of Anaconda in western Montana is anticipating a loss of more than 1,000 jobs in the next 12 months. Most of the men involved are highly skilled, some with 15 or 20 years or more employment with the company involved. We are not yet faced with this type of problem

—partly because we are still confronted with the more basic problem of a general lack of semi-skilled and skilled labor.

A major problem which we do face, which you have no doubt anticipated, is that along with the heavy concentration of our manufacturing gains in just a handful of counties we have many counties which are actually losing manufacturing employment. Depending on whether you use the Census of Population or the Census of Manufactures, a total of 33 or 68 counties have had a net decline in manufacturing jobs. The difference results from the fact that the Census of Manufactures uses place of work as its base, while the Census of Population uses the place of residence.

Using the more recent Census of Population figures, the total employment picture is most depressing. A total of 96 counties had a net loss of employment of all types (including manufacturing) between 1950 and 1960. If you were not clear before as to why Georgia has 74 counties in the 'depressed economic areas" category these figures should help explain why almost half of the counties in the state have been designated in need of "redevelopment."

SKILLS — AND POLITICS

Our lack of skilled workers has been mentioned. This remains a troublesome problem, because it is so fraught with political ramifications. Our industrial arts and industrial vocational training programs are being expanded, but they are still weak in comparison with what they should be. You may have read last week about some of the sharp questions raised by some members of the legislature, an increasing number of whom are convinced that our program is inadequate and completely out of balance. Your local situation is pertinent here, too, for a real need exists in Carroll County for industrial vocational training facilities.

Former Governor Ernest Vandiver put his finger squarely on an extremely sensitive spot when he spoke last June to a special luncheon conference on industrial vocational training sponsored by the State Board of Education. He focused attention on a fact rarely commented on in public—that the state's vocational program is completely out of balance. As he put it, there is ". . . a compelling need for less agricultural training and for more specialized and technical training . . ." for industrial jobs.

Figures from a recently released State Board of Education pamphlet provide a current commentary on this problem. More than 28,000 persons are listed as being involved in "in-school" agricultural

training programs, while less than 8,000 are enrolled in comparable industrial programs. Many other points could be made to note the incongruities involved—for example, the fact that latest Georgia Department of Labor figures show that only approximately 80,000 Georgians now actually earn their living in farming. There seems little point in providing agricultural training for so many when so few are needed. Yet last year's budget for agricultural vocational training totaled well over $3,000,000, while less than $1,500,000 was spent for what appears, from the report, to be comparable industrial training.

Let me digress here just briefly to interject a thought I will discuss more fully a little later. That is the need for individuals with the courage to say what needs to be said in order to correct the many problems which otherwise will not only continue to plague us but will continue to depress the state's economy. There is a crying need for non-conformity. Not for the "beatnik" type, which simply reveals a juvenile rebellion which involves nothing positive, but for a solid, constructive type of non-conformity which will prod and push and haul the State of Georgia forthright into the era of clean prosperity which we all have a right to enjoy.

Much progress was made during the past four years, but much remains to be done. Some of you have the ability to contribute strongly to the further changes needed. If you join the large army of your elders who are afraid to express their opinions—afraid to disagree with the majority, afraid to take a stand they know is right—then you will abdicate your opportunity to contribute to the rapid new economic growth which can come to Georgia.

I would like to add one other comment along this line before moving on. That has to do with the tendency evident in so many organizations to select for promotion and for key positions individuals who are considered "safe." I think this trend is particularly strong in larger, bureaucratic organizations—including our University System. My earlier comment on Tech's nuclear reactor has already suggested that your President is perhaps the outstanding exception I know of among all the individuals who have assumed major positions in the nearly 10 years I have been at Tech.

The important consideration from your point of view is, I believe, that you will often find yourselves under strong pressure to accept a point of view that you don't really believe is best, just because it is certain not to cause controversy. Every good idea I have encountered for as long as I can remember has been considered controversial by at

least some individuals. Too often those at the top will be the most negative and the most timid regarding new ideas.

You will often have a hard choice to make—to take the easy, non-controversial way, or to fight for what you believe is best. I hope many of you will choose the latter.

REVIEW OF PROBLEMS

Many other problems confront us. Rather than spend much more time discussing them at length, let me quickly review the problems I have noted, then add others with only brief comment so that we can move on to "implications" and "prospects."

1. The industrial development which has taken place has been highly concentrated in only a few counties.

2. Many counties have not only lost manufacturing employment, but even more—a total of 96—have suffered a net loss in total employment.

3. Most of Georgia's manufacturing employment is further concentrated in only four relatively low wage industries which employ more than 60% of our manufacturing work force.

4. Georgia has not succeeded in attracting the higher wage, so-called "new type" industries which we badly need—electronics, chemicals, metal-working, aerospace, and so on.

5. Our labor force lacks many of the skills which are important to attracting the types of industries we need to better balance the state's economy.

6. Compounding the problem of our present lack of skills is the fact that the state's vocational training program is badly out of balance. Although in the process of being expanded and strengthened, Georgia's industrial arts and industrial vocational training programs remain relatively weak.

7. Where obsolescence of plants and equipment exists and where automation is taking place, there is no adequate program for generating new employment or retraining or relocating displaced workers.

8. Georgia still suffers a bad "hangover" from earlier years in the form of a generally bad reputation nationally with regard to political and business climates. Tax liabilities, political corruption, demagoguery, uncertainties regarding our schools and related racial problems, speed traps—all have combined to handicap us in the keen competition

which exists for the types of manufacturing plants Georgia especially needs.

9. A generally weak educational system penalizes the state in many ways. Too little money is spent on higher education in Georgia, particularly. And too few cities and counties have sufficient interest in giving their children first class educations. So long as local contributions to our elementary and secondary schools remain as limited as they are now, we will be handicapped in our efforts to upgrade our human resources. The school drop-out problem, which has recently received much attention, is another drag on the state's economy, for it lowers the average skill level sharply.

10. Rapid growth of many of our urban areas has produced a host of serious problems, particularly since in many cases the new residents have been displaced from farm jobs, have extremely limited incomes, and can contribute little to the tax base. Overtaxed water and sewerage systems (one of the problems with which we have been concerned in Carrollton, by the way,) overcrowded and undermanned schools, and slums are only some of the more obvious problems which have accompanied urbanization.

11. A basic problem confronting many local development groups as well as the state as a whole is dominance of economic matters by small minorities. In local situations a single large property holder may, in effect, exert tight control over what amounts to a feudal barony. In some instances, new industry may come in by permission only. A local development agency may find its efforts stymied because of its inability to control needed industrial land as well as in many other ways.

The continued strong rural orientation of the legislature remains a problem. The imbalance which exists in the vocational training field is only symptomatic of the much broader problem. Until reasonable balance is achieved, we shall continue to find our efforts to develop new payrolls seriously hampered for lack of funds.

Increasing talk of county consolidation is another symptom of this same problem. Representative Ebb Duncan has been one of the most outspoken members of the legislature on this score. No one knows how much money is wasted each year because of duplication and overlapping.

It was interesting to me to note in a recent newspaper article on county consolidation one outspokenly negative reaction which came from a political leader of one of the state's smaller counties. This gentleman said that the people of his county see no need for changing

anything—that they are doing fine on their own. Yet per capita income in his county is less than half the U. S. average, the population dropped by 10% during the last decade, and the average manufacturing wage in his county is way below even the state average. One wonders for whom he speaks when he says, "We prefer things as they are."

12. A lack of coordination of the development efforts of the many groups working to bring new payrolls to Georgia is another serious problem. Lack of professional staff and lack of effective organization have been major factors contributing to the lack of coordination referred to above.

These are only some of the more significant problems. Again, there is no easy way to cut the subject short. Cut we must, however, so let me briefly sum up my comments on problems.

It can appropriately be stated that one of our biggest problems has been and continues to be that industrial change is not taking place fast enough. Farm employment has dropped more rapidly than industrial employment has risen. School drop-outs, high school graduates and college graduates have joined the work force by the thousands, while new jobs have been added only by the hundreds. As a result, we continue to experience out-migration. Our more highly educated young people, in particular, tend to leave to seek suitable employment opportunities. This in turn produces other problems—and we are not yet close to breaking the cycle. We need more jobs, more high wage jobs, a better diversified economy, stronger educational programs, and additional political change.

SOME IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS

Many of the implications of the changes and problems I have enumerated are probably quite clear. One of the most pertinent is that many of you have important decisions to face in the months immediately ahead.

Many of you will have to choose between accepting a challenging job away from home—quite possibly in a distant state—or reconciling yourself to taking what is available in your home town or in nearby cities. I do not mean to imply that no one should leave home. In many cases you may have to go elsewhere to effectively use your capabilities. The exchange of ideas which occurs when you move into the new world to be found in other sections of the country provides the sort of intellectual stimulus which has made this country great.

But many of our smaller cities cannot afford to continue to lose

their brightest young people. Some of you will be needed back home to stimulate, to push and to shove, and to get the people and the economic machinery of your home town moving again.

Another obvious implication is that the political revolution which made headlines last year is only the beginning of what is likely to happen during the very near future. Established strongholds can be expected to crumble, and powerful new structures will rise. Capable leadership is going to be critically needed as the state's development programs undergo drastic revision and reorganization, and as our vocational training program, our University System—our entire educational system, from top to bottom—is refurbished and strengthened

New opportunities will open up for those of you who have entrepreneurial inclinations—that is, those who would like to run your own business, be your own boss. With regard to 'being your own boss," I would like to tell you briefly about a project we have underway which will at least indicate some of the things which might come about in the months and years ahead.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

I have long been concerned about the lack of entrepreneurship—the lack of "home-grown" industry—in the South generally. There are many reasons for it; we cannot take time here to go into them in detail. One which I would like to comment on in passing is the tendency in so many college curricula to assume that every student will inevitably wind up as a cog in a huge business or industrial—or educational—machine somewhere. Since complex organizations dominate our economy, and since few professors know anything about entrepreneurship, this is perhaps to be expected.

But why not stop not only to take a look but to do something about it? This is what we have started to do. To date, the beginning is small, but we hope to secure enough financial support for the project to carry out a substantial program.

Our first aim is to learn more about what makes successful entrepreneurs "tick" and what causes unsuccessful ones to fail. Our interests lie not only in personal characteristics, but in the required skills which can be taught. For it seems apparent that an individual with most of the needed attributes might fail for lack of certain skills which he might be taught through special courses of instruction.

Then, through intensive interviewing, we hope to identify a number of interested young men who would like to participate in a

special training program which will be administered through branch offices of the sort which we now have in Rome as well as through our Atlanta headquarters. Each "trainee" will be assigned to work under the direct supervision of an experienced member of our staff who will be specializing in providing technical assistance to small manufacturers and businessmen. This might be done through Tech's co-op program, through a special student assistant or research assistantship program, or through other means.

Let's assume that a student who has participated for three or four years in a special co-op type arrangement with our Division has done an outstanding job. He has learned a great deal about the diverse problems which prevent small companies from operating profitably—from organizational problems to cost analysis to advertising and back again. He is eager to get into business for himself and has been judged excellent entrepreneurial material.

We hope at this point to be able to guide him, through the work of our Market Analysis Branch, to one or more business or manufacturing opportunities which will be of interest and which appear to be within his technical capabilities. A suitable geographic location would be selected on the basis of the requirements of the particular business or industry involved. Financing will, we hope, be arranged either through interested local business leaders or through a new equity capital corporation which may be established specifically for this purpose.

Finally, experienced local businessmen who are interested in contributing to the development of additional "home-grown" industries will provide guidance and counsel during the early months, especially, to help the fledgling entrepreneur keep his new business on a sound basis.

Impossible? Perhaps. But most of the basic elements already exist. It remains only to put them together to make this challenging program a reality. If it can be done, I hope it will offset in part the widespread pressures toward bigness, impersonality, and indifference and push instead toward the type of spirit which not only made the United States the economic power it is but which can perhaps greatly accelerate Georgia's growth in the years immediately ahead. You have one of not only Georgia's but the nation's best examples right here in Carrollton, by the way, in the person of Roy Richards. We should be able to learn a great deal from such examples.

LAMINATED BEAMS AND "POGOLAND"

Innumerable opportunities exist for developing new payrolls in Georgia. A group of businessmen in Waycross used a study we made of laminated wood beams as a basis for setting up a new company there, to cite one of the most recent examples. Three other communities lost the same opportunity because, while they considered and hesitated, the Waycross group acted.

An even more intriguing idea—one which I have been trying to get someone in the same area to act on for five years or more now—illustrates the potentials which in many cases lie almost underfoot. This is for developing an Okefenokee "Pogoland" which would give Georgia a nature-based rival for Disneyland. The vast tourist potentials inherent in this idea include the possibility of manufacturing wood, plastic and stuffed replicas of the "Pogo" family, as well as many other attractive sources of additional income. I am delighted to be able to say that this idea is now being seriously pursued by a second group of Waycross businessmen.

CROSS-GEORGIA WATERWAY

Let me discuss briefly just one more example of the sort of prospects which lie ahead of us if we only have the imagination—and perhaps daring—to push vigorously ahead.

You may have heard Governor Carl Sanders refer to this particular idea just a few days ago. He referred to a proposal for constructing a cross-Georgia waterway which would tie the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic Ocean by connecting the Flint River System with the Altamaha River System.

Detailed study by the U. S. Corps of Engineers will be necessary before the feasibility of this perhaps rather startling proposal can be completely checked out. The implications not only for the 31 counties which would be directly affected but for the entire country are tremendous.

The idea grew out of a broad study we have underway of Georgia's aerospace industry potentials. The transportation of space components and test units has long been a major problem, as I am sure you are all aware. In searching for some means of solving this problem so as to expedite the development of Georgia's coastal area as a new space center, one of our young chemical engineers, Wade McKoy, concluded that a completely fresh approach was required.

The proposed waterway is the result of his imaginative approach

to the problem. It would provide protected inland water transportation from West Coast and Gulf Coast missile and space installations all the way to the Atlantic and to Cape Canaveral. Present routes—and the proposed cross-Florida canal—have two built-in liabilities. One is that open water must be navigated for a considerable distance, since the protected intra-coastal waterway does not extend all the way along the Gulf Coast and Florida. The second is that present and proposed Florida routes go through the hurricane belt.

The proposed waterway would avoid both problems. It would give the United States an unbroken, protected waterway of some 22,000 miles— with Georgia the connecting link. It would accelerate the development of the Georgia coast as an aerospace industry site. It would produce at least six inland ports. It would create a vast lake of approximately 500,000 acres — the largest man-made lake in the country—with attendant recreational and tourist potentials. It would open up new industrial potentials for at least one fourth of the state, in an area which presently includes some of Georgia's neediest counties. New hydro-electric power potentials would be created; new agricultural potentials would exist because of the opportunity for irrigating large areas that could become the state's most productive farm area.

We cannot yet even estimate the industrial potentials. But an earlier analysis of the opportunities created by Columbus by the comletion of a 9-foot channel up the Chattahoochee indicates what might result. By 1975, we estimate that Columbus can hope to develop a $300,000,000 chemical complex—*if* recommended steps are taken to reclaim some 1,200 acres of land needed for industrial sites.

THE "IFS" INVOLVED—KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Such "ifs" are always involved. It would be foolish to complete any set of remarks regarding the propects for further industrial change in Georgia without clearly stating certain assumptions—the "ifs" which will determine the rate at which Georgia will progress in the future. Every such "if" marks a possible turning point for the state—just as each comparable assumption may mark a turning point for your personal future.

In all my remarks about the implications and potentials of past and future industrial change in Georgia, I am assuming a number of important things:

1. Georgia's political and business climate will continue to improve. (The elimination of the 3% use tax on production equip-

ment going into new industrial plants is one forward step which has already been taken during the current legislative session.)

2. Georgia will continue to solve its racial problems with the intelligence and sophistication which have characterized most of its recent efforts in this direction.

3. Present imbalances in the state's vocational training program will be eliminated.

4. Additional local tax support will be provided for the state's elementary and secondary schools; as a result, the University System will receive a larger percentage of total state revenues and will be greatly strengthened.

5. State development efforts will be professionalized and strengthened through the organization of the new Department of Industry and Trade, with resulting better coordination and stronger research and technical assistance programs.

6. Existing inefficiencies and wastes in both local and state government operations will be substantially reduced through further "house-cleaning," and through such steps as tax re-evaluation and county consolidation.

7. The dominance of rural and agricultural interests will continue to decline, as a result of which Georgia will in many ways move more rapidly into electronics and aerospace age.

This last point indicates the further prospects which I see for Georgia in the years ahead—assuming that the conditions set forth above are met.

The Atlanta area's most exciting aerospace industry potentials—quite different from the launch site and support potentials of our coastal area—will be rapidly developed during the next decade. Literally thousands of jobs in such fields as electronics, electrical machinery, metal fabricating, and research and development will result.

The development of both the coastal and Atlanta aerospace potentials will in turn produce dozens of opportunities for the establishment of service and "satellite" industries—many of which might well be manned by alert young Georgians with the desire and ability to run their own businesses or manufacturing plants.

A sharp upsurge in the location of chemical plants will occur now that the 3% use tax has been abolished and other obstacles are in the process of being resolved. Plastics manufacturing operations will develop in large numbers also.

The tourist industry will also expand rapidly as needed corrective steps are taken—including the elimination of speed traps, the improvement of the highways, and the exploitation of the state's extensive but as yet unassessed natural and man-made attractions.

New centers of healthy economic growth will develop—one, we hope, right here in Carrollton—in locations where local government officials and development groups do an effective job. These centers will provide commuting employment for surrounding areas until many nearby smaller towns and cities reach a point where they, too, can attract their own new payrolls.

Other communities and counties will continue to decline as inadequate efforts—or sheer indifference—force their citizens to seek employment elsewhere. New ghost towns will appear.

While these things are occurring, some of you will become successful entrepreneurs and will achieve prominence as heads of your own companies. Others will assume places of responsibility in education or in government. Still others will become successful executives in giant corporations. Many of you will do otherwise.

A sizeable percentage, I hope, will enjoy the maturing experience of learning how to intelligently say what you think and fight for what you believe is right. Those of you who fit this category will likely find your lot a satisfying one, on whatever rung of the economic ladder you may eventually be perched.

CHANGE, ADAPTABILITY—AND CHALLENGE

I have tried to give you some idea of the industrial change which has been occurring in Georgia, some of the problems which relate in various ways to that change, and some of the implications and prospects which continuing change offers for the future. Let me conclude by referring back to what I believe is one of the most important implications for any college student—or college faculty member.

The ability to adapt to economic and social as well as technological change will be essential if what I visualize occurs. The more rapidly we resolve the key problems which confront us the more important this ability to adapt will become.

Formulas which are now useful are likely to be worse than useless a few years from now. This is true not only of engineering and the sciences but even more of human, business and industrial relations. Last year Georgia catapulted into a whole new world when Atlanta's school situation was quietly resolved and the county unit system was a-

bolished. The establishment of an aerospace complex on the Georgia coast or in Atlanta—and both now appear quite likely—will mean another major break-through. The development of a vast project like the proposed cross-Georgia waterway would open up another whole new world and much of the state.

An urgent need exists for new leadership, new ideas, new approaches. Imagination, creativity and entrepreneurship will take on new importance and new value.

In a most meaningful sense, Georgia is moving—slowly, but with increasing speed—into a challenging new frontier. I hope each of you will exert the effort necessary to rise to that challenge.

POLITICAL CHANGE IN GEORGIA

By J. THOMAS ASKEW*

HAS AN OLD ORDER DIED?

It takes a state or a county or a city a long time to develop new political leadership. After the excitement of a revolution is over, the facts must be faced; it can be a dangerous period. All the old vices are still around and some new ones have to be dealt with. Not that Georgia has had a real political revolution. The truth is no revolution has occurred. Georgia looks a little more like her neighbors, nothing more. No state had the unit system in primary elections except Georgia. But now that the federal court has forced a change to popular election of the governor and equitable distribution of representatives in the senate, Georgia may grow a little faster toward what she really always wanted to be if she had had a little more majority government. Everywhere else in this country the governor was elected by popular vote, in the election, or in one party states, in the primary. But Georgia was different.

Under Georgia's Neill Primary Act of 1917, all three branches of the state government—executive, legislative and judicial—were controlled by a small minority whose leadership has changed little during the past 30 years.

Few states of the South could match Georgia's business and professional leadership, but these leaders were excluded, largely, from political leadership as they lived in urban counties.

A quick glance at the administrative branch of the state government reveals 11 important elective posts held in recent years by the same men from 14 to more than 37 years in Georgia state government. No criticism of the men is intended. Many are good public servants. But almost without exception since 1917, our long term leadership has come from small towns and small counties, although business associations of the leaders are frequently urban. Under the unit system they were unbeatable by men from urban counties, no matter how able the urban candidate.

And the state wide judicial jobs have been largely manned by small town lawyers from small counties, or their intimate associates in the middle-sized towns. Many have served many, many years. There was no way to leaven the loaf.

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia.

Many able leaders have come from our small towns and farms. That trend will continue. Even our urban leaders are often not born in the city. Only 18 per cent of Atlanta citizens were born there. But for 50 years now, one's identification with the city in Georgia by residence there has changed his political prospects, mightily. We lost some of our best political leadership that way.

The rural folk, the real people, benefited little from the county unit system. But it seemed to make little difference that all the statistical indices showed more and more people driven from the farm, unit system or no unit system. And the towns under the unit system did little to prepare for the newcomers, the displaced. Bad government seemed everywhere. The New Deal did much to restore our self-respect and our economy, like it did elsewhere. Of course, Georgia was not the only place with troubles—but the point is that the unit system was of no value to poor farmers in good times or bad. A school house or so, yes; but the farmer frequently had to take his young children to the city and leave behind empty classrooms in new buildings. It seems that he had the classrooms provided for his children in the wrong places.

The unit system was not responsible for urban growth, the industrial boom, the mechanized farm or the bulldozer revolution. But schools and roads too frequently went to the places losing population. That would not have been too bad if services had been provided in the cities.

But now that the unit system is gone will government change for the better? Will Georgia devise a road system as honest and efficient as those of her neighbors? Will the legislature be as representative as those of the better southern states? Possibly, but there is no assurance that improvements will be automatic.

From this day forward Georgia should be, it seems to me, more like North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee, and less like Alabama and Mississippi. Most Georgians, I believe, have always felt closer akin, philosophically, to North Carolina than Mississippi, but we have a long way to go to catch North Carolina, after dragging our political feet for fifty years. Georgia was really destined to lead the South into the future, but something went wrong.

It would be a mistake to grow gloomy. After all the county unit system is no more—there is one less albatross. In fact *cautious optimism* may be warranted. Listen to our new governor speak. He said

he was setting up a representative constitutional revision commission to propose a new constitution. That, my friends, a few short months ago, was more apt to be said by any southern governor other than that of Georgia.

Now that the unit system is gone, we might do something by way of writing a constitution. But no *great* constitution is likely to be written without several years of study by the people. What we should do is start a massive educational campaign to teach each other what good constitutions and good governments are really like. Constitutions should grow out of the grass roots. They should express the character and wishes of the people.

It is good to hear a governor speak of consolidating functions and agencies at the state level, improving the structure of the senate, systematizing local finances, encouraging functional consolidations among counties, and urging county mergers. No matter how little or how much may be accomplished, we are partially out of the woods when our governor can talk, for the first time in fifty years, barring catastrophic emergencies, like other governors of other states. A new day will really dawn if we can keep the pace up for a few years.

HOW CAN WE GET A GOOD CONSTITUTION?

"I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change in circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times."[1]

That statement was written by Thomas Jefferson in 1816. Georgia has not had much improvement in its state governmental organization or structure during the 20th century, prior to the recent forced action by the federal courts. Although we have amended our two constitutions 682 times since 1877, the document is no better than the original; and the 1877 original, written under the strain of Reconstruction, left much to be desired. Other Georgia constitutions have been better than

[1] Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, quoted in C. F. Mahoney, "Case for a Popular Constitutional Convention," *Massachusetts Law Quarterly*, XLIV (April, 1959), p. 28.

the ones we have had for the past 86 years.

How should a constitution be written? By a constitutional convention? By a commission such as Georgia had in 1943-44? Judging from Georgia's last commission, which certainly accomplished some things of importance, a commission is not likely to do the imaginative job accomplished by conventions in Hawaii, Alaska, Missouri and New Jersey. But a commission will do the best it can. And it should not be prejudged. But do we know what we want our government to look like?

From 1923 to 1938 one state in the United States called a constitutional convention. At that time some were about to conclude that constitutions would be revised by being amended to death or by some special arrangement such as that of the constitutional commission devised by Georgia in 1943-44. But then ten conventions were called within a few years.[2] States calling conventions were Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Michigan, plus the territories of Hawaii and Alaska.

Calling a convention is not an easy matter in most states. For nearly 100 years the New Jersey rural dominated senate blocked a constitutional convention.[3] And when one was finally called a proviso was included which required that territorial limits of the counties be retained as well as the current basis of representation in the legislature. Each delegate was required to take an oath to abide by the instructions. The new document could not be submitted to the people until the New Jersey secretary of state certified that the constitution complied with the convention call. The once generally accepted constitutional theory that a convention's powers were not limited were bypassed. The practice is dangerous as minority interests can prevent constitutional changes unacceptable to special groups even if desired by a majority. A limited convention is prevented in the new constitution of Alaska.[4]

There would probably be little disagreement among students of government about the excellence of the constitutions of Hawaii and Alaska. They have two of the best constitutions, if not the very best, found among the 50 states. New Jersey and Missouri have documents

[2] John E. Bebout, "Recent Constitutional Writing," *Texas Law Review*, XXXV (October, 1957), pp. 1071-1072. See also *Proposed Constitution of Michigan* (Detroit: Citizens Research Council, 1962).

[3] Bebout, *op. cit.*, p. 1072.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 1074.

which are strikingly similar to those of the two new states in practically all particulars. Though there is dissatisfaction, Virginia and North Carolina have pretty good constitutions. If we in Georgia are to develop good government here, we need to examine the better state constitutions as a start. Let us examine two of the best.

The governor and lieutenant governor of Hawaii, and the governor and secretary of state (who serves the added purpose of a lieutenant governor) of Alaska are the only elected executives. Terms are for four years and reelections are not restricted. Department heads, which cannot exceed twenty, are appointed. Both states have executive budgets.

Alaska and Hawaii have efficient, highly integrated court systems. Hawaiian judges are appointed, but Alaska follows the Missouri plan, to be explained later.

The Hawaiian house of representatives is periodically reapportioned by the governor under a constitutional formula. In Alaska reapportionment of the house is by the governor and an advisory nonpartisan board. Sessions are annual, and only Hawaii limits the length of sessions. Open legislative procedures are guaranteed by the constitution.

The Hawaiian constitution requires the legislature to create only one level of local government, but permits the creation of others. Home rule can be provided by law. In Alaska there are no counties, but there are boroughs. First class cities and boroughs in Alaska have self executing constitutional home rule, and other local governments may secure home rule by law. A local boundary commission in the executive branch of Alaska adjusts local boundaries subject to legislative veto. An Alaskan department of local government publishes government information and reviews local government activities.[5]

Neither Hawaii nor Alaska has local tax limitations which will prevent the development of sound, safe fiscal policies. Alaska's voting age is fixed at 19 years, Hawaii's at 20 years.

Crucial in the writing or rewriting of a constitution is a long period of preparatory, technical research work. The four best constitutions, those of New Jersey, Missouri, Alaska and Hawaii, all followed long periods of preparation. Popular participation was planned from the earliest stages, and lasted for six years (1941-1947) in New Jersey.[6]

[5] John E. Bebout, "Charter For a Last Frontier," *National Municipal Review*, XLV (1956), pp. 158, 160-161.

[6] See Paul C. Bartholomew, "The Constitution of the State of Alaska,"

IS GEORGIA READY FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION?

If and when Georgia's government is to be restructured a point of departure for writing a constitution might well be *A Proposed Constitution for Georgia* which was written by a Committee on the Constitution set up by the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Georgia, back in 1931.

I am reminded of the fortunate circumstances surrounding the writing of the most enduring constitution in the world, the Constitution of the United States, written in 1787. There had already been two conventions or conferences, one in 1785 and one in 1786. People were thinking. Students will recall that the meeting of the constitutional convention of 1787 in Philadelphia was delayed two weeks in opening, as delegates from a majority of the states had not arrived. The tardiness of the delegates from many states turned out to be most fortunate. Those present could leisurely discuss the Virginia plan for union, which had been carefully worked out and largely written by the lawyer and scholar James Madison who had attended the other two conventions. By the time the convention sat, the Virginia plan had become the point of departure in the thinking of most delegates, rather than the far less satisfactory but established document, the Articles of Confederation. The result was the most successful constitution ever written.

Georgia's proposed constitution of 1931 could do for Georgia, to a degree, what the Virginia plan did for the nation—give Georgia a system of government which would equal or excel in excellence a majority of the constitutions of the 50 states. The proposed Constitution of 1931 is brief, about 7,000 words. The document is well integrated and follows the best practices of constitutional writing. It was carefully planned and carefully drawn. The committee of 25 men, including such leaders as Blanton Fortson, Orville A. Park, James K. Hines, Robert M. Hitch, J. H. T. McPherson, Marion Smith, Robert B. Troutman, Pope Brock and others, many of whom are not alive today, met in Atlanta for an organizational meeting and discussion of a tentative constitution draft presented to the committee.

Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XL-XLI (June, 1959), pp. 49-50; P. A. Dionisopouli, "Indiana 1856—Alaska 1956: A Century of Differences in State Constitutions," *Indiana Law Journal,* XXXIV (Fall, 1958), p. 34; Paul C. Bartholomew, "Comparative Analysis of the Constitutions of the States of Hawaii and Alaska," *Federal Bar Journal,* XLIV (Winter, 1962), p. 44; *Constitutions of the United States,* 2 volumes (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1962).

Ground rules agreed to by the committee included these: the constitution must include only fundamental principles of government; the United States Constitution would be used as a guide, and a strong, well integrated system of government would be provided.

Subcommittees were assigned, but much of their work was rewritten after lengthy examination and discussion. As in the case of the United States Constitution, the rough draft was then submitted to a committee on style which again harmonized and rewrote much of the document. It was then submitted to the whole committee, which submitted the work for public debate before the Institute of Citizenship for three days, March 14-17, 1931. A number of changes were then adopted by the committee after the Institute adjourned.[7]

The Institute published the completed work along with a running commentary by the committee. It is undoubtedly one of the best unused constitutions in the country. Some of its provisions have influenced developments in other states, particularly the article on the judiciary.

The personal rights of the individual are amply guaranteed. The provisions on the elective franchise are archaic in one respect; the poll tax was retained. Otherwise the article leaves most of the responsibility for regulating the franchise to the General Assembly where it belongs. In general, the articles dealing with legislative, executive and judicial branches are excellent, and most of the provisions would be applicable today. The voters of 30 legislative districts choose 30 senators, and each district elects one representative for each 50,000 inhabitants. The state is to be redistricted by the legislature after each decennial census on a population basis, and, failing this duty, redistricting is to be performed by the governor. Senators are to be elected for six year staggered terms, and representatives for two year terms. Legislative sessions are not limited. There are too many procedural instructions to the legislature.

The governor is the only elected executive. His term is four years. Executive departments are established by law, and heads are appointed by the governor with the approval of the senate. All other offices and employees are under civil service regulations. The governor and his cabinet sit with the legislature and debate, but cannot vote.

The judiciary of the state is highly integrated and power vested in a General Court of Justice composed of three departments. The chief

[7] *A Proposed Constitution for Georgia, Presented to the Round Table Session of the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Georgia by its Committee on the Constitution, Athens: May* 12-14, 1931 (Athens, 1931).

justice of the Supreme Court is administrative head of the General Court of Justice.

The method for selecting judges was proposed, and its adoption urged repeatedly, by the Georgia Bar Association. It was a compromise between appointment and election. One illustration will denote the principle. A supreme court vacancy would be filled by the governor, with senate approval, from a list of five lawyers nominated by the state bar. Preceding the expiration of his term, the judge's name would be placed on the ballot for the voters to vote on this question, "Shall this judge be retained?" Several states have adopted this plan in a modified form. It is now known as the "Missouri Plan" under which nominees are proposed by a commission from the bench, bar and public.

Provisions on taxation, public debt, the budget, and counties and municipalities are just as progressive as those already examined.

The proposed constitution is not perfect, of course, but it is much better than the constitution Georgia now has. The state should delay a complete rewriting of the constitution until the people can inform themselves, thoroughly, possibly over a period of years, of all the best constitutions in the country. We need a long sustained debate on constitutions throughout the state.

Under unit system politics our constitutional practices have destroyed the constitution in all but name. Probably no one man has ever read the Georgia constitution in its entirety. That is because of our strange and astounding practice of allowing the voters of a county to change the constitution without consulting the state-wide electorate. These local amendments have never been made available to the public, so far as I know.

Sources which list the length of state constitutions must always note that the Georgia constitution is not complete. Maddox and Fuquay[8] list 12 constitutions in the United States which are, presumably, longer than Georgia's; but if local amendments are included, there are probably no more than half a dozen exceeding ours in length. The length alone should distress no one, of course, if it is a good constitution. What Georgia really has is over 200 different constitutions. The same constitution, in its entirety, does not apply from one county to another. Georgia's constitution of 1945 has been amended 381 times, exceeding our former record of 301 for the constitution of 1877. That makes 682 amendments in 86 years.

[8] R. W. Maddox and R. F. Fuquay, *State and Local Government,* (Princeton: Nostrand, 1962), pp. 44-45.

Last year 42 states in the union voted on constitutional amendments. The total was 275 amendments for all the states, but of this total voters of the State of Georgia voted on 137 amendments.[9] It is still difficult to believe the figures are accurate, but the source of the information, the *National Civic Review,* yearly gathers information from all states on proposed amendments.

Of the 137 Georgia amendments proposed last year, 121 were local, and 97 of the 121 passed. Ten of the 16 state-wide amendments passed. No electorate should allow a system to survive that imposes such unreasonable burdens on the voter. Is it any wonder that our young people sometimes grow cynical about our democracy in Georgia? Add to the burdens of voting on constitutional amendments the burdens of filling more than twenty state-house offices and judicial positions with democratic candidates, and the impositions on the electorate become astounding. The long bed sheet ballot at primaries and elections in Georgia appears as if it were invented for the purpose of undermining confidence in our democratic institutions. No well ordered democracy would bring representative government into such disrepute.

The election of judges is rather widespread among the states; but this runs counter to the practices of national democracies, universally, elsewhere, and to the federal system in our country, and to the practices of at least 15 states in the United States.[10] The "People's Courts" or lower courts in the U. S. S. R. are elected by popular vote.

A GOOD LEGISLATURE IS A PREREQUISITE TO A GOOD CONSTITUTION

"Men by their constitutions are naturally divided into two parties: (1) Those who fear and distrust the people, and wish to draw all powers from them into the hands of the higher classes; (2) those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not the most wise depository of the public interests. In every country these two parties exist; and in every one where they are free to think, speak and write, they will declare themselves."[11] Thomas Jefferson wrote that statement in 1824. Jefferson, the democrat, believed in majority

[9] *National Civic Review,* LI (December, 1962), p. 613.

[10] W. St. John Gerwood, "Democracy and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument," *Columbia Law Review,* LIV (1954), p. 561.

[11] Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, 1824, quoted in *National Civic Review,* LII (January, 1963), pp. 4-5.

rule and representative government as well as state rights.

The decline of state influence in the federal system has been widely attributed to an unrepresentative legislature.[12] Prior to Baker v. Carr (the Tennessee apportionment case) many advocates of strong state government had been complimenting the federal court's reluctance to enter the political thicket of local politics, while at the same time they had supported or acquiesced in action by state governments to rig the representative system in a way that would deprive the majority of its rightful voice in state affairs. The well-springs of representative government were being "poisoned at the source." Ironic as it seems, our governors have put up a better fight to save representative government than members of the legislatures.

But when the full implication of the United States Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr became more apparent, the General Assembly of States, a constituent part of the Council of State Governments, suggested in December, 1962, that the state legislatures meeting in January, 1963, ask for a constitutional convention to propose amendments to the United States Constitution. One of the proposed amendments would remove judicial authority over state apportionment of state legislatures, and another would establish a "Court of the Union" with authority to nullify decisions relating to the states' reserved rights. The object was to end all the Baker v. Carr foolishness and restore the old order.[13] The *Washington Post* replied: "For the first time in years the legislatures begin to look like representative bodies instead of warped and obsolete sanctuaries of special privilege. It would be an appalling blunder to reverse this rejuvenation of democracy before the transformation of a new basis of fair representation has been completed . . . ."[14]

Baker v. Carr[15] was a 6-2 decision. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the court which held ". . . that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and . . . (c) that the appellants have standing to challenge the

[12] See U. S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Report to the President* (1955), pp. 28-40.

[13] "Seek to Nullify High Court Decision," *National Civic Review,* LII (January, 1963), p. 31.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] 82 Sup. Ct. 691 (1962).

Tennessee apportionment statutes."[16]

The court remanded the case to the federal district court for a trial on merit. If "invidious discrimination" was found under the 14th amendment, the legislature should be required to reapportion. "We have no reason . . . to doubt [that] the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional rights are found."

The district court did find "invidious discrimination." The Tennessee redistricting under court order was accepted; but in order to avoid ". . . grave doubts as to [the accepted plan's] constitutionality . . .," the court set a deadline of June 3, 1963, for an improved legislative plan.

The 6-2 decision had separate concurring opinions by Justices Douglas, Clark and Stewart, and separate dissenting opinions by Justices Harlan and Frankfurter. Justice Whittaker took no part in the case.

Justices White and Goldberg have now replaced Frankfurter and Whittaker on the court. It is hardly speculative to say that the departure of Frankfurter will lessen the voice of those on the court adhering to the doctrine of judicial restraint on political questions. Political questions apply, said a wit, to those ". . . matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction."[17]

The courts for years have concerned themselves with problems involving the constitutional guarantees of all kinds of individual rights, but until Baker v. Carr, the United States Supreme Court had not included judicial protection of our representative system.[18] The Federal-State Relations Committee of the Governor's Conference declared, "Few decisions have had such an immediate and widespread impact."

Thomas I. Emerson of the Yale Law School faculty, writing in November, 1962, in the *Yale Law Journal,* expressed the opinion that Baker v. Carr would be one of the most important decisions of the century. It may even open up the question of the enforcement of section 2 of the 14th amendment, which provides for a reduction in the congressional representation of a state in the United States House of

[16] *Ibid., supra,* note 24, at 699.

[17] Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution," *Law and Contemporary Problems,* XXVII (Summer, 1962), p. 329; see also Ellan P. Sindlar, "Baker v. Carr: How to Sear the Conscience of Legislators," *Yale Law Journal,* LXXII (November, 1962), pp. 23-28.

[18] "Baker v. Carr—Two Aspects of Apportionment, an End and a Beginning," *Harvard Law Review,* XLII (1962), pp. 1015-1016.

Representatives, in proportion to the number of male citizens 21 years of age and over who have been denied the ballot. Emerson believes the decision ". . . marks a momentous step forward in utilizing law and legal principle for maintaining and invigorating the democratic structures of our society . . . ." Ruth C. Silva, professor at Pennsylvania State University, writing in the *Forham Law Review,* April, 1962, advanced the opinion that Baker v. Carr was probably the most important decision of the United States Supreme Court since Marbury v. Madison (1803), as it will shift, supposedly, the balance of power in state legislatures from rural to urban folk. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., of the George Washington Law School faculty, also believes that Baker v. Carr will rank in importance with Marbury v. Madison.[19]

One of the results of Baker v. Carr may be its influence on changing the electoral college and the method of electing the President. As corrections are made in the inequities of our representative system in numerous states, there may be a change in the attitude of the people in larger states who now oppose changes in the presidential electoral college which requires, where electors are not declared free, that all the electoral votes of a state be cast for one candidate. The present electoral system inflates urban and big state interests, but it has been partially justified on the grounds of over-representation of rural interest in legislatures of the smaller and middle sized states.[20]

The federal courts may be relieved of the necessity of spelling out standards to follow in most cases as state legislatures seem to be taking on these responsibilities. It would appear preferable for the courts to confine their actions to identifying, case by case, discrimination in the apportioning of the members of the state legislature.

Baker v. Carr may restore, not destroy, an old state constitutional practice. Democratic constitutional theory of the 19th century did not include the idea of a "balance" between rural and urban interests to be maintained by a two-house system. The "balance" theory is a recent innovation, partly, at least, to try to justify malapportioned legislatures. When cities were small they were not given control of one house so they could bargain on even terms with a rural dominated house. Many years ago many states had constitutional provisions guaranteeing that

[19] Dixon, *op. cit.,* p. 329. See also E. E. Schattschneider, "Urbanization and Reapportionment," *Yale Law Journal,* LXXII (November, 1962), p. 10, for the city's stake in reapportionment.

[20] Estes Kefauver, "The Electoral College: Old Reforms Take On a New Look," *Law and Contemporary Problems,* XXVII (Spring, 1962), p. 188.

both houses would be apportioned according to population, voters, adults or some similar criteria.

SOME CURRENT CASES
WILL BOTH HOUSES BECOME REPRESENTATIVE?

The enthusiasm with which the federal courts are grappling with this problem indicates that they felt the United States Supreme Court should have acted long ago to modify the doctrine of the political question as applied to representative government. The Colegrove v. Green precedent, admittedly, has been shaky all these years. It was that decision which established the doctrine of the political question as applied to apportionment cases.[21]

Five months after the Baker v. Carr decision, Alan L. Otten, writing in the *Wall Street Journal,* noted that ". . . a swelling flood of lawsuits, court decisions, special legislative sessions and other activity seem likely to overhaul the makeup of a majority of state legislatures drastically within the coming year."[22] Otten found that 44 lawsuits in 27 states had been reopened or filed.

Thirteen states provided for apportionment based on population or voters in both houses prior to Baker v. Carr. Twelve additional states apportioned both houses according to population, except that in one house each district (county or town) was guaranteed at least one seat.[23] There were, then, 25 state constitutions which *theoretically* came close to genuine majority rule in 1962. Under court orders legislatures all around the country are becoming more representative of the people. There is some evidence that many states will be required to consider population in apportioning both legislative houses. Will this become a general precedent?

GEORGIA

In Sanders v. Gray[24] Georgia's existing county unit system used in primaries was nullified. The disparity ratio between Fulton County,

21 See W. L. Taylor, "Legal Action to Enjoin Legislative Mal-apportionment: The Political Question Doctrine," *Southern California Review,* XXXIV (Winter, 1961), p. 79.

22 *Wall Street Journal,* August 9, 1962.

23 Archibald Cox, "Current Constitutional Issues," *American Bar Association Journal,* XLVIII (August, 1962), p. 711. See also Arthur L. Goldberg, "The Statistics of Malapportionment," *Yale Law Journal,* LXXII (November, 1962), p. 91, and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (February 2, 1962), p. 170.

24 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), appeal docketed, no. 959, 370 U. S. 921 (1962).

the most populous, and Echols County, the least populous, was found to be 99 to 1 in terms of population, with each unit vote in Fulton representing over 92,000 people and in Echols representing only 938 people. A revised unit system (15 to 1) was also declared discriminatory. The court used the national electoral college disparities as a standard to judge any new Georgia unit system which might be devised. This was a novel proposal as the ratio depends on the rate of growth of the smallest state, Alaska, and the state having the largest population unit representing one electoral vote, California. Alaska at present is lowest in ratio of electoral votes in population with a ratio of one elector for each 75,389 people; and California is largest with a ratio of one electoral vote for each 392,930 people.[25] I would doubt the wisdom of the United States Supreme Court using the district court formula rule.

In Toombs v. Fortson,[26] the federal district court ordered "at least" one house of the Georgia legislature apportioned on a population basis before January, 1963. In Wesberry v. Vandiver,[27] a congressional district suit was dismissed, the court holding that responsibility belonged to the coordinate branch of government, Congress, but expressing the thought that a properly apportioned Georgia legislature might grant relief in misapportioned congressional districts.

At a special legislative session ending October 8, 1962, the Georgia General Assembly complied with the federal court order and reapportioned the senate on a population basis. The maximum population variation is from 57,000 to 82,000. Area wise, the largest districts compose eight counties while some of the large counties have two or more districts. Oddly, one county, Floyd, with 69,000 people constitutes the only one-county senatorial district.

The state primary was changed to a popular vote basis and the governor and other Democratic nominees were popularly chosen for the first time in over 50 years.

The language of the Georgia suit of last May could be very meaningful. Said the court: "So long as the legislature of the state of Georgia does not have *at least* one house elected by the people apportioned to population, it fails to meet the Constitutional requirement."[28] Eventually, will the other house have to be based on population also? A

25 See Kefauver, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

26 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).

27 31 U. S. L. Week 2017 (N.D. Ga.) U. S. June 20, 1962.

28 *The Atlanta Constitution,* May 25, 1962. Emphasis added.

suit to settle this issue is likely to arise, one day.

In Gray v. Sanders,[29] the United States Government has intervened. This is the Georgia suit now before the Supreme Court. The Attorney General in his brief has involved apportionment as well as the electoral system in his argument, pointing out that the "equal protection and due process clauses condemn any legislative apportionment or electoral system that imposes an extreme and invidious discrimination against any class of voters."[30]

INDIANA

In Gulls v. Anderson[31] state judge Linder, in a declaratory judgement, held the state apportionment unconstitutional because of the passage of time and changing conditions. Said the Court: "The failure of the Indiana General Assembly to reapportion the state for a period of thirty-four years is not in keeping with the terms of the Constitution of the United States which provided every state in the Union a republican form of government."[32]

It may be significant that recent cases are citing the guarantee of a republican form of government found in the United States Constitution. Heretofore it has been frequently referred to as the United States Supreme Court, in Luther v. Borden,[33] refused to apply the guarantee on the grounds that it was a political question.

Judge Linder also found that the statute violated the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution and provisions of the Indiana constitution. ". . . [T]hrough a unique proposition by insuring the re-election of its members [the legislature was] . . . usurping or perpetuating, power against the will of the majority of the people . . . . This is repugnant to the republican form of government . . . . This Court feels it has the duty and authority to act to save the constitutional government in the State of Indiana."[34]

Fearing that Judge Linder would be reversed by the Indiana Su-

29 Supreme Court of the United States, No. 112, October term, 1962.

30 *National Civic Review,* LII (February, 1963).

31 Superior Court, Marion County, Indiana, 559-600 (1961).

32 Quoted by James E. Larson, *Reapportionment and the Courts* (University: Alabama, 1962), pp. 54-55.

33 7 Harvard (1849).

34 Larson, *op. cit.,* pp. 54-55.

preme Court, interested persons have filed an additional apportionment suit in federal court.[35]

ALABAMA

In July, 1962, after the Alabama legislature had not produced an acceptable reapportionment formula, the federal district court accepted parts of the two plans submitted, those parts which were most equitable to the urban areas, and ordered elections on that basis. The court added the admonition that the new legislature elected in November, 1962, must work out a still fairer system of apportionment, possibly indicating that a population basis must be used in the state senate as well as the state house. [36] The case marks the first time a federal court has spelled out a plan for distributing the seats in a state legislature.

In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,[37] the case holding that Negroes had been gerrymandered out of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, the court, it seems to me, strained reasoning somewhat in upholding applicants' rights under the 15th amendment rather than the 14th amendment.

VIRGINIA

Although Chief Justice Earl Warren has granted a stay of the federal district court's order until Mann v. Davis can be heard on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a significant land mark.[38] On November 29, 1962, by a 2-1 decision the federal district panel in Mann v. Davis ordered the legislature to establish election districts for both houses of the Virginia legislature substantially in proportion to population and community of interest.

The majority opinion declared: "No analogy of the state senate with the federal senate in the present study is sound. The latter is a body representative of status quo states, but the state senate is not its regional counterpart. State senatorial districts do not have state autonomy. The bicameral system is a creature of history, and many of the reasons for its creation no longer obtain. The chief justification for bicameralism in state government now seems to be the thought that it insures against precipitate action—imposing greater deliberation—upon profound legislation."

35 Stout v. Hendricks.

36 Sims v. Frink, 30 U. S. L. Week 2512 (N. D. Ala.) (U. S. April 14, 1962); *New York Times,* July 26, 1962.

37 364 U. S. 339 (1960).

38 *National Civic Review,* LII (January, 1963), p. 30.

Said the court: "While predominant, population is not the sole or definitive measure of a district . . . ." The court cited compactness, community of interests of the people, natural borders, historical divisions, as useful guides along with numbers of people in apportioning members. The dissenting judge thought that state courts and the state legislatures should have been given more time before ordering reapportionment.[39]

FLORIDA

Under a federal court threat the Florida legislature, after meeting twice in special sessions, has finally submitted an accepable reapportionment plan that falls far short of "equitable," but apparently the populous centers will be in a slightly improved position to secure an equitable plan. The federal district panel has also indicated that another look at the plan may be made after it is tried. The two houses are enlarged so that big and medium-sized counties get five additional senators and 17 additional representatives. Still 29.06 per cent of the voters can choose a majority of the house of representatives, and 14.5 per cent of the voters can select a majority of the senate.[40] Further reforms are expected, apparently, in the next legislature.

MISSISSIPPI

Mississippi voters voted for reapportionment for the first time since 1890 in an election on February 5, 1963. The election was held under threat of a federal court order to reapportion if the legislature failed to do so. The plan has successfully passed the electorate, and the legislature meets, today, February 25, 1963, to set up "posts" in more populous counties securing additional members. The size of the legislature will be reduced, the reverse of the Florida plan. The house loses 18 members, 140 to 122, but the senate is slightly enlarged from 49 to 52 members. Several seats will be shifted from small to large counties.[41]

WASHINGTON

The February, 1963, issue of the *National Civic Review* reports that a federal court in the State of Washington held legislative apportionment discriminatory in spite of the defeat by the voters in the general election of an initiate law attempting apportionment. In ordering the legislature to reapportion by April, 1963, the courts said: "If

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[40] *The Atlanta Constitution,* February 10, 1963.

[41] *Ibid.*

[the legislature] fails, we, ever conscious of our oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, will unhesitatingly take appropriate action to correct the inequity." Apparently the court intends to require that both houses be apportioned according to population.

MICHIGAN

The Michigan state supreme court in a 4-3 decision ordered the senate apportioned according to population. The house was already so apportioned. Stay was granted by Potter Stewart, and the case now awaits a United States Supreme Court hearing.[42]

But Michigan has just written a new constitution; and, under this new constitution, the people will vote in April on a novel plan to give population 80 per cent and geography 20 per cent weight in districting the state senate.[43]

MARYLAND

A Maryland court of appeals, 4-3, held that the state senate could be based on geographical districts if the other house was based on population. Maryland acquired one additional congressman in reapportionment, but the voters disapproved the legislature's action in redrawing congressional districts varying from 244,000 people to 609,000 people.[44] Largely due to the activity of the League of Women Voters, sufficient signatures under a referendum law were gathered to force the redistricting to a popular vote. The League then sponsored its defeat. In one district candidates will be forced to run at-large.

The Maryland Committee for Fair Representation has a case before the United States Supreme Court attempting to force a second, and more equitable, apportioning in the House of Delegates.[45]

OTHER STATES

Similar developments have also taken place in other states, including Oregon, Minnesota, Hawaii (as a territory) and New Jersey.

ONE MAN, ONE VALUE; ONE VOTE, ONE VALUE

All over the country those who believe in majority government

[42] "Michigan Suit Stay Suggests Reapportionment Guide Lines," *Congressional Quarterly Report,* XX (August 3, 1962), pp. 1302-1304.

[43] *National Civic Review,* LI (January, 1962), p. 634.

[44] *Ibid.,* 624.

[45] The last report on Maryland will be found in "Constitutional Reform Looks Up in Maryland," *National Civic Review,* LII (February, 1963), p. 89.

are taking on new life. Sooner or later the movement will reach Georgia. It is becoming more and more difficult to justify government by minority. Let us wait a while before attempting to rectify old wrongs in Georgia. While the pot boils we need to study how best to establish good government in Georgia. We need experienced, imaginative leadership which is not afraid to rebuild our government from the ground up. But such leadership cannot be developed hurriedly.

Although the Virginia legislature in the 18th century was not as malapportioned as the Georgia legislature in the 20th century, Jefferson denounced the inequality in his *Notes on Virginia.* But Virginia made progress. For many years now, Virginia has been rated among the dozen most fairly apportioned states in the United States, while Georgia's malapportionment has grown more distorted with the passage of time. Even the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided for "proportionate representation." Representative government works well in several state legislatures. It should be tried in Georgia.

It now appears that those who have thrived off the malady of malapportionment will not have to be relied on to find a cure. The courts have acted. What was at stake was the underlying structure of our whole representative system. A Georgia Constitutional Commission can certainly correct some of the anachronism of the present document. But the people should keep up the fight for an equitably apportioned legislature—in both houses. That is the most urgent matter at present.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT:

CAN AND SHOULD THIS HAVE A NEW MEANING FOR GEORGIANS?

By BETTY A. VINSON*

The true barriers standing in the way of reform to bring about just representation in state legislatures and the Congress of the United States lie not so much in the problems of establishing district lines as in the widespread ignorance and misconceptions about the goals and methods of representative government, and in a lack of philosophical consensus on basic principle. Our first task, it seems to me, then, is to shake off some of the "ghosts," while at the same time building up a popular understanding of the purposes of representative government.

In the Tennessee apportionment case, the citizens asked for *equal* protection of the laws; in that case and in others, judges talked of *equal* rights in voting and in representation; in League of Women Voters work to achieve sound representation, we have talked constantly of "standards of equitability."

In its March, 1963, ruling, the United States Supreme Court held that it is a justiciable matter, under the Fourteenth Amendment, when claims are made that state apportionment laws arbitrarily impair voting rights. In its findings, the Court found apportionment laws impaired voting rights when they:

were "arbitrary and capricious";
resulted in "invidious discrimination," or
were based on action "without any justification," or

These terms are not exact, and to quote Justice Clark: ". . . no one . . . contends that mathematical equality among voters is required by the equal protections clause." If the goal is not "mathematical equality," what is it then? How can representative justice and equity be measured in the Georgia legislature?

To help answer those questions, I want us to consider three other questions in addition designed to expand our understanding of basic principles in representative government.

1. Is the pattern of representation in the United States Congress the best one—or the right one—to apply to state legislatures?

2. Is it important that people be represented justly in legisla-

*Former President, Georgia League of Women Voters.

tures and in Congress? If so, how can it be done?

3. What steps can be taken in Georgia to bring about rapid relief and to provide reasonable long-term protection against recurrence of future drift into the same kind of inequities we face now?

In this first question we see indicated the solution which comes to most people almost on impulse.

In Georgia we have redistricted and reapportioned senate seats so that a majority of people live in districts which can elect a majority of senators. Why not be content?

1. HOW IS THE PATTERN OF CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION HELD UP AS A MODEL FOR STATE LEGISLATURES?

In the first place it is pointed out that in Congress, the House represents people and the Senate represents states, and that this system provides a sound model for state legislatures. Proponents of representation of people in one legislative body and area in the other make people think that if they do not support this system in states, they must be opposed to the "good old American way."

The truth is that the United States system of government is a federal system. State government is not federal. The United States was created by thirteen sovereign states, under a Constitution which defines the areas of power for the states and for the nation. The provision that the United States Senate would be comprised of two members from each state was a great compromise, a key device for making the union possible.

"Federalism as a political theory has had and continues to have value as a device of compromise permitting the joining of lesser sovereignties into greater unions . . . . But to speak of federalism within a state is to reduce a great principle to an absurdity."[1]

As Professor Paul David, of the University of Virginia, has written: "The United States Senate is both irrevelant and improper as a model for representation within a state, because a state is not a federal union of sovereign counties." There is no legal basis—in constitutions or in court rulings—"for the notion that a county is a unit in which the right of representation is inherent."[2]

[1] Anthony Lewis, *One Man—One Vote,* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

In a United States District Court ruling in Alabama, July 21, 1962, it was held that the analogy with the United States Senate "cannot survive the most superficial examination" into the history of constitutional requirements for representation or in the functions of state and county or city governments. It held unconstitutional a proposed constitutional amendment which would have reduced representation in the Alabama Senate to one senator per county, because such a move would have granted members representing 19 per cent of the people a majority voice in that body.

How do counties differ from states?

The State Constitution defines a county as "a body corporate with such powers and limitations as may be prescribed by law." Counties are creatures of state governments, set up as administrative units.

The United States government is a federation of states which contracted together to form a union. The United States Congress may not change the boundary of any state. The Georgia Legislature can initiate action to merge counties.

As an attorney for the state said in the Georgia legislative apportionment case, "Georgia is not an indissoluble union of indestructible counties."

There is no separate citizenship in counties; we are citizens only of the United States and of states.

The Federal Government exercises powers not reserved to states. In states, rights are reserved to the people, not to counties. The people, not counties, ratified the Georgia constitutions of 1877 and 1945. General assemblies—acting for states—ratified the United States Constitution and have power to ratify and initiate amendments. Counties have no such power.

As Gordon E. Baker says: "That counties are related to their state as states are to the union has no basis whatsoever in theory, in law or in common sense. States are unitary and not federal in their composition and counties are mechanical rather than organic sub-divisions."[3]

Counsel for the state, B. D. Murphy, reminded the Court in the legislative reapportionment case that elected representatives or senators become "repositories of state power"; that they are not in the legislature as representatives of a county, and must not legislate on behalf of a county, but rather on behalf of the state—a potent argument for

[3] Gordon E. Baker, *State Constitutions: Reapportionment,* (New York: National Municipal League, 1962), p. 13.

grouping counties into districts for election of representatives and senators!

Karl Bosworth says in "Law Making in State Governments": "Any sovereignty of counties or towns is based on entrenched political power, not on constitutional or democratic theory."[4]

In the second place proponents of the federal plan claim that if the apportionment in Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Michigan, etc. is unconstitutional because it violates the citizen's right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, then surely the Supreme Court should find the United States Senate representation unconstitutional on the same basis.

With a bit of thought, the answer to that claim is simple. The provision for two senators for each state is a guarantee written into the Constitution as ratified in 1789, and not amended since, in this regard. It is a constitutional part of the national government *only*. No such guarantee to counties or cities has ever been written into the Constitution of the United States.

The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, specifically wrote into the Constitution a direct order to each state that "no state shall deny to any person" within the state "equal protection of the law."

The Fourteenth Amendment further strengthens the requirements for equal representation of the people in the United States House, by requiring the whole number of persons to be accounted for in apportioning House seats according to population. It even provided a penalty for states failing to comply. BUT NO RELIEF FROM THE "EQUAL PROTECTION" REQUIREMENT for state laws was adopted—not even for state senates.

In the third place proponents of area representation for one legislative branch argue that there must be this differentiation of the basis of representation between the two houses to serve as a check and balance and to justify the existence of a bicameral legislature.

In order to support their point, the proponents of this point of view argue in an all-or-nothing fashion that representation in one branch must be based on *area only,* with no recognition given to population. They fail to recognize the fact that, while there is only one unicameral legislature in the nation, only seven of the 50 states base representation in one legislative branch exclusively on area. Others give some

[4] *American Assembly, The Forty Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 85.

recognition to population—a few to an equitable degree. Yet the other 42 states are not abandoning the bicameral legislature.

They seem to forget, too, that the fact of having two houses which must approve all legislation in itself satisfies the bicameral theory that two houses serve as a check on each other, preventing hasty or ill-considered legislation. This is true in theory, anyway. No legislature is any better or wiser than its members—no matter how many checks are built into the system.

They forget, too, that representative districts based fairly on population do not have to be identical for the house and senate, that even if they are identical in area, the individuals elected are not likely to hold identical views. They forget, too, that part of the protection of the bicameral principle lies in the difference in terms with representatives having two year terms, and senators having four year terms.

In many states it is possible to give recognition to counties *per se* and at the same time provide reasonably proportionate representation of the people. There is nothing in any court ruling to date to indicate that recognition cannot be given to such geographic or political units. There are indications that such recognition to the extent of denying a majority of the citizens a reasonable chance at a majority voice in legislatures might be unconstitutional.

Let us consider the specific Georgia question for a moment. We have already noted that the state has been redistricted to provide election of senators from reasonably equitable districts. To judge whether or not a legislature is representative, it is necessary to look at the whole. In the Senate, people are the basis for determining allotment of seats; in the House, the county is still primary and people secondary. Each county is allotted at least one seat. Population is taken into account by granting:

the *eight* largest counties *three* seats each;
the *thirty* next largest *two* seats each; and
the *121* smallest *one* seat each.

To many people this provides just representation. It certainly is not a duplicate of the congressional pattern. Indeed, Georgia has never copied the United States House and Senate pattern exactly. Under Georgia's present system, the House, which is representative primarily of area, is considered to be the "conservative" body—the legislative branch which will serve as a check on the Senate, which many consider more "radical" because its members are elected from districts having reasonably equal numbers of people.

The real question for the future is: will this system provide a "check and balance" between the two legislative branches; or does it place a potentially dangerous veto power in the hands of a minority? This is the question justices are asking in cases having to do with whether or not both branches of legislatures must be representative of people: "What proportion of the people elect a number of legislators necessary to block passage of laws and constitutional amendments?" This question is one we must understand the answers to before further changes will be effected in our legislature.

These charts will place a few pertinent facts before us: 103 smallest counties having 22.5 per cent of population, have 51 per cent of the seats and votes in the House.

THIS 22 PER CENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES CAN BLOCK THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY AS EXPRESSED IN A BILL ADOPTED BY THE SENATE. Should this power be placed in the hands of so few, or should these representatives more nearly approximate representing about half of the people?

The 69 smallest counties having 12.7 per cent of the people elect 34 per cent of the representatives, the number necessary to block all measures requiring a two-thirds vote—including amendments to the state constitution.

THE INTENT OF REQUIRING A TWO-THIRDS VOTE IS TO INSURE THE MINORITY REAL VOICE IN LAW-MAKING: BUT SHOULD THIS MINORITY STRENGTH BE ELECTED BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE PEOPLE, RATHER THAN BY 12 PER CENT?

What would happen if the Georgia House should have its seats allotted on the basis of one per county, regardless of population?

The 15 largest counties having 51 per cent of the people, would have 9.4 per cent of the representation. The 144 smallest counties having 49 per cent of the people would have 90.6 per cent of the representatives.

Or to look at where the veto power would be placed: the 80 smallest counties having 15.3 per cent of the population would elect 51 per cent of the representatives.

The 54 smallest counties having 9.3 per cent of the people would have 34 per cent of the representatives and votes.

WOULD THIS SYSTEM GRANT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE A REASONABLY FAIR CHANCE TO SECURE THE

KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY DESIRE? THERE IS INDICATION IN A FEW COURT RULINGS TO DATE THAT THIS DISPROPORTION BETWEEN POPULATION AND REPRESENTATION WOULD BE SO GREAT AS TO BE INVIDIOUS, EVEN IF THE SECOND BRANCH OF A LEGISLATURE WERE BASED PROPORTIONALLY ON POPULATION.

The reason the Congress of the United States can allot one seat to each state, and then allow seats in proportion to population with equitable results, is that the number of seats free to be allotted according to population is large.

The United States House has 435 seats, allots 50 seats (one per state regardless of population), but still has 385 seats to be apportioned strictly according to population, so exactly indeed that the greatest variance between per cent of population and per cent of representation is only slightly over one per cent.

If Georgia with 205 seats allots 159 seats, one per county, there would remain only 46 seats to be allotted on the basis of population.

The ratio of seats to be allotted proportionally is too small in relation to the total seats available to permit proportional representation. One of the big attempted frauds in Georgia was launched in the April, 1962, Special Session of the General Assembly. At that time many efforts were made to adopt what was called the federal system of "equal proportions" for use in the Georgia House. The phrase sounded appealing, and without working out a bit of mathematics, the people could be easily fooled. An equal proportions formula can be applied to any problem of seating delegates, but it will not guarantee any real degree of equitable representation unless the number of seats to be allotted proportionally is large in relation to the total number available. To apply the federal equal proportions formula to the Georgia House with the same degree of equity existing in the United States House would require a House of about 2100 members.

THERE REMAIN THEN THESE ANSWERS TO JUST REPRESENTATION IN THE GEORGIA HOUSE:

1. Group counties together or subdivide them into equitable house districts;

2. Increase the size of the House to about 300 to 400 to provide reasonable equity;

3. Consolidate the counties so there will be no more than 55 units (counties) to be represented regardless of population, with the

remaining 150 seats being available for proportional districting.

In summary, it is the wide-spread devotion to counties and "county rights"—hammered into Georgian heads for so many years—that is the big block to progress in the Georgia House. Even if counties were consolidated there would remain the need to understand the difference between representing counties and representing people.

NOW, TO THE SECOND BIG QUESTION: IS IT REALLY IMPORTANT THAT PEOPLE BE THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN ALLOTTING OR APPORTIONING LEGISLATIVE SEATS?

The Georgia Constitution (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. 1, Bill of Rights) says: "All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are the trustees and servants of the people, and at all times, amenable to them." There are no "ifs" or qualifications placed upon this statement. It does not say except that counties or cities shall have prior rights of representation in the law-making bodies.

During the Eisenhower administration, his "Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs" concluded that the decline in influence of state governments must be attributed in part to their failure to maintain equitable representation. Most state governments had legislatures which were representative of rural areas to such a large extent that they denied the majority of the people a chance to elect lawmakers.

A conference of scholars and political scientists called together in 1962 by the Twentieth Century Fund to discuss problems of legislative apportionment agreed that "in the light of democratic principles, of history and contemporary political theory, the only legitimate basis of representation in a state legislature is people. One man's vote must be worth another's."[5]

The report continues: "The purpose of legislative representation in a democratic system of government is just that—to represent. The legislature acts on behalf of the voters. The proper goal of the system of apportionment must, therefore, be to provide effective representation for the body politic."[6]

There are those who argue, to the contrary, that *areas* have just as much right to representation. Some call this representation of geographic areas; some call it representation of political units. In the begin-

[5] Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

ning and in the end, however, it is only *people* who can vote, and whatever a legislature does for or against an area is in reality done to the people there, not to an abstract idea or entity.

Some people claim the only way to protect minority interests is to protect the "rural" areas, by giving these divisions of land more representation than their population would warrant. This same claim was not made for urban citizens in the day when the rural people outnumbered the urban. In the 1890's and early 1900's, when most state apportionment provisions were written into state constitutions, urban areas with about one-third of the people were not granted a majority of the legislature to insure protection of their minority needs. This minority-protection argument has in truth grown up as one of the devices for fooling the citizenry, so that those in power could hold onto what they had gained through the years.

Followed through to its ultimate conclusion, the argument does not hold water. If the rural citizens should be a majority voice in legislatures, just because they are a minority, why should not the Negroes or the Mexicans, where they are in the minority, deserve a majority control? Or how about citizens who are worth over half a million dollars?

In the United States Supreme Court hearing on the Georgia county unit suit, Justice Goldberg asked Attorney General Robert Kennedy with regard to the League of Women Voters: "What would you think about a system that would discriminate against them and would give them half a vote?"

Bobby's reply: "I think it would be unconstitutional and unwise." We agree. Neither would the League as an organized minority demand that it be given a majority representation in either house of the legislature.

There are many ways of protecting minority interests in our nation. Indeed, the system of checks and balances built into the system of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government affords such a protection. We know that pressure groups, organized lobbies, etc. serve to keep minority rights before Congress and state legislatures. Through a combination of factors in Congress, including the seniority system on committees, a few southern congressmen representing a minority of the people wield majority-strength power.

After all, the majority of the people represented in a state legislature will not be comprised of people with a single point of view. The

majority is made up of many people, with varying interests; and a majority vote usually is the result of agreement among several points of view, which taken alone would each be a minority.

It has been held already in court that it is unconstitutional to gerrymander districts for the purpose of disfranchising or weakening an individual's vote because of his race. Why should the courts accept other artificial classifications such as residence or economic interest? As those meeting under the Twentieth Century Fund Seminar agreed: "The central fact is that any basis of representation other than population gives one citizen's vote greater value than another's. There is no justification in our democratic heritage, in logic or in the practical requirements of government for choosing such a course."[7]

Representation according to population is an historic concept in the United States. May I quote for you the three examples cited by Gordon E. Baker (in *State Constitutions: Reapportionment,* p. 3). A speaker in the Massachusetts convention of 1776: "The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially distributed that the representation should have the same views and interests with the people at large . . . . Let the representatives be apportioned among the counties in proportion to their numbers of free men."

Thomas Jefferson wrote in a model constitution for Virginia: ". . . the number of delegates each county may send shall be in proportion to the number of its qualified electors," and the Senate would also reflect the popular base, with one member for each six delegates to the House from a district.

In setting forth the framework for future state governments, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided as a basic tenet that the inhabitants should always be entitled to "a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature . . . ."

None of this emphasis on people constitutes a denial that there are other factors to be considered in drawing legislative or congressional districts. Political boundaries which make for easy election voting and counting procedures, geographic logic, economic balance of interests all are other factors which should and can be considered.

THE THIRD QUESTION: WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN IN GEORGIA TO BRING ABOUT RAPID RELIEF AND TO PROVIDE REASONABLE LONG-TERM PROTECTION AGAINST RECURRENCE OF FUTURE DRIFT INTO THE SAME KIND

[7] Lewis, *op. cit.,* p. 8.

OF INEQUITIES WE FACE NOW?

To answer this question, I shall review briefly the positions the League of Women Voters of Georgia has set forth as goals toward which to work.[8] With these positions I am in complete accord. Time and further study may bring results in changed goals, but these seem reasonable and necessary now.

In one sentence it can be said that we need major revision of the state constitution to require that representation in the legislature be based primarily on people; that the standards of equity be fixed, but provided in such a way as to permit some flexibility in the size of both legislative branches; that a non-legislative body be responsible for periodic redistricting and reapportionment; that the state Supreme Court be given direct responsibility to see that the constitutional standards are met; and that reasonable equity be required in the United States congressional districts.

GENERAL APPORTIONMENT REQUIREMENT: Would make mandatory proportionate representation of people in both legislative branches, with the state divided in *legislative districts* containing about the same numbers of people each, compact and contiguous and "rationally devised with regard to economic and geographic factors," and without gerrymandering of lines to favor any population segment. The maximum variance from the average size set for each legislative branch would be ten per cent.

REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE: Would set the maximum at 54 seats, with one senator allowed per district. Districts would be devised so as to contain about two per cent of the people each, and could be comprised of a single county, a group of counties, or districts within a county. Provision would be made for four year terms on a staggered basis, with one-half elected each two years. Election (and nomination) would be on a district-wide basis in all cases. All senators would be permitted to succeed themselves, thereby writing into the constitution the end of the rotation system. (NOTE: the present system in the Senate meets many of the above requirements, but not all).

REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE: Would set a maximum of 108 members, each to come from districts having about one per cent of the people. (One alternative would be to elect two representatives from each senate district, avoiding another districting system. In

[8]For full copy of proposed amendments, write to Georgia League of Women Voters, 7-17th Street, N. E., Atlanta 9. Ask for *Georgia Voter* reprint of "PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS." Free, with enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.

this case, the two representatives could be elected-at-large from the senatorial districts, or the senatorial districts could be sub-divided into house districts.) Terms would be two years.

CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT: Would require that the average size of congressional districts be determined by dividing the state population by the number of congressmen allotted to Georgia. Districts would then be revised every ten years at least, in such a manner that none would be more than fifteen per cent larger or smaller than this number. (This fifteen per cent maximum variation was the limit fixed in the 1929 congressional districting law of the United States.)

REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION: Would be comprised of Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General. This commission would be required to redistrict and reapportion Georgia legislative and United States congressional districts at least every ten years, immediately after the United States decennial census. The State Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review the commission's plans, and to require the commission to devise plans in line with constitutional requirements. The penalty for failure to do so would be election-at-large of all legislators and congressmen beginning with the first term after the report of the decennial census.

How realistic are these goals? Perhaps the senate plans can be written into a constitutional proposal during the 1964 legislative session. Cases now before various federal courts, including Georgia's congressional case now on appeal in the United States Supreme Court, may hasten action to correct present inequities among districts. No constitutional amendment is prerequisite to this reform, but legislators seem reluctant to move unless forced by court ruling or popular demand, both of which are lacking at the moment.

I would predict no action to improve representation in the Georgia House unless legal action forces it. People in general are fairly well pleased with the status quo, or want more time to test the effects of recent senate revision. Popular pressure may come sooner than we think, however, if another legislature continues the practice of favoring counties with road and school funds, when needs are so great for the money to be where the people and children reside. Without legal action, my guess would be that our best hope lies in rapid action to consolidate counties. The economic benefits are more immediately obvious to the average person than the benefits of equality in representation.

, 1961

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME III JUNE, [redacted] 1962 NUMBER 1

THE NEW EUROPE

RECEIVED
JAN 8 1970
PERIODICAL
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

PUBLISHED BY

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

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CONTENTS

PAGE

The New Europe as Seen by an American Businessman
By *A. B. Vosseller* 3

Britain, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance
By *Alec Robertson* 20

The New France
By *Lee Boone Kennett, Jr* 34

The Economic Miracle of Central Europe
By *Robert M. Bunzl* 47

Trade Relations of the United States with the New Europe
By *Mildred R. Mell* 55

FOREWORD

This publication is an outgrowth of a series of lectures held on the West Georgia College campus during the winter and spring quarters of 1962-63. Sponsored jointly by the Division of Social Sciences, the Department of Adult Education and the Carrollton League of Women Voters, these lectures were designed to acquaint students, community leaders and other interested adults with recent developments in Europe.

The sponsoring organizations are especially indebted to Professors J. David Griffin, Mauriel Holland, Eugene R. Huck, W. Benjamin Kennedy, W. Glenn Moore and Warren A. Walker for their assistance in planning these programs and in preparing the lectures for publication; to Mr. Tracy Stallings of the West Georgia Public Relations Department for many invaluable services; and to Mrs. Pauline Truitt and Mrs. Corene Zachry for their untiring secretarial assistance.

The publication of this series of addresses was made possible by a grant from The Sears-Roebuck Foundation.

J. Carson Pritchard, Director
Department of Adult Education

Mrs. Donald Harrison, President
Carrollton League of Women Voters

John M. Martin, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences

THE NEW EUROPE AS SEEN BY AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN

By A. B. Vosseller*

All our opinions are colored by our own individual experience. When I give you my views of the New Europe as seen by an American businessman, I think it is important that you know what kind of business I have been engaged in in Europe in order that you may have a better feeling for the validity of such opinions as I have, as related to the broad field of business.

For about four and a half years I have represented the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Europe, and, as I believe most of those present today know, our business is the manufacture and sale of aircraft, missiles, and related electronics and other equipment. The type of customers one meets and deals with in a business like this are, I think, quite different from those one is apt to have contact with in, let us say, the drug, chemical, or automobile business.

On the other hand, because our business is so intimately related with the governments and many large businesses in Europe, I and my associates have to look continually at a broad international field which covers developments in the fields of politics, general economic conditions, labor and tax conditions, etc., to say nothing of military developments.

Having thus, I hope, qualified myself, let me proceed to an examination of the New Europe as it looks to me. Before doing so, however, I should like to list briefly the major things which, in my opinion, have brought Europe to the point it is today. Although I am here looking at Europe mainly from the standpoint of business, everyone recognizes that there are many things which affect business at any given time. Those which have had the greatest influence and have produced the conditions we now find existing in Europe are, I think, the following: (I propose to discuss these in more detail later, but they are set down here for convenience in following the thread of my discourse which could get rather tangled considering some of the complexities involved.)

*Vice-President, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Underlying everything is the turbulent history of Europe. It is a story of wars and rumors of war from the very beginning right down almost to the present day.

Of more concern is World War II and the disruption and damage which resulted. Next, of course, came the reconstruction and revival of Europe brought about principally by the Marshall Plan.

Following this came intensification of the Cold War, expansion of the Soviet threat, the Berlin Airlift, and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The next event of great significance was the creation of the European Economic Community which gave promise of political as well as economic unity as the pace of prosperity picked up and business started to boom.

Finally, we saw the dangers of inflation looming, growing dissension in the EEC and what looks like the emergence of a resurgent nationalism which could threaten the spirit of unity and cooperation which had been so carefully nurtured over the last fifteen or twenty years.

The first thing to be noted is that the recovery of Europe after World War II can now be said to be complete. I refer, of course, to Western Europe only, and, more specifically, to the NATO countries, although this observation applies also to some of the other European non-NATO countries such as Sweden and Spain. In fact, recovery is not quite descriptive enough a word to use in the case of many of these countries where "booming" might be more accurate. The booming state of the European economy has led in many places to inflation, and this, in turn, has led to the usual problems which accompany inflation.

But I am perhaps getting ahead of my story. Let me back up and set down a little more background as to how America, and so many American businessmen, got to Europe and got into business there. I think the first cause was, of course, World War II when millions of American servicemen lived, fought and to some extent got acquainted in Europe. Thus, by 1945 many Americans had become European-minded. Thereafter, most of the countries of Western Europe, having suffered great devastation, much loss of life, and almost complete disruption of their whole fabric of society, were destitute, demoralized, and ripe for Communism.

The thing that saved the situation economically and politically—and I am not sure exactly which of these two should be ranked first—

was the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan is something of which we, as Americans, should be extremely proud, and for which, incidentally, the Europeans should be eternally grateful. The Marshall Plan saved and put the countries of Europe back on their feet. And, in the context of my thesis, it also brought American business and businessmen to Europe to help in the process. American business and American businessmen, in large and increasing numbers, have been there ever since and have brought Europe the techniques, the know-how, and in many cases the financing which now enables them to compete successfully with us.

Most economic historians trace the start of the breakdown in Western Europe's economic and trading supremacy to World War I, but this breakdown was not apparent for a long time and did not finally become clear until World War II when appalling weaknesses in the economic structures of most of the member countries of the Common Market came to light. The story of the eventual reconstruction and re-establishment of Western Europe is indeed an unusual tale. Seen against the background of the Cold War and the changes brought about by liberation of a host of former colonies, the developments which have occurred are even more remarkable.

It is now recognized that after World War II practically all estimates of national war damages were exaggerated, particularly those relating to industry, whether because of faulty or scanty statistics or as a deliberate means of obtaining more American aid in reconstruction. This point is worth a little more elaboration, for it furnishes a clue to the amazing recovery which has taken place. When it is realized that many outmoded industrial plants were destroyed in the war, and that the replacements yielded a far greater output than the pre-war level, many damage figures advanced in the early post-war years should no doubt be revised downward, particularly when it is remembered that a large part of the replacements were provided at the expense of the American taxpayer. Indeed, the war effort, especially in Germany, caused an active investment program in key industrial sectors. This was recognized by the European Economic Commission which reported in 1953 that:

> . . . in general, the capacity for industrial production in Europe was, at the end of the war, superior to that at the commencement of hostilities, and in many respects, industrial capacity was better suited to the new needs of Europe.

Even Germany, despite heavy Allied bombings, saw a loss of no more than 25 per cent in actual industrial production in the year 1945 measured against 1938 figures, due in large measure to the enormous increase in productive capacity achieved during the war.

However, whether exaggerated or not, the damages were severe. Losses were heaviest in the field of housing and transportation, and this of course served to impede post-war recovery. Surprisingly enough, in spite of the claims of war damage at the time, manufacturing facilities as a whole were hardly touched as compared with the proportionate damage to private homes and transportation facilities. Not surprisingly, there was an almost complete disorganization of the financial structure of the countries comprising the Six, and the agricultural scene was chaotic. In particular, sources of energy, especially coal mines, were virtually destroyed by bombings. The unfavorable effect of years in which little or no investment was made in the coal mining sector resulted in a complete stagnation of the remaining mines when coupled with the absence of a qualified labor force. Although a hasty attempt was made to augment the production of hydroelectricity and refined oil, the enormous investment necessary rendered impossible any appreciable immediate advance on this front.

In summary, mechanized industry suffered little; indeed, many sectors progressed as a consequence of wartime development. But Western Europe, at the end of World War II, was almost totally devoid of energy sources, which forced heavy reliance on American imports. The shortage of fuel prevented the re-establishment of heavy industry. What little production was forthcoming found few outlets, as means of transportation were totally lacking. Although the Allies gave material assistance in reconstructing transportation lines, the damage to railway rolling stock and trackage, and to roads and ports, was so heavy that Western Europe still suffers from its ill effects. Dutch commercial ports, for example, were totally ruined, and Germany had not a single operating railroad line in 1945. It took truck transportation, mostly by Allied vehicles, to effectuate the necessary transportation.

Human losses were heavy too. Germany's population was reduced by some six per cent, while the nations conquered and occupied during the war suffered heavy human losses (the figures for which are still not accurately determined) by reason of death and voluntary or forced migrations. To add to the problem, refugees from the East, destitute, ill-nourished and homeless, flooded into Western Europe and consid-

erably aggravated the already difficult problem of feeding the labor force.

What is most significant, however, is the fact that the war destruction described above was not distributed equally among the six nations which later came to comprise the Common Market, either in total or in category. Thus, Germany ended the war with an increased manufacturing capacity (within what were her territorial limits of before the war), but losses to her agricultural areas and damages to transportation were severe. The capital market was in total shambles. France and Italy both fared fairly well in the industrial sector, but Italy suffered heavy losses to its hydroelectric installations while France had few coal mines or transportation lines in operation. The Netherlands was crippled by the incalculable damage done to its commercial ports and merchant marine which practically destroyed its entire commercial structure. This, together with the Indonesian War, caused Holland to suffer almost complete financial breakdown. Only Belgium emerged from the war with little destruction. The early liberation of Belgium by American troops prevented heavy bombardment, and the Americans then acted quickly to rebuild Belgian ports for Allied use. Thus, Belgium built up substantial dollar reserves and was able to buy needed American machinery. Drastic monetary control prevented a severe inflation such as developed elsewhere in the Common Market area.

There is little need here to recount in detail the mechanics of operation of the Marshall Plan, nor the maneuvering which took place in the beginning, in which the Soviets attempted to prevent adoption of the Plan and did, in fact, prevent the whole Eastern bloc from participating. It is sufficient to recall that Congress enacted the European Recovery Program, and that the plan was put into practice under authority of the ECA (European Cooperation Administration) which was headed by Paul Hoffman.

The OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) was formed about a year later solely as a body for cooperation and coordination; it had no powers to enforce compliance but only to establish obligations for each member in general as follows:

1) to develop production individually and collectively through the effective utilization of reserves and the modernization of equipment;
2) to prepare general programs for the production and exchange

of commodities and services;

3) to utilize to the maximum, and in the most rational manner, capital available for production;

4) to attempt continually to maintain economic and financial stability all the while assuring full employment;

5) to reduce trade barriers and customs impediments;

6) to reduce barriers to the free movement of persons.

The OEEC functioned approximately as envisioned, and Marshall Plan funds were disbursed to the approximate total of 13.2 billions of United States dollars, making possible the economic recovery of Europe.

The nature of Marshall's offer, coming on the heels of the Czech coup d'etat of 1948, and the subsequent refusal of Russia and the Eastern European satellites to accept its terms, are well-known. Europe was then, it was obvious, divided into two blocs, a division which caused a deep schism in the internal politics of France and Italy. The local Communist Parties of both countries were struggling to participate in each national government and at the same time were following a Moscow-dictated policy. The events of these local struggles are too detailed for portrayal here; suffice it to say that France and Italy both were forced to choose between the United States and non-commitment. Germany was, and still is, split in half; and, if anything were needed to prove it, the Berlin Blockade of 1949 did so. The remaining three members of the Community, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, were wholeheartedly in the Western Camp.

In March, 1948, by the Treaty of Brussels, Britain, France and the three Benelux countries (Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg) agreed to form a defensive alliance called the Western Union. A joint military organization for common defense was set up, and the treaty also provided that the signatories would undertake to "strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united."

Thus the tide of mutual support, international cooperation and coordination—unity if you please—started by the Marshall Plan was helped along in its momentum.

By April, 1949, it was possible to extend the steps already taken in this direction by the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington by twelve nations. In this step the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

zation (NATO). General Eisenhower accepted the post of Supreme Commander and set up SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Paris in 1951. In passing I am proud to interject that I reported to SHAPE for duty in 1952.

Other examples of international cooperation in Europe were tried (the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Payments Union, for example.) These seemed to be succeeding, and it was not long before proposals and suggestions were being made for the formation of yet another type of international cooperation, economic this time but with overtones of political unity possibly to follow.

For reasons too complicated and lengthy to go into here, negotiations were undertaken between two groups of countries often referred to as "The Inner Six" and "The Outer Seven." The first, officially known as the European Economic Community, is comprised of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Germany and Italy while the second, officially the European Free Trade Association is comprised of Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Austria and Switzerland. The latter group has not made much headway, but the EEC came into being as a result of the Treaty of Paris signed January 1, 1959.

Briefly, its six members have pledged themselves to progressively eliminate tariffs and quotas on almost all goods produced within the geographical area formed by the Six. In order to facilitate a higher level of production and a more rational distribution of the product, the member countries have also, in general terms, agreed to work toward the harmonization of investment, labor and transportation policies, and to cooperate in the elimination of all impediments to free competition. These coordinated and liberal policies are hoped and expected to result in a continuous and accelerated pattern of economic growth. Indeed, in the past few years, the rate of increased productivity in Western Europe has surpassed that of the United States; and with the full implementation of the Common Market, an even greater rise in annual growth should be realized.

What may be of even greater significance to American business, however, is the increased competition in Western Europe which it is predicted will flow from the improved economic circumstances of the Six. It is anticipated the Common Market members will be able to produce manufactured goods at home which in the past have been largely supplied by American exporters. The plan is that tariffs and quotas will be eliminated within the Common Market, while the Six

maintain a common tariff wall vis-a-vis the outside world. A result of this would be that a product manufactured in West Germany, for example, will enjoy a better advantage through the Common Market area than a like product fabricated in America. Faced with this increasing competition from Common Market producers, American business might well wish to take advantage of the special benefits afforded commodities by establishing producing units in one or more of the Common Market countries.

In this connection it is worth noting that the population of the Common Market countries totals about 227 million people whereas the United States total is around 185 million.

Even putting aside for the moment the complexities of Western European politics, which dictated both the structure of the Common Market and the choice of the member countries, we may well ask whether the economies of the six members are sufficiently compatible to permit an economic union. A very quick review of the basic economic picture is helpful in order that we properly view the origins of the Common Market as well as the operations of its immediate precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community.

The six nations (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, West Germany, France and Italy) form the geographical heart of Western Europe. Abundant natural resources, good climatic conditions, and excellent river transportation provide the basis for a rich industrial sector which has, in addition, the benefit of one of the highest agricultural productive levels of the world.

But this wealth is not equally distributed among the six nations, particularly as to ferrous metals and sources of energy, as well as means for the transportation of heavy goods. Generally speaking, it is the center of the European Economic Community that is richest in minerals, iron and coal, whereas the northern countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, in addition to Italy and the South of France, are weaker in heavy industrial riches. They provide, rather, the agricultural products of the area plus some important light industries, and, as such, form the natural complement for a heavy industrial center. The labor supply is also unequally distributed, with a general shortage of labor in Germany and a chronic excess in Italy.

Nevertheless, until recently, despite the disparities in the various countries and their economies, it has seemed that the Six could, and would, be able to cooperate effectively.

In the last year or so, two factors have emerged which cast a much less optimistic light on the prospects for the EEC. The first is that in a number of countries the boom has gone too far, too fast, and inflation is becoming a serious problem; secondly, nationalism, principally flowing from President de Gaulle's aspirations and ideas, is creating problems and sowing seeds of dissension and doubt. This is occurring not only in economic and political fields, but in the field of international military cooperation, i.e. NATO, as well.

What are General de Gaulle's views and objectives?

I do not pretend to know accurately and do not believe anyone else, save perhaps one or two of his closest confidants, knows either. He seems to have practically everyone guessing, including the United States State Department.

He is a great man, certainly the greatest in France if not in Europe; and, although he keeps his own counsel until he is ready to move, he has done enough and said enough for one to set down certain of his key ideas and objectives. Those which are known and well documented seem to be: de Gaulle dislikes the Anglo-Saxons (the term he uses to designate the United States and Britain), or at least he dislikes their influence in Europe. He is unhappy over the dependence of Europe, and particularly France, on the United States. He wishes France to be independent and Europe, under French leadership, also to be independent, and in fact to become what he calls "The Third Force" in the world (in addition to Russia and the United States, or perhaps the East and the West), which presumably he thinks would permit Europe to exert the balance of power in the world.

He dislikes NATO and its international character; he calls the United Nations a "debating society" (many in the United States would probably agree) and does not support the UN. As to NATO, he has done a good deal to undermine it, having withdrawn all but token French forces from NATO control and refused to allow American nuclear weapons for use by USAF aircraft stationed in France to be stored on French soil in American custody. He ruled that these weapons could only be maintained there if they were under French custody and control. This was contrary to the U. S. Atomic Energy act which, he well knew, Congress would never change—at least not soon.

In this connection, and still in the military field, he has ruled that France must have its own nuclear deterrent so as not to be dependent upon the United States or the United Kingdom. This is the famous

force de frappe which is currently being developed at vast cost and consequent sacrifices of badly needed schools, housing, roads, etc. The current military view is that the *force de frappe* can never be a significant deterrent and can only be used to start a war—not fight one. But this view is beside the point—which is that France under de Gaulle is going ahead at all costs to provide herself with the power to assert her leadership.

Singlehandedly, de Gaulle excluded Great Britain from the EEC a year ago, maintaining the British were "not European enough," and near the end of 1963 he threatened to break up the EEC if French demands regarding certain terms in the agricultural agreement desired by France were not ratified by all the others by year end.

His recent recognition of Communist China, his meddling in the mess in Viet Nam, French assistance to Castro in Cuba, and de Gaulle's trip to Mexico, all make trouble for the United States and have been done contrary to American advice and request. I am not arguing here that these steps were wrong and American policy was right; I am only documenting some of President de Gaulle's actions which clearly indicate his determination to act as he sees fit, whatever France's allies think may be the consequent damage to their interests. One further straw in the wind was the Franco-German treaty which de Gaulle and Adenauer negotiated and which was regarded by many as de Gaulle's way of tying Germany to France and facilitating French dominance in Europe. If this was indeed one of the objectives, it does not seem to be working out very well as Chancellor Erhard, who succeeded Dr. Adenauer, is developing as quite a strong man himself and seems more inclined toward partnership with the United States than with France.

How this will all end is far from clear, but one thing is plain, namely, that under the spur of de Gaulle's views and actions, a trend toward increased nationalism and away from international unity as exemplified by the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, NATO and, who knows, perhaps next the EEC, has been set in motion. How far and how fast it will go no one can do more than speculate now.

Another factor of great importance existing in the situation today, and I must emphasize once more that here again the question of time—or rather the date—of any observation on this general subject is of overriding importance because of the constantly changing situation, is the problem of inflation.

How to cope with inflation is troubling all the statesmen, economists, and just plain politicians of Europe—to say nothing of businessmen—just as it is in America. Although there are masses of statistics, economic reports, and newspaper and magazine articles on the subject, these are unnecessary because everyone can see for himself, in his daily life, how the prices of everything are increasing constantly. Wages, fringe benefits, material costs and costs for services are increasing too, as at the same time the productivity of workers decreases.

An interesting development in this connection is the way in which the relationship between costs of production, or of doing business, in the United States as compared to Europe have changed over about the past five to eight years. At one time the rule of thumb was generally that labor costs in Europe were about one third of those prevailing in the United States. This was a prime reason for the interest of American business in the Common Market, the thinking being that with their lower production costs *plus* a protective tariff wall around the Common Market countries, it would be impossible for American manufacturers to compete. This idea led to numerous surveys of opportunities for American firms in Europe, and many have built, bought, or entered into agreements with European manufacturing enterprises on the basis of partnerships, part-ownership, etc.

Aside from the problems and difficulties of operating in an unfamiliar environment (including the language problem), it is now becoming clear that European costs, in a number of countries at least, are climbing at such a rate that they now, or soon will, approach American costs of production. These costs of course include social security payments and other fringe benefits, as well as longer vacations, numerous holidays, and, perhaps most important, lower worker productivity. A recent study in the United Kingdom which reported that the British work force was only about half as productive as the American created quite a storm. It pointed out that it takes from three to six times as long to erect a building in the United Kingdom as it does in the United States, and any observer on the scene knows the same or perhaps larger ratios apply in France and several other countries. For example, I have been watching the course of construction of one seven-story office-apartment building near my office for four years. The major construction is now essentially complete, but they have not yet started on the interior finish work. A comparable building in the United States would have been finished and occupied in eighteen months to two years at the outside.

American business in Europe is under constant pressure from our government to sell American products there in order to return a profit to the United States and thus help reverse the unfavorable gold-flow problem which plagues the United States Treasury. This problem exists largely because the United States has for years maintained substantial military forces in Europe to fulfill our NATO and other treaty requirements and, of course, to aid in the defense of Europe. The theory in the beginning was that as the NATO nations in Europe recovered they would take over the major share of the burden of their own defense, and we could gradually withdraw. It has not worked that way; they have nearly all (Germany is an exception) reneged on their commitments in both men and money and the United States is still, individually, carrying the major burden of NATO.

This does not have a direct bearing on the day-to-day conduct of American business in Europe, but it certainly has an indirect effect. What the implications for the future will be in view of the increased interest of the United States Government in the gold-flow problem, no one can say.

Let us now take a brief look at the current economic situation of the six countries of the European Economic Community and Great Britain.

1. France now appears to be the most prosperous with the strongest economic trend; the French financial system is strong; the productivity and production of its agriculture are well above the average in Europe; its capital expansion continues to have momentum; the labor supply is better than in either Germany or Holland; because of the complete dominance of de Gaulle, political disagreements today are far more over personalities and the exercise of executive power than over basic economic or international issues, although the government is having a hard time trying to hold the wage-price spiral down and strikes and agitation for wage increases are common. Nevertheless, we see that French equity prices are high, as mentioned above. France has a wage-inflation problem that is serious, and competition is likely to bring a greater profit squeeze. French adventures abroad (China, Cuba, etc.) may cause trouble later.

2. Western Germany is industrially strong and well rebuilt. However, many corporations and individuals are financially overextended; the financial system is not liquid; labor is extremely short and making the most of it; the country is suffering from wage inflation,

sharply lower gains in the rate of productivity, and a rather general profit squeeze. Consumer gains are likely to continue, but the financial and industrial problems are difficult. It is interesting to note that the political problems, given the explosive questions arising from East Germany and the country's recent history, still are very troublesome. However, German equity prices have become relatively cheap, and West Germany has great potential.

3. Italy has had a great problem with the stability of the lira which should be cured by the recent American loan, and Italy could continue to have the greatest economic growth rate of these countries. Industrialization and the standard of living have further to go in the country as a whole, even after allowing for the fact that a sharp distinction must be made between the much more advanced North and the underdeveloped South. An Italian labor supply continues to be available from agriculture and from the underdeveloped South. However, difficult problems exist in assimilation of Southern Italian labor into the North and in furthering industrialization in the South. From the investors' point of view, the excellent growth is offset by the trend toward nationalism. The nationalization of the electric power industry a year or two ago should not be too discouraging since it is merely following the example of most of western Europe. Nevertheless, the present government considers continued cooperation with the Socialists to be necessary as a counter against the Communists who still constitute an active and powerful political party.

4. The economy of Holland is growing more slowly, largely because of severe labor shortages. The Dutch financial system is generally strong, but a number of industrial companies have had a severe profit squeeze somewhat similar to their German counterparts. Wages are rising strongly, though less so than in France and Germany. The natural gas discoveries in the north are very large and will be important to industry in helping the balance of payments. There appears to be a good long term outlook since the population will grow through a good birth rate and since industrialization has a long way to go. However, the Dutch tend to stick to traditional practices in their economic life more than do other EEC countries. Political stability in Holland is a favorable factor, but the overall Dutch prospects are probably not much above average.

5. Belgium has had the least growth and the least inflation of the Common Market countries. The labor supply is less tight than elsewhere. The country is quite well industrialized, and labor is re-

latively skilled. With Belgium's growing position as an international center and with a strong banking system, the prospects are for no slowdown and perhaps some gain in the growth rate. The loss of her colonies in Africa is bound to, already has had, an adverse effect, and the Belgian treasury is not rich. Politically, the Flemish-Walloon conflict is unsettling though probably not likely to bring a real crisis.

6. The United Kingdom has had a slower real economic growth than the EEC countries, a growth which has averaged in recent years less than 2½ per cent annually or somewhat under our own growth. The country's labor supply is tight though underutilized because of prevailing labor and industrial practices. The productivity gains are under those of the United States and are the lowest of major Western countries. The cost of living continues to rise by an average of about two per cent annually though wage increases of three to four per cent are considerably lower than in Europe. The upcoming elections many believe, will result in a Labor government. Should this take place, the result is likely to be increased nationalization and social security gains for the labor force, developments regarded with foreboding by most observers.

The British financial system is strong. The British have far better security markets than on the Continent. The United Kingdom obviously faces difficult international trading problems unless its productivity is spurred and new arrangements are made. Its Commonwealth trading is becoming less helpful with the passage of time.

This is a lot of history and a lot of description, but I think it is necessary to have this information; otherwise, I cannot see how anyone could understand why conditions in Europe are what they are today.

I am sometimes asked whether I think an American company would be wise to manufacture, set up branches, or go into business in Europe.

What these persons would like to hear is answers to questions such as the following; what are the opportunities, what are the hazards, what are the differences, what are the markets, what is the business climate, what are the peculiarities, what are the problems—how should one proceed, and so on.

I trust some of the answers are evident from the foregoing, if, considering the differences between various types of business, there are indeed any definitive answers to such questions. Perhaps some personal observations and experiences will serve to round out the picture.

The subject of government interference with private enterprise and in the private life of the citizen is always good for an argument in almost any country or gathering. Most Americans think our government is pretty bad, and getting worse, in this respect. They should experience the European brand of supervision and interference.

I do not say it is all bad. It is not, and some of it can be quite helpful, particularly in the field of planning. However, it certainly is aggravating, time consuming, and red-tape generating.

It also is controlling in the sense that the government tells you what you can or cannot do, where you can locate, and what kind of business you can engage in, etc. This is particularly true in England and France where great concentrations of population have grown up around the capital cities of London and Paris. Both governments are trying by every means to distribute industry and population equitably over the countries. Tax advantages and other benefits are given to new businesses which are established in other parts of the country, and new firms, particularly foreign ones, may be forbidden to establish in a locality, such as London or Paris, when they are not wanted.

You used to read a lot in the American press about how the TVA was government competing with private industry and so on. In most of Europe there is so much nationalization of industry that such a thing as the TVA would not cause a ripple of comment. In most of Europe the railroads and the electric power and gas systems have long been government owned and operated. Other nationalized industries, such as automobile factories, steel and iron industries, oil and gas extraction and refining, are not rare; and in many cases where the industries are not out and out owned by the government, they have such large amounts of government money in them that they are government controlled for all practical purposes. Practically all the airlines of Europe are wholly owned or completely controlled by their respective governments.

Socialists of one persuasion or another are common, and Socialist political parties exist and have considerable power and influence in most European countries.

Labor unions are strong and well organized. They do not hesitate to strike against their governments if they choose in the case of the nationalized industries.

In general, business is conducted in a slightly different fashion from what we are used to at home. To illustrate one facet of this, let

me describe a couple of experiences of mine in connection with an office lease.

After considerable difficulty, I negotiated a lease for our office. When the landlord and I finally reached terms, he said, "Okay, we will take it to the *Notaire,*" meaning Notary Public I supposed. We made an appointment, which I thought was strange, and went to the *Notaire* where the landlord sat on one side with his lawyers and I sat on the other with my lawyers and we went down the contract word by word, line by line, with the *Notaire* changing things and putting interlineations in it, which I thought was a mighty funny way for the Notary Public to be acting. At home, I had always walked in, put the paper down, had it stamped by the Notary, paid my dollar and walked out. Well, we got through this long process and finally when it was over I asked how much I owed. I was told I would receive a bill in due course, which surprised me—but not half as much as the bill when it arrived. It was over $1600! I got interested in this matter of *Notaires* (bills of this size always interest me), and I learned that there are some seventy-five of these *Notaires* in Paris, a city of seven million. In some way, which is not quite clear to me, they own their jobs individually, each one having a sort of a franchise which he wills to his son or sells to somebody. With fees like that to be collected, you can see why such a franchise is a valuable property.

I mentioned earlier that there is inflation in Europe. As an example, I had, and have, the usual form of traditional French lease on the office, that is, one which runs for three consecutive three-year periods. The lease contract clearly states that if neither side institutes any negotiations on lease terms or the amount of the rental by the end of the first three-year period, the same terms and payments will follow for the subsequent three-year period. So, when the first deadline passed and I did not get any request for additional rent, although I knew rents were rising, I thought I was safe for at least three years. However, a month and a half after the end of the period, the landlord notified me of a decree published by the French Government acknowledging that the cost of living has gone up more than fifteen per cent in the last three years and, accordingly, that my rental would be increased forty per cent.

Naturally, I rushed to my lawyer, who informed me that, when the government publishes a decree like this, the terms of contracts such as mine are subject to renegotiation. To my outraged protests a-

bout the sanctity of contracts, the lawyer conceded that there is such a thing as sanctity of contracts, "but this is different." We are now taking the matter to court but, as you can imagine, I am having a difficult time making our management at home understand how things like this can happen!

In conclusion, and partial summary, European recovery from World War II is practically complete although there is considerable variation between countries as to the degree of prosperity achieved to date. The European Common Market has accomplished much and may in time contribute considerably more if certain forces and influences now appearing do not interfere with the spirit of cooperation and coordination evident so far by reintroducing the excessive nationalism which has caused so much trouble in the past. Europe may be approaching a cross roads.

The element of time is an essential factor in any assessment of conditions in Europe these days because the situation is fluid and important developments can certainly be expected. No one can say with confidence what they will be—nor when.

European business practices are similar to the ones Americans are used to but still differ enough to be troublesome and, at times, downright difficult and frustrating.

Finally, the New Europe is here; the picture it presents is attractive and promising; however, glimpses of the Old Europe show through from time to time, and one gets the impression that vigilance, and some doing, will be required before the New completely supplants the Old.

BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

By Alec Robertson*

I have long looked forward to being with you today, and first I want to thank you, most warmly, for your welcome and your very kind hospitality.

I shall try to give you as objective a view as I can of the international scene—with particular emphasis on the role of Great Britain concerning Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, as a whole.

I say an "objective view," because I remember what John Hay wrote in the nineteenth century about officials who present their government's views. He said:

> There are three species of creatures who when
> They seem coming are going,
> When they seem going they come,
> Diplomats, women and crabs.

British Colonial and Foreign Policy

About fourteen months ago, one of your former Secretaries of State had just proclaimed that Great Britain had lost an Empire and had not yet found a role.

With all respect to the distinguished gentleman, he was talking through his hat. Let me assure you that he was not the only one; we, too, have had Foreign Secretaries who have talked a lot of bull through their bonnets.

In the Oxford Dictionary, "bull" is defined as "implying ludicrous inconsistency." And a ludicrous inconsistency this statement was.

You in the United States were the first successfully to challenge our colonial rule—and in the context of "no taxation without representation"—with undeniable right and justice. Indeed, a great many people in Britain agreed with your ideals and principles in waging the Revolutionary War, and deplored the policies of Lord North's Government. But your spokesmen need not scoff at the end result — because that end result has been British policy too, for more than one hundred years.

*British Information Officer for the Southeast.

We have not "lost" an Empire; we prepared it as well as we could for independence and gave — yes, *gave* — it freedom. Should we have won more approval had we been less sensitive to the "wind of change" and had expended blood and gold in trying to hold an Empire that (for good or ill) is out of style in the modern world?

We have no apology to make for bringing education, health services, roads and justice—and finally independence—to vast areas of the world which are now paddling their own canoes. True, everything in the new Commonwealth garden has not yet grown to verdant beauty; new countries, like plants, need time. But in general the ties between Britain and the emergent nations are close, based on practical as well as sentimental considerations. Trouble spots there may be, and may yet be, but the recent history is still more of friendly cooperation than of strife.

Even during the recent disturbances in East Africa, it was the free governments of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya which called in British troops to restore order. The Republic of Cyprus requested British forces to stop the strife between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

As to our "role" in world affairs, this remains basically as it has for a long, long time. It is the same as yours in the United States—to preserve peace and foster prosperity.

Yet even in the nineteenth century era of her so-called dominance, Great Britain often could not impose her will upon some foreign nations who opposed her wishes. The Turks, the French, the Russians, the Prussians, and others, at times incurred the majestic displeasure of Queen Victoria. The famous Pax Britannica did manage, until 1914, to preserve the world from global war; but it could not prevent, for example, the Prussian-Austrian war, the Franco-Prussian war or the Balkan wars. The British themselves were often engaged in various conflicts, some of which today we would call "police actions"—sometimes to establish or defend colonial territories, and sometimes—despite the modern taunt of "imperialism"—to defend helpless people against local tyrants. I do not pretend that there were no blots on our record, but in those days, colonialism in its best and most civilizing sense was not a dirty word. But today it is an obsolete one. We accept it.

But the aftermath of Empire has left Britain a legacy which is both an asset and a liability; a liability in the sense that we still have responsibility but no control—as recent disorders in East Africa and Cyprus point out.

Nevertheless, centuries-old ties of law and custom, of mutual respect and, on the practical side, of finance, trade and aid, are not broken in a moment of time.

Britain has responsibilities, yes, but also interests and assets in every continent and on every ocean. The British Army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force still operate from bases strategically located around the world. The British accept a large share in policing the free world and defending it against Communist aggression and subversion.

Because we have spread out into the world so liberally, we look upon our position in it through *global* spectacles—not just British spectacles, or even European, but with a world-wide view. We haven't been isolationists since the Norman Conquest.

We are fifty-three million people, in a country which would fit nicely into the State of Georgia. Even with the world's most highly mechanized and efficient agriculture, we can only feed half our population. We must import the other half of our foodstuffs. Apart from a little coal, we have no raw materials in the United Kingdom. So we must import our primary commodities. These, together with the skills and industry of our people, we turn into manufactured goods, for our own use and for exports, which have to pay for our imports. Some of the most significant advances in science and technology, in all fields, have come, and are continuing to come, from our scientists and research laboratories.

But this ever-present need for import-export means that we have to watch our balance of payments and gold reserves very closely, and counter adverse trends by various monetary and fiscal policies.

Ours is a society that lives from the freeest possible exchange of world trade—or dies without it. It's as simple as that.

We have long realized as a fact of life that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent, and cannot be split up into tight, self-sufficient communities, without sacrificing the well-being of the whole.

The British Isles lie only twenty miles from the coast of France at its nearest point. Europe, as the fountainhead of Western civilization, is close to the minds and hearts of the British people. We have gone to war twice in this century alone to preserve its freedom.

But close as we are, we can never join a Western Europe which sets its sights on self-sufficiency, which dreams of becoming a "Third Force," which can only weaken the "First Force" of a united free world. I will come to this European problem later.

Great Britain's influence in the world has always depended on the skill with which we developed relations with other countries. Of course it is true that with the rise of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the old Victorian-style preeminence of Britain is ended. Historically, it lasted only one hundred years—from 1815, after Napoleon's defeat, until the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914. But our history books did not begin in 1815, and they are unlikely to end in 1964.

This small country on the periphery of Europe managed to halt and defeat the 16th century superpowers of Spain and France and, later, to trounce the German Kaiser and to pulverize Hitler. Sometimes we were alone—as in 1940—but often we had loyal and brave allies equally determined to resist tyranny.

Those who doubt the effectiveness of our present role should realize that our past was not written through the use of overwhelming power—no, not even in the days of Pitt, Palmerston and Disraeli—but in the exercise of influence, the cultivation of strong alliances, the investment of money, the promotion of trade. All these policies are being pursued today, and will be pursued by whatever government—Tory or Labour—may rule.

East-West Confrontation.

But policy is one thing, implementing it quite another. Diplomacy is the art of achieving the possible, which unfortunately doesn't always mean the desirable. And today, even the great and powerful United States cannot get the results from a vast stockpile of nuclear weapons that you and we often got with a gunboat in the past.

The very nature of the nuclear horror makes its use unthinkable, except as a final resort—for ourselves and the Communists alike. This is what Winston Churchill called "the balance of terror."

So I repeat, diplomacy—foreign policy—is the art of achieving the possible. This does *not* mean appeasement. I can assure that although Britons are well aware that the British Isles could be the first nuclear crater of World War III, they see no solution in bending before the Soviet will. That's why we have our own nuclear deterrent.

But rocket-rattling is out of fashion in the atomic age. Even Mr. Khrushchev is not bellowing so angrily as he once did.

In fact, you wonder where the bellow went.

I'll tell you. It went at the time of the Cuba missile crisis, in October, 1962. Suddenly, Khrushchev realized how close Russia was to a nuclear exchange with the United States. Faced with the courageous and wise policy of President Kennedy and his Administration, Khrushchev recoiled from the abyss in horror. He himself has said that a nuclear war would kill a thousand workers for every capitalist. He may be no friend of ours, but he doesn't want to reduce Russia to ruins.

Soviet Tactics: Red China.

Indeed, there is little doubt that since the Cuban crisis, the Kremlin has significantly changed its attitude towards the risk of war. Several factors have probably persuaded the Soviets to reduce tension with the West.

They must realize that their earlier tough tactics, instead of producing gains, have brought unacceptable risks.

The Soviet economy faces serious problems through agricultural failures and the mounting costs of defense, as technology grows ever more expensive. We must not exaggerate Russian economic weaknesses, and they are unlikely to cut down much on their military expenditure; but they may wish to divert some resources to long-term investment and development. This calls for a more peaceful climate, a *detente* with the West.

There is the fateful clash between Soviet Russia and Red China. Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" starts from the conviction that capitalism can be "buried"—Khrushchev's term—without war, as Communist economic and scientific advances persuade the world of what he regards as "the inevitable trend of history towards Communism." The Russians will give this so-called trend a mischievous hand whenever possible, but not to the extent of risking nuclear war—although they might miscalculate those risks.

But the Chinese regard "peaceful coexistence" as weak and ineffective. They favor tough tactics, in the apparent belief that war between the capitalist and Marxist states is bound to come. Perhaps, as they learn more of the annihilating power of the nuclear bomb, they may eventually have second thoughts.

It is hard to say which Soviet attitudes stem from the dispute with China and which are due to traditional elements in Soviet policy. "Russia," as Winston Churchill once observed, "is a riddle wrapped

in a mystery inside an enigma." The Soviet Union probably doesn't regard China, in her present stage of development, as much of a menace —yet; but she may well wish to hedge her bets.

Reducing Tension.

So — out of this nettle, danger, can we pluck the flower of safety? I think we may — if the West is wary, but not so rigid in its views that genuine attempts by Russia to reduce tension are rejected. We have one —and only one—major identity of interest at present: to avoid nuclear war. But out of this common purpose could flow other long-term benefits.

We *can* come to agreements. The Test Ban Treaty is one example. We welcome it as a first step, but only a first step, towards an East-West accord. If the Treaty helps to lift, not only the cloud of radio-active fallout, but also the cloud of suspicion between the Russians and ourselves, it could lead to measures of real disarmament for which we all pray.

There are other interim agreements we may well reach, for we can only hasten slowly along the tortuous path to peace.

Any relaxation of tension, for almost any reason, is a good thing. But don't let us get too starry-eyed. The hostility is still there. Foreign affairs can seldom be regarded in terms of jet black or pure white; but it is certain that we can't yet turn Russian red into red, white and blue. Meanwhile, we must resist Communist expansionism whenever and wherever it comes; and the nuclear deterrent must do what it is designed to do: deter.

The German Problem.

The two Germanies still pose the most complex and the most dangerous problem in East-West relations.

The Berlin Wall can barricade bodies but it can't bar the passage of ideas. In that sense it is a mediaeval anachronism, doomed to tumble down on top of its Red humpty-dumptys.

Great Britain, the United States and the NATO Allies are pledged to maintain the allied presence in West Berlin, to guarantee access to the city and to preserve its freedom and viability. *We will not renege on this.*

Anglo-French solidarity with America was shown last November by the support given by British and French convoys to the American convoy which Soviet troops temporarily blocked. Despite their harassing moves, the Russians must realize that if necessary the allies will fight for the freedom of West Berlin. If we let it go, a wave of dismay and of no confidence would sweep over the free and the uncommitted world alike.

An Atlantic Community?

But important though the German problem is, it is only one symptom of the international *malaise*. So far, NATO has managed to keep the Berlin patient convalescent, but there are other sick areas of the world body which need urgent treatment. Unfortunately, the doctors disagree on the kind of treatment needed.

We hear a lot about the "Atlantic Alliance." It sounds good, but what is it? We know where we are with NATO, but exactly how much more is meant by an Atlantic Alliance?

What is somewhat loosely termed the "Atlantic Alliance" embraces, of course, the nations allied within NATO; but it is, or could be, something more—at least as the vision of the late President Kennedy regarded it, and as British statesmen regard it.

President Kennedy visualized it as a future "Atlantic Community," woven into a close political and economic association of Western nations, determined to resist Communism everywhere, and strong enough to do so—for the only thing the Reds respect is strength.

What is now the European Economic Community—the Common Market—and at present the British-led European Free Trade Association, combined with the United States and Canada, would form an Atlantic Community of nations which no other consortium of powers could successfully challenge.

Whatever may have happened to Western Europe's willingness to go along with the American idea, one fundamental unit of this noble conception exists. You can call it the cornerstone, because without it the edifice of Western solidarity cannot be built. This is the Anglo-American partnership.

Anglo-American Partnership.

We have heard a good deal lately about what is termed the "special relationship" between America and Great Britain. One Wash-

ington columnist, perhaps over-impressed by the potential power of the upthrusting Common Market, suggested that this special relationship was no longer valid, and that the United States should seek new partners within a resurgent Europe.

One or two of our allies have always viewed this Anglo-American association with the darkest suspicion, regarding it as a kind of Machiavellian device—invented by perfidious Albion, of course, and cunningly conceived to keep other countries out of the Anglo-Saxon club.

Well, this is sheer nonsense. We are all in the West partners versus the Communist threat. No British or American statesmen wants to blackball other free European countries from the club—our joint desire is all the other way: to pull them into what we hope will become this Atlantic Community as America and Great Britian foresee it.

Tragically, at a time when the Marxist world itself is rent by divisions, this vision of Western unity has been temporarily obscured by France, who, having barred Great Britain from the Common Market, is trying to form a European club under a French president.

Yet no one can deny that there *is* a "special relationship" between America and Britain. It has never come as a consequence of power, or of diplomatic ingenuity, but through our common heritage, common laws, a common language and shared ideals and beliefs.

This relationship calls for constant exchanges of ideas and practical cooperation in many fields and at all levels between the British Government and the United States Administration. It is to the interest of both our countries that our policies should be concerted to the greatest possible extent, and in most cases they are.

It was not always so. True, our first Ambassador to the young United States, the 28-year old George Hammond, made himself as much at home as any representative of George III could be expected to do, by persuading a Philadelphia girl to marry him and her parents to consent. Such extreme methods of cherishing Anglo-American relations were not always approved during your early history. There was the reaction of a Philadelphia Quaker Mother who was shocked to receive a letter from her son in London reporting that he had danced at a Court function with the young, then unmarried, Queen Victoria. "I hope," wrote the Quaker Mother post haste, "I hope that thee will not marry out of the meeting."

But through the last quarter of a century, Anglo-American harmony has developed in a remarkable way.

This doesn't mean that we automatically agree on everything. Besides sentiment, our national attitudes are governed by geographical, political and economic aspects; and on occasion, by emotional feelings, too. After all, if Georgia and Florida sometimes fail to see eye-to-eye on things like chickens, why should it be easier for Great Britain and the United States—separated by 3,000 miles of ocean—to live perpetually in heavenly harmony? I think it was Dr. Johnson who said that even the English and the Scotch need a little explaining to each other.

For example, the sale of British buses to Cuba seems to us an entirely legitimate commercial transaction, while what we feel is United States discrimination against British merchant shipping appears to you as justifiable protection for your own merchant marine.

This Cuban bus deal is engendering a great deal of emotion here and is consequently harmful to Anglo-American relations. One tends to forget the many other areas of policy, of far more importance, on which we completely agree.

But I can best quote from an editorial which appeared in one of your great newspapers, *The Baltimore Sun,* on January 9:

> In winning a contract to supply 400 buses to Communist Cuba, a British motor manufacturer had to outbid dealers in France, West Germany, Spain and Japan, as well as Czechoslovakia. The competition is hard evidence that the American economic blockade of Cuba, in so far as it extends to non-strategic goods, has scant support among our closest allies . . . .
>
> "If Britain or any other country were sending Castro weapons useful for offense the United States would have a compelling interest. In the missile crisis it has already been demonstrated that on a matter of substance the Western world stands together. But there is little substance in the bus protest. It is hardly reasonable for the United States to offer its wheat to Moscow, but to dispute Britain's right to offer civilian vehicles to Havana . . . .

To put it simply, this is the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and it is supported by the vast majority of the British people.

While we do understand the special circumstances which govern the United States position over Cuba, we believe that the exchange of non-strategic goods between the free world and Communist countries is far preferable to stopping all trade and glowering at each other over the iron and bamboo curtains—and, for that matter, a sugar curtain,

too. If we cut off all commerce with Cuba, we should only succeed in kicking her closer into the Communist camp. (I don't mean trade in arms, of course. Britain has long imposed a ban on the export of all military material to Cuba.)

In the long run, as our Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, said in Washington last week, a comfortable and well-fed Communist is likely to be less hostile than a hungry one.

Your own statesmen have taken a similar view. On May 5 last year, President Johnson (then Vice-President) told the Polish-American Congress that ". . . by maintaining the channels of trade to the West we can keep Communism from completing its contamination of Poland and the lives of the Polish people." That was your own President.

What is the essential difference between Poland and Cuba—they are both Communist states?

I'll tell you. Cuba is ninety miles away from Florida. But we in Britain are much closer to the heart of Communism—Russia and her satellites—than is the United States. We have been living under the shadow of Red missiles for many years.

The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, showed that on a matter of substance Great Britain stands with the United States. Britain's nuclear V bombers, like your own forces, were alerted during that grim week end. But British buses won't blow up the world; and they won't sail Castro's *conquistadores* into Florida.

I am going to hark back to this question of trade. It is very important.

The British Government fully supports the restrictions, agreed to by all NATO countries, prohibiting the export of military supplies and strategic materials to Communist countries, and it has faithfully applied these restrictions to British exports to Cuba. Nevertheless, Britain's very existence is dependent upon the continued success and expansion of its export trade. For this reason Britain must trade, with all countries—even those of whose regimes we do not approve.

Our commerce with Cuba is small—as Secretary of State Rusk admitted, the other day—much smaller than it was before Castro took over. But for us, every little counts, and if we had refused them, then the West Germans, or the French, or someone else, would have sold buses to Cuba. But bad old Britain beat them to it.

Now I am sorry to see hints that there may be some kind of retaliation, in the form of an official boycott staged by certain "private individuals," on the sale of British goods in the United States.

Were this to happen to any great extent, it could well spark a chain reaction which would do great harm to Anglo-American relations.

If we stick together—as we do—when the chips are down, surely we can be allowed an honest difference of opinion on matters which, if looked at objectively, are not nearly so grave as that unhappy policy-split between us over the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal, back in 1956.

I have dwelt on this current instance of difference between us at some length, because if the United States and Britain can get "het up" over things like buses, how is the Atlantic Alliance as a whole to survive the much greater strains and stresses upon it?

The Need for Western Unity.

There is a pressing need for Western unity. How far the backward, undeveloped nations will go along with Khrushchev and Mao-Tse-Tung, in their belief in the eventual triumph of Communism, depends largely on the economic progress of the West.

Economic progress, like peace, is indivisible. So much of the hungry, ignorant poverty-ridden areas of the world rely upon Western aid, technical assistance, trade and investment. You play your full part in this; so do we in Britain in at least an equal proportion of our resources.

Yet a sudden fall in the world price of some primary commodities, the export of which is vital to the countries concerned, or the population explosion in countries such as India, can swiftly wipe out all the benefits of aid which you and we give over long periods. The problem is grave and complex, and I cannot deal with it here. But this is evident. What we used to call a few years ago the "have-not" countries, most of them in the Southern hemisphere, are groping desperately for political and economic maturity. Unless the rich and technically advanced nations, who are mostly in the Northern hemisphere, manage to give sufficient help in time to these impoverished societies, then Mr. Khruschev's "inevitable trend towards Communism" is likely to be proved right. It is an unfortunate contradiction that much of this well-intended assistance is often abused by some of the fiercely nationalistic societies which need it most.

It follows that in this titanic struggle between social and economic systems, the West simply cannot afford to split into rival economic

camps of its own. But, as the song has it—it's a mad, mad, mad, mad, World!

But a split in fact occurred when General de Gaulle barred British entry into the European Economic Community—the Common Market. He did not do this out of feelings of rancor alone towards Britain. He had ideas of his own as to the development of Europe, and France in particular, and these had no place inside President Kennedy's vision of an Atlantic Community. This, if it came true, would sweep aside de Gaulle's own "grand design" of a loose confederation of Western Europe, under French hegemony. The French President sees his kind of Europe, led by France, as a "Third Force," able to negotiate on equal terms with both the West and the East.

He felt that if Great Britain entered the Economic Community, she would act as a kind of "Trojan Horse" through which American influence could penetrate into his Gaullist Europe and thus wreck his plans.

In effect, one of the terms of entry of Britain into the Common Market was the sacrifice of the Anglo-American Alliance. This we would not agree to, and never will.

Can General de Gaulle succeed? To us his conception of a "Third Force"— a *Europe des patries*—under French leadership is harking back 200 years, to the grandiose ambitions of Louis XIV. It is rather like playing a 20th century record with an 18th century needle. Would powerful West Germany long tolerate France as lord of the European manor?

Certainly, the other five countries in the Community don't foresee de Gaulle's kind of Europe at all, but they have built up an edifice of West European unity that they don't want to smash up. There are, of course, considerable advantages in keeping the EEC as a going concern.

The fact that five of the six countries in the Economic Community wanted Britain in made no difference. France's veto was absolute. The breakdown was bad, bad for Europe, bad for Britain, bad for America —and tragic for the Anglo-American vision of an Atlantic Community.

Now, instead of spreading outward, the Common Market is in danger of looking inward—towards the "closed shop" of protectionism, rather than towards the liberal policies of trade expansion, towards—if France had her way—political "independence" from both East and West —which is a pipe-dream.

There is no early prospect now of Great Britain entering the Common Market. Yet communications have not broken down, far from it. Last October, for the first time since the collapse of the Brussels talks in January last year, the Foreign Ministers of the six nations and Britain met, as members of the Western European Union, to discuss political and economic subjects. That meeting was a success and is being followed by others. We hope that out of these discussions will come a more realistic approach to unity, for in the long run—as five of the six members of the Common Market well understand—it is impossible to divorce Great Britain from Europe. We are only twenty miles away.

The Trade Boom.

Whatever the political implications of the European split, forebodings in the economic field have so far failed to materialize. Both in the European Common Market and in the other great trading system, headed by Britain, the European Free Trade Association, production and trade have been booming.

Britain is sharing fully in this success story. Production has increased by 4½ per cent over last year, as compared with the average for previous years of 2½ per cent. Exports stand at record levels, thus enabling us to buy from the world and so stimulate trade all round. Much of our increased trade has been with the Common Market itself. West Germany, for example, is one of our best customers, as we are of hers. New scientific skills and production techniques are enabling us to hurdle tariff barriers, and British economists and industrialists seem confident that this strong expansionist trend will continue for some time to come. I hope they are right.

After all, we're not exactly new at the job. One hundred and sixty years ago, Napoleon scoffed at England as "a nation of shopkeepers." Well, we're still running the store.

Today, London, as banker for the Sterling Area, finances forty per cent of free world trade. The pound sterling, not the mark, not the franc, not the yen, is one of the two great reserve currencies of the world. You all use the other.

It all seems a great success story—so far. Yet, if Europe split in two can achieve these results, how much more could be done when working together. Like Mr. Drew Pearson, who states that most of his predictions come true, I will make my own prediction with equal

confidence. Unity is bound to come. The only question is when? And will the world wait for it?

The British Role.

This year there will be parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom. Whatever Government emerges from these—Conservative or Labour—it will make no basic difference to the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain. Both great political parties are firmly committed to the Anglo-American Alliance.

To play our full part in this is our role—and our goal. As so often and so eloquently, Sir Winston Churchill can express it best. In his letter last April to President Kennedy, having just been made an Honorary Citizen of the United States, he wrote:

> In this century of storm and tragedy, I contemplate with high satisfaction the constant factor of the interwoven and upward progress of our peoples. Our comradeship and our brotherhood in war were unexampled. We stood together, and because of that fact the Free World now stands. Nor has our partnership an exclusive nature: the Atlantic Community is a dream that can well be fulfilled to the detriment of no one and to the enduring benefit and honour of the great democracies.

THE NEW FRANCE

By Lee B. Kennett*

Within the past few years France has undergone a spectacular political revolution as only the French can produce them. She has undergone even more profound changes in the socio-economic sphere, but this second revolution lacks the sound and fury of recent French political history. It has been a quiet revolution; but since it is in the process of remaking a great nation, it is well worth our attention this evening. Having defined my topic, I should add that I hope to expound it without inflicting too many statistics upon you. When economics becomes numbers, it does indeed become "the dismal science," for lecture audiences at least.

Of all our European allies, the French are perhaps the most difficult for us to understand. Their problems are sometimes incomprehensible to us, and their solutions to them even more so. With the French, there is lacking that curious sense of rapport that the American often feels with the Englishman or with the German—a mysterious bond that perhaps had already been formed when our ancestors fought the Romans together in Teutoburg Forest. The French perhaps sense this more than we do, for they still refer to the English and ourselves as the Anglo-Saxons.

How often, when reading of events in France during the past few years, have we asked ourselves "Why do they do as they do?" Or if we are frank with ourselves, and acknowledge the vanity that is in us all, we probably asked ourselves "Why don't they do as we do?" How can a mature, intelligent people exhaust three dynasties and a dozen constitutions since 1789 in a fruitless search for a government which pleases them, while we have been content with one constitution in all that time? How can this same people exploit a homeland rich in resources and a sizable colonial empire, and maintain a stagnating, museum-piece economy whose anachronisms become more glaring with the passing of every year?

To answer such questions the "Anglo-Saxon" reader could consult a variety of works by his compatriots explaining the French enigma, works whose calculations were as sombre as some of their titles: *France—The Tragic Years, The Twilight of France, France Against Herself.*

*Assistant Professor History, University of Georgia.

Whether they treated political or economic problems, the authors found little room for optimism. The general impression, well bolstered by evidence and statistics of all sorts, was that France, once the terror of her enemies, was to be the despair of her friends for some undetermined period of time.

The salient features of the French economy in the period between the wars, as they were developed by economists and historians, do indeed present a strange picture to the average American. The first and most noticeable fact is that the flamboyant, wildly speculatory period of capitalism is over in France. The great strides in industrialization taken before 1914 are not followed up. From 1906 until 1954 the number of Frenchmen employed in industry has increased by only 140,000. Per capita industrial production increases a healthy 31 percent between 1920 and 1929, but then decreases by 14 percent during the years of the Great Depression—a decrease that was peculiar to France.

Capital there was in France, as there always has been and will be. But money for a brash new venture that is shaky but capable of immense profit—that sort of risk capital was seldom to be found, if indeed anyone sought it. Many people still invested in government securities, lending truth to at least part of the old adage that Frenchmen are loath to give their money to their government, but are willing to lend it at a respectable rate of interest. Inflation in the 1920's caused a decline of interest in government securities, and large amounts of capital were quietly placed abroad, in places that it was hoped would be safe, profitable, and undetected by the French revenue service. Lending practices of French banks were exceedingly conservative by American standards in the 1920's, a conservatism which stood them in good stead in the Depression, for hardly any of the French institutions failed. As a further indication of the conservative nature of French capital, there was, and probably still is, a sizeable sum that parsimonious Frenchmen have invested in gold coins or bars, and secreted about their houses. Indeed, the demand for this clandestine commodity is an excellent barometer of political and economic conditions in France.

The French businessman was as conservative as the potential investors in his concern. His education was often acquired in a family business, and he tended to bequeath the same techniques that he had been taught. There was no annual flood of business school graduates armed with new techniques and visions of becoming another Carnegie or Rockefeller. During the period we are talking about, the nation's

best minds were more attracted to the civil service or the liberal professions, not to economic enterprises. It was not so much that material rewards were greater, but that the prestige of the professions was so much greater. Probably the first and most impressive image of the capitalists that Americans encounter is Daddy Warbucks, as inherently good as he is rich. Young Frenchmen, however, encounter Monsieur Perrichon, a *nouveau riche* of comically despicable proportions whose dishonesty and boorishness are surpassed only by his desire to rub elbows with his social superiors. Artistic and literary circles, the remnants of the nobility, continued to look down on "M. Perrichon," while a militant industrial proletariat borrowed epithets from Marx and made "bourgeois" sound like a dirty word.

The French entrepreneur was typically bourgeois or middle class in his set of values. The economic pie was only so big, he told himself. He has a modest slice. If he attempts to take more from his competitor, he may end by losing what he has. This attitude is ideally illustrated by the old French proverb, "My cup is small, but it is mine." Such an attitude expresses basic satisfaction with things as they are, the very essence of conservatism. It is by the same token the very antithesis of the aggressively dynamic qualities the entrepreneur has often shown in the United States. This state of mind can be attributed in part to the tendency of the French bourgeoisie to work slowly and steadily toward modest, but concrete and attainable ends. In part, however, such a social attitude bespeaks a static rather than a growing population, and a population that is old, whose standards are mature, indeed staid. The cause of this population trend in France is still unclear, but shortly after the turn of the century the French population levelled off at forty million. For several decades thereafter it barely managed to renew itself; indeed, in some years there was an appreciable decline in the population, concealed by sizeable immigration. In a very real sense, then, French entrepreneurs were correct in seeing the market as constant, or "the pie" as only so big.

French industry in the interwar period generally adhered to this concept. Concentrating on a home and colonial market which was carefully protected by a high tariff wall, French entrepreneurs carved up the pie by cartels and marketing agreements. The giants which dominated the various sectors of the economy protected the interest of one another, and also, curiously enough, they safeguarded the interests of their small competitors. This last arrangement seems strange, but was the essence of wisdom to the large manufacturers. First of all,

the business lost to small competitors was more than compensated by their aid in lobbying activities. They were economically weak, but often numerous enough to be of political weight in securing such government aids as high tariffs. Secondly, by their very existence, small competitors seemed to give the lie to charges of monopoly. Thirdly, and most importantly, the high prices which had to be charged by small marginal producers simply meant a higher margin of profit for the large, efficient producer who sells at the same high price.

The peasant was not as well favored as the industrialist in the interwar period. He fed his fellow Frenchmen, and fed them well, but he suffered from increased competition in world markets, particularly from American and Canadian wheat. A declining rural population succeeded in producing increased quantities of food, but the real modernization of French agriculture was still in the future. For the time being the peasant accepted tariff protection and government subsidies but not advice. There was a golden opportunity to revitalize agriculture, and indeed life in general in the north eastern departments which suffered heavy damage in 1914-1918. Ambitious plans were made to build model villages and farms in the place of what had stood before, but the government was never able to sell its urban and rural renewal policy. In the end, the same dreary and squalid farms and villages rose again like phoenixes from their ashes.

No treatise of the French economy failed to devote a good deal of attention to the French distribution system. Some authorities claimed to see in it the achilles heel of the economy, and many Frenchmen have been inclined to agree. The visible sign of this affliction is "Les Halles," the enormous vegetable market in the heart of Paris, where, in the midst of traffic jams, overcrowding, and enormous spoilage, food is purchased for distribution to most of France. The distribution system was and still is one of the more cumbersome and old fashioned, and it is also an expensive one for the consumer. But the middle men are well organized, and their services are after all indispensable.

The attitude of the French government toward economic affairs in the interwar period was a conservative, almost a prosaic one, if we except the government of the Popular Front. It applied to an ailing economy the prescribed medicine, tariff protections and subsidies, but not inflation. The early 1920's did see a significant decline in the value of the franc until 1927, when it was stabilized at about twenty per cent of its prewar value. Thereafter the government, mindful of its creditors,

kept up the value of the franc when other nations were turning to devaluation. During the early thirties in particular, the economy was virtually sacrificed to the currency. France's over-priced goods almost disappeared from the world's markets. Beyond these measures, the government did little else of a positive nature to allay the effects of the depression. In a negative manner it made other efforts. It permitted industries to allot their own shrinking markets, and gave farmers a partial holiday from taxes.

Some Frenchmen genuinely believed that their economic system was not only adequate, but superior to other, supposedly more advanced ones. Particularly it was argued that it was relatively immune to the "boom and bust" of capitalism. In the initial stages of the Depression, this seemed to be borne out; but when the crisis did eventually penetrate that hot-house economy, it came to stay. Poets also could argue for the system—if indeed poets ever argue over such—on the basis that it was preserving the Old France, the land of small shops, family businesses, and quaint, if slightly rundown farms.

When French businessmen were accused of lacking initiative or being hostile to progress, they often replied that they did not devote their entire energies to the sordid business of making money. And taking that authoritarian tone that only Frenchmen can take in cultural matters, they would point out that there were the finer things of life, things of which their frantically materialistic and ulcer-ridden American counterparts knew very little. In all fairness, I should say that some French economists and politicians were extremely critical of the French economy. One group was led by Andre Tardieu, a rightist politician who had been French purchasing agent in the United States during the First World War. In the 1920's he initiated a movement calling itself *Redressement Francais*—the French Resurgence. The group called for a new entrepreneurial spirit, more competition, and the application of new American production and marketing methods.

Perhaps the most important single figure in the move to vitalize and update the French economy was Andre Citoen. This mechanical wizard worked for a time in the Detroit automobile plants, and returned to France determined to become the Henry Ford of his country. He utilized the assembly line and developed marketing techniques to sell his mass-produced cars at the expense of his competitors. For a time all France was agog. Messages in skywriting extolled the virtues of the Citroen automobile, and similar messages were flashed at night by an illuminated sign on the Eiffel Tower. Unfortunately Citroen

had chosen the wrong time for his grandiose experiment; the Depression closed in, and he refused to retrench. Instead, he planned to capture the automobile market with a revolutionary front wheel drive. Before the new car could appear, the creditors closed in. Citroen's empire collapsed in 1934 with a spectacular crash. Citroen died shortly after an unsuccessful operation for ulcers, and many Frenchmen thought they found a moral there.

The period in French history from 1930 to 1945 forms a sort of protracted crisis: the Depression, the rise of Hitler, the disintegration of the French alliance system, colonial difficulties, the humiliating gestures toward appeasement and their failure, the catastrophe of 1940 and four years of ruthless occupation—truly a surfeit of calamities. But is was in this very period that the first steps were taken toward the economic renovation of the country. First of all, the Popular Front Government of 1936-1938—a sort of French New Deal—enacted a series of long overdue laws on labor and welfare, including the idea of favoring large families. Further, it began a program of nationalization of key industries—a project of no particular value in itself, but of great importance should the government take the initiative in economic renovation. These measures would probably have been supplemented but for the fall of the Popular Front and the outbreak of the war. Subsequently the Vichy government implemented the social welfare program, and may have intended a full-fledged effort at economic reforms. Marshal Petain made several allusions to such a step, but his government, like so many others in the history of France, never had a chance to carry out its program, good or bad.

A curious development is apparent about 1940—after nearly half a century of virtual stagnation, the population of France begins to increase at this time. The increase was not spectacular, to be sure, but it was perceptible and steady. Just why did this come about? It proceeded not primarily from increased longevity, but from an increased birth rate. Thus, we must assume that the phenomenon came about intentionally, and not incidentally. Individual families have or do not have children from a variety of reasons, to be sure; but when several million families begin to have them in much greater numbers than before, there must be some single explanation. Some students of the phenomenon think the cause is to be found in the legislation favoring large families. Others attribute it to a fundamental change in the attitude of the French. A hope or determination—or perhaps both—that the next generation will have a better life; this, we are told, is the

new attitude. Unfortunately, his is not the sort of question that can be easily answered through a public opinion poll.

There is no doubt that during the Occupation, and particularly during the days of guerilla activities and the liberation, a tremendous enthusiasm and desire to remake France were generated among all elements in the population. In the resistance, France had somehow found her lost unity and sense of purpose. This feeling undoubtedly reached its zenith with the liberation of Paris and the return of General De Gaulle as the bearer of France's honor. Many who remember Paris in the late summer of 1944 were sure that they were witnessing the dawn of a new era; tragically, it was to be a false dawn, at least for France's political state.

French political history from 1945 until 1958 is a tangled and sombre story, but the briefest outline will help us relate the political events to economic ones. The provisional government established under the leadership of General De Gaulle took as one of its first tasks the condemnation of the collaborationist Vichy regime. It was decided that the Third Republic had never formally ended, therefore Frenchmen could return to the old system of government if they chose to. By an overwhelming majority they voted to bury the past and the Third Republic. A constitutional convention drew up a new constitution after great difficulty and violent debate. The proposed constitution of the Fourth Republic so nearly resembled that of the defunct Third that General De Gaulle resigned from the government. The constitution was nevertheless submitted to the French people, who rejected it. A new constitution was drawn up, only slightly different from the previous one. I might explain, at this point, that the problem was that the left parties—Communist and Socialist—had a large voice in these deliberations because of their role in the liberation. It was these very parties, however, who most feared a strong executive to counterbalance the power of the French legislature. The right wing parties who favored a government with a strong executive had followed Petain to disaster and political death.

In 1947 the second constitutional draft was accepted by a bare minimum of voters necessary for acceptance—slightly over a third of the registered voters in France. This was the inauspicious beginning of the Fourth Republic. Two sizeable blocs within the chamber of the Fourth Republic were dedicated to its overthrow: the Communists went into opposition over the Marshall Plan, and De Gaulle's R.P.F. party sought a new constitution by rendering the existing one un-

workable. Between these two blocs the deputies of the Fourth Republic had to organize some sort of working majority.

If these problems were not enough, the government of the Fourth Republic attempted to reclaim France's colonial empire, and for its pains it became involved in a decade and a half of unrelenting war in one or another of its rebellious colonies. First, there were uprisings in Madagascar and Indo-China. The first of these was successfully quelled, but the Indo-China war dragged on until 1954, when the Geneva accords were reached. In November of that same year, a new colonial rebellion broke out in Algeria, where the grave was dug for the Fourth Republic. Tunisia and Morocco were given their independence in 1956, but Algeria was not to be abandoned so lightly. The million European inhabitants of Algeria found strong support for holding on to the country from the French Army, which after twenty years of lost battles all over the face of the earth, did not relish another humiliating withdrawal. Between them, both the colonials and military brought the Fourth Republic to heel. Soon France had stripped her NATO forces to the bone and had half a million troops in Algeria fighting a war they could not win. In 1958, when the French public was growing tired of the war in Algeria and the government of the Fourth Republic showed some signs of relenting in the struggle, the Algerian faction did not hesitate to overthrow the regime by a thinly veiled show of force.

The finances of the Fourth Republic were as disordered as its politics. It struggled with only moderate success against inflation. It resorted to deficit finance and domestic and foreign loans, and watched helplessly the deficits in its balance of payments. From such indications the Fourth Republic could hardly be expected to play a significant role in the economic reconstruction of France. And what a task that was in 1945! Industrial production was down to about forty per cent of the prewar levels. After four years of forced association with the vampire economy of Germany, much of France's wealth had been siphoned across the Rhine. The Germans also left a wildly inflated currency, and a rampant black market. Much of the labor force too was on the other side of the Rhine as prisoners of war or slave laborers. Damage to the railways, roads, bridges and factories had been very heavy. The immediate task was to see that the people did not starve or freeze to death, and this taxed the country's resources. In the dark winter of 1945, a terrible coal shortage developed; and French health authorities speculated on the permanent harm done to a genera-

tion of French children who suffered from malnutrition, particularly from a lack of milk.

The Fourth Republic took on this task of recovery, and surprisingly enough it did a very creditable job. To supplement its overslender resources, it called upon the United States, and we answered that call with a generosity that the French have not forgotten. I still have in my library a slender volume of Voltaire which came from the French "merci" train. An unknown Frenchman sent it with an inscription which says in a few polished phrases a sincere "thank you."

It was the Fourth Republic which spurred the nation's economic resurrection by a whole series of measures. First, the principle of nationalization was extended to the coal, gas and electricity industries. The news wire service was nationalized along with the four largest banks and most of the insurance companies. These enterprises, added to those already under government control—railways, Renault automobile works, etc.—placed sizeable sectors of the economy in the hands of the state. Even more important was the decision to use these to spearhead a drive to remake French industry. To make up for the lack of private capital, the government took the courageous step of underwriting the renovation program. Both public and private sectors of the economy were to take part in planning economic growth. Indeed a government commission under Jean Monnet assumed the leaderhip of this voluntary experiment. By loans and subsidies and other encouragement, the planning commission was able to orient the development of the French economy. It is not, to be sure, the all powerful planning agency that *Gosplan* is in the Soviet system, but it has provided a guiding spirit and a set of goals. One of these goals, now largely completed, was the reconstruction of France's heavy industry.

As a final contribution, the Fourth Republic brought about a great turnover in government circles and among the career civil service. Ostensibly the discharged personnel were released for collaborating with the Germans, but many of those discharged protested their loyalty vehemently. Whatever the motives, the result was to bring younger men and experts to the force, along with their new ideas. This has undoubtedly had its effect on the formulation and execution of economic policy.

To the Fourth Republic, then, belongs much of the credit for the economic revolution of the country. Credit was not given at the time, for economic progress was obscured by political stagnation. Among the political storms of the winter of 1948-49, scarcely any attention was

paid to the announcement that France had attained her prewar production level. Yet this would indicate a recovery even more rapid than after the First World War.

What, in fact, has been the extent of French economic growth within the past twenty years? The answer—an impressive answer—may be given in a few simple figures. French agriculture has made more progress in the past fifteen years than in the entire half century preceding. French industry, after attaining prewar levels some fifteen years ago, has not stood still. In fact is has increased its production at a yearly rate of between four and five percent—approximately twice the growth rate in the United States. This tendency gives every sign of being as permanent as it is strong, placing France at last among the advanced capitalistic nations where life and growth are synonymous. Is this change a really profound and significant one? The answer to this question is yes, too. It is, in fact, so profound that it is in the process of changing the very warp and woof of French society. But before I pursue this topic further, I would like to examine the causes for this economic rejuvenation.

I have credited the governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics with a certain role, but the real decision was made by the French people, and is a psychological matter. Out of the shock of despair and defeat came the realization that there was need for change. With liberation came the hope for better days and a further weakening of the resistance to change. Secondly, fresh winds began to blow, particularly through French governmental and economic circles, as the expert or technocrat at last came of age. Better economic understanding and better management were the result. The United States played a major role here, for along with aid it gave counsel, and the French accepted both. Wartime association with our military machine, which was a product of our economic system too, made a strong impression on many Frenchmen. The vogue for things American began in this period, and still continues. American technical assistance has thus been all the more welcome.

I well remember serving as interpreter (a poor one, I am afraid) for two young Frenchmen who came to the United States a year or two after the end of the war. One was here to study textiles, and the other was sent to learn American dairying methods. They were quite likeable, but so intense and deadly serious about their work that they did not conform to our picture of the French. I can see them now, firing

questions and waiting, pencils poised over little black books, to record the answers. Looking back on it, I can understand the spirit which animated them and most of their countrymen in the postwar period.

The consequences of the economic renovation are very far reaching. First of all, as we might expect, there has been a significant increase in material conditions of life, or the standard of living. But beyond that, a new society is emerging. This society, unlike its predecessor, is one which regards growth and progress as a normal state of affairs; along with this, and perhaps a contributing cause, is the fact that the French nation is now a young nation. The swelling birth rate has increased the young element in the population—those under twenty-one—by some thirty per cent since 1940. A young population is of necessity a forward-looking one, concerned with the future.

Another quality of the new society is increased social mobility. Class lines have blurred, and the traditional class antagonisms are less seldom voiced. A further social development—and an extremely important one—is the decline in the revolutionary attitudes of the industrial proletariat. Traditionally they have felt themselves the victims of capitalism, and have been attracted to the Communist Party. Now, attitudes are gradually changing. The Communists find it increasingly difficult to bring workers out on political strikes, mainly because the workers do not want to miss a payment on the television set or automobile which they are buying on time. Undoubtedly, this is a factor that Marx never counted on.

"La France s'embourgeoise"—"France is becoming middle class:" this expression is often heard in France, and reflects a simple truth. With increased class mobility and a rising standard of living, increasing numbers of Frenchmen are calling themselves middle class. Conceivably the day may come when Daddy Warbucks will replace M. Perrichon as the symbol of businessman civilization. Rotary and Kiwanis are already there, so perhaps it is only a matter of time. With a pardonable pride, the French point out that they are already surpassing us in production techniques. The Renault factory at Flins is now the world's most advanced automotive plant. I can personally testify to the existence in Paris of a medical center that might have been the brain child of Jules Verne. Here a variation of the assembly line has been devised, with flashing lights and doors that mysteriously open and close.

The profound changes which are occurring in France are, most of them, occurring in neighboring countries. The New France is a

part of a new Europe. To be sure, the exact relations between France and her neighbors have been difficult to understand. In 1950, the French government proposed a European Defense Community, and four years later the French rejected the proposed E. D. C. treaty. France played a major role in the negotiation of the Rome Treaty, the basis for today's Common Market, while De Gaulle's government seems periodically on the verge of wrecking the entire agreement. Are the French for the idea of European association or not? If we may accept the verdict of public opinion polls in France and other countries, Europeans do favor the "European idea" by a significant majority.

The two nations which have had the most difficult time making up their minds about European integration—political or economic—have been England and France. The English government has been most consistently hostile to the idea, I think, but has now accepted its inevitability. The French government has blown hot and cold on the matter. In both cases, I think, the governments have simply been unable to decide whether they are still world powers, or simply European powers.

The present De Gaulle government frankly has pretentions to world leadership, which may or may not be justified. De Gaulle has made it obvious that he will not accept full political integration of Europe, but he is by no means opposed to the close association of the European powers. In the economic sphere, which most interests us here, it was De Gaulle's government that prepared the French economy for entrance into the Common Market, and indeed has agreed to the acceleration of the whole program. Not that there have not been difficulties—De Gaulle can be the most difficult of men, as anyone from our State Department would bear witness; but economically at least, Europe is still moving toward integration.

The French economy can expect to benefit in several ways from participation in the Common Market. Not only will expanded markets be available, but economic competition from over the frontiers will increase as the tariff walls come down. This will probably have a therapeutic effect on the French economy. It will complete the renovation of the economy by destroying the static, old-fashioned producers which still exist at the sufferance of their more efficient fellows. Finally, the distribution system must inevitably be improved to correspond to this new wind which is beginning to blow. The larger French industrial concerns have for the most part anticipated the

tumbling of tariff walls, and are looking forward to it. Fiat of Italy and Simca of France have already begun to market each other's automobiles under an agreement reached several years ago, and there are many other examples of this type of agreement.

I hesitate to speak in any detail about what the immediate future holds for France and for Europe. Prognoses are difficult on nations whose leaders play their cards as close to the chest as does General De Gaulle. But I think I can at least conclude on an optimistic note. I recently received a letter from a French friend who tells me that after years of riding a bicycle to work, and then the subway when his legs rebelled, he has finally acquired an automobile. To be sure, it is a tiny vehicle some ten years old—a venerable age for a car even in France—but it *is* a car. For my friend at least, it is the symbol of the New France.

THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

By Robert M. Bunzl*

For two reasons, I am always glad to have students as an audience. First, I find that young people know much more about the world than adults and are, therefore, a better audience. Every week the consulate receives calls from people inquiring about Sydney and Melbourne, and the callers are a little embarrassed to hear that Australia and Austria are different countries. They also confuse Vienna and Venice. Things like that cannot happen in a school or college. The second reason why I like to talk to students is that you will be responsible for the future of the United States. You might be in politics yourself, or as voters will have to decide the representatives, senators, and president. Information about the world will be necessary and, in order to form a correct opinion, you will have to know more and more about its geography and history, and also you will have to learn foreign languages. Many people tell me: "We do not have to learn languages because English is spoken all over the world." This is true, but only to a certain extent. Well-educated people are speaking English or French, or even both languages. You will also find that the hotel porters, head waiters, and some sales girls in first-class stores understand and speak English; however, when you want to get the opinion of the population, you will have to talk to the man in the street, middle-class people, and workers. When you do not know the language, you will have to rely on an English-speaking guide to tell you his personal opinion, which usually is not the general one.

Well, I did not come here to tell you what you should learn, or know, and I wish to apologize for this introduction to my talk. Upon your invitation, I did come here to talk about the situation in Central Europe and its so-called economic miracle. In a talk about Central Europe everybody expects to hear about Germany—the largest and most important country over there. However, I am the Austrian Consul for this district, and you will understand that it is not my business to speak about Germany. I have explained to your program chairman that the economic situation in Austria is very similar to the one in other countries of Central Europe. I shall inform you about Austria's distinctions, which are not important as far as economic matters are concerned, and concerning her foreign policy, economic relations, and agreements with other countries.

*Austrian Consul-General in Atlanta.

The population of Germany and Austria participated in the two world wars. Both countries were defeated and, therefore, impoverished. During the First World War, the two countries were partners under an agreement. Actually, the war broke out when Austria, after the murder of her successor to the throne by a Serbian, could not accept the guarantees asked from Serbia, and, therefore, declared war. Russia had to protect Serbia by starting the war with Austria and Germany. France and England had to do the same under their treaties with Russia, and the World War was on.

The situation was quite different in World War II. Germany attacked Poland; however, Austria did not exist any more as an independent country. As you know, Hitler took Austria by force in March, 1938, and made Austria a province of Greater Germany. Therefore, one cannot say that Austria was in war even though Austrians, being then German citizens, had to fight. After the First World War, Germany lost Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the German colonies were distributed among the victors. Actually, not too much happened; the greatest part of European Germany remained unchanged, and the country recovered gradually and became strong again. Under Hitler's regime, Germany was ready for revenge.

Concerning Austria, you might remember that until 1918, the end of World War I, the small Austria of today was a part of the very important Austrian-Hungarian Empire, ruled by Hapsburg Emperors. with a population of over 50 million. The First Republic, which started in 1918, had a population of seven million, and the country still has the same size and population. Because the new small republic did not have enough foodstuff and lacked coal, oil, and raw materials for their industries, it was far more difficult for Austria, than for Germany, to recover from the First World War. Until 1918, the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, with thirteen different nations within its borders, was more or less self-sufficient—Hungary and Slovakia had plenty of food, Czechoslovakia was rich in coal, and Galicia—which now belongs to Poland—had oil. On the other hand, Austria was an industrial part of the Empire and could sell her finished goods to the other parts of the monarchy. She did not have to export to foreign countries on a big scale, and the empire was a kind of common market.

Therefore, in 1918, when Austria was reduced to a country half the size of Georgia, with a starving and freezing population of seven million, the whole economy had to be reorganized. Because the former parts of the Empire became independent states, hostile and reluctant

for a long time to trade with Austria, the reorganization has been an extremely difficult process.

After the end of the Second World War, the situation was somewhat different. Both countries—Germany and Austria—were occupied by the armies of the four world powers; the East by the Russians; the other parts by Americans, British, and French. As you know, Eastern Germany is still occupied by the Communists and the former capital of Germany, Berlin, is encircled by the Russians. Theoretically, Germany is still at war. Because no peace treaty is in existence or even proposed, Germany does not recognize the partition of her country, and does not want to prejudice her situation by making treaties in the name of West Germany alone. This is also the reason why Germany is not a member of the United Nations Organization.

Austria fared better. The Western powers accepted the fact that Austria never declared war, and did not ask for a war indemnity; on the contrary, they confiscated the German property—several big industries—located in Austria, and gave them to the Austrian state. On the other hand, the Russians claimed enormous amounts and wanted to sell the German property of the Russian zone to Austria. It took ten years and about 300 meetings before a peace treaty was agreed upon and signed, May 15, 1955. By this treaty, the Second Republic of Austria became fully independent. In November, 1955, all troops left Austria and she did not lose any territory. There were two reasons why Austria was treated in a different way from Germany. First, the country was never at war; second, the Second Republic decided to accept a Russian condition, which was to declare herself neutral. This means that Austria cannot join any military alliance, that no foreign troops are allowed to enter the country, or establish military bases on her territory. Furthermore, Austria has no right to make political agreements with other states; and, as I will explain to you later, this clause has serious economic disadvantages.

The great surprise was that, after 300 meetings in which Russia opposed any agreement, it suddenly became possible to reach an understanding. Personally, I have an explanation: Russia, after two wars with a powerful and ambitious German neighbor, still fears an attack one day. Therefore, Russia wishes to protect herself by wide buffer states stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic Sea. When Austria agreed to become a neutral country, Russia hoped that Germany might follow the example. I believe, personally, that Germany could have been reunited by declaring neutrality. If Germany and Austria became

neutral and formed a large buffer zone between East and West, Russia might agree to the reunification and independence of Germany. When I occasionally mention this to my German colleague, he answers that neutrality means weakness, and that every neutral country sooner or later faces dependence or annexation. I hope for Austria's sake that he is wrong, and Switzerland is the best proof of my contention that neutrality can work.

I began with some details about the past which brought Central Europe into a very serious situation; however, you will want to know how it has been possible for Europe to recover so rapidly and thoroughly. The situation in Germany is very similar, although not exactly the same. I hope you will not mind if I spend more time discussing my country, about which I am better informed. It is also my duty as Austrian Consul to acquaint you with this small but beautiful country and its highest old culture.

It is really remarkable that Austria, which had no peace from 1914 until 1955—a period of more than 40 years—, has recovered so thoroughly. Today, Austria has a surplus in her balance of payment, no unemployment (actually a labor shortage), an excellent, stable currency, and has reduced taxes four times. She has a higher living standard than ever before. I said no peace from 1914 until 1955 because of the upheavals, riots, unrest, and even civil war between the First and Second World Wars. One cannot consider these years to have been peaceful ones.

There are three main reasons for the so-called economic miracle. Because all of you participated directly or indirectly by paying high taxes, you will guess the first reason. As you know, it was the money the European states received as Marshall Plan aid, and Austria received more than a billion dollars. Even these large amounts were not sufficient to build a new sound economy; however, they were large enough when used wisely to make a good start. After meeting the most urgent need for food and fuel, the money was spent for repairing and modernizing factories, buying raw materials for industries like cotton, and repairing highways and hotels which are so essential for the tourist traffic—the biggest source of foreign exchange in Austria. Because the Marshall Plan has been the basis of the recovery, Europe, especially Austria, will never forget the enormous help received from the United States. A block of new houses has been named the George Marshall Development, at which a commemorative tablet says:

> This city housing development has been named after the American general and statesman George Catlett Marshall, 1880-1959, winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace. He was the creator of the European Recovery Program, which is known in history as the "Marshall Plan." Following his advice, the American people made those great material sacrifices which contributed decisively to the reconstruction of Europe after the second World War.

A second reason for the improvement is the fact that Austria, until 1955, was not allowed to have armed forces. Even now, with a small army trained to defend the neutrality, the cost is only about 5% of the Austrian budget. Compare this to the military cost—60% of the budget—of the United States. The situation, of course, is different in Germany which is a member of the NATO, and today has a large army.

The third and actually the main reason for the recovery was the wish, desire, and urge of the population to recover by hard work. Destroyed houses and factories were rebuilt as soon as possible. Not only was it necessary to provide the necessities for the area's population, but to force exports and thereby earn a foreign exchange essential to the importation of raw materials and machinery. There is a difference between a man working eight hours a day, just to make a living, and every man, woman, and even teen-agers having the urge and patriotism to work longer hours with enthusiasm to help their fatherland attain a speedy recovery. Women and teen-agers helped to remove the rubble of destroyed houses. Old women, who could not work in factories or in the building trades were knitting and repairing wornout clothing, and also accepting home work. Today, all destroyed houses have been rebuilt in Germany and Austria; the hotels are remodeled and redecorated; the population is well dressed. One cannot believe that it has been only eight years since the peace treaty was signed.

Another reason for the recovery might be the kind of government. As in the United States, Austria has two big parties—the People's Party (conservative) and the Labour Party (moderate). Both parties have approximately the same number of votes and representatives in the parliament with a very small majority in favor of the People's Party. To avoid too many serious fights between the two parties, Austria has a coalition government. This means that both parties, according to their strength, are represented in the government, and both parties

are trying to avoid differences and reach a mutual agreement in the interest of the country.

You will agree with me now when I tell you that the recovery was no *miracle* at all.

There is another very important reason why Central Europe recovered, and this applies only to Germany and Italy, and not to Austria. After the First World War an Austrian Count named Coudenhove Callergi, a very able and intelligent economist and diplomat, started and promoted the idea of an United Europe. His organization had the name *Paneurope,* and he was internationally minded. He wrote several books about his ideas and travelled all over Europe and the United States speaking to the heads of government. France, under Briand, and Czechoslovakia became very interested in the movement. *Paneurope* made excellent progress, but became hopeless when Hitler started his nationalistic propaganda which was so successful in Germany. Hitler also had been in favor of *Paneurope,* of course, but under his domination. When Hitler occupied Austria, Coudenhove Callergi left Austria and went to Switzerland. Otherwise, he would have ended in a concentration camp.

After the Second World War, the first step for the international cooperation was taken by the French Minister Robert Schuman, who was successful in making a coal and steel agreement with Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium—the so-called Monnet Union. It was the first time that two archenemies like France and Germany, which had fought each other so often, came to a peaceful agreement. After this success, it became easier to try for more. One of the most important economic events in the history of Europe came when six states—France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—made the agreement called the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Common Market. I do not have to explain what the Common Market means; you read about it almost every day in the papers; therefore, all of you know of its enormous success and of the favorable economic consequences for these six countries.

Because of the Commonwealth, Great Britain did not want to join. Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria could not participate as neutrals Therefore, seven states under the leadership of Great Britain established another common market with the name of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—called the "Outer Seven." Members of this nonpolitical organization are Great Britain, the three Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal.

Although it would have been the natural thing, Austria was not allowed to join the EEC. You might not know that, under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, the Common Market agreement contains political as well as economic clauses. As I have said before, Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden could not join the EEC because of their neutral status. If Austria had become a full member, Russia would have considered this step a violation of the peace treaty and might have used her troops from Hungary—only a few miles from Vienna. Though some members of the Austrian Government did not consider the proposed participation in the Common Market as a breach of treaty, Austria did not dare take the risk. This is the reason why Austria joined the EFTA. EFTA participation is useful, but it cannot fully and satisfactorily replace membership in the EEC. Austria gets 58% of her total imports from the EEC countries and 50% of her exports go to these countries, against only 15% to EFTA countries. Austria is, therefore, trying to become an associate member of the Common Market, which means that her participation would be restricted to the economic rules and would exclude the political clauses. I hope that after some time Austria will be accepted, and will have the opportunity to export without custom duties and other restrictions. Exportation on a big scale is absolutely necessary to pay for the very important imports. Austria is exporting approximately 25% of her total production (United States exports only 2½%). These merchandise exports, together with the invisible exports (tourist traffic and royalties), bring in the foreign exchange necessary for the large imports. I wish to mention that Austria buys from the United States twice as much as she sells to her.

If Austria is not accepted as an associate member, it is quite likely that her exports to the EEC countries will be reduced considerably. Because these countries are increasing their production and are getting more and more competitive, they will reduce their imports from Austria and other countries, and it would be very difficult for Austria to replace such export losses. The natural customers for Austria would be her Communist neighbors; however, Austria does not want to increase her exports to the East considerably, and actually cannot, without becoming dependent on the Communist countries in some way. It would also be difficult. Because of a balance of payment problem, these Communist countries do not want to buy more than they can sell to a specific country. Russia has made an exception by buying from the United States wheat against payment in dollars or gold, but this was

quite unusual and only done because of Russia's urgent need for wheat.

I hope that within a few years not only Austria, but also Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland will become partly full, partly associate members of the Common Market so that there will be one United Europe—one large market which will make agreements with the United States and also with the Eastern bloc.

Count Coudenhove Callergi, mentioned before as the pace setter of an United Europe, suggested in a recent speech in Vienna that the members of the seventeen NATO states and the members of the eight states belonging to the Warsaw Pact should get together and achieve the end of the cold war by a lasting peace. Because Austria is a neutral country and on friendly terms with the West and the East, he says that Vienna would be the right place for such a conference. The Austrian diplomats have great experience; they are objective, liked, and respected all over the world. One hundred and fifty years ago, the country was the seat of the Vienna Congress. An international peace conference after the Napoleonic Wars was held at Vienna, and the purpose of this meeting was successful. The chairman of this Congress was the famous Austrian statesman, Chancellor Metternich. The Viennese people understood very well the propriety of softening up the hostile atmosphere among the heads of government of the antagonistic countries. They arranged daily festivals, at which government representatives and their wives met on a friendly and congenial basis, danced together, and became almost friends. This Congress, which was followed by a full understanding and peace, got the nickname of the "Dancing Congress."

If at a second Vienna Congress world peace and the end of the cold war could be established, it would be a wonderful thing, and would make me very proud of my former fatherland. Austria, which started the First World War just 50 years ago, could become the historical setting for world peace.

TRADE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE NEW EUROPE

By Mildred R. Mell*

My part in your social science series concerns *trade relations* of the United States with the New Europe. If I had been asked to talk about our *trade* with the countries of the New Europe it would have been necessary to give you statistics of many kinds. Personally, I get great pleasure from statistical analysis, but I find many people do not. *Trade relations* can be discussed without an overdose of figures, but there is danger of inaccuracy when an analysis is made largely without them. I am aware of this, but I hope my trends and generalizations are accurate enough to be useful.

Trade relations between the United States and Europe are an old story with much that is new perhaps, but just the same much that is old. In some of its basic phases even the old, familiar story of the Boston Tea Party, involving as it did manner of trading and duties to be imposed, is not so far removed from our chicken war.

Time goes on, and buying and selling form a perpetual link in the relationships of man to man and nation to nation. Battles of words and deeds, with or without the use of weapons—wars of many battles with or without the use of violence—mark the history of trade relations wherever we look. But also peace and friendship have been achieved with enduring qualities which economic pressures and rivalries cannot destroy. Indeed we have come to have great faith in trade as a means of developing peaceful ways of living together and of working in cooperation toward mutually desired ends.

However, the newspapers greet us each day with evidence of stress and strains in our trade relationships with the so-called free countries of the West. These arise out of the relationships of the economies of those countries with ours. The chicken war is not something unique. Swiss watches, industrial diamonds, clothespins, textiles, sugar and other more or less significant items have been storm centers for months or years.

We have things to sell. So do other countries. Upon what terms can each of us sell what we want to sell and buy what we want to buy with the spending power we get from our sales? The answer to that question ought to be very simple. It was in societies of an earlier day.

*Retired Professor of Economics, Agnes Scott College.

It sounds simple today. Would that it were! We all want to sell and we all want to buy, but to do so we must trade in the international market according to terms prevailing in that market. Each country can have some effect on that market, but no one of them can actually boss it. We in the United States today and every other day buy from other countries and sell to them. This involves us in carrying out old trade agreements we have made with other countries, in trying to reshape those agreements more to our taste, and in making new agreements to cover new situations. In these efforts we are, of course, dealing not only with countries in the New Europe, but also with countries in most parts of the world today. Our primary interest in this short survey is with trade relations with Europe as shaped by events of the last two decades.

Historical factors, as is true for all nations, have shaped our trade patterns. For example, most of our ancestors crossed the Atlantic, not the Pacific, so geography and traditional ties reinforcing history made our trade relations flourish greatly with the Old Europe, so our trade relations with the New Europe are not entirely new after all. It should not surprise us, if we are historically minded, to find that the European countries today are just about our best customers. It is historically natural that they should be.

Just for the sake of getting a perspective, look back with me for a bit. Perhaps our tariff history is the easiest field glass for us to use in getting this needed long-time view. It is probable that to many people tariffs seem dull and unrelated to things that are really interesting. But when we talk of them, we are talking about trade. Trade is business, and business is a favorite occupation in America from the days of playing store in childhood to the later years of big business and ulcers! Tariffs dull? *Not at all.* They play a dynamic role in our search for the good and prosperous life.

Early controversy about tariffs in our trade with the more highly industrialized England and Europe began in 1791 with Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures,* one of the very famous documents in the early days of our nation. With it Hamilton posed the question of protection by tariff for America's infant industries. Our first revenue act had passed two years before in 1789 and had imposed tariffs on imports as a means of raising revenue for the government. These were called tariffs for revenue only and were imposed with the desire to have goods come into the country so that governmental revenue would be available. Hamilton was not pleased with that kind of tariff. He advocated high tariffs to keep goods out and thereby protect American

industries from competition with foreign goods. Hamilton was a persuasive man and a hard fighter. He started a controversy which lasted down the years, far beyond his lifetime. Division of opinion in the controversy followed certain economic lines as was to be expected. The developing industrial interests cried loudly for protection, while the agriculturists supported free trade or tariffs for revenue only. Before the civil war, a see-saw pattern of tariff levels—up and down—was characteristic of tariff legislation passed by the Congress, but the trend was strongly toward free trade or low tariffs. After 1860 this trend was reversed with up and down swings continuing according to the dominant influence in government of Republicans or Democrats. But the long-time trend was toward high tariffs. The peak of this trend was reached in 1930 in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill.

The controversial issues before that bill was passed had been concerned primarily with domestic matters, such as nursing infant industries into full fledged big industries without competition from outside. Even as late as 1930, in spite of the fact that we had participated in a world war and in the war debt controversy of the post-war period, we tended to think of our economy as going-it-alone, a form of economic isolationism. But since the days of the Great Depression, which in reality was already upon us when the Smoot-Hawley Bill was passed, there has been increasing awareness that we need to buy and sell far and wide and that in so doing the question of tariffs involves international relations and not simply the nurturing of our own economy. Furthermore, awareness has begun to include the realization that trading nations sink or swim together in the final analysis.

The Great Depression stayed with us during the 1930's and, taught by sad experience, the United States reached out to other areas for the stimulus of international trade. Our economy needed a shove, and, even though our foreign trade had traditionally been a comparatively small part of our total trade pattern, it was evident that its loss could and did get us into trouble. America was learning to think in less provincial terms. As we had begun to comprehend the basic fact of international economic relations—that we can and do prosper together—we became less fearful of foreign trade; we began to see that it might be good for trade. Another step in our education through experience was the understanding that in the final analysis debts can only be paid in goods and services, or in gold, and that to be paid in gold is not the most desirable way. During the 30's a steady flow of gold came our way until we buried in Fort Knox the major portion of

the world's supply of gold and we were not too happy over it. We will surely never be as foolish again as we were when we urged Europeans to pay us what they owed us and at the same time passed the highest tariff bill in our history, the Smoot-Hawley Bill. To all intents and purposes this bill meant that we were saying: "Pay us but do not pay us with your goods." An excellent example of lack of sophistication in economic affairs.

With growth in sophistication came the era of reciprocal trade agreements representing a great effort to extend international trade through more reasonable tariffs. The first trade agreements act was passed in 1934 to be in force a limited period of time. It was renewed eleven times, every time with some revision. The final renewal in 1958 was for four years with 1962 being the expiration date unless it was renewed again. This legislation reversed the trend in tariffs which had held from the Civil War until the 30's. Under the new legislation, negotiations were carried on to get reciprocal lowering of tariffs. This had to be done bilaterally, but the benefit of the lower tariff could be spread through the "most-favored-nations" clause. This made it possible for any nation, which might desire to do so and could meet the requirements of the bilaterally negotiated agreements, to receive the benefits of the lower rates which had been established. By the 1960's our reciprocal trade agreements legislation needed a complete overhauling instead of further revision, although much had been accomplished under it toward bringing about a freer flow of international trade. Experience under it had brought a climate of opinion which made it possible to pass the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This is now our permanent basic trade law. As we had faced the fact in the 30's that international trade relations are a part of our foreign policy, the sort of "horse trading" which characterized the setting of tariffs by the Congress was no longer a good technique for shaping such relations. Under the reciprocal trade agreement acts, therefore, the tariff became primarily the problem of the executive branch of the government instead of being something for Congress to determine through a bargaining process involving, for the most part, various domestic interests with little or no reference to foreign policy. With the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the importance of foreign economic policy was recognized, as well as its significance in foreign policy on the political level. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was shaped by this concept.

During the Second World War we were in a very real sense the

arsenal of democracy. Concern with tariffs tooks a back seat for a while. The lend-lease pattern guarded us against some of the problems of post-war economic relations which had followed World War I, but after World War II there were plenty of other problems to plague the international market. Because of the devastation of the war period, Europe's industries were largely crippled and non-productive for a period of time. Great Britain and Europe needed our goods without having much to sell us. We had no competition in the world market, so we sailed along in a seller's market. Practically anything the American seller put on the market could find a buyer, so scarce were goods. The trouble came from the fact that there was need to pay us in dollars, and dollars were not available in the market because there was so little for us to buy from our former allies until they could get back on their feet. The dollar shortage became the most serious problem of the international market. Under such conditions, tariffs were not very interesting. But the Marshall Plan had been put into operation. West Europe mustered its strength, and things changed. The Marshall Plan enabled England and West Europe to get back on their feet and to begin that remarkable period of rapid economic growth which makes a great story. By the 50's their production had expanded to such an extent that their goods were pouring into the world market. Our seller's market and the dollar shortage disappeared from the scene. Terms of trade and the problem of trade barriers, tariffs and quotas became topics of daily concern. Western Europe, with its problem of economic recovery faced and conquered, was ready to push for expanding world trade.

But the New Europe had become the East and the West; the Cold War had brought the Iron Curtain, had brought East Germany and West Germany, East Berlin and West Berlin. The Congress of the United States had passed the Export Control Act of 1947 and the so-called Battle Act of 1951 prohibiting trade with Communist nations in strategic materials and seeking to hold down all kinds of trade with them.

Expanding world trade under these conditions was to be only with non-communist Europe. A big slice of European territory was to be outside the western trading area and millions of people off the list of prospective customers. But expanding world trade was still on the agenda for us and for Western Europe, and chance was not enough to depend upon. After about three years of imaginative thinking and negotiating under the aegis of the United Nations, in 1947 the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (in our alphabetical world called

GATT) made its appearance as a new instrument through which the United States, Western Europe, Great Britain and other countries of the free world could seek the goal of expanding world trade. Growth of trade involving especially Western Europe and the United States would mean problems of tariffs, trade practices and trade disputes. Since 1947 GATT has sought greater expansion of trade through agreements which would result in the general lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers, and through discussion of and agreement upon all aspects of trade relations. Exploring of other ways to increase trade led to another organization of trading nations—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD for short—which came into being in 1961. This would give a way for joint consideration of economic problems such as are involved in the balance of payments and rates of growth in various national economies.

In 1962, when our Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, it seemed to us that the stage was set for real expansion of world trade. The act continues the principles of the Trade Agreements Acts, but increases the bargaining powers of the President within a wider range of permissible tariff reductions and makes possible across-the-board negotiations in place of the older tedious and slow process of dealing on a commodity-by-commodity basis. Beginning in May, 1964, we shall be negotiating under the authority of the act at the Geneva meeting of GATT. We are at present carrying on talks in Geneva to set the ground rules for the actual negotiations themselves. The President's special representative for trade negotiations, former Secretary of State, Christian Herter, and his committee (Senator Talmadge is a member of this) are responsible for setting the ground rules as well as for the real negotiations. Since the act authorizing the appointment of Mr. Herter and his committee was passed, much water has gone over the dam. Perhaps we could say more specifically, President de Gaulle has entered the scene. Things are not as we had hoped, but we shall see. The Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act with high hopes that we are entering a new era of cooperative efforts toward developing a world market in which there would be progressive lowering of trade barriers and expansion of world trade for the benefit of all economies. We do not know what is going to happen to these hopes. Perhaps our expectations were too great. We are impatient most of the time, so perhaps we want changes to take place in one year which may come in only many years. Again, we shall see.

We have sketchily surveyed some great changes in our own trade

history. From 1789 to 1964 is 175 years. A long time. But measure the 175 years in terms of economic change and we find it hard to believe that so much change could come about in only 175 years. The contrast between our trade ideas in Alexander Hamilton's day and our hopes and desires as the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations is about to begin in Geneva is astounding. Out of these negotiations may not come all that we would like to see, but the backward glance from the year 2000 may highlight the year 1964 as the beginning of a trend in line with our hopes and desires.

Countries across the Atlantic have not stood still during the 175 years of American trade history at which we have glanced. Revolutionary changes have brought them into the middle of the Twentieth Century, and our trade relations with them today and tomorrow are and will be shaped under conditions rooted in those changes. The Great Depression came in Europe as well as in the United States, and with it increasing recognition of the value of international trade to all economies. Europe was willing to follow the path toward expanding trade in negotiating trade agreements with us, giving a degree of recovery from the depression before World War II came along. During the war, normal trade relations were no longer normal. To meet the peculiar needs of war cooperation on the economic level, lend-lease was devised. This proved a very effective way of preventing the weight of one-sided indebtedness from being an obstacle to good trade relations after the war, and that was all to the good. But trade necessitates production of goods on both sides of the transaction. After the war, the crying need was for European productive resources to be rehabilitated and put to work once more. The Marshall Plan, or something very similar to it, was a necessity for both Europe and the United States. Human sympathy was undoubtedly involved in the support given by Americans to the Marshall Plan—a plan to help those who help themselves. But along with human sympathy was an awareness, at least on the part of our leaders, that the various European economies had to be brought back into production as quickly as possible for the sake of expanding world trade, and that, of course, was vital to us as well as Europe. Russia, as you know, refused participation in the plan for herself and her satellites. Inevitably, the division between the East and West became deeper and more certain.

The success of the Marshall Plan is a well known story. There is no need to tell it here. Perhaps a less well known story is the development of trading blocs among the non-communist nations which came about as

European economies became strong enough to stand on their feet. With productive resources rehabilitated and industry functioning well, markets for the goods became increasingly important. Trading blocs seemed to offer part of the answer to the need. By the end of the 50's, casual newspaper readers became aware of the "Inner Six" and the "Outer Seven." The readers scarcely knew what it was all about, but awareness of economic alignments taking place could not be avoided. The more attentive readers soon learned that the "Inner Six" was really the European Economic Community (the EEC) or the Common Market; and the "Outer Seven" was the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). How and why had these groups come into being?

In finding the answer to this, there is much to be learned from examining a strong thread of influence woven into the fabric of European history, appearing first some decades earlier. This thread took the form of a concept of the United States of Europe, a sort of dream of idealists and some hard thinkers about which there was much heard during the inter-war period from 1918 to 1939. But dream or not, the concept fired the imagination of such a thinker as Jean Monnet whose brain child is the European Economic Community. From the standpoint of our own national experience, one aspect of Monnet's vision of Europe's economic needs is especially interesting—the need for a larger geographic area of freely circulating goods. On our side of the Atlantic, with our constitution prohibiting the states from imposing tariffs at their borders, we have a huge free trade area of our own. Contrast the size of that area with the sizes of the individual countries which together make up Western Europe, remembering that tariffs have been customarily imposed at the border of each. In about a century and three-fourths, we have grown at an amazing rate in all our economic activities until today we are the world's richest country with a high level of gross national product steadily increasing. It seemed to Europeans considering the advantages of a trading bloc that the enormous free trade area formed by our states must be an important factor in our economic growth.

As a stimulant to the economy, perhaps, this seemed more important than plentiful resources. International trade could not be the answer as the United States had depended upon the domestic market to an extent not true of any European country. Even Europeans who had not been favorable to the concept of the United States of Europe were intrigued by the idea of a large free trade area. Early in the 50's the famous European Coal and Steel Community had been organized

and was proving to be very successful. A second community came into being early in 1957—the European Atomic Energy Community. The remarkable influence of Jean Monnet was central to both these developments. As a very young salesman he had seen Americans prospering in a great mass market, undoubtedly influenced by what he had known at first hand. He gave leadership to the movement for the European Economic Community. It is usually said that he really fathered it.

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed by France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, six countries agreeing to work toward the final elimination of tariffs within the area, and a uniform tariff structure for goods entering the market from outside. The European Economic Community, or the Common Market, had been brought into being. This regional group is not only concerned with economic matters but also with the political; but we must stick to our knitting at this time and examine only the economic side of the picture, if that is possible.

Great Britain might have been one of those originally signing the Treaty of Rome. Among other things her traditional unwillingness to consider herself a part of Europe may have prevented it. On the outside of the "Inner Six," her initiative helped to bring into being the European Free Trade Association, "The Outer Seven." In 1959 the Stockholm convention creating EFTA was signed by Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal. These seven nations agreed to liberalize quota restrictions on trade, to reduce tariffs on non-agricultural goods and to form a free trade area among themselves, but no political bonds were contemplated.

We, on this side of the Atlantic, watched these developments in Europe and cheered them on from the side lines. As we have seen, since the 30's we had led the way toward freer international trade. The trend in our tariffs had been downward. We recognized that we would face increased competition, but we believed Europe would be strengthened and thereby become less dependent upon us. We believed that some of the burdens which we had had to assume as the richest nation would be shared by a stronger and a unified Europe. Undoubtedly some of these beliefs have proven to be justified. And we believe today, that in the long run and on-balance, the New Europe is good for the world.

There are many indications that the common market countries took for granted that Great Britain would finally come into the group. In 1961 she applied for membership, and negotiations seemed to be

going along as well as could be expected with agriculture and commonwealth relations involving the most difficult considerations. Then came President de Gaulle's bombshell. At times the news seems to indicate that he wants the door kept open for England. One columnist insists that he wants a window left open for the United States. But the news tends to make us feel confused and even frustrated at times. Meanwhile, Great Britain continues her relations with the European Free Trade Association which is functioning in the narrow range of economic cooperative procedures it was intended to cover. Great Britain has to trade to live, has to be a world trading nation, has to import half of its food, and practically all of its raw materials. EFTA offers an answer to part of her problems, but only a part.

Last fall, the prophets of doom became very pessimistic about the future of the Common Market. The fact that the six countries were finding it very difficult to develop a common policy about agriculture seemed to hold a threat of dissolution. The problem was two-fold. There had to be developed a common system of domestic prices which would make it possible for agricultural goods to circulate freely throughout the six-nation area, and there had to be worked out a common system of external tariffs on agricultural goods. These two things had been fairly easy to accomplish for industrial goods, but it was extremely difficult to do so for agricultural goods. To build a single farm system from six different and separate agricultures, if at all possible, would certainly take time; and President de Gaulle expected it to be accomplished by the first of January, 1964, or the Common Market would be done for, so he said. Here are some of the problems which faced the common market commissioners. Germany's agricultural production is more costly than that of France, France's more costly than ours. Germany wanted tariffs set so that she might continue to have the advantage of the lower cost American imports. France wanted the German market for her agricultural goods. That meant Germany would have to pay more for agricultural imports than she would if she could continue to buy American agricultural imports. France pressed for external levies (or tariffs) high enough to keep the market for her agricultural goods.

On December 23, 1963, the six common market nations reached a compromise on their disagreements. The next morning *The Atlanta Constitution* in commenting on the fact that the breakdown of the common market had been averted said: "In exchange for granting concessions to France in agriculture, West Germany received conces-

sions on external trade." These "concessions" were the promise of a liberal approach to the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations. De Gaulle won the actual formation of a single agricultural system in Europe based upon a single supported European price level and protected by levies on imports. *The New Republic* of March 7, 1964, says that "hindsight suggests that General De Gaulle won at Brussels another victory in his policy of containing U. S. influence in Europe." But here we go into the political! The United States recognizes that the common market agricultural agreements are not such as to be helpful to us, but the EEC has adopted a common position for the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations and this may indicate the community's intention to negotiate liberally. What that means remains to be seen. The early indications of the trade policy to be pursued by the Common Market were that it would be "outward looking," but the pessimists are fearing that it is tending to be increasingly "inward looking."

At any rate, preparations are under way for the meeting of GATT (58 members) in Geneva in May. Negotiations will probably go on there for at least a year. We have called these negotiations the "Kennedy Round" as President Kennedy's leadership was largely responsible for the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which makes possible these new negotiations. The Europeans use the expression, "Kennedy Round" just as we do. We began our preparations for it during the fall. Not much has been in the papers, but we know that our list of products for GATT negotiations which has been published includes some 6,000 items. The Common Market is engaged in determining its list of products which it wants to exclude from the 50% across-the-board tariff cuts which the United States is seeking under the authority of the Trade Expansion Act. The European Free Trade Association is using its influence to persuade the Common Market to cut down on its list of exceptions. Already in the United States, various protests against including certain industries on our list have been made by the industries themselves. The textile industry says it was shocked to find itself on the list. The chemical industry has asked to be omitted from the 50% across-the-board negotiations and in certain cases to be left off entirely. President Johnson must announce the list in May before GATT begins its work. Very likely, we will emerge from the year-long negotiations with a generally lower level of tariffs, but we will still be far from a free trade country. And that is true of the New Europe as well. The forecast is true that President De Gaulle will make his influence felt in keeping tariff cuts small, and not in trying to prevent negotiations from proceeding.

All this may seem dry as dust to you, but look at the "chicken war" and you will know that it is not. There has never been a better publicized story than that of Georgia's thriving poultry industry facing unfair treatment in the European market. Because the common market tariff on American frozen poultry was increased, you remember, the American producers claimed that they had a loss of $56,000,000. The United States took the position that it had the right under GATT agreements to retaliate by raising tariffs on goods we import from the common market countries which would result in a comparable loss to them. Under the auspices of GATT, agreement was finally reached that the American loss was $26,000,000 in fact. Our next move was to select tariffs which we would raise which would make common market countries suffer a similar loss. In January, 1964, the increases went into effect covering pickup trucks, cognac, dextrine and potato starch. There have been many smiles as well as snarls over the "chicken war," but it has very real significance. To quote from the *Christian Science Monitor* of December 6, 1963: "What the office under Christian Herter is concerned with is not primarily the $26,000,000 chicken exports, but the total annual United States farm exports to the Common Market of $1,200,000,000 . . . . The tariff on chickens means nothing in terms of the overall American economy. But the January 7 suspension of lower tariffs on four items may warn the Common Market that next year will be tough. For example, what about wheat? And wheat probably will be a headache.

Since Europe is modernizing its agriculture and increasing its production, markets are important. We produce in abundance, so markets are important to us. Our traditional markets in Europe are not to be lost lightly. We are pressing for negotiations on agricultural goods as well as on industrial. So-called tariff disparities are already a controversial issue. Oversimplifying a bit, that means American tariffs by and large tend to be higher than those of Great Britain and the European countries. If we all cut agricultural tariffs, for example, across the board by 50%, it is said that the United States still will have higher tariffs than they do. Can we work this out? We must, somehow. A nationally known newspaper in an editorial in its March 10, 1964, issue said: "So the watchword . . . is patience . . . and the most useful warning to be given is not against a possible De Gaulle maneuver, but in an increase of suspicion among Western nations toward him or toward one another. The difficulties are real enough without exaggeration. But . . . there is nothing insuperable about them."

GATT negotiations must be seen as a search for ways and means by which to expand world trade. Looking at the details of the negotiations makes it easy to forget that. In those details, short-run ills may mean long-run gains. Short-run gains may mean long-run ills. Who is to be the judge? Our negotiators will face such problems constantly, and, to make matters more difficult, they must recognize that "The importance of trade as a means of supporting the basic foreign policy objectives of the United States transcends all other considerations," according to Don D. Humphrey the author of a recent book on *The United States and the Common Market.*

All mixed up with trade relations is the balance of payments question. At the bottom of this, of course, is the simple fact that we owe other nations and they owe us as day-by-day transactions go on. If you think of these debts as represented by IOU's arising in these transactions, then the balance of payments means the balancing of these against each other. If the sum total of the IOU's held against us is greater than the sum total of the IOU's which we hold against others, there is a deficit, putting us in the red. During the five years from 1958 to 1962 the sum of our deficits amounted to $15.7 billion, but during 1963 our position improved. Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon has announced that our deficit last year was $410 million. This was a remarkable reduction won by careful planning. Our deficits have not come from our trade balances. The latter are measured by a balancing of the IOU's in exports and imports, shipping, travellers' expenditures abroad, etc. IOU's in our favor in this area of our international transactions have, since the 30's, exceeded those held against us. It is in this indebtedness to us in trade balances that we have funds available in the international market for military or economic assistance, or capital investments. Our trade balance with the EEC in 1963 was $2 billion in our favor. The positive, constructive way for us to seek to handle our deficits in international payments is to increase our exports even more than we increase our imports. Through intelligent agreements which we may reach in the GATT negotiations, there will be the possibility of expanding world trade in such a way as to increase the difference between our exports and our imports. This will give us spending power in the international market to meet our international responsibilities without incurring a deficit. We believe it is possible to do this and at the same time for the foreign trade of the two European trading blocs to increase, bringing prosperity to their economies as well as ours. The deficit problem in the balance of international

payments, which is more than just an American problem, can be handled better as world trade expands.

At the present time our friends in both EEC and EFTA are more willing than we are to trade in non-strategic materials with the communist countries—the Soviet Bloc, Red China, Cuba. We, of course, have made a big wheat deal with Russia. This was a shock probably because of its size, and therefore its visibility, and because few people have been fully aware of the amount of trading that has been carried on quite legally with licenses to do so from the Department of Commerce. Our concern about trade with the communist countries is that it may become a commonplace, everyday affair and that economic pressures will not be available as weapons in the cold war. We are frustrated when our friends fail to agree with us that selling wheat to Russia is different from selling buses to Cuba. Our friends see the world as a big market and the communist countries almost an untapped market as far as the West is concerned. For example, they are thinking of the demand for consumer goods which would develop if the Russians saw these goods and wanted them. Most of us know that seeing and wanting come close together. We want things that we see and it is probable the Communists would also, particularly as they have lived with a minimum of things to make life a little pleasanter than austerity makes it. The temptation to trade is surely there. Are we right or are our friends right? We are using our persuasive powers to get them to stick with us. We think it is desirable to have a common trade policy vis-a-vis the communist countries. Our friends do not think this is important. During the decade and a half following the Second World War, common thinking and doing made matters easier for us all. Differences and controversy today make things more difficult. We may need a rethinking of earlier ideas and convictions. Controversy inevitably makes it a necessity.

ce, 1965

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME IV JUNE, 1965 NUMBER 1

THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

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PUBLISHED BY

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

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CONTENTS

PAGE

The Role of the Governments of the World in Establishing a Rule of Law Instead of Force
By *William O. Douglas* 3

The Changing Role of Congress
By *Albert Gore* 17

The Changing Role of the United States in World Affairs
By *Charles D. Hounshell* 23

The Changing Role of State Government
By *Lynwood M. Holland* 33

The Changing Role of Colleges and Universities
By *John M. Martin* 42

FOREWORD

This publication is an outgrowth of a series of lectures delivered on the West Georgia College Campus during 1964-65. The first four were sponsored jointly by the Division of Social Sciences and the Department of Adult Education and were designed to acquaint students, community leaders and other interested adults with changes in the roles of different levels of government in the 1960's. The fifth was delivered as a Parents' Day Address at West Georgia College in May, 1965.

The sponsoring organizations are especially indebted to the late Professor J. Carson Pritchard for his assistance and encouragement in planning the series, to Professors Eugene R. Huck, Gail Stanley, Doyle Mathis and Naomi Satterfield for their assistance in planning the programs and preparing the lectures for publication, and to Mrs. Corene Zachry and Mrs. Diane Wiggins for their untiring secretarial assistance.

The publication of this series of addresses is made possible by a grant from The Sears-Roebuck Foundation.

John M. Martin, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences

Collus O. Johnson, Director
Department of Adult Education

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD IN ESTABLISHING A RULE OF LAW INSTEAD OF FORCE

By William O. Douglas*

We live today, as you know, in a Nuclear Age which, I think, has caused uneasiness in every school room and every household in the land. According to our scientists we could not stand, nor could Russia, nor could Red China, nor could any other country, a massive nuclear attack unless everything we possess was two hundred and fifty feet underground. Six hundred ten megaton bombs exploded on a clear day, thirty miles above the land surface of this country, would destroy everything if they were placed strategically. I refer you to Harrison Brown's book, *Community of Fear,* which states in a very dramatic way the cold realism of the nuclear situation.

For every human being there is in this world the equivalent of eighty tons of explosives. The fallout from the nuclear tests that were held by Red China, added to those that we have ourselves produced, and those of France and Russia, will, in time, I am sure, produce in this world millions of defective children. The prevention of nuclear war is our only hope. As Dean Rusk said of the Cuban Crisis, man had a chance to peer into the Pit of the Inferno. The risk is that some power will accept the challenge of war. Victory through war is a dangerous delusion; the thought that we will be able to dictate the foreign policies of other nations is also a great delusion.

In fifteen years, at least fifteen nations will have the nuclear bomb. Red China already has it and some gather comfort from the fact that she will not have a delivery system for some little time. That is a very short-lived hope. There is no possibility that breaches of the peace or even the nuclear problems themselves can

*Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.

be resolved unless all nations are in the United Nations. There are now 115 members in the United Nations, but there is no possibility that an effective rule of law can reach the dimensions of the present world problems with Red China outside the United Nations.

Peking's absence from the United Nations makes this organization ineffective. Consider for a moment the Sino-Indian conflict. Peking refused India's request to arbitrate and the United Nations could not put pressure on Peking. We can make great progress, at least we did under the regime of Khrushchev in Russia, because the possession of nuclear bombs by each produced fear and mutual respect. We will, in time, have to listen to Peking and she will be forced to listen to us.

The idea that the stockpile of nuclear bombs is a deterrent to war is greatly exaggerated and largely illusory. We know from our own experience that the death sentence is no deterrent to crime. We know that states like Michigan and Minnesota, that have not had the death sentence for years, have felony statistics not greatly different from those in New York and California. The massing of arms leads to war. The abolition of nuclear weapons is not the solution. Now that many know how to make them, when a war starts, the nation that makes them the fastest will win.

We, therefore, come to the cold basic reality that the prevention of war is the only road to survival. The world was beset by slavery and religious wars from the beginning of time. Just as we have been able to eliminate the blight of slavery, religious wars, and religious persecution, the threat of a nuclear war can be eliminated, but not overnight, and not by us alone. It can, however, be eliminated by conscientious efforts of the men of good will of the world.

The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a step in the right direction. Disarmament is, of course, the remedy but it is slow and cumbersome. Yet even inspection may come sooner than we think due to the use of the satellites and their increasing efficiency. We have today, and that is what the press emphasizes, sharp cleavages in the world. With ideological cleavages—Communist power, our

democratic power, feudalistic regimes, military regimes, and underdeveloped nations—it is sometimes difficult to see where there could be common ground among all these diversities. We often curse the state as the villain responsible for all our woes. If you look at the world scene and travel it, I think you will begin to realize that the Western World, Russia, and China, while enshrining different concepts of freedom and justice, have come far to organize men of infinite variety into cooperative activity. Apart from the weapons system, the world system that exists is probably better by most standards than any previous one in world history. As the real inutility of the weapons system becomes apparent, and its burdens become more persistent, more rational means, I think, will be adopted. A demilitarized world cannot and will not eliminate the inherent power struggles in the nature of man. It can, however, eliminate war systems that carry the awful risk of reducing the world through radioactive rubble. We have made, as I said, great progress with Russia under the regime of Khrushchev. What will happen now after Khrushchev's fall no one is wise enough to know. We do know that Russia has become a member of the affluent society. By world standards she has a standard of living of about eight or nine hundred dollars a year per capita. Also, we know that the desire of the Russian people is to get more and more dividends from her industrial plants. So we do know that we have some common ground for continuing cooperative work with Russia.

The twin tasks before the major nuclear powers are to put to rest the clashes of political interest and try to find cooperative efforts for the solution of problems that arise between the nations. What the future between Russia and China will be we do not know. We would be very vain to think of that possible clash as solving any of our problems. We know that Russia's ideological split with China dates back to 1957 when Russia started to withdraw her economic aid. The Russian-Chinese situation will, in our lifetime, be a very tense one regardless of any temporary rapprochements that may be worked out.

Siberia, which I always thought of as a wasteland filled with miserable salt mines and windblown wastes, is really hand-

some country something like southern Canada. It is twice the size of the United States. China could put three hundred million people there and Siberia would still be less thickly populated than the United States. The Russians are fearful of that.

Outer Mongolia, which I had the privilege of visiting in 1961, is as large as Europe. It is completely surrounded by Russia and Red China. It has a population of only a million and it, too, could be filled by Chinese. Russia, I think, is aware of this.

In the universities in Russia you find great competition between the Russian and Chinese students. There is a distinct dislike on the part of the Russian for the Chinese whom they call "blue ants" because of the blue tunics which they wear. Russia wants coexistence at this junction in history so that she may enjoy some of the dividends from her industrial plant which has been built with great sacrifice and suffering. Red China seems to want a world in conflict because she cannot compete as yet at the technical level in the underdeveloped nations. She, therefore, cannot make herself felt as a political force to the same extent as can the United States, Europe, and Russia. Red China with her great population is also in an expansionist mood. Tibet at one time was a nation of two million people. Red China, however, has filled Tibet with six million Chinese and has placed another six million Chinese into Inner Mongolia. Red China's map includes Nepal, Sinkiang, and Bhutan on the southern slopes of the Himalayas.

The problems of Europe, Russia, and Red China will come more and more into focus within the next few years because of the emergence of Red China. In considering the approach to Russia, whom we suspect as well as Red China, we must remember that it is almost impossible to trust any nation beyond that nation's self interest. One of the great reasons for the misunderstandings between the East and the West in the international field is that we Americans think in terms of poker. We think in terms of winning a hand or a victory and then returning to our normal tasks. Russia does not think in terms of poker, nor does China. They think in terms of chess—this move being meaningful only after twenty-one other moves have been made. For this reason many in the Western world have not yet seen that the Cuban

crisis had no particular relationship to Cuba but was tied to American outposts in Iran and in Turkey.

As I have mentioned, the United Nations today fills many of the international needs for cooperative action. It is a sanctuary for weak and insecure nations. To them it is a world for the airing of world problems. The protection of the rights of the great powers took the form of a veto in the Security Council. With the increase in the power of the General Assembly, there is some sentiment at this time for weighted voting by nations in the General Assembly. So far in the history of the United States, we of the West have pretty much had our way; but we must now prepare for the day when the small nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will outvote us. We are now faced with a problem of what to do about nations (Russia and France) that have failed to pay their assessments because they disapproved of the purposes for which those assessments were being made, such as the Congo operation. How that will be resolved I do not know, but I cannot imagine that it would be resolved through a dissolution of the United Nations. If the United Nations did not exist today, we, and groups like us all over the world, would be assembled attempting to generate enough sentiment to create another organ in order to have at least a skeleton of an organization competent to handle the staggering world problems that are beyond the power of any one nation to handle.

I think the United Nations has made great achievements. The outlawing of aggressive war, as in Korea, was a great step forward. It was police action in Korea—police action against an aggressor—that all the democratic nations of that time approved, including India. It was not "war," even though the Soviets called it war, and General Dwight Eisenhower in his 1952 campaign stooped so low as to call it "war." It was, rather, a great principled action—a police action of a United Nations' emergency force. We have had similar action in the Suez Crisis, and it still operates. In 1958, we had a task force under the United Nations in Lebanon. In 1960, a similar one went to the Congo, and this year, as you know, another went to Cyprus. Ineffective as some of these measures have been, the deficiencies reflect largely only the deficien-

cies of the international order itself, which is still in a very embryonic stage.

At the administrative level, those of you who travel the world will burst with pride at the work of the United Nations through the various technical missions in the underdeveloped nations. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Latin America has been outstanding and the programs of village reforms have been greatly inspired by it. These technical missions are small—not large—planners and educators. The children's unit has been outstanding. The United Nations' Special Fund, administered by Paul Hoffman, is engaged in probably one of the single most important jobs of any group in the world today. The underdeveloped nations of the world need one million trained managers—not managers from the United States, but managers from their own countries. Paul Hoffman's Special Fund, so far, has trained thirty thousand of this one million—just a bare beginning. At least, however, it is on the way. Other agencies are doing similar collaborative works with various underdeveloped nations.

We have in the United Nations—in embryonic form again—a highly organized and, I think, a very distinguished judicial system. I refer to the International Court of Justice. It is rather ironic, however, that in this troubled time of the 1960's the International Court of Justice should have so little to do. Why do we hold back? Why are we afraid to submit our controversies to this Court? Our Supreme Court in Washington had 3,184 cases during the last term while the International Court of Justice had only one. Why? Well, it goes back in large part to the so-called Connally Amendment that was adopted when we opposed the United Nations in the 1940's. The Connally Amendment (Senator Thomas Connally of Texas) in substance provides that we, the United States, will abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice if we choose, but we will not abide by it, if we do not like it. That is our prerogative as a defendant. Once we become a plaintiff, however, the principle of reciprocity is applied so that the defendant nation can claim the like privilege, with the result that the International Court of Justice has very little to do,

since most of the nations of the world have this Connally type of amendment. I have a very high regard for this International Court and have known many of the judges from around the world. Its judges are nominated by national groups of jurists, not by governments. Each group can name a total of four, and only two can be of its nationality. Those elected must receive an absolute majority of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Berlin Crisis was made to order for submission to the International Court of Justice. Probably there are few who have not made up their minds as to who was right and who was wrong, yet I would wager that there are not ten per cent who have ever read the basic documents from which the dispute arose. We were in Berlin by reason of agreements, not by reason of force, and the construction of these agreements is made to order for justiciable treatment. One of the greatest gestures toward the prevention of war through the use of law as a substitute for war would have been made if we, the Western Powers, had been willing to submit the Berlin Crisis to the International Court of Justice.

The executive branch of the United Nations is, as you know, the office of the Secretary-General. Mr. Khrushchev—I think sometimes that we are going to miss him—proposed the troika idea of three instead of one Secretary-General. The idea was laughed off the pages of our newspapers by our editors and columnists. Of course, it is not a very efficient device compared to the one-man executive. His idea was to have one from the Communist bloc, one from the democratic bloc, and one from the so-called neutralists. I have the impression that before many years pass Americans will be promoting the troika idea. When these neutral or other groups become more powerful and assert their independence, the American vote among 115 is, sometimes, going to look very small.

I say that survival depends upon our adoption of a rule of law. Of course, that cannot come as a result of a unilateral action because a rule of law, like the federal system in our country, depends upon a consensus—an agreement to live under a certain kind of regime. There can be no consensus on certain things. We

would never have a consensus with a Communist country to surrender our liberties and to be occupied. As I see America, there would be no consensus possible that would establish a Communist outpost—say a Red Chinese military outpost—in Mexico. We are, therefore, wishful thinkers to imagine that we could get any kind of a livable situation if we tried to establish a military outpost in Laos. We have no monopoly on the ideas implicit in the Monroe Doctrine. Laos is Red China's sensitive border, as sensitive as the Mexican border is to us.

There are, however, certain types of consensus that are practical. One is a consensus that provides procedural devices for keeping the conflicts from triggering a nuclear holocaust, ground rules that bring an issue to conference rather to war. We have this experience in our labor-management field while other nations have similar experiences in their domestic affairs. We have comparable devices—certain pauses, certain interludes, and so on. A consensus is necessary to produce a like remedy in the international field.

I was very much surprised that 1964, this great historic year in world history, did not produce much response to a proposal that Khrushchev made on January 1, 1964. He proposed an international agreement not to use force to alter existing state frontiers, but to use negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, or some other conciliatory procedures to settle those controversies. That proposal has practical application in many parts of the world, the most dramatic being between India and Red China. Perhaps that is why Lal Bahadur Shastri, the new prime minister of India, stated only last month in Cairo that border disputes everywhere ought to be resolved through negotiation rather than by force. That would be a beginning, similar to the Test-Ban Treaty, and one more mosaic in a pattern that eventually could build a consensus that would be rather complete coverage.

A second consensus among like-minded nations, such as England, India, Israel and the United States, would be an agreement to settle all of their controversies by law. This would mean

the repeal of the Connally Amendment. It would mean American leadership to induce as many nations as possible to submit to a rule of law. The influence of such steps, I think, would be contagious. I do not think that any such movement could be successfully opposed. World opinion would be almost unanimously behind it. This would mean introducing conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and the use of the World Court.

The third consensus would be one which I have already mentioned—automatically to bring into the United Nations all the nations of the world so that the institutions of the United Nations would be available for the mediation and adjudication of all issues that threaten world peace. This would provide a skeleton, not a full-fledged system such as we have in our federal system, or such as the one on the Continent of Europe and in Russia. I repeat, this would be a bare skeleton. But if the nuclear holocaust could be avoided under even a ten-year regime of this kind of rule of law, it would, I believe, produce the greatest security the world has ever known.

There is much more, however, to this problem of survival than the United Nations. Many of our problems of the world are of a regional nature rather than of world dimension. Many regional problems would be solved if NATO evolved as a full-fledged political regime. In this continent, the Organization of American States, OAS, is embryonic in many respects. It does not even have a court. It needs a judicial tribunal and some kind of military establishment* in this continent. Look at American foreign policy and American foreign aid and you will see that about sixty-seven to seventy per cent of American foreign aid is military aid. Aid to armies in Latin America merely makes those armies better able to overthrow governments of the people, and better able to stamp out experiments in democracy. Last year, under Juan Bosch, the Dominican Republic was one of the greatest and most exciting experiments in democracy that this hemisphere has ever seen. This experiment, however, was ruthlessly stamped out by the army after six months. Today, a very reactionary and corrupt regime

*A military establishment was created as this article went to press in May, 1965.

which follows the pattern of General Rafael Trujillo is back. There have been many discussions about this kind of problem. One of the proposals that seems to me to make some sense is to provide a military establishment for OAS so that this organization, on a vote of the Council could move in with its military establishment and displace the little military tyrants that had thrown out people like Juan Bosch. They could restore men to office who have been lawfully elected and allow them to complete their terms. There is no other way in which people can get any real experience in democracy.

We have in Europe the European Commission of Human Rights to which fourteen of the fifteen European nations are signatories. This is a full-fledged international tribunal in which a citizen of Germany may sue the Crown of England, or a citizen of England may sue the government of Italy, or in which a citizen of England may sue the government of England in the event that he is unable to get justice in his own courts. This is working in a very interesting way—several hundred cases a year are handled by the Commission, only a few in the Court. It is very suggestive of the kind of thing that other federal regional systems will eventually adopt. It is more advanced in terms of law and the development of law than anything we have known. I commend it to you for your detailed study. Some people in the OAS are promoting this same kind of tribunal for this continent. I was in West Africa last year and I discovered that there is a great deal of sentiment there for that kind of an arrangement.

As you can judge from the bad headlines, we have a disastrous situation in Viet Nam due to the fact that there is no system for settlement of controversy apart from attempts to settle it by war. I do not know how long it will take the American people to realize that the presence of a white army in Southeast Asia is very unwelcome. It only tends to unite the people against the whites. I do not know how long it will take Americans to realize that the only possible solution in a situation such as Viet Nam is a political solution. We can not successfully maintain an army there any more than Red China could successfully maintain an army in Mexico. There are big problems to settle. I have

traveled Viet Nam and have seen most of the leaders and I know that most of the problems are political. The food is located in the South and the people are in the North. No matter how many armies, or tanks or bombs you have, you cannot successfully keep people away from food very long.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is obsolete. It was created by France and England to maintain the remnants of their empire. But in the crises that have developed, members of SEATO are sadly lacking. France and Pakistan have refused to send any aid. Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the Philippines have offered only token forces. More than anything else, Asia needs a great big Asian Treaty Organization, and we in this country, through our ambassadors, should be trying to work this out for Asia, composed entirely of Asian nations. Japan, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and the Philippines are the big components of Asia, and only through them can we find any kind of peaceful solution to Asian problems. This is probably the most acute and burning issue of the day. It is, indeed, a big problem.

Out of the association of the Asian nations of Japan, India, Malaysia, the Philippines and Pakistan could come a great common market comparable to that of Europe, a police force, a judicial force, and an administrative force. The cohesion of the big powers of Asia could supply the only possible counter balance to the tremendous Red China forces consisting of seven hundred million people.

This problem of the common market is a part of the big problem of the creation of a rule of law in world affairs. The common market is a product of a consensus; it is the product of an agreement. The early work of our Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, during the period from 1801 to 1835, laid down the basic ground rules that have produced in this country today the greatest common market in the world. The fifty states have free movements of commerce so that a person in any town with a new gadget to place on the market has a national market immediately. That is possible as a result of the consensus of our people to live under a Constitution which has a federal

Supreme Court. The creation of any common market requires a like consensus—a meeting of minds—a creation of new institutions. This problem of the common market is as acute in the world as any problem that will face the younger generation during its lifetime.

The common market puts into focus the problems of the "haves" and the "have nots" at the world level. We are the affluent society with $2,500 per year per capita, and there is no reason why we cannot maintain and perpetuate it. But it sometimes distorts our view of world problems. I often think that we Americans live in a big white house on the hill and do not understand very much the problems of the slums that surround us. Our appropriation for the Pentagon each year is greater than the national income of seven hundred million Chinese in Red China. Last year all the underdeveloped nations of the world had about 165 billion dollars in their gross national product. Ours is about five hundred billion dollars. Go into Africa and look at the low standard of living; look at the low educational advantages of the people. The average teacher in Africa has had only seven years of schooling. Nigeria has only one thousand qualified teachers; she needs one hundred thousand. These people, if they are to raise their standards of living to comply with political pressures, must become producers. They will, of course, be the high cost producers in the world, because an African factory cannot produce goods at a price that can compete with the mass production processes of Europe and the United States. The problem is not to keep the rich getting richer, but to see to it that while the rich get richer the poor do not get poorer. Unless we of the West work out some kind of preferential tariffs for these nations, we are going to have the world's greatest tragedy facing us in ten or twenty years from now. We must remember that the "haves" in the world today are the whites, and the "have nots" are the yellows, the blacks, and the browns. The racial conflict will forever continue unless this economic problem among nations is solved. Foreign aid from all industrial nations amounts to about four billion dollars a year in terms of *net capital transfer*. After this sum is distributed into the various categories, however, the eco-

nomic dent in the problem of the underdeveloped nations is not very great. If we Americans invested abroad as heavily in proportion to our national income as Britain did in the Nineteenth Century when she was developing her Commonwealth, we would be lending or granting about thirty billion dollars a year.

I have been galloping along and touching on a number of controversial subjects in, perhaps, a very superficial way. I hope, however, I have challenged your thinking and stirred you up. I do not ask you to agree with me. I do ask you to think about these things. They are problems of your generation. My generation, unfortunately, has hardly begun to solve them. Hardly any of these problems, as I have said, emerged in the great debates that have taken place in the 1950's and 1960's. Yet they are the stark realities of the power struggle.

The power struggle will go on, and the way to save the civilization from the nuclear holocaust is to see that problems are channeled through institutions of law, and that they are handled at the level of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication. Those who support the tradition of the free society should make the rule of law their way of life. We cannot require, force, or dictate to Russia or China; but we of the West, once we are united, have a very strong position in the world. Israel, India, Japan, England, Europe, Turkey, and Nigeria are nations more or less oriented to the ideas and ideals of the free society. We can start with this group and establish our rule of law. That would have a tremendous and magnetic attraction around the world. Further, we can develop a consensus with the Sino-Soviet bloc on the ground rules to avoid military clashes, and a consensus in time, perhaps, with that bloc to use the rule of law rather than force. This seems to me to be the only alternative to triggering the nuclear holocaust that would bring an end to all life on this continent, as well as on other continents.

I hope that we never produce conformity in this great world of diversity. But we can, I think, produce harmony. This may be the great and wonderful dividend from the Nuclear Age. I think that it would be wonderful if this country made 1965 the "Inter-

national Rule of Law Year" patterned after the "International Geophysical Year." That, perhaps, could make a stout and sturdy beginning toward all peoples of the world living together in some kind of harmony—a beginning similar to that made by the scientists in the "International Geophysical Year."

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THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONGRESS

By Albert Gore*

The theme of your lecture series intrigues me. Change is, of course, the one immutable characteristic of these or any other times. And the single outstanding characteristic of greatness among men and viability among institutions is the ability of these men and institutions to react to change. So I am glad to have this opportunity to talk to you about the changing role of Congress.

The necessity for adaptability to change was recently impressed upon me while watching on television the funeral of the late, great Winston Churchill. I had the privilege of meeting with him on three occasions, I believe, in the heyday of his career. He was universally recognized as an orator, writer, painter and inspiring leader in both peace and war. People spoke and wrote about these specific accomplishments of his, but I rarely heard anyone speak of his greatest single characteristic, that is, the ability to adjust to changed and changing conditions.

Here was a man whose active life saw warfare move from the old-fashioned cavalry charge to the employment of nuclear weapons. Changes in other areas during his lifetime were equally significant. Yet, Churchill was able to adapt to change philosophically and practically, and to provide the most dynamic leadership of any single man during our century.

Acceleration of the rate of change seems to be a prime characteristic of our times, and this does put to the test our leaders as individuals, and our institutions as instruments for the public good.

The Congress has, of course, felt the impact of changes which have occurred in the world and in the United States. It has responded to those changes, although not with the type of

*United States Senator from Tennessee.

response a great many critics—including some of its own members—feel is adequate.

I think we can detect three changes in the Congress which have become quite pronounced during recent years. Not all are for the better. On the other hand, these changes do not by any means signify the demise of Congress or any drastic change in its traditional role. These changes are:

1. The Congress has become a national-minded body, rather than a group of men representing local interests.

2. The Congress has become secondary in importance to the Executive Branch, even at times in the legislative process. The secondary role of the Congress has become more pronounced since the end of the Eisenhower Administration.

3. The individual member of Congress has become bogged down in the details of constituents' problems. This has, to some extent, taken up time which should be devoted to legislation.

Perhaps the most important change in the Congress in recent years—since World War II, I think—is the fact that the Congress has become more national-minded, more oriented toward the needs of the country as a whole. There has been at least a partial breakdown in the localism which formerly plagued the Congress and hampered much legislation which could have moved the country forward along progressive paths.

Except in such matters as priorities among public works projects, a matter which usually generates little heat, there are few members of Congress who take a purely local view of issues. Tariffs are no longer fixed individually by the Congress, and this has been helpful in this regard. Today, it is principally in the case of civil rights legislation that localism, formerly observed in many fields, still manifests itself.

There are several reasons for this growth in national outlook. First, and probably most important, is the fact that we have experienced continued outside pressure in this country for the first time in our history. During the period of the Cold War, we

have been compelled to put the national interest foremost in dealing with more and more problems.

Another important consideration is the drawing of the country physically closer together by means of better transportation and communications. Air travel, radio and television have brought the country together both economically and culturally. Obviously, we are closer together as a nation. Our young people are far better informed. Our aspirations are more nearly common to the majority of the whole country.

As a result of this new cohesiveness and similarity of aspirations, the federal government has assumed a larger and more important role in our society. Many people deplore this change because they feel it represents the end of states' rights. I do not believe it means the end of states' rights. I do believe, however, that when a governmental unit fails to meet its responsibility in seeking and providing solutions to the problems of the people, the people will necessarily look for new leaders and new governmental units to meet these responsibilities.

Then, too, with advancements in industry, science and technology, more and more of our problems become national in character. This is not to say that there are not a plethora of problems which can be dealt with most effectively on the local or state level. But, for example, how could we have fifty different civil aeronautics authorities? Or how much more difficult would it be to enjoy radio and television without the Federal Communications Commission? With each state having its own commission granting licenses for 50,000 kilowatt stations, the overlap would result in poor service for everyone. Decent reception, needless to say, would be impossible.

I could cite any number of problems, as you can, in this age of technology that are national in character. I am the author of the interstate highway system, and it is my proudest accomplishment in the Congress. We simply could not have an interstate system of national super highways except through the leadership of the national government.

One of the severest battles I had to fight, a battle requiring

two years of effort, was establishing limitation of access. Had this question been left to the states, we would not have limited access across the country. I had some difficulty coming to that conclusion myself. The public highway, it seemed to me, should be open to anyone who wanted to enter wherever he wished to enter upon it. Then I took a drive on U. S. Highway No. 1 out of Washington. When first built, it was a magnificent multi-lane highway; but it had become a death trap with neon signs flashing, obscuring traffic lights, and people backing out into the highway from all sorts of establishments and "joints." In short, it had become the most hazardous highway in the country. I became convinced that the only way we could have a safe highway permitting rapid transit was to permit access and egress only at given points and only under given circumstances such as those provided by cloverleaf type interchanges.

But Congress had to be convinced. It was very hard to convince the Congress, and I think it would have been impossible in our time to convince fifty different state legislatures. I cite this as an example of congressional enactment of constructive legislation remedying a pressing national problem, and doing so by adopting the national rather than the parochial view.

The second major change which has been noticeable in the Congress is its increased dependence on the Executive Branch even in legislation. To some degree this is inevitable. To some degree this is desirable. But to some degree it is not in the best interests of the country and it is perhaps time for a short pendulum swing in the other direction.

Of course our government operates on an executive system. This is the concept embodied in the Constitution. That is the way our system must function. We do not have a parliamentary system.

There have been times when the Congress has attempted to grab the reins of leadership. The results have been stalemate at best and disaster at worst. Perhaps the sorriest period of misgovernment we have ever had in this country was the Reconstruction era when the Radicals in Congress attempted to lead the country. It would not work then, and would have even less chance of working now.

Executive leadership is certainly clearly in evidence today. While the executive branch of government has grown larger and larger, its agencies multiplying and its functions increasing, the legislative branch is essentially the same body it always has been.

I think that perhaps the single greatest danger to our system of government is the growing number of increasingly complex issues, so difficult for popular understanding. As a result, many issues are dealt with upon which no genuine public opinion has been formed. These problems are so many and so great and so complex that even Congress cannot undertake to deal with them effectively without outside assistance. And that assistance often must come from the Executive Branch.

Congressmen and senators themselves are required to work harder than ever before. If I may cite a personal example, my one greatest task is to keep abreast of current problems and anticipated future problems, and to stay informed.

There is much sentiment in the Congress for changing its rules and organization. Perhaps some streamlining is needed. Perhaps more and better qualified staff is a partial answer. This matter is now being studied intensively and I look forward to reviewing the recommendation of the special committee set up for that purpose.

The Congress is still an independent branch of government and it performs constructively for the most part. It has not succumbed to the fate of so many of our state legislatures which have yielded almost all initiative to the governors. The Congress is still a separate and distinct body, jealous of its powers, prerogatives and privileges. But, in order for it to continue to play a positive role, some changes in organization are due. The necessary change in outlook has, I feel, already occurred.

The third change which has occurred in connection with the work of the Congress is the increase in the amount of time which must be spent on helping constituents with their problems—individual problems, community problems, state problems.

There are always service personnel with grievances who feel that justice will not be done without congressional intercession.

Many do not get the type of treatment from social security officials or others in various government bureaus and agencies which they feel they deserve. A letter to a congressman or senator will, it is thought, bring everyone into line.

It is now necessary for a member of Congress and his staff to spend two-thirds to three-fourths of their collective time on matters not related to legislation as such. I do not object to this type of work. Indeed, I can sympathize with the mayor of a small town in Tennessee who needs assistance for some badly needed project and who does not know the best way to thread his way through the Washington maze. But this type of activity takes time away from legislation.

Altogether too many of us find ourselves bogged down in details.

I am not sure just what the answer to this problem is. Increasing the staff of the member is of some assistance, but that does not remove from the member himself the ultimate responsibility for seeing to the proper functioning of his office in all its details.

It might be possible, in considering the reorganization of the Congress, to set up a special committee with its own staff to handle what are essentially administrative details.

It is clear that the times have changed and that Congress has changed to keep pace. The basic role of the Congress, that of legislating responsibly, has not changed, but the manner in which this public responsibility is carried out has changed in many respects, not all for the better.

Perhaps the greatest single attribute of our Constitution is its flexibility. But it is not sufficiently flexible to continue to serve as a basis for our government if Congress does not, in fact, continue to perform properly its primary role as an independent legislative body.

We must maintain the Congress and the individual member as independent and necessary parts of our governmental machinery. This will be done.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

By Charles D. Hounshell*

Prior to the twentieth century the United States played a minor role in world affairs, and foreign policy played a minor role in the United States affairs. Today the United States plays a major role in world affairs, and foreign policy plays a major role in United States affairs. This change has been characterized as revolutionary.

The story of the changing role of the United States in world affairs might be divided chronologically into three periods: before 1898—the period of isolation; from the Spanish-American War to World War II—the period of involvement; after World War II—the period of leadership.

ISOLATION

America was born of European politics, but the Revolution was an assertion of independence from Europe. During the first one hundred years of its history, the United States was preoccupied with its own affairs, with its sectional conflict, and with the development of a continent westward. Isolation from Europe was feasible; the broad Atlantic Ocean seemed a physical and psychological barrier, and there was no general war between the defeat of Napoleon and the outbreak of World War I into which America was drawn either as a pawn or as a participant. In his Farewell Address in 1796 Washington advised his fellow countrymen to have as little political connection as possible with European states, avoiding partiality for one or resentment against another, and shaping policy on the basis of their own interests. After the abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance of revolutionary days with

*Associate Dean of Emory College and Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory University.

France, the United States did not enter into any close political connection with any European power for more than a century.

In the absence of a threat from abroad, it was feasible for the United States to devote its energies to expanding its territory and to establishing its pre-eminence in the hemisphere. The western border was successively extended from the Mississippi to the Rockies to the Pacific. With the purchase of Alaska in 1867 the United States achieved its present continental domain. In 1823 Monroe had proclaimed that the American continents were not to be considered subject to future colonization by any European power and that any intervention on the part of the Old World powers with the New World republics would be regarded as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. Subsequent corollaries asserted that the United States could not view with indifference the transfer of New World territory from one European power to another, that the United States was opposed to the control of an interoceanic canal by any European state, that the United States could insist on arbitration of a controversy between an American and an European state over boundaries involving New World territory, and that the United States could exercise a kind of international police power in the New World against unruly states which would otherwise be threatened with intervention by European powers.

INVOLVEMENT

The Spanish-American War and the turn of the century mark the beginning of an era that culminated with World War II and that might be called a period of United States involvement in world affairs. Within the western hemisphere the position of the United States matured from that of a brash upstart to that of an older brother. The latter part of this period especially was characterized by a growth in the Pan-American ideal: in 1938 at the conference at Lima provision was made for a meeting of the foreign ministers on call; in 1939 at the conference at Panama provision was made for concerted measures of economic assistance, and in 1940 at the conference at Havana the American states agreed that an act of aggression against one would be considered an act of aggression against all.

The acquisition of the Philippines as a consequence of the Spanish-American War gave the United States a stake (an unwise over-commitment?) in the Far East. Earlier the United States had assisted in the opening up of Japan to trade with the West, but following the Russo-Japanese War tension between the United States and Japan mounted. The United States became increasingly apprehensive about the aggressive designs of the Japanese militarists and increasingly threw its support behind China as a balance to the growing power of Japan.

The change from isolation to involvement in European affairs is related to the change in the European balance of power from a dominance by Great Britain which did not threaten American security to a possible dominance by Germany which was seen as a threat to American security. The United States was shaken from its traditional policy of isolation and neutrality toward Europe by German submarine activity. Following World War I the United States stance was ambivalent. The strong resistance to involvement in Europe that was epitomized by the neutrality legislation of the 1930's, however, was swept aside by the aggressions of Hitler. The repeal of the arms embargo in 1939 was followed by the destroyers-bases agreement in 1940 and by lend-lease, the Atlantic Charter, and formal entry into the war against the Axis in 1941.

LEADERSHIP: CONTAINMENT

Following World War II the role of the United States in world affairs necessarily changed from one of involvement to one of leadership. There had been seven major powers before the war, but after the war there were only two super-powers. The pattern of world politics following World War II has been labelled "bipolar"—two strong powers repelling each other at all points with the smaller states being drawn into one of the two "fields." There were potentially powerful "neutral" or "uncommitted" nations, but the primary competitors in world politics were the United States as the leader of the "Free World" and the Soviet Union as the leader of the "Communist Bloc."

It is instructive to observe the post-World War II pattern

of power from the point of view of the geopolitician. Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, had warned that "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World." Professor Nicholas Spykman, an American geographer, hypothesized that he who rules the "Rimland" commands the Heartland, the World Island, and the World. The Heartland was defined by Mackinder as that vast area of Euro-Asia which stretched from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean and which was invulnerable to British sea power. The Rimland was defined by Spykman as the arc encompassing the outer portion of the World Island, extending from Europe through the Near East, India and Southeast Asia to Eastern Siberia.

Faced with a competitor who occupied the Heartland and who threatened to encompass the Rimland, the United States could not withdraw to its own shores and abdicate to the Soviet Union the geographical base for world control. On the other hand, any overt attempt on the part of the United States to have driven the Soviet Union from the Rimland—to have rolled back the iron curtain by force—would certainly have been viewed by the Soviet Union as a threat to its security and would almost certainly have precipitated World War III. The policy of containment that was pursued by the United States might be viewed as the effort to achieve two traditional policy objectives—a division (balance) of power in Europe and a division (balance) of power in the Far East—within the framework of a bipolar world. The policy of containment eventuated in the drawing of crucial lines in the Rimland: around Greece and Turkey, from Stettin to Trieste in Europe, in the Taiwan Strait, at the 38th parallel in Korea, and at the 17th parallel in Viet Nam.

The policy of containment envisaged resistance to Soviet expansion and the building of areas of strength at all points and by appropriate means: military, economic, political. It assumed that Soviet policy was expansionist—resulting from Communist ideology, traditional Russian objectives, and the dynamics of a dictatorship in a police state; that confronted by strength Moscow

would stop; and that, unable to expand, the Soviet system would be modified, making accommodation possible. It assumed that the Communist system contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction; it assumed the long run superiority of the democratic system.

The initial post-war target of Soviet expansion was Europe where it had the support of the Red Army. The tide was stemmed by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of NATO. Blocked in Europe, the Communist thrust was directed toward the Far East with the use of political and covert military techniques. The Far East thrust was countered by economic and military aid to Nationalist China and other countries, by military force in Korea, and by mutual security pacts such as Anzus and SEATO and those with the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and Formosa. The "New Cold War" was characterized by an attempted economic penetration of the Middle East, which was countered by economic aid, by METO, and by the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Following the death of Stalin there had been a lessening of tension resulting in the "New Cold War" of economic blandishments and the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955. The *detente* of the 1950s, however, did not survive the decade. By 1957 Khrushchev had consolidated his personal power position, having gained clear control over the machinery of Soviet government as well as over the Communist party. The Soviet Union developed thermonuclear weapons and the capability of delivering them over long distances by rockets, as dramatized by Sputnik in October, 1957. The marked acceleration in the revolutions of nationalism and modernization of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America inflamed Soviet hopes. There is little doubt that Moscow came to believe that it had deeply rooted advantages in seeking to expand Communist power and influence in these regions at the expense of the West by orchestrating flexibly the devices of subversion and guerrilla warfare; trade and aid; appeal to anti-colonialism and nationalist sentiments; and by the claim that Communism was not merely a fast-closing rival of the United States but the possessor of a method for the more efficient—even if ruthless—modernization of an underdeveloped region.

The renewed Communist offensive would seem to have been fully underway in 1958. It was in that year that Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin, that the Communist party in Hanoi announced it would undertake a guerrilla war in South Vietnam, and that Castro took over in Cuba. The Pathet Lao, with the active help of Communist North Vietnam, resumed their effort to take over Laos, the Soviet Union sought to exploit the potentialities for acquiring in the Congo a Communist base for operations in central Africa, and the Soviet Union gave military aid to Indonesia and fanned the friction between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea.

The Communist threat of nuclear blackmail was countered by a build up of United States military forces, by a firm stand on Berlin, and by a dramatic challenge to the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles from Cuba in October, 1962. The Communist threat in the underdeveloped areas had to be met at many points and by various means. In Latin America the isolation of Cuba was complemented by the Alliance for Progress. In Africa the new U. S. stance was symbolized by support of the United Nations in the Congo. In Southeast Asia there was a clear determination to prevent a Communist takeover; in Vietnam there was a massive enlargement of the counterinsurgency program.

By the end of the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962, according to W. W. Rostow from whom this analysis is taken, the momentum had drained out of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive, despite the unresolved crises in Cuba and Southeast Asia.

LEADERSHIP: BEYOND CONTAINMENT

The role of the United States in world affairs today is not confined to the provision of leadership and strength merely to counter the offensives of Soviet Communism in a world characterized by a simple bipolarity. The positive role of the United States is to provide leadership in shaping the fundamental forces in this modern complex world to its own purposes and interests as a nation committed to the principles of national independence and human freedom.

The world today is no longer characterized by a simple

bipolarity. There has been a diffusion of power both within and without the Communist bloc; there has been a revival of economic and political strength in Western Europe and in Japan; France and China are already included in the growing list of nuclear powers. There is a revolution of modernization and rising expectations in the underdeveloped areas of the world. There is a political revolution marked simultaneously by proliferation of ardent new nations and an intensified interdependence which requires the individual nation-state to cooperate increasingly with others in order to provide for its security and economic welfare.

Mr. Rostow, writing as Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State, states that in the light of this view of the world the strategy of the United States has five dimensions:

First, strengthen the bonds of association among the more industrialized nations which lie mainly in the northern portion of the free world: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.

Second, support the efforts of the underdeveloped areas which lie mainly in the southern portion of the world (Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East) to bring to bear the fruits of modern science and technology, to elevate the standards of life of their peoples, and to provide a firm basis for positions of national dignity and independence on the world scene.

Third, build a new relationship between the developed northern portion of the world and the underdeveloped southern portion of the world based on cooperation among self-respecting sovereign nations to supplant the old colonial ties.

Fourth, provide for the military security of the free world. The United States has developed a full spectrum of military strength, ranging from nuclear weapons deliverable by ICBM or by Polaris submarines to conventional weapons and troops trained in the techniques of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. The United States has made it clear that a nuclear attack would be met by nuclear response, that direct invasion will be met by appropriate force, and that covert aggression by imported terrorists and insurgents will be resisted.

Fifth, clarify its posture toward the nations now under Communist rule. The United States does not intend to initiate nuclear war to destroy the Communist bloc, but it does intend to pursue the goal of achieving a world organized on the principle of voluntary cooperation among independent nation-states dedicated to human freedom rather than permitting the world to be organized on the principle of Communism.

CONSEQUENCES FOR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

The changing role of the United States in world affairs—from isolation to world leadership—has had far-reaching consequences for life and government within the United States. Foreign policy questions are no longer remote and secondary; they are of transcendent importance and they impinge directly on the life of every person. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between foreign and domestic questions. Is a fifty billion dollar defense budget a question of foreign or domestic policy? Is voter registration in Selma, Alabama, a domestic question only, or does it have implications for foreign policy?

The world leadership role of the United States has had a great impact upon the distribution of governmental powers within the United States. The role of the national government in relation to the states has been magnified and the role of the President within the national government has been enlarged. The constitutional basis for the enhancement of the role of the national government and of the President as questions of foreign affairs have increased in relative importance was set forth by the Supreme Court as early as 1936 in *U. S. vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* wherein Mr. Justice Sutherland, one of the "Nine Old Men," said:

> . . . the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs . . . are different, both in respect of their origin and nature. The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to

carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers *then possessed by the states* such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states. That this doctrine applies only to powers which the states had, is self-evident. And since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source. During the colonial period, those powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of America" declared the United (not the several) Colonies to be free and independent states, and as such to have "full power to levy war, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent states may of right do."

As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America . . . .

It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution . . . .

Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of this na-

> tion. He *makes* treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates . . . .

As questions of foreign affairs have become relatively more important, those governmental agencies that deal with foreign affairs—the national government and more specifically the President—have become relatively more important.

SUMMARY

The role of the United States in world affairs has changed from isolation to involvement to leadership.

The United States cannot turn its back on the world of the twentieth century; nor can the United States—consistent with its principles—attempt to dominate the world and establish a world empire.

The objective of the United States should be and is, according to one official spokesman, to lead the world in the building of a community of self-respecting nation-states which would permit its citizens to live in an environment of peace and progress.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENT

By Lynwood M. Holland*

Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1908: "The question of the relation of states to the federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system. It cannot be settled by the opinion of any one generation, because it is a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new question."

Historically no one can question the importance of the states in our system of government. In fact, it was the underlying theory of the Articles of Confederation that the powers of the general government should be exercised through state governments. States formed the basis of our federal system, and they have all of the powers not specifically delegated to the national government.

Until the latter part of the Nineteenth Century states generally considered themselves dominant in their relationships in the federal system. By 1940, federalism had undergone a change that had developed into a form of "cooperative federalism." This meant a marked shift in the balance of power toward the national government. The increase of power by the central government has resulted in part from popular demand because of the growing complexity of social and economic conditions for the performance of more functions by government at all levels and because the states have been unwilling or unable to meet the demands of the people for more and better services. The national government has entered into many activities which were supposed to have been reserved by the Constitution to the states. To many people this change has been a cause for much concern and an opportunity to dust off the old cliches of states' rights and to declare them more vociferously than ever before. Yet the powers of the national government continued to expand and states have done very little

*Professor of Political Science, Emory University.

to set their houses in order so that they can assume their rightful role in the "new federalism" since World War II.

What has happened to states that has caused them to play a lesser role in our federal system and what efforts, if any, have been made to remedy these weaknesses? These are questions that must be answered if one is to attempt to analyze what is the role today of states.

Although there are many factors accounting for the decline of states prior to 1960, one of the major reasons was the over-representation of rural areas and their blind dominance of the general assemblies; farms, cows, trees, and hogs were better represented in most of our state legislatures than people. Almost without an exception, state legislatures were rural controlled and dominated. A study in 1955 reported that of the forty-eight states then in existence only Wisconsin and Massachusetts provided fair equal representation of urban areas. Prior to the Twentieth Century there might have been some justification for basing representation so that the preponderance would be from rural areas because that was where the people lived, but today, the unwillingness and the inability of the legislators to meet twentieth century changes have created a stalemate of unfairness that has aroused the ire of most thinking people in both rural and urban areas.

The unrealistic attitude of the rural dominated legislatures has stymied state governments and caused cities and metropolitan areas to look to the national government to help solve some of their more urgent problems, such as housing, flood control, slum clearance, etc. Undoubtedly, another important effect of our rural dominated legislatures has been to raise fundamental questions concerning the effectiveness with which state governments fulfill their responsibilities. The public has been critical, rightly so, of questioning not only the inertia of our legislators but also their caliber, and the lack of respect has been general. We did not attract the top flight men and women to our legislatures, or if we did, they were in such a minority they accomplished very little. One of the best examples of absurdity was in the senate of the Georgia General Assembly before the recent reapportionment.

The state was divided into fifty-four senatorial districts and the system of rotation was adopted. Fifty-two districts were comprised of three counties each. Under the rotation system one county elected a senator once every six years.

The inability to reapportion state legislatures so that they represented population has added to the complexity of the problems. The urban population became the "forgotten or second-rate people" in the lack of representation in our legislatures, and yearly they became more discriminated against in taxes, services, and representation. No wonder they had little confidence in the state legislators who had no interest in their urban problems.

Excessive membership, part-time status, and negligible salaries of legislators also added to the reasons why legislatures have lost respect in the eyes of the public, for top flight personnel even from the rural areas were not being attracted to our general assemblies. And a majority of those elected seldom spent more than three days out of five in session, for they returned home to supervise their business interest, usually leaving on Thursday and returning on Tuesday. Again, Georgia is an excellent example of this. It often is difficult to secure a quorum on Monday, Thursday afternoon and Friday. How can a house with 400 members (New Hampshire) or even 246 (Vermont) or 240 (Massachusetts) or 294 (Connecticut) or even 205 (Georgia) really be a deliberative body? No wonder the committee system has grown like mushrooms; the actual work must be done by a smaller body.

Detailed and cluttered constitutions in forty-four states have practically placed these state governments in rigid straitjackets. Absolute procedure of rules and regulations plus the inclusion of unnecessary statutory materials tie the hands of the legislators or cause them to spend too much time dealing with local matters that should be left to counties and municipalities. Most of our legislation consists of private bills when there are more urgent matters of a general nature.

All of these factors have made our state government lethargic and ill-equipped to cope with our rapidly changing social, economic, and political environment. In fact, many outstanding writ-

ers in the decades of 1930 and 1940 were stating that "the epic of federalism is over" and predicting the "withering away" of the states because they were too small to handle problems of regional or national scope and too large or unnatural in jurisdiction to handle local problems. In other words the state governments were finished; they had failed and were failing to meet the demands caused by the changing needs of the day. How far wrong is evidenced by the expanded role and increased services and expenditures of the states today, and by the close relationship of their activities to the individual citizen. They are also important as proving grounds for national leaders, as experimental laboratories, as electoral machinery for the election of the President and members of Congress, and as an essential element in federalism.

I would hasten to say to you that the powers of the national government have expanded far beyond the dreams of the Founding Fathers, and this has resulted in a change of the original concept of federalism in which the states were unquestionably, in the thinking of most of the representatives in Philadelphia in 1787, to be dominant, to the "new federalism" of 1965. This means that national-state relationships are not only characterized by cooperation, coordination and the sharing of power, but also one in which the national government's influence is predominant over the states.

But the picture is not a dark one. In 1962, the Supreme Court in *Baker v. Carr* and on June 15, 1964, in *Reynolds v. Sims* has raised fundamental questions concerning the effectiveness with which state governments fulfill their responsibilities. By making reapportionment justiciable and requiring "one man one vote" in both houses of the legislatures, the Supreme Court has removed one of the major deterrents of the past; namely, the archaic pattern of representation, and made it possible for states to recognize the change in the pattern of population growth.

Not many of us realize the significance of these decisions because of our rural or urban blindfolds that have caused us to see that reapportionment and redistricting are really only the surface evidence of even more crucial and fundamental changes

which are underway. And "these changes are not occurring as cold, impersonal adjustments in the program for a battery of computers, for the complete record is a complex story of the interplay of personalities and power centers." The complete power structure of states is undergoing a change and there are no better examples than Vermont, Georgia, Minnesota, etc., although a few leaders in both Congress and state governments still think and act in terms of the rural dominance.

The reapportionment of the senate of the General Assembly of Georgia in 1962 has shown some evidence of the effects we can expect—better qualified, younger, more interested and active senators. Many are thinking state wide rather than local.

Reapportionment is not the whole answer to improve state governments; it may be the catalysis or cartharsis which will put the spotlight on state government; it is not the total cure for why state governments have lost respect and power in the past.

The citizens of states need to take a very hard look at their constitutions. Except for Missouri, Alaska, Hawaii, New Jersey and Michigan, most of the other forty-five state constitutions are not fundamental laws but rather antiquated machinery, archaic procedures, and unnecessary statutory details. Just to have another revision or amendment does not answer the real problem of modernizing constitutions to fix the needs of the present missile age. The citizens must analyze the present needs, evaluate the old constitution and understand first what a constitution is and should contain before anything is done. To realize one's weaknesses is neither popular nor easy, but this must be done if state governments are to be strengthened and function as they should.

The judicial articles of state constitutions should be revised so that the court systems will be unified thereby eliminating such weaknesses as inequalities in the distribution of work, the lack of uniformity in interpretation and administration of law, and an outmoded structure. Missouri, North Carolina, Illinois and Michigan have pointed the way for other states. Each has provided in some form a substantial degree of unification in which the supreme court is the administrative head and has power to

establish rules of practice and procedure for all of the other state courts, and to transfer judges temporarily from one court to another.

Court reforms do not come easy, for there are many opponents to any change. Success can come only when an enlightened bar, judiciary, and citizens unite to work for reform. Not until states begin to recognize the court system as an effective instrument of government rather than as "brakes" on the total job of government will the necessary changes be made.

After careful diagnosis, constitutions must be made to contain a bill of rights in line with recent decisions of the Supreme Court, an apportioned legislative body that has modern processes and procedures and can deal with urgent problems adequately and promptly, an executive who has the powers to be executive in fact as well as in theory, a modernized judicial structure that will meet the needs of today and protect the people and prevent the miscarriage of justice to all of its citizens.

The role of the states in the future will be greatly determined by the ability to raise money enough to provide the services which the public expects and demands. This means that the constitutional limitations on finances and borrowing must be reexamined and adapted to meet the problems of an urbanized society, and new sources of revenue must be found. Many of us fail to realize that "the rate of growth in expenditure, revenues and employment by states and local governments outstrips the growth rate of all other parts of the economy, public or private."[1] What does this mean? Briefly, it means that during the past decade, cost of state and local outlays increased more than eight per cent annually, or double the growth rate of the national income, that state and local governments have had to increase tax rates repeatedly while the national government has had two large cuts, that state and local debts increased by 170 per cent from 1952 to 1962, that state and local employment is rising annually (in Georgia alone public employment increased 20.8

1. Alan K. Campbell, "Most Dynamic Sector," **National Civic Review**, February, 1964, p. 74.

per cent in five years (1957-62) while the entire increase of U.S. was 16.7 per cent), and that all sources of revenue increased. Yet the tax mortality of state and local political leaders is very high. To raise taxes is too often political suicide, for political and economic pressure at the state and local level are against tax increases. It is easier to turn to the national government for a grant, and as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has observed "there is nothing so permanent as a temporary grant-in-aid." We ask and accept and then berate and condemn the grantor, the national government.

The picture is not given to be pessimistic but rather to present some of the more urgent problems facing state governments now and in the years ahead and to show that they may impede the states' future role. Never in our history has a greater challenge been given to state governments to get their houses in order so that they can assume more responsibility in the future. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy created special commissions to study national-state relationships and to make recommendations. In spite of the marvelous studies of these commissions the states have been unable or unwilling to assume their responsibilities.

The apportionment decisions have offered to the states an opportunity to adjust their representation and legislature structure so that they will recognize the changing pattern of population and its effect upon the laws of political power. However, the recent unrealistic debate in the General Assembly of Georgia and many other states, or the unrealistic attitude in Florida or Illinois, and the proposals to stay the implementation of the United States Supreme Court decisions truly reveal a profound "lack of understanding of both the constitutional position of states and the nature of their responsibilities in a dynamic urban society." The maintenance of the *status quo* must not be permitted; change is inevitable and leadership must be provided. The responsibility is upon the shoulders of every citizen of the state to become interested and concerned about what is happening at his state capitol.

People must not forget that the popular image of their state

legislature is to a very considerable extent, the image of state government generally. This image will be altered when the electorate demands programs to meet the changing needs. And this can be done when the whole machinery of government has been modernized—not just one branch, but all branches. The relationship between the states and their local governments must be carefully analyzed so that each will be strengthened. This means establishing confidence so that state and local governments will trust one another, and home rule will be adopted—not as a cure-all for what is wrong with local governments but to give them an opportunity to try to solve their own problems.

Before home rule is granted to local governments, states must take a hard look at the entire tax system. No longer can large urban and metropolitan areas survive on mere "hand outs" from the state. As more services are being demanded by the larger cities, there must be some means of giving and paying for these services. States must not only make it possible for these areas to have new sources of revenue but must also share some of the taxes which they are collecting within these areas. Only a few states have been wise enough to recognize this problem and try to do something about it. Until local governments have confidence in state legislatures and are encouraged to look to them for help they will continue to look toward Washington for the financial support they need in providing for the needs of their growing population. The only way to offset the big government in Washington is for states to meet their responsibilities and to get rid of those things that have caused them to fail or create distrust. The future roles of the states in America today is now being decided in the degree that they are attempting to readjust their administration and programs to meet the needs of a changing urban society. As long as outmoded constitutions, archaic structure, and ancient procedures are retained for states to use to try to solve urban and rural problems, the role of the states will remain subordinate. The opportunity is here if we will avail ourselves of it. But if we are so blinded by the past that we are unable to face the future, we deserve the condemnation of the men and women of tomorrow for our lack of leadership, foresight and vision.

The future of our federal system rests upon the awareness we arouse in our states to accept the challenges of today. This means every citizen must have the opportunity to be informed of the challenges with which we are faced, so that he can become more keenly alert and active in his government. He must assert himself so that the responsible leader will be encouraged to assume the role for which he was selected. The power structure of a government is greatest when it is the power of the concerned. Today there are people concerned in every state, although some states are more fortunate in having larger numbers than others; they are the ones who will guide the destiny of our states and local governments in spite of the rocky road that must be traveled in the future. We must measure how far we have come before becoming discouraged at the distance we must travel to make the states assume their roles in America.

State governments are more important to democracy today than at any time since the adoption of the National Constitution. They have many times greater responsibilities today in educating the young, hospitalizing the sick and mentally ill, maintaining law and order, controlling traffic, building highways, regulating trucks, utilities and insurance companies, and conserving natural resources.

State governments are not going to be rendered obsolete, but are going to be put to a severe test in the years ahead. They must modernize, reorganize and reform. What their future role will be will depend upon how successfully they meet the problems of today.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES*

By John M. Martin

Today, colleges and universities have an increasing responsibility of producing graduates prepared to deal with rapid political, social and technological change. If future leaders are to be effective in helping to preserve and strengthen our free society, they must be equipped not only with special skills but also with broad understanding. In carrying out its mission, higher education is faced with a number of problems.

One is the problem of numbers resulting from the population explosion and the increasing emphasis upon college attendance. In 1940, for example, there were 1.5 million college students, and about 35 per cent of high school graduates attended college. In 1965, there are about 5.2 million in college, and about 54 per cent of the high school graduates entered college. By 1975, the projected enrollment is 8.6 million, and nearly 60 per cent will be going to college. According to figures of the Southern Regional Educational Board, college enrollment in Georgia jumped from 35,743 in 1950 to 67,457 in 1964, nearly double. The average per cent of college-age Georgians in college rose from 15.7 to 23.5 and is expected to rise to 28.3 per cent in 1970. Despite the large percentage increase, however, attendance is only about half the national average, and the projected percentage for 1970 is still far below the national projection.

As recent growth has taken place, strains have been placed upon institutions of higher learning, strains that will continue in the future—supplying teaching staffs, classroom facilities, laboratory facilities, library space, dormitories, dining facilities, etc.

The problem of staffing is further complicated because industry, government, and research projects are competing for

*Parents' Day Address, West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia, 1965.

the limited number of graduates being turned out by graduate schools each year. Under pressure to do research, moreover, some of the better instructors are able to give little attention to students. The president of the American Council of Education recently pointed out that the average student is in danger of becoming a "forgotten man" as institutions become increasingly involved in such concerns as aiding various levels of government in research programs, meeting miscellaneous demands for continuing education and lending personnel to underdeveloped nations. *Newsweek,* March 22, spoke of "jet-set" professors whose students seldom see them except on the way to the airport. Jacques Barzun in *The House of Intellect* says "The highest prize of the teaching profession is: no teaching."

Among those who have considered higher education thoughtfully, there is increasing concern about the impersonality of the larger institution. A major reason for recent student unrest at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California was resentment of students because they were mere numbers and had so little meaning as individuals. They paraded with huge replicas of IBM cards. Writing in the *Saturday Review of Literature,* March 20, a former college president said these students were frustrated by locked office doors and ill-prepared lectures. The writer maintains that the greatest need, in most educational institutions, is the "rediscovery of the student, even the individual student, as one who needs to be, perhaps even wants to be, taught." Paul Sharp, recently appointed Chancellor of the University of North Carolina, said a short time ago: "The university exists, strangely enough, for the purpose of teaching students, but this purpose seems to have become understressed these days." A parent of children formerly in West Georgia College told me a few days ago that, above all, West Georgia College, as it grows, should maintain interest in the "individual needs of students." And it must, if it is not to fall into the same pattern into which other institutions have already fallen.

Another problem growing out of changing conceptions of education is that of *mediocrity vs. excellence.* As parents and children have become convinced that college is the only passport

to a successful life, demands are made that a college education be provided for the masses. One hears such statements as, "Everyone has the right to go to college," or, "All high school graduates should have the right to a college education." Although most of us will agree that a college education would be desirable for all, we know that to include all would necessitate watering down the curriculum, as has been done in some high schools (and even colleges) with deplorable results, fully documented in a number of recent studies. Even with selective entrance practices, instructors are hard pressed in dealing with people of diverse home backgrounds, varied educational attainment, and degree of motivation. Superior students are not always challenged as much as they should be.

Still another problem of the college today is that of *specialization vs. generalization* in the academic program, or, in other words, *vocationalism vs. a broad general education.* We see the tendency toward overspecialization in the demand by parents that sons and daughters not take "impractical" courses and in the insistence of major professors that students take education courses, or business administration courses, or engineering courses, to the neglect of a liberal education. This tendency has been recognized and deplored for decades by many educators. Woodrow Wilson wrote in *Forum Magazine* in 1894:

> The graduates of our University (Princeton) no longer go forth with a common training which will enable them to hold together in a community of thought. Some of them are trained in science, some in letters, some well and broadly trained, many ill and narrowly. Scarcely one of them has been fully inducted in the learning which deals with common experience . . . .

Dean David B. Truman of Columbia University warned in 1963 that specialists were a menace, for they were "trained but uneducated, technically skilled but culturally incompetent." The late A. Whitney Griswold of Yale University said that we have tended to produce "capable but uncultivated graduates."

Speaking at the University of Georgia a few weeks ago, the editor of *Business Week* said:

> There is a danger that American education is becoming a routine process, capable of producing reasonably efficient technicians and specialists, but not much good at developing people with the depth, drive, imagination, creativity, and character that our Society most requires. It is far more important that the colleges and universities aim at producing such people . . . than that the schools supply business with personnel trained to perform their first jobs.

In the May 1 issue of the *Saturday Review,* James R. Killian, former Assistant President for Technology, called for a new type of engineering program including humanities, public administration and management. "This new kind of engineering," he wrote, "as a tie between science and the humanities, stands for a technology shaped, disciplined, and controlled first and last to enhance, not to corrode, humanity."

Speaking at Georgia Tech on the occasion of its 75th Anniversary, Secretary of Defense McNamara stressed the need for scientists capable of seeing the political and social implications of scientific and technological change.

These men agree that, despite the pressures from specialists, from graduate schools, and from the practical people, students need a broad education as well as particular skills. Others point out that specialization is a menace even to the specialists, for knowledge is expanding so rapidly that a professional with mere trade school training risks being obsolete in a few years.

How well has West Georgia College adjusted to these problems? It has had a period of rapid growth (about four times over in the eight years I have been here); but, at the same time, it has raised standards: admission requirements, academic standards, and graduation requirements. Quality has not been sacrificed for quantity. Better students are being challenged more than ever before, and more and better students are being graduated each year. Advanced placement is given to superior students, permitting

them to skip courses that would be repetitious and to begin work at the level for which they are prepared. On the other hand, a summer trial program has been initiated to give marginal students an opportunity to prove themselves. Some of these students have done well, a convincing argument that admission standards should not be absolutely rigid. As high school programs are improved, more and more adjustments will need to be made, especially for the benefit of superior students.

Despite the keen competition for personnel, great progress has been made in improving the West Georgia College faculty, and a massive building program is under way to provide a variety of space needs.

Even though the college is no longer small, it still has a friendly atmosphere. As a rule, faculty members are still accessible, and they stress good teaching. The individual still has meaning and is more than a mere IBM card. This atmosphere must continue. The students' welfare and development must remain central.

The purpose of West Georgia College reflects a commitment to a broad program of liberal arts. It reads:

> The purpose of West Georgia College is to help each student develop a disciplined and open mind, the capacity for self-realization, and the ability to become an effective citizen in a changing society as well as to attain certain specialized skills needed in such a society.

Stressing the need for informed responsible citizens, the aims of the Division of Social Sciences are "to help the student attain a constructive, inquiring attitude toward learning, gain a knowledge of the historical development of contemporary institutions, and develop a responsibility for intelligent participation in the affairs of society."

The Division of Humanities seeks to develop in the student "independent powers of judgement, inner discipline, and creative expression" to the extent that he can "rely on his own critical faculties and can respect his own creative achievements."

Henry Wriston, former President of Brown University, noted recently: "A liberal education is a profound experience. The effects are not transitory; they are a part, thereafter, of one's personality. If the undergraduate student is making a man of himself, he is doing the world's most important job. Growing and working, thinking and gaining power, reflecting and gathering insights, the student justifies his life; the future may safely be left to his own devices." John Stuart Mill once wrote: "Men are men before they are lawyers or physicians or manufacturers; and if you can make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers and physicians and manufacturers." Both of these views, I believe, are embodied in the aims of our institution.

The West Georgia College curriculum is designed to prepare each person to contribute effectively in society, as well as to do well the job for which he is trained. Every vocation and profession, we know, has an interest in the development of "capable and cultivated" human beings. Each person needs to be both an expert and a layman; an expert in a particular field, but an informed, reflective layman with capacity to understand and evaluate other experts. As the amount of knowledge increases and the demands of vocations and society increase, the problem of what to include in the curriculum becomes more complex, and constant re-study is necessary in light of many changes taking place. Some say that most colleges have been too conservative in making needed adjustments. We must prepare students for the Twenty-first Century even if the adjustment requires that some of us give up our favorite courses.

To have a great institution, there must be adequate facilities (laboratories, libraries, etc.); an imaginative leadership; a well-designed curriculum; a sound guiding philosophy; highly trained dedicated, inspiring teachers; but, most of all, well-prepared

students who are strongly motivated and willing to work. If West Georgia College is not already a great institution, it has the materials from which one can be made.

1966

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME V JUNE, 1966 NUMBER 1

ISSUES IN THE COLD WAR

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Soviet Political Warfare Under Khrushchev
By *Paul W. Blackstock* 3

The Spectrum of Insurgency in Southeast Asia:
The Chinese Communist Revolutionary Model
By *Donald E. Weatherbee* 18

Some Problems of Nation-Building in Southeast Asia
By *Thomas J. Bellows* 33

Nationalism and Developing Internationalism in
the United Nations
By *Marietta Tree* 46

Security in Our Time
By *J. Chalmers Vinson* 54

Latin America's Appalachia:
Its Genesis in Illiteracy
By *Eugene R. Huck* 66

FOREWORD

This publication is an outgrowth of a series of lectures held at West Georgia College during 1965-1966. Sponsored by the Division of Social Sciences, the Division of Education, the Department of Adult Education, and the Student Government Association, the series was designed to acquaint students, community leaders, in-service teachers, and other interested persons with different aspects of the Cold War.

The sponsoring organizations are especially indebted to the participants in the series, for their able lectures, and for giving special permission to use them in this publication. Among the many others who contributed to the success of the venture were Dr. Prentice Gott of the Division of Education, Mr. Peter White of Education for Freedom, Mr. Tracy Stallings of the West Georgia Public Relations Department, and Mrs. Corene Zachry and Mrs. Alice Holland, secretaries of the Division of Social Sciences.

The publication of the series of addresses was made possible by a grant from the Sears-Roebuck Foundation.

John M. Martin, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences

Collus O. Johnson, Director
Department of Adult Education

SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE UNDER KRUSHCHEV

By Paul W. Blackstock*

Introduction

In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21, 1961, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the late President Kennedy described and evaluated Soviet political warfare in these terms: " . . . We face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments. The armies are there and in large numbers. The nuclear armaments are there. But they serve primarily as a shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas, one by one, in situations which do not permit our own armed intervention . . . . Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs; on armies prepared to cross borders; on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough; that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border." President Kennedy then pledged his administration to respond to this situation as follows: "We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war, where disappointment will often accompany us."

Earlier in the same month, even before the Bay of Pigs incident, ex-Premier N. S. Khrushchev spoke with equal candor to the American journalist, Walter Lippman, about Soviet political warfare. According to Lippman (who was described during the Stalinist era as "the Town Crier of capitalist imperialism"), Khrushchev regarded revolutionary movements among small na-

*Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

tions—he specifically mentioned Laos, Cuba, and Iran— as examples of a "world-wide historic and revolutionary movement, akin to the change from feudalism to capitalism, which is surely destined to bring the old colonial countries into the Communist orbit." Khrushchev added that he (meaning Soviet Russia) would help this manifest destiny and we (the United States) would oppose it, although "the destiny would be realized no matter what either of us did." Khrushchev left the impression that "in his book it is normal for a great power to undermine an unfriendly government within its own sphere of interest," and that "his primary interest is not in the cold war about the small and underdeveloped countries. The support of revolutionary movements among these countries is for him an interesting, hopeful, agreeable opportunity, but it is not a vital interest in the sense that he will go to war about it. He is quite sure that he will win this cold war without military force because he is on the side of history, and because he has the military power to deter us from a serious military intervention."

Since the Bay of Pigs, which brought the United States openly into the political warfare business, including covert or secret operations, President Kennedy has been assassinated and Khrushchev has been replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin. But there has been no basic change in the foreign policy of either the United States or the USSR. The traditional attitude of both powers toward political warfare and covert operations can be summarized in the formula, "public disavowal and private (or covert) practice." Since both the United States and the USSR recognize that coexistence is better than no existence, the continuing struggle between them is called "peaceful coexistence." Thermonuclear deterrence—the so-called "balance of terror"—which each side once regarded as a comforting shield is now recognized as a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of all humanity. Under these conditions, it is clear that the contest will be fought and won, not on the battlefield, which might well lead to a thermonuclear holocaust, but by means of political warfare. What does this term mean?

Definition

Political warfare is a broad, inclusive term applied to a wide range of essentially non-military instruments of foreign policy. These instruments may be open or legal, such as political and economic pressure, foreign aid programs, forceful action through the United Nations and the international labor and youth organizations, and, on the part of the Soviet Union, the open use of the Communist Party and its front-organizations as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Beneath the surface of visible historical events, however, there is a whole range of political warfare operations which, like the lower part of an iceberg, remain hidden from view and are, therefore, called clandestine or covert operations. These are usually controlled by the intelligence agencies of the Great Powers and include such necessarily illegal or secret activities as political assassination and the use of agents, saboteurs, and guerillas for the purpose of carrying on subversive, revolutionary or counter-insurgency movements. It should be emphasized that with the founding of the Comintern, the worldwide network of Communist parties, each party entering the organization pledged itself to carry on both legal and illegal political warfare activities.

In addition to this broad spectrum of both open and covert operations, the term "political warfare" also includes a wide range of informational or propaganda activities. These range from straight news services and cultural exchanges (which we like to call "the strategy of truth") to the most scurrilous forms of rumor-mongering, frauds, forgeries and so-called "black propaganda," including clandestine radio broadcasts which disguise or conceal their true sponsorship or source.

The Present International Situation

Now what does all this mean in the present international situation? Before that question can be answered, we must first take a look at the outstanding factors of the situation as it has developed since World War II.

The end of World War II, when the German armies were defeated and the United States forces were hastily brought home and demobilized, left an enormous power vacuum in Central and Western Europe. We now know from postwar memoirs (Milovan Djilas, *Conversations With Stalin* that after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in early 1943, Stalin intended to impose the Soviet political and social system wherever his armies could move. There is also little doubt that, capitalizing on their wartime resistance record and the political, economic and social dislocation caused by the war, the communist parties in Western Europe hoped to be able to "carry the torch of revolution" so to speak and to seize power, backed by the enormously increased strength and prestige of the USSR. The story of how the Soviet Union, in cynical violation of its solemn treaty pledges, moved into Central Europe and one by one seized the satellite countries, is too familiar to need repeating here. It was this Soviet threat, first Greece, Iran and Turkey, then to Western Europe with the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1948, that called into being the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and finally, NATO, the alliance of our Free World partners to defend themselves against further Soviet encroachment. In Asia the same kind of pattern repeated itself with the Chinese Communist victory in China and the unwarranted attack on South Korea, an open act of aggression which rallied the United Nations to meet this attempted conquest with armed force on the field of battle. The key years of this postwar decade, 1947-1953, may be called the Classic Cold War period of mounting tension and limited warfare during which only the threat of atomic destruction symbolized by SAC, our strategic striking force, prevented a Soviet attempt to overrun Western Europe and the outbreak of a Third World War, as the late Winston Churchill repeatedly emphasized.

Then something happened at the center of Soviet power which has had far-reaching consequences. Stalin died on March 5, 1953; and a new team took over, first under Malenkov, and then under an uneasy "collective leadership" from which Khruschev emerged as "first among equals" in February 1957 (with the elimination of the old-line Stalinists, Molotov, Kaganovich

and Shepilov.) At the same time in the early 1950's the Soviet Union achieved atomic parity and a delivery capability roughly equalling that of the United States. The incredibly destructive powers of the hydrogen bomb were first indicated by the Soviets in August 1953 and convincingly demonstrated by the United States in the 1954 Pacific explosions, with their highly publicized radioactive fall-out effects. In 1957 the Soviets achieved a spectacular missile breakthrough with Sputnik. A reluctant and terrified world was thus catapulted into the thermonuclear and space age by these technological developments, which then as now, were shrouded in a thick mantle of military secrecy for obvious security reasons. There were now two thermonuclear deterrent forces in the world where only one, SAC, had existed before, adding up to a strategic military stalemate in a bi-polar world of nuclear plenty and reciprocal deterrence. The United States and the Soviet Union, to use Oppenheimer's famous figure of speech, were like two giant scorpions trapped in a bottle, spitting furiously at each other but neither daring to strike since the other world would automatically strike back and mutual suicide would result.

Under these circumstances, although we may never know the whole truth, it seems clear that sometime between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference, Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders took a long, second look at where the Stalinist policy of aggressive expansion had led them and decided to adopt a new policy of reducing tensions and the implied threat of general war which, if fought with even the primitive fission weapons in the kiloton range of the period, would entail unacceptable risks, especially for the USSR, which had already suffered twenty million casualties in World War II. The threat of Soviet aggression had cemented the Free World into defensive alliances. Perhaps the best way to dissolve these alliances would be to hide the threat behind a mask of smiles and cultural blandishments, while reducing immediate military tensions at such focal points as Berlin. Thus, at the Summit Conference in 1955, the world was presented with a truly novel spectacle. Without giving an inch on such major issues as the

unification of Germany and European security, the Russian bear burst out into gay smiles and began the task of killing with kindness and amiability. Without materially reducing fire power or their capability to attack Europe, the Soviet and satellite armies made certain reductions in troop strengths which were highly publicized by communist propaganda. These moves almost convinced our Western allies that the threat of atomic war was minimal. The cement which bound the NATO forces together, that is, the fear of Soviet aggression, came dangerously close to being dissolved in a flood of vodka, visiting Soviet firemen such as Bulganin and Khrushchev, and general affability. NATO solidarity received its worst blow, however, during the Suez crisis of 1956 when Khrushchev was able to offer the United States the assistance of Soviet troops and Chinese volunteers to help us defeat our allies, the British and French. This was Khrushchev's finest hour so far as political warfare was concerned, although at the same time he badly damaged the new Soviet image by brutally crushing the Hungarian uprising.

On the home front, de-Stalinization and liberal reforms (such as the down-grading of the Secret Police) resulted in a tremendous burst of creative energy. The Soviet rate of economic growth rose to 6 per cent a year—double that of the United States—and there was a steady rise in the standard of living which, although only half as high as that of the United States, was still a remarkable improvement over the terrible deprivation of the immediate post-war period. Moreover, beginning with Sputnik in 1957 a series of spectacular Soviet missile and space achievements have created the image of a Soviet power which is ahead of the United States in most scientific and military fields and is likely to remain so. The United States has recently caught up with the Soviet Union in a missile thrust capacity, but Soviet political warfare, which has exploited every triumph and obscured every failure, has been most impressive in this area.

The New 1956 XXth Party Congress General Line

Whenever the Soviets move into what they call "a new phase of historical development," they rewrite communist doc-

trine and set forth a new General Line for the guidance of the faithful. This was announced to the world at the famous 1956 XXth Party Congress and has not changed basically since. It is summarized in the slogan "peaceful coexistence," since the first plank of the new platform calls for the peaceful competition of states with different political and social systems. The new line also calls for the reduction of tensions between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World which, during the Stalinist era, were set on a collision course of bitter, irreconcilable conflict. Since a thermonuclear exchange would be suicidal, the new General Line reverses the old Leninist concept of a final showdown between the two camps. Since 1956 the Soviets have claimed that war is no longer inevitable; there is now a Third World, a "Buffer Zone" or "zone of peace" formed by the newly emergent nations which have derived from the postwar break-up of the former colonial empires of France and England. The Soviets have even abandoned the basic Marxist-Leninist idea that revolution is inevitable. They now claim that by steadily boring from within, the communist parties can seize power legally by parliamentary means. At the same time, the Soviets have made it perfectly clear that they intend to carry on relentless political warfare against the capitalist powers. Khrushchev has repeatedly emphasized that there can be no ideological coexistence between the two systems, and no compromise with capitalism. No Soviet leader can afford to be "soft on capitalism," and the Kremlin has consistently pledged to support colonial "wars of liberation" as they are called. As previously indicated, Khrushchev is convinced that sooner or later the newly emergent powers in the underdeveloped areas of the world will fall into Soviet control like ripe fruit from the ex-colonial tree. Not, of course, if the United States and its allies can help it! What this means in practical terms is that the Soviet Union and the United States are competing for the allegiance of the newly emergent states of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia, states inhabited by nearly one and one-half billion people, the majority of the population of our planet. But with the appearance on the scene of Communist China as a militant, revolutionary and recently nuclear

power, there is now in reality a three-way tug-of-war between three camps, and the picture is infinitely more complicated than it was in the relatively clear-cut days of the Classical Cold War period. The one-time monolithic Sino-Soviet Bloc began splitting at the seams with the defection of Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, the East German Revolt in 1953, followed by the Polish Revolution of October 1956 and the Hungarian uprising in the same year. The leaders of Communist China never bought the 1956 General Line, and now claim to be the true heirs of Lenin, and the rightful leaders of what was once a world communist movement. As a result of the Sino-Soviet rift which came out into the open in 1961, the communist parties over most of the world have split into Soviet and Chinese factions. The Chinese, led by Mao-Tse-Tung, not only claim that war is inevitable but that the United States is a "paper tiger." Although Khrushchev has repeatedly reminded them that the tiger has nuclear teeth (for which the Soviets have a healthy and wholesome respect), Mao apparently believes that the masses of Chinese are more than a match for the megatons of thermonuclear weapons in Western stockpiles. With over 700 million Chinese in their back yard, the memory of their defeat by the Japanese in 1905 still vivid, and the specter of a two-front war very real, the Soviets pulled their technicians out of China five years ago (in 1960). Khrushchev, beginning at Camp David during his 1960 visit to the United States, agreed to cooperate secretly with the United States to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The last Soviet move in this direction was to join with the United States in the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, a sober aftermath of the spectacular Cuban missile crisis (October, 1962) during which both the superpowers recoiled from the brink of the thermonuclear war.

Thus, when we talk about Soviet political warfare in the age of Khrushchev, it should be understood that this is a deliberate over-simplification of a complex picture. However, the same basic principles apply to both the Soviet and the Chinese operations. Even when the two communist camps have been working at cross purposes, they have both directed their operations against the United States and its allies during their critical

period. Let us turn now to an analysis of political warfare, including covert operations and the principal instruments used in this contest.

The Operational Model

The underlying purpose of all the techniques or instruments of political warfare is to extend the influence of one state over another by means short of war, although limited military activities such as border raids, guerilla warfare and organized internal resistance or insurgency may be an integral part of the combined operations. What we are analyzing, speaking frankly, is aggressive intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another to extend political influence and control.

In analyzing political warfare, it is useful to adopt an oversimplified model in which a hypothetical aggressor state deliberately sets out to extend its control over another using essentially non-military techniques. Whether carried out openly or secretly, such intervention may take several forms. These may be viewed as either operational techniques or as stages in the extension of control. Three initial stages or operations may be distinguished and described as (1) *penetration or infiltration,* (2) *forced disintegration or atomization* (Zersetzung), and (3) *subversion,* followed by a fourth stage (4) or period of *covert control.* In cases of actual take-over, covert control is followed by (5) seizure of power, and (6) ultimately the assimilation of the victimized state into the political system or power complex of the aggressor. As previously indicated, these operations are accompanied by the massive use of propaganda in order to catalyze each stage or process of intervention. Let us take a closer look at each of these stages or operations.

By *infiltration* is meant the planned penetration of political and social groups within a given state by agents of an intervening power for manipulative purposes. To the extent that it is both planned and aggressive, such penetration is usually covert or secret. The term "penetration" is much more accurate in conveying this element of motivation than "infiltration." The analogy of

a military patrol which crosses into enemy trerritory to gather intelligence and perhaps spread propaganda is a good analogy to keep in mind. The presence of embassies and their diplomatic staffs in a host country is normal and inevitable and is not a case of penetration. Such staffs include military attaches whose espionage functions are recognized as a matter of international custom. However, many states and certainly the Soviets, maintain within their embassies *under cover* additional agents who attempt to penetrate selected political and social groups in order to obtain classified information and to carry on covert political activities. Morover, it should never be forgotten that such clandestine operations were made a necessary precondition for membership in the Comintern at its second Congress in July 1920.

Among states which have exchanged diplomatic representatives, a minimum operational base for penetration is provided by the exchange of such representatives and their staffs. But even if the aggressor state has not achieved *de jure* recognition, the use of trade, economic or cultural missions abroad may provide ready access. Ribbentrop once complained, for example, that during the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon period (1939-1941) the Soviets sent a trade delegation of over 900 men to do the work of a few experts on either side. For this reason, many of the new African states limit the number of United States or Soviet diplomats in their countries on a strictly reciprocal basis to the number they have in Washington or Moscow!

By *forced disintegration* (Zersetzung) or *atomization* is meant the splitting of the political and social structure of a victimized state. It is based on the promise that competition for power and status among political, class, religious, or ethnic minority groups inevitably creates tensions in any society. These tensions may be exploited by setting such groups against each other in hostile, uncompromising opposition. By inciting such hatreds, the fabric of national morale can be made to disintegrate, and the internal political and social structure can be so weakened that the victimized state is unable to resist further intervention. This "softening-up"

or forced disintegration may facilitate seizure of power by an aggressive political faction *within* the state, as in Nazi Germany.

By *subversion* is meant the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor. The assumption behind the use of subversion is that public morale and the will to resist aggression are the products of combined political and social or class loyalties which are usually attached to national symbols, such as the flag, constitution, crown or even the persons of the Chief of State or other national leaders. These loyalties may be detached and transferred to the political or ideological cause of the aggressor. Both Nazi and Communist subversion have been directed at the broad masses as well as the political elites of the target countries concerned, and totalitarian subversive appeals have been highly complex, involving deep ideological, even religious commitments, as well as those of the "class" character. *The God That Failed* is the title of a book of confessions of former Communists or fellow-travelers which proves this point. We have used it as a very effective political warfare weapon all over the world.

The final stage in the transfer of loyalties is open treason, i.e., a willingness not only to collaborate with the intervening state, but, in the case of war, with the enemy forces as "liberators." This total transfer of loyalties is a maximal goal. Most espionage agents are traitors, but so was the late leader of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, who deserted the French Army during World War II and went to Moscow to serve in response to what he called "a higher cause"! Many French military and political leaders such as Pierce Laval also felt this way about Nazi Germany!

The term *covert control* is useful to describe the relationship between an intervening power and its victim after an advanced stage of forced disintegration, infiltration and subversion has been reached. When public apathy and defeatism are widespread and corruption and venality are rampant, covert control is

greatly facilitated, although the degree of influence is never absolute and at best can only be estimated. This is the kind of situation which the Viet Cong have created in much of Vietnam today (1965).

This summary sketch of the background of Soviet political warfare and three of the basic operations involved barely scratches the surface of the material covered in *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1964.) Another book entitled *Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political Intrigue Among Nations,* scheduled for the spring of 1966, will deal with the political warfare use of frauds, fabrications and forgeries.

This review would be out of context without a word of caution. Successful political warfare is not as pat or easy as it may seem at first glance. If it were, the Soviets, who have been working at it for more than forty years, would have taken over the world long ago! There are complex problems of national policy guidance and control which limit its effectiveness as the late President Kennedy discovered at the Bay of Pigs which he described as "a sobering incident with useful lessons for all"! But in the last five years the Soviets have also discovered that not all the iron heads are on this side of the iron curtain and that the Ugly Russian (the title of a recent book by Victor Lasky) is more than a match for the one-time "Ugly American" at losing friends and alienating people. We hear so many exaggerated accounts of Soviet political warfare progress that I think it only fair to close with a report on a spectacular Soviet failure, the case of their open and secret intervention in the little African state of Guinea, a former French colony, led by Sekou Toure, a Lenin "peace prize" winner and fellow-traveler. By 1960 not only the Soviet Union but also the other Soviet satellites were pouring enormous quantities of foreign aid into Guinea with the idea of making it a "socialist show-window" and a "bastion of Communist penetration" in Africa. ". . . The Russians landed two huge sets of road-building equipment on the docks at Conakry. Along with the steam-rollers and bulldozers, believe it or not, were four

snowplows! This for a country which sits almost on the Equator and where the temperature averages 90 degrees. The only thing slightly resembling snow in sight was an acre of white Czechoslovakian bidets, the elite toilet equipment used in Parisian (and continental) bathrooms, and almost as unnecessary in underdeveloped Guinea a the snowplows." The Gung-ho good relations with the Soviet Bloc soon went down the bidet, to borrow an indelicate but in this case, very apt French expression. There were widespread and obviously organized but "spontaneous" student and other street demonstrations. To the amazement of the Free World press and public, Sekou Toure complained of a "Communist plot" and of demonstrations aimed at overthrowing his government. There were demonstrations all right, but they were not organized by the Communists but rather by the secret intelligence agency of a Western Power (not, I hasten to add, the United States). Toure was presented with the complete blueprint of a prefabricated revolution and said something to the effect that "You've got me all wrong, boys, I'm not a Communist, I'm just an author, a Lenin Peace-prize winner!" The Soviet Ambassador left within a matter of days, and the gaudy socialist show-window in Africa collapsed from within.

"Since that time, Guinea has tried to balance the U.S.S.R. and the U. S. against each other to get as much out of both as possible. Some call it blackmail" (and Egypt's Colonel Nasser has been a master at the game) . . . . "In carrying out his balancing act (Toure) has sometimes used as many as 1200 Communist advisers. Of late (1965) they have tapered off. But there are still reported to be approximately 600 Chinese working in Guinea, mingling with the Guinea people under working conditions similar to those of the African natives. 'Russians and Americans are all alike,' one African told me. 'They live by themselves, have their own schools and import their own food. They don't get out among the people.' " (Source: Drew Pearson, *The Washington Post,* October 1, 1965, plus personal sources.)

This image of the American and the rich American ghetto abroad is rapidly changing under the impact of the Peace Corps,

which has been one of our most successful political warfare operations. However, many good Americans believe that there is something essentially "unAmerican" about political warfare or even the use of propaganda abroad. Historically, this is wrong; for no less an American than General Washington, in the dark days of Valley Forge, enjoined his men to save the worn-out socks and the rags wrapped around their frozen feet in order to produce propaganda leaflets which were spread in the camp of the enemy. In those days where was no such thing as cheap newsprint, and these leaflets had to be printed on rag paper.

George Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, and other historic American figures have made skillful use of political warfare in times of both war and peace. This includes covert operations. The First Appropriation Act of the First United States Congress in 1789 contained a contingent fund for the "bribery" of foreign statesmen. Thus it is an unfortunate paradox that our political warfare agencies, the USIA and especially CIA, have been the object of misleading attacks and books such as *The Invisible Government*. Our information activities, ranging from the Voice of America to our library programs, have in the past served as something of a political football. Such attacks have, of course, played directly into Soviet hands by confusing and paralyzing our own political warfare effort, while the flood of Soviet propaganda continues unabated.

The battleground in the struggle between the Free World and International Communism has switched to the area of political warfare, including covert operations. With more than forty years experience at home and abroad, the present Soviet leaders have expressed confidence in their ability to win this contest hands down. The threat is a real one, and we cannot afford to be complacent about it. Now, as never before, the United States must develop the strongest, the most hard-hitting political warfare program of which it is capable. Half-measures will not do. We must educate and train our best talent, and devote our best thinking to the job ahead, and we must have the financial resources to do whatever a successful program demands. And above all, we must believe in the power of democratic ideas and put

into practice the ideals of social justice to which we pay lip service. We must be worthy of General Washington, who asked his men to save the rags from their feet in order to be able to carry the American message into the rival camp. And, like Washington at Valley Forge, we cannot afford defeat — we must win.

THE SPECTRUM OF INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Donald E. Weatherbee*

Caught up in the pain and drama of the war in Vietnam, the American people, and sometimes the policy-makers, are prone to view this particular struggle as being finite; having limited goals and territorial extent. Perhaps militarily, from the side of the United States, this is true, but politically the conflict in Vietnam represents only the upper end of a spectrum of insurgency dispersed throughout Southeast Asia. Communist-led insurgent struggles, in addition to the one in Vietnam, and at differing stages of organization and intensity, are taking place in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and perhaps Indonesia. Although these conflicts might be considered discrete from the point of view of geography, they are in fact linked by ideological affiliation, common strategy and tactics, common identification of the enemy, and the objective conditions of Southeast Asian life that have created fertile ground for the seeds of the insurgents' appeals to fall upon, grow, and ripen into internal warfare.

Insurgent Warfare - People's War

In these days of mutual nuclear deterrence and limited real power on the part of the world's "have-nots," violent attacks on the *status-quo* have been characterized by insurgent warfare. In this form of conflict the revisionists hope to minimize disparities of power. In insurgent warfare the premium is not on the ability to bring strategic weapons to bear against the enemy but on the capacity to control the actions of the non-combatant mass of the population. Insurgent warfare is highly political warfare.

*Assistant Professor, Department of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

> History shows that the new-born revolutionary forces are invariably weak to begin with, but that they always keep on growing, developing from small and weak to large and strong forces, and eventually defeat the seemingly strong forces of counter-revolution. To begin with, the new-born revolutionary forces have no arms at all or are only poorly equipped, but they always defeat the forces of counter-revolution which are well-equipped and armed to the teeth. In the final analysis, it is men and not things, the masses of the people and not weapons, that are the basic factor deciding victory or defeat.[1]

A politically neutral definition of insurgent warfare states that it is "a cellular development of resistance against an incumbent political regime and which expands from the initial stage of subversion-infiltration through the intermediate stages of overt resistance by small armed bands and insurrection to final fruition in civil war."[2] From the vantage of an established government, insurgency is illegitimate political action within the state that in a non-linear progression ranges from a low order of violence such as strikes, demonstrations, propaganda, etc., through terror and armed revolt. It has as its end the overthrow of the established government. In communist parlance these insurgencies are "people's wars" or "wars of national liberation." As such they are the new "just wars" of history - the rightful struggle of a people to liberate themselves from imperialist aggression; to emancipate themselves from the trammels of economic and political domination. The theoretical framework for the conduct of this kind of war, based on the Chinese Communist Party's own experience, has been dogmatized by Mao Tse-tung. We call it here, Chinese revolutionary strategy.

The target of communist insurgencies is not just an abstract notion of imperialism. It is embodied by the actions of the United

[1] Peng Chen, *Speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences in Indonesia* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 11.

[2] John S. Pustay, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 5.

States and its allies. By definition the role of the United States in the support and defense of non-communist African and Asian countries is aggressive imperialism. Non-Western leaders in friendly association with the United States are imperialist puppets and lackeys. For the Peking rulers and their ideological confreres, the United States is the number one enemy of the peoples of the world. Marxism-Leninism and the historical experience of the Afro-Asian people prove that there is only one correct attitude towards American imperialism in all of its manifestations: "Either kill it or be devoured by it; there is no other alternative. A showdown between the peoples of the world and U. S. imperialism is inevitable."[3] To the Russians who speak of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese retort, "There can be no peaceful coexistence at all between the revolutionary people and U. S. imperialism."[4]

The Chinese Communists and their allies argue that the United States is nothing but a "paper tiger" meaning that it is historically doomed to defeat. But, tactically, in specific struggles they recognize that the United States is a real tiger — "a man eater." The tiger hunters believe, however, that in the strategy and tactics of "the people's war" they have the weapons to destroy American imperialism.

The Principal Elements of Chinese Revolutionary Strategy

The first essential of Maoist strategy is the thoroughgoing political mobilization of the population. The people must be aroused to action by fostering disaffection and discontent among them. As Chairman Mao has said:

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[3] Fan Hsiu-chu, *A Struggle Between Two Lines Over the Question of How to Deal With U. S. Imperialism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 15.

[4] *A Great Victory for Leninism. - In Commemoration of the 95th Anniversary of the Birth of Lenin* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 8.

> The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war.[5]

In their efforts to mobilize the populations of Southeast Asia, the Communists have been allowed, in some cases almost by default, to appropriate the symbols of nationalism and progress. They are able to manipulate for their own ends real political, social, and economic grievances. The programs and manifestoes of the various Asian insurgent movements are replete with references to policies and goals that, on the surface at least, are quite acceptable and even desirable in any democratic society. In this respect, it is instructive to examine a representative sample of this kind of appeal. Typical is the six-point programme of the Thailand Patriotic Front. This organization came into existence formally on 1 January 1965. Its appeals, as broadcast by the Voice of the People of Thailand, a clandestine radio transmitter, are as follows:[6]

> 1. To strive for national independence, abolish all unequal treaties signed by Thailand with the United States and drive all imperialist troops and aggressive forces out of Thailand.
>
> 2. To strive for the people's democratic rights, overthrow the fascist dictatorial government which is subservient to U. S. imperialism, establish a government of patriots and democrats, and safeguard the people's freedom and democratic rights.
>
> 3. To pursue a policy of peace and neutrality, withdraw from SEATO, cease intervention in the affairs of neighboring countries, live in amity with the people of all other

[5] Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 228.

[6] As published in the *Peking Review*, February 12, 1965, p. 25.

countries and support their struggle for national independence and progress, oppose the war provocations of U. S. imperialism and strive for world peace.

4. To develop the national economy, promote agricultural production, help the poor peasants, assist and protect national industry and commerce, restrict foreign capital whose aim is to seize profits from Thailand, and establish an independent and self-reliant economy.

5. To improve the people's livelihood, suppress and mete out severe punishment to traitors and bureaucrats who oppress the people, distribute enough land to the peasants for them to earn a living, and adjust the wages of workers and the pay of junior staff members, service personnel, teachers, army men, police and workers in the professions.

6. To develop education and public health, oppose imperialism's corrupt culture and develop a fine national culture, improve school facilities and put into effect measures of sanitation and public health throughout the country.

Nationalism, anti-imperialism, peace, and plenty are the themes employed. There is nothing in this document that would indicate the goal of a totalitarian state. Let us not be misled, however, by confusing the Communists' employment of appeals rooted in social and economic evils with their methods and actual goal.

The mobilized population, readied for action either by an awakened political consciousness or fear of communist terror, must be organized for participation in and support of the revolutionary war. This is the function of the communist cadres working through the "united front." The united front is the revolutionary infrastructure claiming to unite the diverse elements of resistance against the aggressor. The united front pretends to be the alliance of all classes and all progressives, Communist or not, in opposition to the imperialists. Examples of this technique, *inter alia,* are seen in the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the Malay National Liberation League, and the above

mentioned Thailand Patriotic Front. In the front the Communists are able to mask the fact that it is a creature of their own invention by the cover of popular, non-communist support. The front stands for the "people." The attackers of the front are, again by definition, against the "people."

Unfortunately there still appears to be a number of observers in the United States who do not understand the operation of the communist united front tactic and would argue that a body like the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is broadly representative of the real interests of the Vietnamese people. As evidence of who a front really represents let us take the testimony of Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Minister of National Defense: "History shows that within the united front the Communist Party must maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence, adhere to the principle of independence and initiative and insist on its leading role."[7] In the specific case of the NFLSV, the North Vietnamese Communists have not been reticent in proclaiming their role in the direction of the struggle in the South. *Hoc Tap,* the North Vietnamese Communist party journal, reported:

> They (the authorities in South Vietnam) are well aware that *North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution* and the point on which it leans, and that *our party* is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people, and *is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution.*[8]

With the consolidation of a political base and the assurance of rural support, either voluntary or forced, the revolutionary forces can successfully launch the attack against the imperialists. From secured bases in the rural areas the people's army will en-

[7] Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory of People's War!* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 19.

[8] *Hoc Tap,* March 1963, as quoted in *Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet Nam* (Washington: U. S. Department of State, 1965), p. 21.

circle the cities. The tactics are guerilla tactics, the strategy "protracted war." The strength of the people's forces will increase in proportion to the diminishment of the imperialists' power. The protracted war is a three-stage war. In the first stage the people are on the strategic defensive and the enemy has the strategic offensive. The second stage is strategic stalemate. The enemy is engaged in consolidation while the people are preparing for the counter-offensive. In the third stage the terms of the first stage are reversed. The people have the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive. The entire strategy has been summed up as follows:

> Our victorious experience in the War of Resistance and in China's revolutionary wars as a whole has taught us that the correct way for an oppressed nation in a colony or semi-colony to achieve emancipation is for the party of the proletariat to hold aloft the banner of anti-imperialism and of national liberation, lead the broad masses of the people, form the broadest united front against imperialism and its lackeys on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, wage self-reliant revolutionary armed struggle, build a people's army of a new type, and put into operation the whole range of strategy and tactics of people's war; it is of particular importance for the party of the proletariat to go deep into the rural areas, establish revolutionary base areas there, and use the villages to encircle and finally capture the cities until nation-wide victory is achieved.[9]

What kind of war is the "people's war?" Lin Piao has recently interpreted it in uncompromising terms. He said, "War of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of our military operations." [10]

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[9] Lo Jui-ching, *The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U. S. Imperialism Too* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 2.

[10] Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

The Efficacy of Violence

The central feature of the Chinese approach to the problem of change, and the one most repugnant to the West, is the emphasis on the discriminate and indiscriminate use of violence and terror as efficient political tools. The relationship between violence and politics is epitomized in Mao's famous aphorism, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."[11]

The Chinese Communist attachment to violent change theoretically rests on their adherence to a doctrinaire, non-revisionist reading of the basic teachings of Marxism-Leninism. The key question in any revolution is the seizure of state power. The state itself is a form of violence. The reactionaries who control the state will never give up power voluntarily. The revolutionary forces have as their task seizing power by armed force. Violent revolution is the universal law of revolution. "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. *This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally,* for China and for all other countries."[12]

Among these other countries is Vietnam, where, according to the Chinese ideologues, we have the "most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating U. S. imperialism by a people's war."[13] The murder of village officials; the systematic assassination of teachers, health officers, etc., the agents of social and economic change; the bombing of busses, restaurants, homes; all of these acts of terror are justified by the revolutionary ends of the "people." It has been said that the war in South Vietnam is a "dirty war." All people's wars, by their very nature, are dirty wars. In the West we shrink from the necessities imposed upon us by the overweening ambition of the Communists to create world revolution. We do not wish to be soiled by the dirty wars. In our democratic tradition the use

[11] Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy." in *Selected Military Writings, op. cit.,* p. 272.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 267. Italics added.

[13] Lin Piao, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

of force and war is retrogressive; to be avoided unless absolutely demanded for the security of our territorial integrity, institutions, and way of life. Lin Piao's militant statement that war is a great school, that "war can temper the people and push history forward," strikes no responsive chord in our own society.[14] Its galvanizing echo, however, is resounding throughout Southeast Asia.

Laos

The one other area in Southeast Asia where communist insurgent warfare has already involved competitive great power interests is Laos. There the communist-dominated Pathet Lao, since the Geneva agreement of 1962, have been able to consolidate their control over the larger part of that country. The Laotion People's Liberation Army and the political grouping called the Neo Lao Hac Xat pose a threat not only to the noncommunist government of the Kingdom of Laos but also to Thailand. Fighting continues in Laos but the conflict has been relatively quiescent lately. This is not due to any scaling down of communist ambitions, but rather can be attributed to the material demands on scarce communist resources of the immediately more important South Vietnamese struggle. Pathet Lao held territory is a vital link in the communist supply system. The so-called Ho Chi Minh trail runs the length of Laos. Despite the vigorous protestations of the Laotian Communists and their allies in Hanoi and Peking, United States air sorties are flown against targets on this complex of routes.

Thailand

We have already mentioned the existence of the Thailand Patriotic Front and its program. The Front is attempting to exploit the underdevelopment and ethnic tensions of the northeast part of Thailand in a campaign aimed at the overthrow of the Bangkok government, described by the Front as a "fascist clique" and "lackeys of American imperialism." Vocally sup-

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

ported by Peking and Hanoi, and probably materially supported by the Pathet Lao across the Mekong River, the Thai insurgents are actively engaged in propaganda and isolated acts of terrorism. Armed encounters between government military and police and the insurgents is becoming more frequent. An apt comparison can be made between Northeast Thailand in 1966 and South Vietnam in 1961.

The Thai government is well aware of the dangers in the situation and has embarked upon a crash program of information, development, and security in the region. The United States is committed to the defense of Thailand from this kind of indirect aggression and has gone to great lengths to assure the Thai authorities of the firmness of our policy in Southeast Asia. One can only hope that the lessons of South Vietnam are well learned and that we are not confronted with a case of too little—too late. [15]

Burma

The Burmese state has been subjected to insurgent attacks from its inception. These have not been only Communist but from dissident ethnic groups as well. The ramshackle edifice of General Ne Win's army socialism inherited this problem and has not been able to establish control over the Burmese countryside. Two insurgent communist forces exist in Burma, the Red Flags and the White Flags, split on doctrinal issues since 1946. Although numerically weak, (probably less than two thousand), the Burmese Communists have been able to utilize the disaffection of the ethnic minorities, particularly the Karens and Kachins to their own advantage.

Malaysia

For the people of Malaysia a second round of insurgency is being prepared. Having defeated the Malay Races Liberation

[15] The author has in preparation a study of the "proto-insurgency" in Thailand that will be published in Summer, 1966, by the University of South Carolina Press.

Army led by Chin Peng's Malayan Communists in the period 1948-1957, the now sovereign government of Malaysia has heard a new call to arms. On June 3, 1965, a front styling itself the Malayan National Liberation League issued its Manifesto in Jakarta, calling for the overthrow of the "neocolonialist regime of the British imperialists and their lackeys." China has announced support for the MNLL and the Malayan National Liberation army headed by P. V. Sarma. Originally a stalking horse for the Indonesian campaign to crush Malaysia, the MNLL has shown its true colors and affinities with such fronts as the NFLSV and the Thai Patriotic Front.

In the Thailand - Malaysia border area the remnants of Chin Peng's guerillas are still active on both sides of the international border. Links between this insurgent band and the insurgents in Northeast Thailand have been uncovered by the Thai security authorities. Coordination of the Thai and Malaysian efforts to control the border guerillas has been announced. A third communist insurgent group in Malaysia is the Clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak. The CCO actively assisted the Indonesian "volunteers" in the "Crush Malaysia" campaign.

The Philippines

In this island democracy the successors to the Hukbalahap, now styling themselves the People's Liberation Army, carry out sporadic acts of terrorism. Operating in the Luzon provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, the PLA is credited by Filipino security officers with capacity for rapid expansion.

Indonesia

The Indonesian Army purge of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) following the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, has succeeded in destroying the party's legal political strength. Fighting back in a desperate attempt at survival, communist insurgent bands literally took to the hills. The violence of the Army-PKI clash is underlined by the number of deaths which have grown out of the conflict. Sukarno, himself, has admitted

87,000 while other sources have put the figure as high as 200,000. It is not outside the realm of possibility that communist insurgent warfare will develop in Indonesia.

Counterinsurgency

Insurgency as a political-military concept has generated its antonym — "counterinsurgency." Counterinsurgency means all military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities directed toward preventing and suppressing insurgent groups. In the heat of confrontation with insurgent groups the emphasis tends to be placed on the military activity. We must not lose sight of the fact that the minority of hard-core Communists in the countries we have catalogued enlist the support of the populations through their espousal, cynical or not, of the material and political demands of the people. Even in the Philippines the pressure for social revolution may become so great that the democratic institutions cannot handle it. *The Philippines Free Press,* the leading newspaper in the country, has asked:

> How long can a system go on abusing peoples' patience; what will happen if the Chinese Communists make a success, an economic one anyway, of their system. The Philippine way of life will look stupid, incompetent, hopeless. The demand for change, Communist-style, will mount.[16]

This is not the place to rehearse the real needs of the peoples of Southeast Asia that must be met if their aspirations are not to be frustrated — aspirations, we should hasten to add, that in large measure stem from a growing consciousness of what the West already has achieved. Let us only point out here that paternalism is not the answer. The peoples of Southeast Asia must be allowed to become articulate within their domestic political processes. Patchwork reform from the top in response to the attacks on the system by the Communists does not in fact give the people a stake in the system. As long as there do not exist legitimate channels for political opposition, a responsive bureaucracy,

[16] As quoted in the *New York Times,* November 22, 1965.

and shared values, the illegitimate actions of the Communists will remain attractive.

In a very real sense the entire concept of "counterinsurgency" is too negative, too self-defeating, to describe the task facing the governments of Southeast Asia. If they address themselves only to countering insurgency they too, to use a good communist term, "will end up in the dustbin of history." The task is essentially to give democratic *content* as well as institutions to the political system. It goes without saying that although we have here been talking about Southeast Asia, the pertinence of the comments have a much wider extent.

The Lessons of History

Marxism-Leninism purports to be a science of history. It is the laws of history that guide the actions of the communist revolutionary movements. The Chinese Communists surveying the historical experience of the Post-World War II revolutionary turmoil note that from China to Cuba all of the victorious revolutions were won by armed struggle and by fighting against the imperialists. The Chinese have drawn some principal lessons from these revolutions that bear repeating, if we are to comprehend their methodology. It is interesting to note that the lessons quoted below were cited by the Chinese to the Russians.[17]

> 1. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.
>
> 2. The peasants are the most dependable allies of the proletariat. The proletariat must closely rely on the peasants, establish a broad front based on the worker peasant alliance, and insist upon proletarian leadership in the revolution.

[17] Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) and *Hongqui* (Red Flag), *The Proletarian Revolution of Khrushchev's Revisionism - Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU* (VIII) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 47-48.

3. U. S. imperialism is the arch enemy of people's revolution in all countries. The proletariat must hold high the national banner of opposition to U. S. imperialism and have the courage to fight with firm resolve against the U. S. imperialists and their lackeys in its own country.

4. The revolution of the oppressed nations is an indispensable ally of the proletarian revolution. The workers of all countries must unite, and they must unite with all the oppressed nations and all the forces opposed to imperialism and its lackeys to form a broad international united front.

5. To make a revolution, it is essential to have a revolutionary party. The triumph of the proletarian revolution and the triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat are impossible without a revolutionary proletarian party established in accordance with the revolutionary theory and style of Marxism-Leninism, a party which is irreconcilable towards revisionism and opportunism and which takes a revolutionary attitude towards the reactionary ruling classes and their state power.

The logic of the connection between the communist goal and the desires of the people of the underdeveloped world is clear, albeit unpalatable. In less oblique terms than the Chinese have used, we can say that history has shown that the Communists have sought to capture the revolutions in the underdeveloped world as part of the "tit for tat" struggle against the non-communist West. The parallelism seen by the Communists in their own revolution and the efforts of the emergent peoples is strikingly demonstrated by the hortatory injunction: "To insist on revolutionary armed struggle is of primary importance not only to the proletarian revolution but also to the national democratic revolution of the oppressed nations."[18]

The Peking ideologues have sought to utilize the Maoist strategy of the people's war as a model for the international struggle of the people against Communism. The fullest recent

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

exposition of this thought has been given by Lin Piao.[19] According to this line, the national struggle of the people against the imperialist aggressor is duplicated in the universal struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism. Mao's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from these bases is just as applicable.

> Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world" . . . . In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

The last sentence of Lin Piao's statement deserves closer scrutiny. "In the final analysis," he claims, "the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples." This assertion alone tells us why it is so important for the United States to maintain its commitment in Vietnam, Thailand, and elsewhere where the Chinese revolutionary model is being employed. The ultimate target is the United States itself.

[19] Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-52.

SOME PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Thomas J. Bellows*

National Identification

The preliminary stages of nation-building in Southeast Asia have largely been achieved. By this I mean that the populations of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and the Philippines feel that their continuing existence, especially the social and economic improvement of this existence, depends to a large extent upon the present or future political leadership of the states of which they are nationals. By and large, the problem of national boundaries has been solved by the colonial experience; and irredentism, of the type which plagued central and eastern Europe, is not now, at least, a potential catalyst for conflict. The colonial experience, with the exception of Thailand, has given to each nation in Southeast Asia a European lingua franca, particularly with reference to the educated, a geo-political origin, a distinct and separate modern historical experience with distinct and separate laws, governmental organization and educational institutions, all of which trace most of their roots to the colonial period.

A possible exception to this is Vietnam whose boundary remains the same as it was under the last stage of French rule with the question being whether or not it should remain divided as the French left it. By and large then, most of the peoples in Southeast Asia, except for the most technologically backward and isolated, have passed the critical threshold of nation-building - that is, a sense of national identification. The question of loyalty to a neighboring geo-political entity or the creation of a new entity is not an important issue in Southeast Asia today. The political question which does arise, and to which no one appears to have

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, West Georgia College.

an answer, is what type of political system or systems will emerge in Southeast Asia.

The Appeal of Communism

Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, said in a recent speech: "The millions of dispossessed in Asia care not and know not of theory. They want a better life. They want a more equal, a more just society. He who gives them this is their saviour." Ferdinand Marcos, the President-elect of the Philippines, has spoken in a similar vein. When asked to explain the most important reason for his election victory he replied, "The gut issues." By this he meant that the issues of poverty and high prices were the means by which he was propelled into Malacanang Palace.

Performance will determine the survival of the existing political systems in Southeast Asia. No country in this area is now Communist with the exception of North Vietnam. Whether or not this situation continues will, in large part, depend upon the performances of both the non-communist and anti-communist governments currently holding power.

It is essential to realize that the appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia is not by and large theoretical or intellectual; it is pragmatic, sometimes with overtones of chauvinism - in the case of the Chinese. Communism is the politics of desperation and despair. Its appeal is born out of a continually worsening and depressing daily existence where new and extreme change appeals as the only answer because no condition could be any worse than the present. The emphasis of Southeast Asian Communism, as it was also true of Marx, is not on a detailed program of the future but, rather, on stressing the absolutely corrupt and degenerate nature of the present. Also important are the omnipresent examples of Russia and China, very hazy in detail but clear in outline, examples of countries which adopted Communism during distinctively low points in socio-political development but which are now enjoying a position they have not enjoyed for centuries, or possibly at any time in their respective pasts.

Non-communist political systems will survive if their level of performance is satisfactory. And, I repeat, Communism is the politics of desperation and despair.

The future of Southeast Asia is not bright. Vietnam is a spectre which falls across the entire region. It is a haunting reminder that a communist-inspired insurrection can transform a difficult situation into a nearly impossible situation. And, each country is already on the razor's edge. Once a contiguous nation is controlled by a communist political system in Southeast Asia, the neighbor must expect to be infiltrated, if not flooded, by communist agents of subversion and destruction. No Southeast Asian country, however achievement or performance oriented it may be, can presently afford to have such a catalyst in its midst. This, if for no other reason, is why Communism cannot be allowed to absorb South Vietnam. Should Communism triumph in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand would succumb in a few years.

I now propose to discuss some of the problems which put Southeast Asia on the razor's edge.

Population Explosion

The population explosion has meant that growth of Gross National Product is frequently never represented by any increase in per capita income or per capita consumption. Each advance often simply becomes a holding action. No Southeast Asian country faces a crisis of national starvation as does India, but real dangers are, nevertheless, present. Figures from Singapore illustrate conditions which are true of the whole region. In 1946, there were approximately 900,000 Singaporeans. By 1962, there were 1,700,000; and in 1982, if the present fertility rate continues, there will be 3,400,000 Singaporeans. If there is a rapid reduction in fertility, there will still be 2,900,000 persons in the island state of Singapore by 1982. Thus, whatever Singapore can hope to do in terms of family planning between 1962 and 1982, the population is certain to increase by at least 70% - at a minimum. This is the situation which has been repeating itself throughout South-

east Asia since the end of World War II. Whatever the experts may say with regard to potential world food production, the potential is not being realized by millions of Southeast Asians. In fact, it is probably accurate to state that nutritional standards throughout the region as a whole are the same as they were in the depression pre-World War II years. In fact, nutritional standards in some areas are lower than those of the late 1930's. Twenty-six thousand starved to death on the island of Java in 1964. In summary, this means that a few wealthy and middle class Southeast Asians are maintaining living standards which equal their counterparts in the West but that the masses, though aware of this affluent presence in their societies, have not partaken of the same cup.

Industrialization

The governments of Southeast Asia are approaching this situation in two ways. The first is through efforts at industrialization. Some scholars, such as Edward Shills, have argued that industrialization, often physically impressive but not so impressive in terms of economic viability, is more often than not a status symbol and a convenient and easily discernible way by which to measure the success of a society and a particular government. I am afraid that I must disagree here. Singapore has over 50,000 persons reaching the age of eighteen year every year. Even if we were to assume, an assumption which is not true by the way, that only males would be seeking jobs, it would still mean that each year, simply to keep up with the population increase, employment must annually increase by 3 per cent. This is true of all the urban areas of Southeast Asia. Employment on such a scale can be provided for only by some type of industrialization, and we have not even taken into consideration the growth of the rural areas and the annual flow of persons to the urban areas seeking new and different opportunities.

The revolution of rising expectations and the relative cheapness and quality of Western and Japanese goods (and sometimes Hong Kong and Communist Chinese goods) have meant that, whenever possible, these consumer-type goods are purchased. In-

cluded here are such things as cigarettes, soap, pens, watches, tinned goods, soft drinks, etc., for which even the poorest have acquired a taste. The market for such goods has never been higher in Southeast Asia. Concomitantly, as the prices of the exports of these extractive societies fall, items that were formerly foreign luxuries have become accepted as necessities. As a result, the combined trade deficits of the ECAFE region are running at about two billion dollars annually. This within itself is sufficient reason to inaugurate a program of industrialization.

The dangers caused by the appeals for foreign goods can be illustrated by reference to the Philippines where extreme difficulty is being encountered in its industrialization program. Industrialization requires some type of tariff protection, at least initially, to enable new industry to get its feet on the ground and into a postion to compete with similar products which often already dominate the market. As a result, smuggling offers rich rewards when such everyday items as cigarettes and textiles have had tariffs placed on them. In the Philippines, it has meant that large profits are rather easily made and that funds invested in a smuggling enterprise are often returned within a twelve-month period. On the other hand, even under the most ideal conditions, new industry in Southeast Asia cannot even hope to realize any return on its investment until after the fifth year. The Philippines is probably the most extreme example in Southeast Asia, but the appeal of imported goods has critically hurt the industrialization program, not only in this archipelago, but also throughout the region. For the person with money to invest, smuggling, not industrial investment, may offer the greatest rewards. Thus, smuggling and its impact on the Philippine economy is one of the most worrisome problems facing these islands today. If smuggling is not controlled, the situation will continue to deteriorate; but, as I shall now indicate with reference to Singapore, control of smuggling will not provide a solution. It will only eliminate an immediate cancer.

Even under optimum conditions, industrial growth, as the Singapore example shows, is extremely difficult for the develop-

ing countries of Southeast Asia. There is no question about it, Singapore must industrialize. She has no alternative. With an area of only 224 square miles, she has no rural base on which to fall back, even temporarily. Describing the state of industrialization in Singapore in 1959, the Minister for Finance said, in effect, that Singapore had no industry, and that she knew little, if anything, about industrialization. Questions concerning what industries to put up and who would put them up were questions to which none knew the answers. All of Southeast Asia is in a comparable position. In education, the term late-bloomers is used for those who rather late in their experience begin to realize their potential. In industrialization, late blooming may prove to be almost fatal. Later, in 1963, Singapore's Minister for Finance could report, because of extensive efforts on the part of the government and large-scale development of industrial sites, that 3,500 new jobs had been created. Remember, however, we said Singapore needed at least 22,000 new jobs every year. Further, Singapore is blessed with a very progressive and efficient government; but, even under these conditions, this island state is having a desperate time industrializing. The situation is not about to become critical, it is critical.

Foreign investment could possibly overcome some of the preceding difficulties which have been discussed. What should be pointed out here is that foreign investment in Southeast Asia has its appeal, not so much for the money that is provided, but for the foreign experts that the new companies bring in to organize and staff the new enterprises. In most cases, there are sufficient private funds in Southeast Asia to maintain the current necessary industrial momentum. The experts to set up and operate the new factories, however, are not present. The only recourse, then, is foreign investment. Industrialization, no matter who controls it, provides jobs, and this is often the immediate and critical need. Thus, these countries turn toward the West because local money is unwilling and because only foreign-owned companies with foreign know-how can immediately compete with imported goods for the local market. Western nations, by and large, have not had

this rather unhappy experience of having to win back all potential local markets from foreigners.

However, there are some inherent dangers here in private foreign investment. The first ECAFE Conference on Industrialization met during December of last year in Manila. A draft report was presented to the conference which reported that out of foreign investments in Asia amounting to 181 million dollars, profit remittances to the investment countries amounted to 708 million dollars. Thus it is, that the presently available avenue to industrialization has aspects which are very detrimental to efforts to increase per capita income. Immediate jobs may be provided, but future benefits from industrialization appear to be much smaller than they would be in the more familiar contemporary Western experience.

Another, and probably as critical a factor in industrialization as any, is the viability and nature of the Southeast Asian markets. The markets are small, varying from two to thirty million people, with per capita domestic consumption low. Further, the markets are dominated by foreign brands - one of the heritages of colonialism. The Southeast Asian industrialist almost invariably begins an imitative industrialism designed to produce consumer goods which will compete with those already in the market, also possessing the advantage of requiring the least amount of per-employee investment. The novice industrialist finds himself competing with high-quality imported goods in a cluttered, if not saturated, market. If he turns to foreign markets, he encounters high tariff barriers. In addition, each country in Southeast Asia is going through a similar stage of industrialization in which the various goods produced are almost identical - textiles, tires, paints, cigarettes, mosquito coils, soft drinks, etc. Trade between countries within the region is severely limited by the lack of any mutual interdependence of markets. Exploitation of child and female labor during the initial stages of industrialization, such as occurred in Europe's Industrial Revolution, is usually prohibited by labor union activity or by legal restrictions. It takes a brave person in-

deed, given the nature of the market and the strength of the competition, to enter the industrial arena.

Unfortunately, the example of Hong Kong provides only limited precedents for Southeast Asia. Hong Kong owes its miracle to those who fled from China in 1949 when the Communists took over. This resulted in a unique concentration of capital and skill. Hong Kong has the tremendous advantage of being a major economic outlet for 800 million people.

The Hong Kong experience does, however, suggest that without Western markets, no Asian country can hope to industrialize. Singapore believes this so firmly that it has said, in effect, to the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, give us one-eighth of one per cent of your market and we can survive. If you do not, you and the things for which you stand do not deserve to have any influence in this region of the world. Whether the United States can or will do this I do not know. But, if we do not, Singapore, for one, does not believe it will survive as a non-communist state.

I am not an economist but I have spent quite a lot of time on this question of industrialization because Southeast Asia believes it cannot economically survive unless industrialization occurs. The difficulties are immense and, unhappily, no solutions have appeared which are acceptable to all concerned. But, with its burgeoning population, unless some type of economic development occurs, Southeast Asia will be absorbed by Communism. As President Marcos said, the gut issues are the important ones. Jobs must be provided, and standards of living must be maintained and slowly improved.

The Rural Sphere

As I mentioned earlier, the governments of Southeast Asia are approaching these problems from two angles. We have discussed the efforts in the urban industrial sphere. Now, I should like to discuss briefly the rural sphere. In this latter effort, government-to-government foreign assistance has played a greater role.

Reference has been made to the revolution of rising expectations. What were once regarded as luxuries are now considered as necessities. The Communists are important here, but in any political system where there is even a modicum of competition, non-communist opposition groups play a more important role. This is especially true in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. These are countries which have relatively open political systems and where the appeal of the non-communist opposition is that we can do more for you faster.

The revolution of rising expectations has meant that rural development at this particular moment in history is oriented to making life more bearable. Roads, wells, schools, medical facilities, and generators are the order of the day in the kampongs and the barrios. These, of course, are necessary and are to be expected; but, because of the cost and effort involved, only now are steps being taken or contemplated toward the more fundamental needs of larger and more efficient food production and tenancy. Life may be becoming less arduous in the rural areas, but the fundamental issues of tenancy and increased food production are only beginning to be stressed. Whether or not the governments move quickly enough and efficiently enough will determine whether discouragement will turn to despair and thence to Communism.

Exploding populations and the revolution of rising expectations has meant that a laissez faire attitude by government is impossible. Governments which have not been extremely well known for their efficiency, imaginativeness, and dedication now must exhibit all of these or most assuredly they will be replaced by groups which do appear to have such traits. The more nearly hopelessness and despair dominate the feelings of the masses, the more nearly is it only the Communists who appear to exhibit dedication, efficiency, and imagination. To a desperate man, the most radical situation is the best. The Communists represent the clearest break with the present.

Vietnam

Our discussion thus far has centered on the extreme difficulties facing Southeast Asia and has implied some contributions

the United States might make in Southeast Asia which could help to ease the situation. Now, I should like to turn to our most important role in Southeast Asia - and one which we are currently fulfilling.

During the past several years, the United States has adopted a somewhat new approach to Southeast Asia. Given this region's socio-political-economic milieu, with its variety of complex and often unpredictable forces, official United States policy has come to assume that revolutions of various types are bound to occur within the various countries. The nature and direction of these revolutions we cannot hope to control, let alone even always influence. However, what we can try to do is to prevent external forces from fomenting or directing the changes which will take place. Particularly does this mean that we should prevent, whenever possible, the penetration of those forces which have a communist origin and direction.

This is the importance of Vietnam. If South Vietnam succumbs, there will be a succession of South Vietnams, ending only in Singapore or Manila. South Vietnam is a striking example of communist agitation which, to a considerable extent, is supported and directed by forces not indigenous to the area where the revolution is occurring. South Vietnam exemplifies not only revolutionary ferment but also a nation subjected to continuous and protracted external aggression.

Red China

The great external danger to Southeast Asia today is Communist China. It is the communist state most dedicated to violent revolution. In addition, it has an appeal as the outstanding example of an Asian nation which, during the depths of despair and disorientation, has pulled itself up to a point where it has the most effective political system it has experienced in over three hundred years.

China must be checked now. If she is not, she will make it impossible for the nations of Southeast Asia to find their way out of what is, at the best, a very difficult situation. December head-

lines were made throughout Southeast Asia when Robert S. McNamara said that Red China will have a stockpile of efficient nuclear weapons, including medium range ballistic missiles, within two years.

I recommend that everyone read an article which appeared in *Life International* during the past year by Dr. Ralph E. Lapp dealing with the nuclear power of China. In this article, Dr. Lapp provides some rather frightening quotes by Red Chinese leaders. Khrushchev reports Mao Tse-tung as saying: "Personally, I think that in the entire world, half of humanity, and perhaps even more than half, will perish. If half of humanity were destroyed, the other half would still remain, but imperialism would be destroyed entirely and there would be only socialism in all the world, and within half a century or a whole century the population would again increase by more than half."

If China is willing to make such sacrifices, is there any way to stop her in Southeast Asia? It has been said of Vietnam with good cause, "China is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese."

China could of course be destroyed, but this would mean a potential destruction of nearly 800 million people—over one-quarter of the world's population. However, it would take years to convince China of this and these would be the years of China's greatest adventurism. If we were to resort to the destruction of 800 million persons, I doubt that our collective consciences could ever rest easy again.

Dr. Summerfield, Professor of Aerospace Propulsion at Princeton, warns: "From my contacts with many Chinese students, professors, and engineers over the past 30 years, I would say it is a serious underestimate to believe that they cannot plan and execute an efficient research, development, and production program for practical missiles, and it is a serious underestimate to believe that they are not already close to their objective."

Within a few years, China will not only be able to present us with a nuclear challenge but will also be able to reach such targets as San Francisco and Los Angeles. This is most undesirable

and there does not now appear to be an evolution in Chinese military or political thinking which would lead to a less militant attitude by Chinese leaders. It is extremely unlikely that nuclear capability will encourage humility in China.

Immediate Crisis With China

The immediate crisis with China is in Vietnam. There will be others of a similar nature unless some type of modus vivendi is reached. The chances for a negotiated settlement in the Vietnamese situation are not bright, principally because there is very little over which to negotiate. The United States cannot accept less than a non-communist South Vietnam. More important, the South Vietnamese government, which must have the final say, does not wish to negotiate. On the part of North Vietnam and China, any type of negotiated settlement would involve a significant loss of face, given the nature of the type of settlement which would have to be reached and the objectives of North Vietnam and China.

Escalation

Escalation of some type appears to be the most likely development. This might involve bombing the industrial complex near Hanoi or destruction of the Port of Haiphong. Another possibility, though more distasteful, would be to destroy the dikes along the Red River, thereby creating conditions of chaos in North Vietnam. The letter might be most effective, but it would be morally painful, at the least, and it would result in the drawn out process of starvation of North Vietnam which would place an onus on the United States and what it stands for that would be impossible to overcome in the foreseeable future.

A possible solution, one which might be more palatable and which would be more permanent, which would involve much less loss of life, and which would give Southeast Asia, as a whole, a breathing spell, would be the destruction of Red China's nuclear complex - a complex largely concentrated in a single area of Western China. A strike of this type would be treated as a surgical strike, intended only to extract a dangerous cancer, and not to be followed up by any other measures once the malignancy was

removed. This step would preclude the not too distant situation when Red China would be capable of raining nuclear destruction on American cities. Immediately, it would crucially weaken Red China's ability to further disrupt an already precarious Southeast Asian milieu. Such a strike could quite possibly lay the groundwork for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, and it would serve notice on the rest of Southeast Asia that it now had an opportunity to construct viable political systems without the continuous threat of disruption via Chinese sponsored subversion.

This is not a solution to Southeast Asia's problems of nation-building. It might, however, make the task less difficult. Long drawn out programs and adjustments, only now in the incipient stage, will have to take place; but we will, at least, have drawn back from the brink of impossibility; and the future will be a little less arduous, and will enable a non-communist solution to, at least, be possible.

NATIONALISM and DEVELOPING INTERNATIONALISM IN THE UNITED NATIONS

By MARIETTA TREE*

The topic that I was given for today was Nationalism and Developing Internationalism in the United Nations. After thinking about the subject for a while, I decided to rename it: Developing Nationalism and Developing Internationalism - and Which Will Win? This is surely the greatest suspense story of our time and all time. Remembering that Thoreau said, "A frontier is neither East nor West but wherever man faces a fact," I shall try to put facts about nationalism and internationalism into two columns or into a dialogue between the two. Although they will not be all of the facts, and they are my choice of facts, perhaps this comparison will help you to decide how to figure this race between developing nationalism and developing internationalism at the United Nations - this race that will decide whether there will be a *human race.*

The nationalist begins—

"Five years ago a Norwegian statistician got a computer to work counting history's wars. The machine, according to *Time* magazine, 'quickly, competently and a bit contemptuously announced that in 5,560 years of recorded human history, there have been 14,531 wars or, as the computer pointed out, 2.6135 a year. Of 185 generations of man's recorded experience, the machine noted with a touch of sarcasm, only 10 have known unsullied peace.' "

You may think you have been living in a moderately peaceful world since the end of the Second World War in 1945, but again *Time* has listed forty wars since 1945 - many of them small civil wars - bandits versus the government as in Venezuela

*Former representative of the United States to the United Nations.

in 1963, and some over in a day or two - when Britain came to Kuwait's aid against Iran in 1961, but many of them have been long and expensive in human life and the world's resources.

In rebuttal, the internationalist says that in the twenty years since the United Nations has been established, in such places as Korea, Suez, Cyprus, the Congo, and latterly in the Indian-Pakistan struggle over Kashmir, the United Nations has played a vital peacekeeping role. In fact, for every year of its life, the United Nations has resolved one crisis which could have escalated into a major war.

At this very moment the agenda of the Security Council lists about sixty international disputes; forty-nine or so are border disputes; some of them have been settled; some are quiescent, and others could flare again at any moment. The point is that more than half a hundred international guards have been considered by somebody to be enough of a threat to the peace to take the case to the court of last resort - the Security Council.

The nationalist goes to this next point.

We were taught that the Congress of Vienna unleashed nationalism, but I am certain that the Czar, Metternich and Talleyrand would be aghast to learn that in the twenty years since World War II the number of sovereign nations in the world has increased from 68 to 127, with many more to come as nations like Malaysia split in half, or federations in the Carribbean and Africa break into splinters. The United Nations lists sixty remaining non-self governing territories. Many of these look forward to the day of independence. The other day the Maldive Islands were welcomed into the United Nations with a population of 85,000.

Each new country has its own self interest, its new power of decision, its own officials (who like their jobs and titles), its own police force, army and supply of weapons. With so many nations enjoying the heady wine of power and the trappings of power for the first time, is it likely they would give this all up easily, especially when independence had meant the Promis-

ed Land of the Land of Promises for so many for so long? Well, it's hardly human nature. Incidentally, when human nature is referred to in this sense, it generally refers to the id or selfish side of human nature.

The internationalist points out that twenty years ago the United Nations membership was 50 and has increased to 117 today with an expected membership of 125 in a few years. All these who enter the United Nations must in entering accept the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They must pay their dues and abide by the rules of procedure which make the United Nations a training ground in parliamentary democracy. In some sense, therefore, unbridled national sovereignty is curtailed by the United Nations. And why do these 117 nations voluntarily agree to accept the principles of international cooperation through the United Nations? Because a society of nations incorporates the constitutional right of all states - particularly of small states - not to be overawed and trampled on by powerful neighbors; because it gives them the right to a voice in the governance of the world, the right to some stake in the planet's resources, the right to live in short, in a world society somehow beginning to resemble the open society of the West.

A corollary to these needs and rights of nations is the fact that the United States belongs today to 53 international organizations. We contribute to 22 international operating programs, mostly sponsored by these same organizations. And last year we attended 547 international inter-governmental organization conferences. In the 19th Century, in contrast, the United States attended about one international conference a year. These 53 international organizations exist simply because they are needed by all the states. We belong to them because it serves our national interest.

"Next point," says the nationalist, "thermonuclear weapons may have forestalled the holocaust, I grant you, but there will always be necessary limited wars. When a nation's prestige or borders or ideology are threatened there will be a limited war just

as sure as shooting. Longing for peace got our ancestors nowhere and will do no better for us."

The internationalist, who calls himself a hopeful pragmatist, replies that the last two decades have seen the growth of regional organizations. The Organization of African Unity, an institution hardly out of its swaddling clothes, quickly arranged cease fires when fighting broke out on the borders between Morocco and Algeria and between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Organization of American States has a good record also in settling disputes and quelling conflict as it is now doing in the Dominican Republic.

At the next level, as close to the global as we can get, is the United Nations peacekeeping system.

Just after the last war, the Soviet Union sent two armored divisions through Northern Iran toward the Turkish and Iraqui frontiers while Bulgaria massed troops on its southern frontier to form the other prong of a huge pincers movement against Turkey. Then the Security Council met in London for the first time and presently the Soviet troops went back into the Soviet Union. Not a shot had been fired.

Since that time there have been over twenty occasions in which the armed forces of two or more nations engaged in more or less formal hostilities - in another day there would have been wars fought until "victory" was attained by one side or the other. Eight of these could be classified as outright invasions, in which the armed forces of one nation marched or parachuted into the territory of another; only one of them - the mismatched affair between India and Goa - was settled in the traditional way in which wars have been settled in the past. On at least twenty other occasions there has been minor fighting on frontiers. Any one of these would have qualified as a casus belli in another day.

This is not exactly peace - but if fighting breaks out tomorrow the chances are good that the next step will not be the

sound of trumpets but the call to cease-fire.

Now this United Nations peacekeeping system was not built to rush in, to resolve every conflict everywhere. The United Nations indeed was designed to be a court of last resort rather than as the first port of call—more as a reserve system when direct negotiation or a regional organization's efforts break down.

It has sought to solve a diversity of conflicts with a diversity of means. Actions have ranged from military defense of a victim of aggression, to the appointment of an investigating committee, to the work of a single civilian mediator. It has ranged from the American marines in Lebanon to a 21 nation force in the Congo. Some peacekeeping operations have been authorized by the Security Council, some by the General Assembly, some by nations directly concerned, some by a consortium of countries in a voluntary basis, some by the assessment of dues on all members.

Finally, we have seen that in some cases the United Nations has succeeded, sometimes brilliantly, in the role of peacemaker and peacekeeper - I cite Suez, Korea, the Congo, and in some cases has been unable to act - as in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese refuse to bring their case to the UN. Such experience defies the most careful efforts to draw clear lessons, make accurate predictions or derive neat clear lessons, make accurate predictions or derive neat formulas for the future.

Yet from the basis of past experience, we know the formulas must be improved. Resources at the ready must be enlarged and improved, and it is encouraging that the Scandinavian countries, Canada and several others have earmarked specific battalions, submarines, aircraft and weapons which shall be specially trained and allocated for instant United Nations use when crises flare.

Peacekeeping procedures can be improved. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the Security Council for the first time "demanded" a cease-fire between India and Kashmir last month, with the unstated implication or threat that other devices such as force or sanctions would be used if the demand was not met. But

the ad hoc character of the United Nations operations in the peacekeeping field probably will be their trademark for some time to come.

Our nationalist friend now interjects on this long discourse to say that when United Nations peacekeeping has been successful it has been because the Soviet Union had been absent from the Security Council, as when the vote was taken on Korea, or had not felt its interests threatened and had gone along on a peace action.

The nationalist points to the 103 vetoes of the Soviet Union in the Security Council which has stripped or paralyzed so much peacekeeping action. It is the Cold War that ices the wings of the dove of peace. Imagine how much colder will be the Cold War, how many more vetoes will frustrate peacekeeping if and when Red China enters that great glass house on 44th Street and the East River.

This is a hard question for the internationalist who replies that the United Nations purports to be a universal organization and that in this shrinking world an aggressive nation of several hundred million cannot be treated as if it didn't exist. The problems of Red China will not go away if the Chinese are ignored. Also, he tells the story about a mouse who complained to a friend about his job with NASA. "They stuff me in a nose cone until I can hardly breathe. Then they shoot me miles high into space through magnetic belts that shock me; then they dump me into the sea and almost drown me; then they put me on the laboratory table and stick pins into me." "That's awful," his friend interjected, "Why don't you go back to your old job?" "What!" cried the mouse—"Back to cancer research?"

The nationalist points now to nuclear proliferation. Perhaps the Soviet Union and the United States are wise and controlled enough not to push the button. But France and China and perhaps other nations will have the bomb and the means of delivering it in a few years. Who is to stop a crazy dictator or a nation whipped to super nationalist fury from blowing us to eternity?

The internationalist points to the Test Ban Treaty signed by all the nations of the United Nations - to the hot line between the Kremlin and the White House - to the United Nations Resolution banning nuclear weapons on vehicles in outer space - to the United States Atoms for Peace program - to the unanimous United Nations resolution calling for total disarmament by all nations - and finally to the United Nations Disarmament Committee which meets for many months of every year. Although this committee has not accomplished much, world public opinion forces the members to go on meeting and there are occasional signs that the terms of the two major powers - for instance on inspection - are coming closer together.

Finally the nationalist points out that the United Nations has listed 26 member nations as "developed" - the other members are considered "underdeveloped." The rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer - the gap between them widening. There is an urgent demand by the present leaders of the undeveloped countries that the rich countries must help them to meet successfully this revolution of rising expectations or suffer the gravest sort of risks themselves. If the developed nations do not do so, and we must remember for example, that United States foreign aid is smaller every year, the conflict between the North and South could make the present conflict between East and West look like a tea party.

The able and farseeing Director of the United Nations Special Fund, Paul Hoffman, who, as you may know, was fifteen years ago head of the Marshall Plan, has asked that we imagine a small country with a population of only three million of which one million have a high standard of living, have a life expectancy of about seventy years, are almost entirely literate and with at least a fairly good education, and preponderantly white; while the other two million of its people are desperately poor, have a life expectancy of thirty to forty years, are about half illiterate and with a few exceptions without much education, and are preponderantly of dark skin. Would we think, Mr. Hoffman asks, that a nation so constituted would have any chance of long run political stability or was, on the contrary, headed for an explosion?

Yet if you multiply these population figures by a thousand, adding up to three billion instead of three million, this is precisely the state of the world today. And the whole population of the world, North and South, rich and poor, is living almost as close together in 1965 as the population of a small country of three million was in 1800.

The internationalist in riposte says that the entire United Nations family is developing a program to help the underprivileged peoples to help themselves to decent living standards. The United Nations Decade of Development aims to raise by 5 per cent the Gross National Product of every country by 1970. And to that end the World Health Organization is stamping out malaria and curing disease. The UN Special Fund analyzes the resources and outlines country development programs. UNESCO is improving basic education; the Food and Agriculture Organization is improving and increasing food supplies; the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association are helping to stabilize commerce and assist with the financial resources for trade and aid. As an illustration, twelve different United Nations agencies have been at work for several years in Southeast Asia preparing places for a multi-purpose development project for the Lower Mekong Delta.

So, ladies and gentlemen, here are some of the facts and figures in Developing Nationalism and Developing Internationalism. I leave it to you to decide who will win this race and it looks neck and neck to me. I leave it to you to decide what you are going to do about it if you would be masters of your fate and are concerned with the survival of your children.

SECURITY IN OUR TIME

By J. Chalmers Vinson

In the popular mind no words so well epitomized the policy of an era as did Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's all too mortal words on his return from Munich, September 30, 1938: "I bring peace with honor. Peace for our time." One must wonder what happened in the years since 1938 to those thousands who cheered his words at the London airport and those millions of Americans who read them with sighs of relief. They are very difficult to find. Truly "defeat is an orphan," and this one had few if any acknowledged parents in the years that followed. Appeasement became an unspeakable word and even the umbrella, because of association with the Prime Minister, lost, for a time, its popularity and regained it only because its obvious utility outweighed its symbolic onus.

Yet, Chamberlain represented in his policy of peace the aims and hopes of a generation of American statesmen. He must be recognized as an accurate reader of public sentiment even though his prediction does not make him a great prophet. From Woodrow Wilson with the 1917 appeal for a war to end war to Franklin Roosevelt's 1940 promise—made again and again—not to send American troops abroad, the spectrum of American policy making was limited to the search for peace and the conviction that in peace lay security. Calvin Coolidge, at his taciturn best, summed up his foreign policy for America in one word — peace. His contemporary, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes described his department as "the department of peace." The 1936 Neutrality act was renamed by Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Peace Act of 1936.

These statements and the policy they described did not constitute a rejection of security as a national goal. They reflected the conviction that attack from without was impossible. Ocean moats

*Professor of History, University of Georgia.

guarded east and west while there was nothing to fear from the weak neighbors to the north and south. Successful direct attack on the United States was an impossibility. Congressman Hamilton Fish asserted in 1938 that a navy of a thousand ships, each capable of one hundred knots per hour, would be insufficient to invade the United States. No such fleet, either in size or in speed, existed. Great Britain's friendly navy was still supreme in the Atlantic; Japan's hostile fleet was based too far away to be effective against the continental United States. So secure did Americans feel that they allowed their Navy to fall far behind treaty limitations set in 1922, and the Army, with only 122,000 men, was seventeenth among the nations in the early 1930's. Neither force was expanded significantly until after Europe was at war. The United States was in fact secure from invasion, incredible as that may seem today. Even if this had not been the case, the conviction that security existed was so strong that policy would have derived from it.

The only possible threat to the nation, it then followed, was that its values would be destroyed from within. Chief of these values was republican government, and its greatest enemies were a large standing army and the martial spirit. "War kills democracy," was an article of faith in the Senate. The use of military force, even in the hope of protecting democracy, was asserted to be futile. "Fifteen minutes after war is declared," said Senator Arthur Vandenburg, "the Bill of Rights would need a gas mask to survive." Another current theme was that America's entry into World War I had been unrelated to security. It had been promoted by the "merchants of death"—the munitions manufacturers—to serve their own selfish purposes. In short, military force was not only unnecessary to protect America; it was itself the chief danger to the ideal of republicanism that America sought to protect.

The Second World War reversed these deeply held convictions virtually overnight. Security became the only question in foreign policy and collective security the only answer. A nation that had refused the League of Nations for twenty years could scarcely wait to organize and join in a new attempt at security

through world organization. Both houses of Congress adopted, in 1943, resolutions advocating establishment of an international organization with "power" to prevent aggression and preserve the peace of the world. A poll in 1943 showed 54 per cent of the American people in favor of allocating greater military force to the international organization than would be retained by the United States. Historians demonstrated that the "rhythm of tragedy" was the recurring failure to check aggression. America's new internationalism was based less on a change of heart than on solicitude for its security and a better understanding of the problem of security. Peace was not dropped as a national objective, but security and peace became the twin national aims to be attained by crushing aggression through unconditional surrender and forestalling its reappearance through a forceful United Nations. These hopes proved altogether too sanguine. By 1947 a weak conventional American military establishment and a divided United Nations had failed to stabilize conditions and bring security.

A sharp shift took place. Where statesmen in the 1930's sought to conduct a successful diplomacy without power, their successors have been charged with concentrating on power without diplomacy. President Harry Truman led a shift to a new theory and policy for security in 1947. Where peace was proclaimed to be the way to security in the 1920's, the statesmen of the 1940's and 1950's asserted that security was the only road to peace. Truman executed Senator Vandenberg's advice to "scare the hell out of the American people" in order to gain support for his program of assistance to Greece and Turkey. Security became the watchword. As George F. Kennan observed: "A nation that gave no thought to security in 1900 could think of little else in 1950." While Franklin Roosevelt found few supporters for his alleged assertion in 1939 that America's frontier was the Rhine River, Truman found very strong support for the idea that America's frontiers were in Greece and Turkey—indeed, the great globe itself.

As we look to security in our time, as Roosevelt did in his, our first problem is to define the area to be defended. A second

question is to determine how this commitment may be met without destroying the domestic economy.

Taking the first of these questions one finds a number of sharply different answers. In his book on the Cold War Denna K. Fleming asserts that Americans after 1945 "quickly swung all the way over from our isolationist refusal to accept any responsibility in the world and came close to assuming military responsibility for everything, everywhere." Another aspect of this reversal is that proponents of a "realistic" school of diplomacy were applauded by internationalists in the late 1940's for asserting that national interests could not be confined to the continental United States. In the 1960's they were charged with neo-isolationism for contending that American interest was not global in scope —that some conflicts did not touch American national interests at all.

This argument when driven to its essentials was many decades old. Theodore Roosevelt declared that a threat to peace anywhere in the world was a threat to America. Woodrow Wilson went to war "to make the world safe for democracy" and based his vision of a League of Nations on a mutual guarantee of political and territorial integrity to all members everywhere. Aggression against one member was, in fact, aggression against all peace-loving states and must be checked by their collective action. This was the same theme Franklin Roosevelt touched on in his Quarantine Speech and Rhine frontier statement. "When peace has been broken anywhere," he said in 1939, "the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger." Peace, and with it security, was indivisible. If peace and security were destroyed anywhere, they might quickly be destroyed everywhere. This case was analagous to domestic law. Law breakers must be suppressed and punished. It would be difficult to have a law abiding community in which some law breaking was tolerated.

The Senate of the United States was in the Twentieth Century the chief spokesman for the opposition to the theory of indivisible peace with its global reach. In debate after debate over major foreign policy issues eloquent senators asserted that peace was divisible—some conflicts concerned the United States; others,

quite clearly, did not. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge asked in 1919 how any conflict in the Middle East could possibly touch on any American interests. Therefore, he opposed membership in a League pledged to put down all disorders when only a few of these threats would ever be the direct concern of the United States. Senator Gerald Nye in the 1930's was another spokesman for the theory of divisible peace. He buttressed his position with evidence from his investigation of the munitions industry showing that American entry into the First World War was unnecessary in terms of security. Economic forces, neutral rights, national honor, and vaguely realized ideals of service to humanity were the impelling causes for American participation in the war.

Because peace was divisible America's responsibility to the outside world was to serve as a lighthouse to guide them in their efforts to establish orderly, democratic governments. The United States did not have a responsibility to throw out a lifeline to nations in distress and supply the strength to pull them to safety.

Force was not recognized as an essential to secure the ideal divisible peace. Armament itself was a major cause for war. Hence, increasing the military force decreased the chance for peace. In Walter Lippmann's summation of the rationale of naval disarmament: "Big battleships meant big war, little battleships meant little wars, and no battleships meant no wars." Arguments over the divisibility of peace ended only with the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

These bombs appeared not only to have destroyed a fleet but America's approach to security as well. Senator Robert Taft, long an isolationist leader, wrote in 1944 that it had become evident that any major war was likely to involve the United States. It was expedient, therefore, to use force to prevent aggression and discourage the small beginnings of war which would otherwise grow and envelop the nation eventually. "I believe," said Taft, "all nations should enter into an obligation to join, and use economic sanctions and force if necessary, to provent law violation which is defined as aggression and found to

be aggression by an international council." The idea that force settles nothing, so popular in the 1930's, was replaced by the conviction that nothing could be settled without force.

The American public and government appeared to have resolved the debate. The area to be defended was world wide, the ideal to be protected was human liberty. Liberty, like peace, was indivisible, and could not be diminished anywhere without being endangered everywhere. The global scope of this burden would not overextend the United States, for the commitment would be met through global support for collective security under the United Nations.

Within two years these all too sanguine dreams were dead. With the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the United States still defined aggression as the enemy of peace, security, and freedom and still affirmed determination to resist such aggression anywhere in the world. It was not United Nations collective action, but American economic aid and military assistance that was to underwrite this policy. This policy of containment formulated in 1947 was based on recognition of the world wide threat of Communism, both to land and freedom, balanced by a counter force ready to meet anywhere in the world. The idea of collective action was scaled down to regional alliances, the Pact of Rio and NATO in which all members could clearly see the threat to their national interests.

The North Korean aggression of 1950 tested American commitment, with limited UN aid, to the global concept of security. Great effort did not bring an entirely satisfactory solution to the problem, but the global theory itself remained intact as American policy.

The Eisenhower-Dulles years began with a reaffirmation of the nation's global responsibility raised to a new level by determination to seize initiative and "roll back the iron curtain." The latter purpose was sharply modified by time and circumstance; the world wide area of responsibility remained. Dulles decried containment of Communism along a border 20,000 miles long as impractical—"it would lead to strength nowhere and

bankruptcy everywhere." Massive retaliation, based on the ability of the Strategic Air Command to deliver atomic weapons to any global target, changed the method but not the aim of the United States security policy. "Positions of strength" were built through alliances around the world in a veritable fit of pactomania made possible by airplane diplomacy.

The Kennedy Administration turned to conventional military forces in addition to nuclear weapons as the first line of reliance in providing security, but the basic goal remained the same—"a peaceful world community of free and independent states."

Dissenters have questioned the wisdom of all of these actions; candidates for office have promised new approaches; but, in fact as well as in theory, there has been no break in consistent support of the global definition of American security interests since World War II. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as to policy in Vietnam in 1966, emphasized that to yield to coercion and aggression is to invite catastrophe not only in Southeast Asia but everywhere else. The structure of peace is indivisible and world wide, and security can only be built, the Secretary insisted, on determination to check aggression whenever and wherever it is found. He went on to quote, as the authority for this policy, the Truman Doctrine: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressure." This, said Rusk, is the policy applied in Vietnam today. President Johnson has likewise lost no opportunity to tie the present commitment in Vietnam to the stated policies of world wide security of all his predecessors from Franklin Roosevelt on.

For a democracy at the mercy of a supposedly fickle public, twenty years of constancy is a long time. What are the possibilities of change? They are always present, for basic conditions may alter, upsetting all of the structures built upon them. A case already noted is the way in which World War II revised America's approach to security. One factor that has been changing is the de-

gree of American reliance on the UN and on alliances. Collective security through the UN has gradually diminished until even its role in "preventive diplomacy"—policing quarrels not of major significance to the great powers—appears to be withering for lack of a viable peace keeping force and a system for assessing costs for such operations.

The alliance system has worked well, especially in Europe, but is now threatened with destruction by virtue of its very success in providing security. As the danger of actual attack has lessened and the western European powers have gained strength, their willingness to cooperate has decreased. The alliances in other areas, especially Southeast Asia, apparently have accomplished little beyond committing the United States and probably will be even less reliable in the future. These trends indicate that the United States may well expect less and less aid in the future in its global efforts to keep peace and maintain security. Thus the area of defense has remained constant while the means for executing the commitments have sharply diminished. American reaction to sole responsibility over an extended period has yet to be tested. Korea was costly but the burden was partially relieved by the joint character of the intervention and the approval of the UN. The unilateral character of the Vietnam campaign will test American resolution and assumptions. With the hope of outside aid removed, will Americans be willing to join battle the innumerable times the global scope of the present area demands?

Nations have policed the world before but only in pursuit of the tangible rewards of imperialism. Security and freedom under the theory of indivisible peace has so far furnished the imperative for the American nation's world wide vigilance. Support of security at the cost of blood and treasure may bring demands to reassess the nation's security needs. If the security forces are national in scope, there may be demands to reduce the area of security to national limits.

The cost of military preparation in the expanding economy of the past twenty years has not been an insurmountable problem. Although defense costs have accounted for about half the Fed-

eral budget (57 per cent estimated for 1967), they are decreasing as measured by the Gross National Product. Hence, they are said to be well within the nation's capability to sustain. The economy not only can accommodate fifty billion dollar military budgets but also seems to thrive on them. Over the last ten years business cycles have closely followed the rate of arms spending. General Eisenhower, in his farewell address as President, however, warned of danger in this apparently ideal state of affairs. The military complex was becoming so large a part of the basic economy that its authority in directing the nation's economic growth was growing rapidly. Some economists have estimated that about 25 per cent of the economy now depends directly or indirectly on military demands. This question is raised as to whether the nation can afford disarmament even if it could be arranged. It is charged that nuclear weapons are grossly overstocked and the condition is not checked because of the adverse effect such action would have on the economy. In terms of economic soundness the question is asked: If increasing dependence on military expenditure is not reversed where will it stop? Can the nation reach a point where it can destroy any possible combination of outside enemies but finds itself choked on fiscal problems and dominated politically by a military-industrial clique?

Another cost of military expenditure is diverting brain power from civilian needs. Already the United States is facing a shortage of medical doctors partly as a result of competition between medical schools and government sponsored scientific-military projects. Two-thirds of all technical research is for military purposes. There are not enough scientists to go around. Were it not for the influx in the past few years of doctors from other lands, 1,600 in 1963 or the equivalent of the yearly graduation classes of sixteen medical schools, the United States would already face a widespread shortage of competent medical aid. The number of doctors per 100,000 has dropped from 109 in 1960 to 97 in 1963. Thus, one cost of expanding military preparation is a dwindling talent pool for civilian scientific needs and humanistic study. If the majority of brains go to the devising of bigger guns, the art of making good butter may be lost. As the proverb has it, "God said, 'Take what you want, but pay for it.'"

Yet another aspect of the high military budget is the warping of industry to meet military needs. One example is the American shipyards. Here the United States has fallen far behind other nations in the development and production of merchant marine at least in part because of the emphasis on naval craft. Whereas merchant ships cost something like twenty cents a pound, atomic submarines cost five dollars a pound. Hence, the emphasis in American shipyards on making atomic submarines. Again where it is manifestly more profitable to produce guns, plants for churning butter will not be built.

That is not to say that past expenditures and present military costs are unjustified. But it must not be expected that military requirements can be met without civilian sacrifices. If these sacrifices cannot be explained in terms that a majority will accept, the military requirements for security will have to be reduced.

If these and other dangers are evident in overextending military preparations, how much is enough? The first step toward an answer is to determine the area to be defended. If this can be done, a major problem still remains, how strong is the potential enemy? Obviously no nation can set an absolute maximum for military preparation without regard for the enemy program. It must plan on out building its foes sufficiently to guarantee victory. The wise commander will accordingly overestimate his needs; there will be little chance to order equipment after the battle is underway, none if it is a nuclear exchange.

The stockpiling of nuclear weapons presents some problems to the civilian mind. Each year for some time now the United States has spent more on atomic weapons than was spent for all the Manhattan Project research leading to the development of the first A-bomb. One result of this outlay is the development of a twenty-five megaton bomb—1250 times more powerful than the one used on Hiroshima. A study in 1962 concluded that American missiles with atomic war heads could destroy all Russian cities of 100,000 persons or more. This estimate was based on an anticipated 30 per cent failure of missiles to fire

or reach their targets. The overkill was estimated at 1,200—that is each city would be destroyed not once but 1,200 times. Secretary of Defense McNamarra said in February, 1966, that the United States could take an initial atomic attack by Russia and still launch a counter attack; even if only one-fifth of the American missile strength survived, that could destroy one-third of the Russian population and one-half of that nation's industrial capacity. These figures were based on a force of 1,200 nuclear missiles. Present plans call for an expansion of this number to 1,700. With manned bombers the United States could easily drop 400 bombs, each rated at 25 megatons, on Red China. This would work out to 14 tons of explosives for every man, woman and child in Red China. The distribution would not in fact be as even as it is in theory, and the casualties of such an attack are estimated at only 500 million. On the other side the 1962 study indicated that Russian missiles could destroy all American cities of over 100,000 persons, well over half of the population, and do so with an overkill ratio of 140. More recent estimates calculate 130,000,000 American casualties in a Soviet attack.

Despite these incredible figures military experts warn against the fallacy that war will bring total destruction. Plans must be made on the basis of possible survival of such catastrophic attacks as are already possible. In the absence of any practical hope for limitation of armament, the continual expansion of these atomic stockpiles seems to be an inevitable part of the price of security in our time. Indeed, as the anti-missile missile is perfected, more and more missiles will be needed to make an attack successful.

The democratic ideal, nonetheless, has been and must continue to be the minimum defense consistent with security. The crucial question then remains—What is to be secured and what will it cost to do it? Calvin Coolidge acidly observed: "No nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or ensure it victory in time of war." It is expedient that Americans of the 1960's attempt a better solution that Coolidge thought possible. Many desirable steps are impossible but others can be taken.

Chamberlain in 1938 thought it incredible that Britons should be concerned about the digging of trenches in "a far off land." Leaders of the American government today find it incredible that the nation not be concerned about warfare in a far more distant land. Security, like all problems of government, requires a sense of balance. The easy logic that argues that a failure in one direction can be corrected by moving in the opposite direction finds no sanction in history. The responsibilities and objectives of American security must constantly be reexamined and measured against cost and capabilities.

LATIN AMERICA'S APPALACHIA: Its Genesis In Illiteracy

By Eugene R. Huck*

Poverty is not a new thing in Latin America. It has existed since the time of the conquistadores if not during its pre-history. It has become a legacy that is passed on to over half of the people, one that has come to be accepted as a way of life. Dirty-faced children who eat from garbage cans or refuse piles in the cities are in many ways more fortunate than their country cousins whose rural environment does not provide the cans or the refuse piles. The "Appalachia" of Latin America cannot be defined in terms of a locale which is geographically circumscribed. Neither can it be described in general terms such as rural as compared to urban. Poverty in Latin America is ubiquituous. It knows no physical boundaries nor does any one country have a monopoly on it. Venezuela, the country with the highest per capita income of any of the Latin American nations, has a very visible poverty-ridden element. This paper proposes to do three things related to the "poverty-illiteracy syndrome" in Latin America. First, basic causes of the poverty will be viewed, then the extent of the infection will be surveyed, and finally some attempts to solve the problem will be summarized.

The ingredients which form the gruel of poverty are not as simple as meal and water. A diversity of causes can be pointed to as contributing, one of which is the rapidly increasing population. The rate of increase in Latin America makes it one of the fastest growing regions in the world with an annual rise of 2.8 per cent. Of the various regions of Latin America, Central America leads with 3.4 per cent; and one of its countries, Costa Rica, reaches the world's peak of 4 per cent, matched only by Ghana.[1]

[1] Tad Szulc, *The Winds of Revolution: Latin America Today - and Tomorrow* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 46. India's population was increasing at the rate of between 2 and 2.4 per cent while China was growing at the rate of 2.3 per cent during the 1950's.

*Professor of History and Head of Department of History, West Georgia College.

The Pan American Union projects that by 1975 Latin America will have a population of 293,400,000, as compared with 217,-000,000 for the United States.[2] One could hastily say that, if Latin Americans would cut down their birth rate, their problems would subsequently be diminished. One must remember, however, that Latin America is basically Catholic and that birth control is frowned upon.

Other apparent causes of Latin American poverty are legion. One could point to such things as the lack of industrialization, the domination of foreign capital through the years, the penchant for military dictatorships, the prevalence of graft, the staple crop economy, the transportation problems in such a widely scattered area, the Latin disdain for physical labor, the extremes of climate and the Spanish "mind." All of these could be documented and a good case be made for each, but to do so would require a much longer work.[3] Of all of these staggering problems one which seems basic to them is the existence of widespread illiteracy. I have chosen this one as fundamental and one which, if corrected, would go a long way towards eradication of the others.

In the United States a famous poverty fighter recently pointed out that a country of unprecedented wealth and prosperity harbors in its midst thirty-five million people without sufficient food, shelter and clothing. He continues by saying that "it is the story of one out of five Americans who live in poverty, shame, misery and degradation."[4] Saying that "perhaps the greatest edu-

2. William Benton, *The Voice of Latin America* (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 15.

3. Victor L. Urquidi's work, *The Challenge of Development in Latin America,* surveys very adequately for the lay reader the current problems in Latin America. Published by Praeger in 1964, this work is replete with excellent tables on such things as population, estimates of per capita gross domestic products, manufacturing output, world exports of selected products, investments and price fluctuations.

4. Hubert H. Humphrey, *War on Poverty* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 9.

cational need is intensive and specialized reading programs, both in and out of school," Vice President Hubert Humphrey adds that "it is this deficiency of a good background in the three R's which is the greatest single educational handicap and one which prevents individuals from participating in many of the existing higher-level training programs."[5] If basic education which produces literate people is lacking or weak in the United States and thus contributory to its poverty, what must it be like in Latin America which has had few educational advantages?

"Illiteracy and poverty are linked in a tragic bond throughout the continents. At least 700 million people in the world are illiterate. Almost all of them live in the underdeveloped two-thirds of the globe."[6] In the United States in 1960, there existed outright illiteracy of 2.4 per cent of the population or about three million but there were eight million functional illiterates who had less than five years of schooling.[7] In a society which is rapidly becoming mechanized and automated, illiteracy can have nothing but a negative effect. Francis Keppel in a speech to a national conference held at the University of California, Berkeley, in February, 1965, pointed out that vocational education, which has now become "respectable," should be pushed to help in the fight against poverty.[8] It should be noted, however, that to enjoy the benefits of a vocational school education one has to be able to read instructions to graduate. This automatically means that the illiterates in all countries are excluded. To read the "Help Want-

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

6. Irwin Isenberg, ed., *The Drive Against Illiteracy* (New York: Wilson, 1964), preface, p. 3. This excellent little volume is in the Reference Shelf as Volume 36, Number 5, and is the source for many quotes in this paper. When such quotes are used, they will be cited by their original location followed by Isenberg's name and the page in his Reference Shelf book, i.e., (Isenberg, pp. 23-24).

7. *Ibid.*

8. Margaret S. Gordon, ed., *Poverty in America* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp. 131-138.

ed" column in the papers, one must be literate. Such mundane things as shopping for a can of tomato soup or catching the correct bus demand literacy. There is an account of an illiterate Chicagoan telling how he carried a newspaper under his arm in public to give the impression that he could read. When required to fill out a job application the same man, claiming that his hands were dirty, asked the clerk to put it in the typewriter and said he would tell him the answers.[9].

A popular belief is that the presence of a high percentage of literates makes it easier to combat illiteracy. The opposite, in reality, is true in that business enterprises adjust their activities to the level of skill of the men and women they are able to hire.[10] As a result, many of the industries in Latin America are of the non-complicated type because of the difficulty in obtaining operators. Once these industries get established, they are almost impossible to modify for more technical production. Even the successful farmer must be literate to read the farm bulletins, the seed packets and the instructions on the care of his tools and machinery. Indeed, illiteracy is a heavy load for one to bear, and there is ample illiteracy in Latin America. Let us look at the extent of the malignancy.

In every country in Latin America with the exception of Argentina and Uruguay, at least every fifth person is unable to read and write. In Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala and Haiti the figure reaches one in every two.[11] One of the most dismal situations on the literacy front is that of Haiti where a long succession of dictators has fostered an illiteracy which reaches ninety per cent, the worst in Latin America. The overall picture is that one-half of the people over fifteen years of age are illiterate.[12] Vene-

9. Bernard Asbell, "Till the Robots Come," in *McCall's*, XCI, pp. 96-97, February, 1964, (Isenberg, pp. 44-45).

10. Eli Ginsberg, *Americas*, X, pp. 6-10, November, 1958.

11. C. K. Yearly, Jr., *Commonweal*, LXXI, pp. 175-177, November 6, 1959, (Isenberg, p. 10).

12. Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

zuela, a country which enjoys over a billion dollar a year income from oil, was in a sad educational situation by 1958 when dictator Marco Perez Jimenez was ousted from office. Out of a total population of 6.8 million, about two million adults were illiterate and 40 per cent of the school-age children were without schooling facilities. Within two years after his replacement by Romulo Betancourt, schools were provided for 80 per cent of the school age population.[13]

One of the main contributory causes of illiteracy in Latin America is *desercion* (dropout). In most of the Latin American nations only about 7 per cent of the students who begin school complete the first six years of school. On the secondary level it is even more discouraging in that only 16 per cent of the youths of high school age ever attend school as compared with 75 per cent for the United States. Those that do manage to go to college seem to be attracted by law, humanities and "cultural" courses which do not tend to produce functional practical graduates such as teachers.[14]

All of the Latin American nations have stringent laws concerning public education, and education, being a function of the government, is uppermost in their minds. Each country has compulsory educational provisions for at least four to six years. Each nation has its Minister of Education with cabinet rank and the schools are tax supported. The central governments usually control the selection of texts and the course of study. Why then does this grim situation of high illiteracy exist and what is being done about it? Is it that the governments of those countries are not interested in the problem?

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13. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

14. Harold F. Peterson, *Latin America* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 75-76. This publication in the MacMillan "Culture Regions of the World Series," edited by Seymour Fersh, is designed for upper high school level students but makes good general reading for adults at any level. It has good charts and tables and is compact enough for quick reading, but informative enough to appeal to the mature reader.

Other than population, few specific causes emerge. The shortage of funds by the government hampers the development of the best laid of plans. Chronic treasury deficiencies plague most of the countries. Another real reason for illiteracy is the absence of teaching materials. Because much of the literate population spends its time writing items to impress one another, little is done in the way of production of textual materials. Then too, in nations where Indian dialects are the basic form of communication, the scanty materials which are available are useless. Needless to say, scarcity of teachers contributes greatly to the problem. Salaries are low, and it is difficult to get a city-trained teacher to go to the rural areas where his services are desperately needed. One of the biggest factors to compound the problem is the attitude of the parents themselves. It is very difficult to convince a parent that his son needs to go to school when the parent can see that the time spent in school means that much less available to help tend and harvest the marginal crops for the poor family. Every hand is needed around the house.

It is to the illiterate that the appeal of Communism is sometimes the strongest. A person who cannot read the policies and information of the various governments of Latin America is often appealed to by the Communist or fellow-traveller who is quite willing to go into the hinterlands to convey his message. The future for the illiterate, as well as for his democratic government, however, need not be too bleak. Here are a few of the remedies which are being applied to the illness of illiteracy.

Among the most effective opponents of illiteracy is the Alliance for Progress. With all of its weaknesses and hardships, the Alliance is making some success. Its main objectives - lofty, but attainable - call for a program "to wipe out illiteracy by 1970; to extend, as quickly as possible, the benefits of primary education to all Latin Americans; and to provide broader facilities, on a vast scale, for secondary and technical training and for higher education."[15] It is significant to note that, of the resolutions

15. Pan American Union, *Declaration to the Peoples of America,* Punta del Esta, Uruguay, August 17, 1961.

made by the ministers who attended the Punte del Este meeting which was designed to implement the features of the Alliance for Progress, the first one (Resolution A. 1) set up recommendations for education. Its programs included such things as establishing "at least six years of elementary education, free and compulsory for the entire school-age population," carrying out systems of adult education so that "it would be possible to bring over 50 million illiterate adults into minimum levels of effective participation in the cultural, social, and economic life of their countries," and providing "social and economic assistance to students in order to reduce the practice of abandoning school particularly in the rural areas."[16]

Although the Alliance for Progress will probably be the most effective in the long run, it is not the only movement at work to promote reading and writing. In the state of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil, Maria Pequena de Souza, age 32 and the mother of six, has learned to write. She took a forty hour course conducted by the Alliance and was ecstatic when she was able to recognize the word *belota* (tassel.) This was a small miracle that is destined to be repeated many times in Latin America.[17] Another skirmish in the struggle against illiteracy has grown out of the efforts of concerned parents of a high school group in the United States. Since most of the farmers in Latin America have to work during the daylight hours, little time is available for their private struggle against illiteracy. Realizing this, the PTA Student Forum Club of Navasota High School in Texas sent Coleman-type lanterns - at a cost of $25.00 apiece - to illuminate classes for the Indians in Peru. [18] A modest start but yet a beginning. The Brazilian Army, "which is rated high in competence by American military men, is much more than a fighting force. It is also one of the nation's most important educational institutions." More than

16. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

17. Juan de Onis, *New York Times*, June 2, 1963, (Isenberg, pp. 27-28).

18. Edwin A. Roberts, Jr., *A Report in Depth on Latin America* (Silver Silver Spring, Maryland, 1964), p. 75.

half of the conscripts in the Brazilian Army are totally illiterate when they enter military service, but when their eight months are up they have been taught a trade in addition to having learned to read and write.[19] In Mexico, the rate of illiteracy has dropped markedly within the last few decades. Attributable in large measure to the changes wrought by the Revolution, the statistics are impressive. In 1930, the illiterate population of six years of age or older was 66.6 per cent; by 1940, 58.3 per cent. By 1950, it had reached 44.07 per cent; and by 1960, it was 37.77 per cent. [20]

A project which has been doing a great deal in Latin America to combat illiteracy since 1956 is the UNESCO Major Project for the Extension of Primary Education in Latin America. It has been particularly active in Mexico and Brazil which, between them, account for half of the illiterate population. Primary school attendance has increased by 18 per cent and 22 per cent respectively during the years 1958 through 1960. Although there is a long way to go, this represents a significant beginning.[21]

In surveying some of the activities which are at work on the monumental job of eliminating illiteracy in Latin America, one can hardly overlook the Peace Corps. Actual statistics are hard to come by, but there are stories of individual efforts to light the lamp of literacy. One comes from a Peace Corpsman in a small Bolivian town as he explains the efforts of the Indians to bridge the time gap to modern society. He says:

> Behind that blank expression - far behind it - is a human intellect. We have had our best success with the chil-

19. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

20. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "The Mexico Which Has and the Mexico Which Has Not," Stanley R. Ross, ed., *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?* (New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 225.

21. Oscar Vera, "Seventy Million Illiterates," in UNESCO *Courier*, XIV, pp. 33-35, June, 1961. Vera is professor of Sociology and Education at the Pedagogical Institute of the University of Chile and is coordinator of the UNESCO project. (Isenberg, pp. 25-26).

dren who are anxious to learn. The Indians can be taught and they sometimes surprise themselves at their own intelligence. The Indians have thought themselves as being pretty pathetic for a long time - since the Spanish conquest - and they like the idea of learning and bettering themselves in the simplest ways. We are trying here to awaken dormant minds."[22]

With the real understanding and effort of many people, illiteracy can be constantly attacked and may be some day beaten. Latin America has a real conflict facing it, a conflict which will be decisive in the Cold War. That basic conflict - the eradication of illiteracy - could well be the most important one facing the nations of the new world and the free world in general.

22. Roberts, *op. cit.,* p. 101.

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